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This Handbook emerged out of the Digital Russia Studies (DRS) initiative,1 
launched by Daria Gritsenko and Mariëlle Wijermars at the University of 
Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute and Helsinki Center for Digital Humanities 
(HELDIG) in January 2018. The aim of the DRS initiative was to unite schol-
ars of the humanities and the social and computer sciences working at the 
intersection of “digital” and “social” in the Russian context. By providing a 
regular meeting place and networking opportunities, we sought to establish 
open discussion and knowledge sharing among those who study the various 
aspects of digitalization processes in Russia and those studying Russia with the 
use of (innovative) digital methods. The many positive responses to our inter-
disciplinary approach and the exciting research that is currently conducted in 
this area of study inspired us to join forces with Mikhail Kopotev to compile 
this Handbook.
The editors would like to thank Lucy Batrouney and Mala Sanghera-Warren, 
our commissioning editors at Palgrave Macmillan, for their enthusiasm for the 
project as well as the anonymous reviewers for their critical eye. We thank the 
Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki for making it possible to publish 
the Handbook in Open Access. We are particularly grateful to Aleksandr 
Klimov, our research assistant, who was of great help in preparing the manu-
script for publication.
The interdisciplinarity of the Handbook has affected our choice concerning 
the transliteration of Russian. While it is customary for scholars working in the 
humanities and social sciences to apply the Library of Congress system of trans-
literation, for scholars in linguistics and computer science a different system, 
ISO 9, is more appropriate. For consistency, we have chosen to follow the 
vi PREFACE
Library of Congress system for references (authors’ names) and ISO 9 for all 
other Russian terms and names throughout the book. Where appropriate, cus-
tomary English spellings are maintained for familiar terms, places, and per-
sonal names.
Helsinki, Finland Daria Gritsenko
Maastricht, The Netherlands  Mariëlle Wijermars
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CHAPTER 1
Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction
Daria Gritsenko, Mikhail Kopotev, and Mariëlle Wijermars
1.1  AreA StudieS Go diGitAl
The “digital” is profoundly changing Russia today. While in the mid-1990s less 
than 1 per cent of the Russian population had Internet access, today Russia 
ranks sixth globally with approximately 110 million Internet users, or three 
quarters of the population (The World Factbook 2019). The proliferation of 
affordable smartphones in the 2010s has made Internet access a common place 
by 2020, with over 60 per cent of users connecting through mobile devices, 
and Russia’s Internet market is the largest in Europe (GfK 2019). According 
to the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass 
Media, the Russian Internet industry amounted to an estimated value of five 
trillion rubles in 2019, or 5 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) (TASS 2019). Taking into account the additional 25 million Russians 
who live outside of Russia, it is no surprise that Russian is the second most 
popular language on the Net after English (Historical trends 2019). These 
figures alone make Russia an attractive object for researchers interested in the 
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development of today’s digital society. The Russian information technologies 
(IT) industry, moreover, is an ample provider of highly sophisticated digital 
tools and well-organized software solutions: Nginx’s popular web server that is 
used by, for instance, Netflix; Kaspersky antivirus software; optical character 
recognition application ABBYY FineReader, to mention just a few. In Russian- 
speaking markets, tech conglomerate Yandex furthermore successfully rivals 
with Google, while social networking sites VK (formerly known as VKontakte) 
and Odnoklassniki outperform their international competitor Facebook.
The global digitalization trend and the major societal shifts that accompany 
the process of converting ever more information and communications into 
digital form, challenge and transform existing practices across all spheres of life. 
In many ways, the digital transformation Russia is undergoing is far from 
unique. For example, the Russian government, similar to governments else-
where, actively develops digital strategies, looking to reform education, finances 
and telecommunications and to increase governmental efficiency. Russian busi-
nesses seek to reap the benefits afforded by information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) and big data as they operate in and expand into domestic 
and global markets. Russian citizens, meanwhile, actively engage in the pro-
duction and consumption of web-based content, while their dealings with state 
authorities increasingly occur through online e-government portals. New 
trends and practices emerge in the arts, where literary authors experiment with 
virtual personae and hyperlinked narration, while visual artists explore collab-
orative and cooperative online work and digital forms of expression.
At the same time, the impact of and responses to these digitalization prac-
tices in Russia are evidently context driven. The conservative and authoritarian 
turn in Russian politics (Smyth 2016) during Vladimir Putin’s third presiden-
tial term (2012–2018), for example, has influenced not only the political, but 
also the technological landscape. State attempts to control the online sphere 
have materialized in various forms, including the regulation of data flows and 
the blocking of access to unfavorable online content and unruly platforms. 
Russia also exerts pressure on major domestic and international Internet com-
panies, for example to transfer personal data of Russian citizens to servers 
located in Russia, and seeks to shape global Internet governance to reflect its 
favored terms. At the same time, digital communications have created new 
opportunities for the facilitation of civic resistance, as is evidenced by the suc-
cess of oppositional leader Alexei Navalny in rallying support and mobilizing 
political resistance through his online activities.
For researchers investigating Russia, digitalization has resulted in the emer-
gence of a wealth of new (big) data sources, including social media and other 
kinds of digital-born content that allow us to investigate Russian society in 
novel ways. The accelerating speed at which Russian archives are being digi-
tized means that collections of research materials have become more easily 
available, while simultaneously new methodological possibilities open up for 
examining Russian historical sources with the help of digital tools. The abun-
dance of computational methods, ranging from simple automated keyword 
sorting to complex machine learning algorithms, allow us to tap into the 
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opportunities offered by combining different types of data that have not previ-
ously been used together, or to explore patterns in large datasets that are dif-
ficult to grasp with a “manual” approach.
Given the intricate combination of the universal and the particular in how 
Russia is influenced by the digital as well as gives shape to digitalization trends, 
and the specificities involved in the availability and use of digital sources and 
methods, we argue that an area studies approach is both timely and productive. 
Area studies, as we know them today, developed in American and Western 
European universities in the second half of the twentieth century, when depart-
ments studying non-Western cultures welcomed sociology, economics, and 
political science specialists to, together with language and literature scholars, 
explore the contemporary social life of the regions they studied (Colonomos 
2016, 65). The value of area studies, essentially a Cold War project striving to 
provide a general framework to describe and explain what was going on in dif-
ferent parts of the non-Western world, be it the Soviet Block, the Middle East, 
Africa, Latin America, or China (Rafael 1994), was increasingly questioned 
after “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989). The forces of globalization, the 
third wave of democratization, and the worldwide triumph of the market econ-
omy were expected to diminish the value and necessity of studying an area, 
with its emphasis on contexts; disciplinary knowledge was thought to be cen-
tral and contextualized “place knowledge” secondary. This volume asserts that 
area studies, as a geographically and geopolitically motivated interdisciplinary 
research domain, is of particular value to and can provide a general framework 
for describing the variety of responses to digitalization and explaining the 
mechanisms that assist or obstruct the domestication of global trends. In this 
respect, we can build upon earlier efforts in this direction, such as the volume 
Digital Russia: The Language, Culture and Politics of New Media 
Communication (2014) edited by Michael Gorham, Ingunn Lunde, and 
Martin Paulsen and the journal Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central 
European New Media (digitalicons.org). Other area studies fields have similarly 
turned their attention to digitalization. Consider, for example, the launch of 
the Digital America journal in 2012 and publications such as The Other Digital 
China by J. Wang (2019). All such emerging digital area studies initiatives, in 
turn, draw upon and contribute to the by-now-established field of Internet 
Studies, exemplified by, for example, The Oxford Handbook of Internet 
Studies (2013).
The fact that digitalization started making major headline appearances 
around the same time the post–Cold War end of history was declared is instruc-
tive for understanding how it came to be viewed (even though the process of 
converting traditional forms of information storage and processing into the 
binary code of computer storage can be traced back to the advent of comput-
ing after the Second World War). The ideals closely connected to the early 
development of the Internet, such as freedom, decentralized control, the claim 
of universality of technological development and so on, fitted well with the 
overall narrative of global modernity (Dirlik 2003). Yet, during the past decade 
we have witnessed backlashes on all “global fronts”—including democratic 
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backsliding, the rise of populism, the return of economic protectionism and 
borders, first off- and then online—allowing area studies to make a comeback. 
More than half a century of area studies scholarship has brought forward 
important methodological accomplishments that turn out to be extremely use-
ful in approaching these global backlashes. First, the idea that context matters, 
a staple in the disciplines of geography and anthropology, has been explicitly 
brought into studies on economics, politics, and society through in-depth field 
research. Area studies have routinely challenged the US- and Euro-centric 
assumptions of many disciplines, while Szanton (2004) even argued that main-
stream disciplines are in fact special cases of area studies, American and 
European Studies, respectively. Practices of place-based research that produce 
contextually and culturally rooted explanations are useful if we seek to fully 
understand questions of digital transformation.
Second, the multi- and interdisciplinary approaches that are inherent to 
research projects in area studies have led to extensive conceptual borrowing, 
cross-fertilization among disciplinary fields, and an emphasis on comparative 
methodologies (Katzenstein 2001). Practical circumstances—colleagues work-
ing at centers for area studies are likely to have various disciplinary backgrounds 
and area studies conferences bring together scholars working across the 
humanities and social sciences—not only push individual scholars out of their 
(disciplinary) comfort zone, but also provide ideas and nourish creative con-
ceptual development. This feature, we want to suggest, is invaluable for study-
ing digitalization across societies. Finally, language, which has been at the 
center of area studies from its very inception, has been recognized “as produc-
tive and powerful in its own right” (Gibson-Graham 2004) and capable of 
shaping social practices. Accentuating the performativity of language and the 
power of discourse as a method for critical deconstruction, area studies have 
been at the forefront of the so-called interpretative turn in the social sciences. 
By the same token, language-based approaches—in particular computational 
approaches—are among the backbones of digital studies.
Therefore, it makes sense to talk about Digital Russia Studies. Yet, a com-
prehensive volume that offers novice-friendly guidance for navigating the full 
breadth of this new territory is currently lacking. To grasp the simultaneous 
transformation of research object and research practices, this Handbook brings 
together world-leading experts and emerging scholars to lead the way in the 
emerging field of Digital Russia Studies. That being said, we are moving away 
from the conventional label of Russian Studies to highlight that we aim to 
contribute to and consolidate a methodological broadening in area studies: 
Digital Russia studies focuses on the digital transformation of the (geographi-
cal) area of study, while digital Russia Studies indicates the use of digital sources 
and methods in studying it and that is only partially captured by the term “digi-
tal humanities.” Together, Digital Russia Studies emphasizes how these two 
research lines are intertwined, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing.
Drawing the borders of Digital Russia is no easy feat, even though it is clear 
that it cannot be reduced to the digital projection of the state within its physical 
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borders. For one, many political and economic digital actors of significance are 
located outside Russia, for example online media outlet Meduza that operates 
from Latvia and Yandex N.V. that is registered in the Netherlands. Russian 
services also operate in languages other than Russian and are not merely hosted 
on the Russian .ru domain, but also on international domains (such as .com or 
.edu) and the still functional Soviet .su domain. Russian Studies for the digital 
era therefore deals with opaque, negotiable, and constantly moving borders—
material and virtual—that cannot be set once and for all, but rather require 
careful consideration depending on the case-study, level of analysis, or specific 
research application.
Aiming to present a multidisciplinary and multifaceted perspective on the 
issues outlined above, the objective of this Handbook is twofold, as reflected in 
its two-part structure. The first part of the book, Studying Digital Russia, pro-
vides a critical and conceptual update on how Russian society, politics, econ-
omy, and culture are reconfigured in the context of digitalization, datafication, 
and the—by now—widespread use of algorithmic systems. Reviewing the state 
of the art in scholarship on a broad range of policy sectors and issues, the chap-
ters investigate the transformative power of the digital and the particularities of 
how these transformations manifest themselves in the context of Russia. The 
chapters also reflect on societal responses to these ongoing transformation 
processes.
The second part of the Handbook, Digital Sources and Methods, combines 
two subsections that aim to answer practical and methodological questions in 
dealing with Russian data. Digital Sources describes the main resources that are 
available to investigate the multifaced Digital Russia sketched above: textual, 
visual, and numeric. In addition, the vulnerabilities, uncertainties, legal and 
ethical controversies involved in working with Russian digital materials are 
addressed. The second subsection, Digital Methods, showcases examples of 
cutting-edge digital methods applied in different fields of research. The chap-
ters provide a concise overview of the manifold opportunities for studying soci-
ety, politics, and culture in novel ways. The chapters also address the particular 
methodological issues that researchers will encounter when working with 
Russian data, such as working with Russian social media platforms and process-
ing sources written in Cyrillic rather than Latin script. The chapters in this 
section demonstrate how the area studies tradition of invoking context as an 
essential element of scientific explanation can leverage some of the criticism 
that is being directed to the use of digital methodologies and big data in 
humanities and social sciences research. In the remainder of this introduction, 
we provide an overview of the topics, questions, and methods covered by the 
contributions in this Handbook and briefly sketch the emergence of digital 
technologies and networks in the region.
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1.2  StudyinG diGitAl ruSSiA
The first attempts to establish a national digital network in Russia can be traced 
back to the late Soviet period and the never realized project called OGAS 
(Obsêgosudarstvennaâ avtomatizirovannaâ sistema, All-State Automated 
System). As is recounted by Benjamin Peters (2016), the story of OGAS is a 
troubled one that ended in total failure due to the forces of Soviet bureaucracy, 
effectively resisting innovations capable of jeopardizing state power, or the 
positions of those in power. In the 1990s, local- and national-level networks 
were overtaken by the expansion of the global Internet, emerging out of the 
efforts of, for example, research institutions Conseil Européen pour la 
Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) in Switzerland and the Institute for High Energy 
Physics in Russia (Abbate 1999; Gerovitch 2002). Since then, global techno-
logical developments have followed similar trends, albeit at different paces; for 
example, the transitions from low- to high-speed Internet, from wired to wire-
less access, and from expensive to affordable services offered by Internet service 
providers. While the Internet was becoming more user-friendly, functional and 
attractive all around, its social and political domestication in Russia had its 
specificities: whereas many Western publicly available online services were 
developed by IT geeks in garages, the Russian Internet, as legend has it, was 
born in the kitchens of the intelligentsia. This local feature is sealed in the term 
“Runet” coined from the words “Russian” and “Internet.”
The concept of Runet has evolved over the course of the past decades, along 
with the object it describes, as Asmolov and Kolozaridi explain in their chapter. 
Yet, in any circumstance it cannot be reduced to the .ru-domain or to online 
content in the Russian language. In the late 1990s–early 2000s, when the con-
cept gained a foothold, Runet was defined as having two fundamental features: 
it was logocentric and free. The first feature refers to the fact that many of 
Runet’s forerunners had an interest in the arts and humanities:
The RuNet is specific with regard to the topic of literature: the myth of ‘literature- 
centrism’ of Russian culture (almost dead, as it seems) has been resurrected on 
the RuNet’s literary sites, which have no analogues in the other (national) seg-
ments of the Internet. (Konradova et al. 2006)
The first Runet websites, for example lib.ru, while technologically and 
economically amateurish, were oriented toward the free distribution of infor-
mation and deeply rooted into the domestic cultural context. Many of these 
features are still preserved in Runet today (see Chaps. 15 and 9), even though 
it has become technologically advanced and market oriented, as the chapter 
by O. Gurova and Morozova on digital consumption shows. Runet preserves 
some of the spirit of freedom, although the legality of some of these activities 
can be questioned (see Chaps. 7, 8 and Chap. 6). Digital technologies have 
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given a great impetus to innovation of the arts, as Strukov demonstrates in 
his chapter. The Internet has also been instrumental in facilitating the expres-
sion and negotiation of gender identities, analyzed by Andreevskikh and 
Muravyeva, and is leaving its mark on religious practices, as Khroul’s chapter 
demonstrates.
In its early days, the Internet in Russia developed practically free from state 
interference. As many sources testify (e.g. Babaeva 2015), soon-to-be president 
Vladimir Putin hosted a meeting with representatives of the IT (information 
technologies) industry on December 28, 1999, during which the sector was 
promised a decade of free development. Limited state regulation and meddling 
indeed was among the defining features of Runet for a considerable period of 
time (e.g. the lack of effective online copyright protection), but the screws have 
been steadily tightening, most rapidly from 2012 onwards, as is addressed in 
multiple chapters in this volume (e.g. Chaps. 16, 8 and 2). The Russian Internet 
has come under ever more direct and indirect control of the state, among others 
in terms of extensive surveillance capabilities and prerogatives concerning digital 
communications and the economic dependence of IT businesses. In 2019 alone, 
there have been several milestone decisions that illustrate the extend of state 
control over how the Internet develops in Russia. For example, the expansion of 
5G network technology has been significantly delayed because of continued 
resistance, among others by the Security Council of the Russian Federation, 
against making the preferred frequency band available for civilian uses (the 
3.4–3.8 GHz range earmarked for 5G use by, e.g. European Union [EU] coun-
tries, is currently used by the Russian military and security services), while Yandex 
changed its corporate governance structure to accommodate governmental pres-
sure and avert the introduction of legislation limiting foreign ownership of major 
Internet companies (Yandex N.V. is registered in the Netherlands).
While the Russian government has sought to counteract the freedoms previ-
ously afforded to the Internet through regulation and other control strategies, 
the analyses in the first part of the Handbook make clear how it at the same 
time recognizes the enormous potential of digital technologies. Indeed, the 
Russian government frequently points toward digitalization as a cornerstone of 
the country’s development. At the 2017 Saint Petersburg Economic Forum, 
for example, Putin highlighted Russia’s place among the forefront of research 
into artificial intelligence (AI):
Just like other leading nations, Russia has drafted a national strategy for develop-
ing AI technologies. It was designed by the Government along with domestic 
hi-tech companies. (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60707, offi-
cial translation)
The federal government runs various programs to support digitalization 
across sectors, such as government (analyzed by Gritsenko and Zherebtsov), 
politics (discussed by Wijermars), law and justice (addressed by Muravyeva and 
Gurkov), economy (examined by Lowry), and education (analyzed by Piattoeva 
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and G. Gurova). Billions of rubles from the federal budget have been invested 
into infrastructure, making available many e-services, as well as an abundance 
of administrative, legislative, archival, textual, geospatial data (explored in Part 
II of this volume). As the chapters in this Handbook discuss in more detail, the 
success of these federal programs is ambivalent. It is however undeniable that 
the massive amount of data that is produced by various agencies as a result is 
now available to experts and citizen scientists alike, enabling them to conduct 
in-depth big data analyses, among others to reveal breakdowns in governance 
(as is argued by Parkhimovich and Gritsenko, and Kopotev, Rostovstev, and 
Sokolov in their respective chapters).
The ostensibly clear-cut image of Russia’s Internet status changing from free 
to not free over the course of the past two decades, as is evidenced by annual 
rankings of Internet freedom, therefore fails to tell the full story and its inher-
ent paradoxes. Manifold examples demonstrate how the Internet continues to 
be instrumental for facilitating civic resistance, as Lonkila et al. recount in their 
analysis. From this perspective, today’s digital dissidents can be seen as acting 
in the vein of the Soviet intelligentsia, even though the two groups represent 
different generations and values.
1.3  diGitAl SourceS And MethodS
The second part of the Handbook is diverse and of a more applied nature. It 
starts with chapters discussing the most widely used digital sources, mainly 
those for text-based studies that depart from the assumption that language can 
be studied as a reflection of society. Collections of texts, or textual corpora, are 
a key resource for linguistic studies as well as for a wide variety of applications 
within the humanities and social sciences. Kopotev, Mustajoki, and Bonch- 
Osmolovskaya describe these sources with a focus on the Russian National 
Corpus (RNC), a deeply annotated and well-designed resource on the Russian 
language, and the Integrum database, which comprises most newspapers, jour-
nals, and online media published in Russia or in Russian, as well as TV and 
radio transcripts. Thesauri, for example the Russian RuThes thesaurus that is 
discussed by Loukachevitch and Dobrov, are more sophisticated linguistic and 
terminological resources for automatic text processing that can be used to 
explore concepts, changes in word meaning, text categorization, and so forth. 
More recently, social media have established themselves as a new channel of 
communication and novel resource for studying a wide set of societal ques-
tions. In a chapter that focuses on assessing the applicability of existing models 
of social media research in the Russian context, Koltsova et al. present the limi-
tations of existing approaches and suggest best practices for social media 
research that uses Russian sources.
Two chapters are devoted to digital archives and digitized archival materials. 
While all standard text-analytical techniques, both qualitative and quantitative, 
can be applied to these materials, the contributions draw attention to questions 
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regarding their provenance, objectivity, and affordances, and the complex 
political economy of historical knowledge production. Providing an overview 
of digitization practices in Russia, Golubev reveals an underlying political 
agenda to restore epistemic sovereignty over Russian history. Kalinina, in turn, 
raises a series of techno-methodological questions concerning the composition 
and affordances of a digital archive platform created by a community of volun-
teers. The final digital source covered is open government data, which is pre-
sented by Parkhimovich and Gritsenko from an infrastructural, legal, and 
technical viewpoint. Illustrating their argument with examples of projects and 
applications utilizing open government data, especially open financial data, the 
authors provide concrete use cases that show the perceived benefits for govern-
ment agencies and citizens.
The final collection of chapters is methodological in orientation, presenting 
a variety of digital and computational techniques and providing concrete exam-
ples of their use in Russian Studies. First, topic modeling, a method of proba-
bilistic text clustering, is explored. Bodrunova looks at how topic modeling 
techniques have been developed and employed by Russian scholars—applied 
both to Russian and other languages—paying special attention to questions of 
validity and assessment of model quality. Oiva shows how topic modeling can 
be applied to Russian historical sources—such as Soviet newspapers—and offers 
an accessible step-by-step walk through of the basics of topic modeling. 
Indukaev then applies topic modeling to a contemporary media collection 
obtained from the Integrum database and showcases how the analysis can be 
enriched by incorporating the word embedding technique. He argues that the 
latter is capable of providing more accurate observations of the data. Artemova 
dives even deeper into Natural Language Processing (NLP). She focuses on 
deep-learning applications for processing Russian, presenting state-of-the-art 
methods in the field. The chapter written by Kopotev, Rostovtsev, and Sokolov 
investigates the issue of academic plagiarism and how its detection posits a 
challenge for computational linguistics. Another popular NLP application—
sentiment analysis—is discussed by Loukachevitch, who explains the main con-
temporary applications of the method focusing on Russian-specific components 
of automatic sentiment analysis.
While computational text-analytical techniques constitute the backbone of 
Digital Russia Studies, other methods provide equally exiting opportunities for 
future research. The first of these is network analysis, a method for exploring 
relationships and structures based on graph theory. To show the versatility of 
its application, we have included two chapters. Fischer and Skorinkin apply 
network analysis in the field of literary studies. They demonstrate how texts can 
be formalized into a set of nodes and edges, where nodes represent characters 
and edges describe interactions between these characters, based on a selection 
of Russian plays and the classic novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. The sec-
ond application concerns a study of Russian politics and society on microblog-
ging platform Twitter. Zherebtsov and Goussev analyze six resonant political 
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events to demonstrate how network analysis enables an alternative approach to 
answer classic questions within political science, such as designating political 
communities, tracing group reactions to informational events, and detecting 
opinion leaders and influencers.
The Handbook concludes with two methods that operate with nontextual 
data. The field of art history, Kangas argues, has lagged behind in joining the 
digital humanities trend; yet, digital image analysis opens up various new ave-
nues for research. Drawing upon the example of Soviet political cartoons, she 
advocates the use of mixed methods to best utilize computational and human 
interpretative strengths. The final chapter is devoted to the analytical use of 
geospatial data, their attributes in Russia’s online ecosystem, and the method-
ologies best suited for their analysis. Makhortykh discusses novel techniques 
for extracting geolocations from various data formats and demonstrates differ-
ent ways of using these data, from mapping the spatial distribution of social and 
political phenomena to the use of the geoweb for narrating individual and col-
lective identities online.
1.4  concludinG reMArkS
With this Handbook we have aimed to lay down the foundations for the emerg-
ing research direction of Digital Russia Studies. Through its 32 chapters, the 
book makes a timely intervention in our understanding of the changing field of 
Russian Studies at the intersection of the societal and the digital in order to 
become a first comprehensive review and guide for scholars as well as graduate 
and advanced undergraduate students studying Russia today.
As is true for any work that seeks to carve out the contours of an emerging 
field of study, the range of topics, approaches, and methods covered in this 
Handbook is necessarily incomplete. However, by compiling analyses of the 
impact of digitalization on various spheres of Russian politics, society, and cul-
ture in a single volume together with chapters exemplifying best practices in 
using digital sources and methods in Russian Studies, we hope to have demon-
strated the value of an area studies approach in studying the digital domain. At 
the same time, it has to be acknowledged that this Handbook is itself a product 
and expression of the shifts we are currently witnessing: while most analyses 
included here are still predicated to some extent on the opposition between, 
coexistence, and interwovenness of digital and analogue, such distinctions may 
rapidly become obsolete as digital becomes the new norm in ever more 
domains. In this regard, the Handbook also functions as an important land-
mark, documenting these transitional pathways as they take shape across vari-
ous spheres of society and human activity.
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Digitalization has affected politics in manifold ways, which result from the 
broad variety of technologies the term comprises. The Internet and, more 
recently, social media have, for instance, transformed political campaigning. 
The publication of public policy documents on government websites has cre-
ated new expectations for political transparency. And, the introduction of vot-
ing computers and other e-voting solutions has made it possible to fundamentally 
rethink the voting process (e.g. online voting) while raising novel security con-
cerns. In its strictest sense, digital politics can be defined as “how politicians 
employ the Internet to reach, court, and mobilize citizens and about how citi-
zens rely on the web to inform themselves and engage with others politically” 
(Vaccari 2013, 4). Yet, as is pointed out by Stephen Coleman and Deen 
Freelon, “[t]o speak of digital politics is not simply to tell a story about how 
political routines are replicated online,” rather it is about the (unforeseen) 
transformations of political practices that result from digitalization:
One feature of all technologies is that they are constitutive: they do not simply 
support predetermined courses of action, but open up new spaces of action, often 
contrary to the original intentions of inventors and sponsors. (Coleman and 
Freelon 2015, 1)
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In this chapter, I discuss the impact of digitalization on politics in Russia and 
the extent to which such unforeseen transformations in the political process 
have taken place. My discussion highlights four areas: political communication; 
political campaigning; voting; and, political participation and civic engagement.
While the digitalization of politics is a global trend, the characteristics and 
constraints of the national political context, such as the uptake speed of par-
ticular technologies, condition the shape digital politics takes. In the case of 
Russia, the proliferation of digital technologies unfolded in parallel with the 
“authoritarian turn” under President Vladimir Putin (Smyth 2016). As the 
examples discussed in this chapter will illustrate, digitalization has in fact been 
a deliberate politics on the part of the Russian state. While it is therefore neces-
sary to consider to what extent the impact of digital technologies on politics 
unfolds differently in democracies as compared to hybrid regimes or non- 
democracies, the opposite poles of the scholarly debate are similar: they either 
highlight the democratizing potential of digital tools or focus on their unin-
tended or negative consequences. Given the different starting points—for 
example, the extent to which the object of study can be classified as a function-
ing democracy—this nonetheless results in different questions being asked.
Regarding Western liberal democracies, the democratizing potential is 
thought to lie in the opportunities digitalization provides for remedying the 
democratic deficit, for example through increased citizen participation, more 
direct communication channels between politicians and citizens through social 
media and the facilitation of forms of direct democracy. On the flipside, con-
cerns have emerged about how online communications, in particular social 
media, may have polarizing effects that negatively affect societal stability and 
may be used to manipulate public opinion and election outcomes, as well as 
concerns about expanding state surveillance. In a similar vein, in the context of 
hybrid or non-democratic states, scholarly debate placed high hopes on the 
democratizing potential of the Internet. It was assumed that, among other fac-
tors, increased access to information online and the facilitation of political 
mobilization through the use of social media would empower citizens to chal-
lenge state power and demand a greater say in political decision-making (e.g. 
Castells 2012). Departing from the same assumption, many studies have exam-
ined states’ efforts to control online communications and protect the political 
status quo in response (e.g. Deibert et  al. 2010). The extent to which the 
Internet indeed functions as a “liberation technology” is increasingly ques-
tioned (e.g. Diamond 2010). Rather, it appears that the proliferation of 
Internet access has given rise to “networked authoritarianism” (MacKinnon 
2011, 33), a condition in which:
the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of conversations 
about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites and social- 
networking services. The government follows this online chatter, and sometimes 
people are able to use the Internet to call attention to social problems or injus-
tices and even manage to have an impact on government policies. As a result, the 
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average person with Internet or mobile access has a much greater sense of free-
dom—and may feel that he has the ability to speak and be heard—in ways that 
were not possible under classic authoritarianism. At the same time, in the net-
worked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of individual rights and free-
doms. (MacKinnon 2011, 33)
Notwithstanding the challenges that online communications raise for main-
taining political control by increasing citizens’ access to information and 
opportunities for free speech, it appears many authoritarian states are disin-
clined to (fully) limit access to the Internet. The seeming paradox—often 
referred to as the digital “dictator’s dilemma”—may be explained by the poten-
tial economic consequences of such a decision, fear of popular unrest or the 
undermining a regime’s democratic image or other sources of regime legiti-
macy. Yet, scholars have also noted that digitalization may, in fact, strengthen 
rather than weaken authoritarian regimes since the Internet can be used to 
effectuate political control, and information and opinions shared by citizens 
online can be a valuable resource to gauge public opinion on policy issues (e.g. 
Gunitsky 2015).
In this chapter, I first examine how the activities of political actors in Russia 
have changed as a result of digitalization, focusing on political communication 
and election campaigning, before turning my attention towards changes in vot-
ing and other forms of political participation. Many of these changes result 
from or developed against the backdrop of the introduction of open govern-
ment ideas. Therefore, I open with an overview of actions in this domain. I 
argue that, while some of the changes described can be categorized as mere 
digital reproductions of existing political practices, several spheres of Russian 
politics have been transformed as a result of digitalization, in particular the 
opportunities for political opposition and civic engagement.
2.2  open Government
The concept of open government promotes the ideal of transparency and 
accountability in governance: citizens should be able to access governmental 
documents and proceedings in order to establish an effective climate of checks 
and balances. In the past two decades, the concept has been inseparably inter-
twined with the notion of “e-government”: the spread of Internet access and 
information technology (IT) infrastructures have made the Internet the perfect 
solution for achieving the aims of “open” government. Combined, the overall 
goals of open and e-government are to increase efficiency and transparency, as 
well as to simplify and improve the provision of governmental services to civil-
ians and government-to-citizen communication. In Russia, the government 
initiated the expansion of information technologies, digitization, provision of 
online services, increased governmental transparency and so forth in earnest in 
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the early 2000s (see also Chaps. 3 and 5). The Federal Program “Èlektronnaâ 
Rossiâ (2002–2010)” (Electronic Russia)
called for the ‘widespread integration’ of information technology in government 
operations for such tasks as document management, registrations and declara-
tions, and procurement tenders. To accomplish this mission, E-Russia’s goals also 
included building up the nation’s IT hardware and telecommunications infra-
structure and developing a supportive legal and regulatory environment. Of note, 
the program’s mission statement also called for ‘significantly increasing the vol-
ume of information [that] government institutions provide to citizens, including 
via the Internet,’ such as draft laws and decrees, government revenues, and bud-
gets; performance reports by public enterprises; and assessments by auditing 
agencies. In the process, information technologies were seen as ‘cardinally chang-
ing the basis of the government’s relationship with citizens and businesses’. 
(Peterson 2005, 51)
While some government bodies were early adopters, from 2003 onwards all 
federal agencies were required to make a broad range of information accessible 
online, such as regulations and legislation, and information on the activities of 
their officials (Peterson 2005, 58).
With modernization and innovation as the buzzwords to define his “lib-
eral” presidency, Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) launched a federal program 
aiming towards turning Russia into an “Information Society” (2011–2020) 
(Toepfl 2012, for more, see also Chap. 25) and a Minister of Open Government 
was appointed in 2012. In 2018, the ministerial position was discontinued, 
signaling the topic had lost priority with the authorities. The push towards 
open government has resulted in a significant increase in the availability of 
open government data. For example, information concerning government 
tenders can be accessed on the Goszakupki (Government procurement) por-
tal, zakupki.gov.ru, while various open data sources are collected on the open 
data portal data.gov.ru. Through the creation of dedicated online platforms, 
the transparency of the legislative process has been enhanced; for example, the 
video recording of the Russian State Duma can be viewed on the platform 
video.duma.gov.ru and draft laws are made available for public discussion on 
the platform regulation.gov.ru (for more, see also Chap. 5). Yet, many issues 
remain, including a tendency to reintroduce restrictions on publicly available 
information. For example, in response to investigations by Alexei Navalny’s 
FBK (Fond bor’by s korrupciej, Anti- Corruption Foundation), examples of 
which will be discussed below, the FSB (Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, 
Federal Security Service) proposed a law in 2015 that would severely restrict 
access to information about property ownership contained in Rosreestr 
(Federal Register). While the law was not passed, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in 2017 that Rosreestr is permitted to limit third-party access to owner-




2.3  polItIcal communIcatIon
Parallel to the emphasis on adopting digital technologies in the policy sphere, 
significant changes were implemented in the authorities’ communication strat-
egies that, to an extent, resemble trends in political communication elsewhere. 
As a public advocate for technological innovation, Medvedev can be credited 
with pushing forward both the open government agenda and expanding 
Russian political communication from traditional media to online platforms. 
Through videos posted on the Kremlin website and, from 2009 onwards, his 
blog on LiveJournal (at the time the most popular blogging platform, see 
Podshibyakin 2010), Medvedev set an example for novel ways of communicat-
ing and engaging with citizens, and he pushed other government officials to 
start blogging as well (Gorham 2014). In 2010, some 35 per cent of Russian 
regional governors had a blog, a third of which emulated the videoblog format 
exemplified by the president (Toepfl 2012).
Medvedev’s blogging activities were criticized for being “a blog without a 
blogger” (Yagodin 2012, 1422): his page featured videos posted by the presi-
dential administration and functioned rather as a one-way channel for commu-
nication, lacking signs of Medvedev’s direct contribution or his interaction 
with the online community, for example, with those commenting on his posts. 
Notwithstanding Medvedev’s initial statements about aspiring towards a form 
of direct democracy through digital means, in practice most Russian politicians 
used their online communications “in ways that minimize the perils of truly 
direct online interaction and opting, instead, for a more hierarchical model of 
communication grounded in the discourse of ‘e-government’” (Gorham 2014, 
235). Rather than entering into conversations with engaged citizens, the online 
communication strategies they chose opted for “the carefully structured, moni-
tored, and filtered interfaces such as the online opinion polling, ‘online recep-
tion area,’ or the sound-bite sized Twitter scroll” (Gorham 2014, 246). In a 
similar vein, Florian Toepfl (2012, 1454) argues that, when it concerns the 
leaders of Russia’s federal subjects, “most Russian governors did not set up 
their blog primarily with the intention of gaining electoral support.” Instead, 
blogging was predominantly “a symbolic action that showcased their allegiance 
and loyalty to the president, who was widely known for his Internet enthusi-
asm” (Toepfl 2012, 1454).
In his capacity as prime minister, following Vladimir Putin’s return to the 
presidential office in 2012, Medvedev moved his most visible online presence 
to Twitter and Instagram, following the shifts in the platforms’ popularity. 
Compared to his earlier presence on LiveJournal, the Instagram account is 
administered as a personal account, alternating between press photographs and 
pictures taken by Medvedev himself, accompanied with brief captions. Contrary 
to the LiveJournal blog, there is some interaction between the prime minister’s 
account and other users on the platform, with Medvedev now and then com-
menting and responding. The increased personal dimension of Medvedev’s 
social media presence may be explained by changing public relations (PR) 
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needs—aimed to remedy the previous lack of connection with citizens and fol-
lowing the more general trend of increased personalization of politics. The fact 
that Instagram is predominantly image-based—Medvedev is known to have an 
interest in photography—and allows one to post, edit and comment quickly 
through the application on one’s smartphone may also have been factors.
Yet, the decision to switch to Instagram also created vulnerabilities. Indeed, 
it was Medvedev’s Instagram that provided opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s 
Anti-Corruption Foundation with crucial visual evidence to tie together vari-
ous publicly available sources of information indicating the prime minister’s 
involvement in large-scale corruption (including hacked emails leaked by 
Russian hacker collective Šaltaj Boltaj [Humpty Dumpty], Global Positioning 
System [GPS] tracking of naval movements and various official registries). The 
results of the investigation were published in a video entitled “On vam ne 
Dimon” (“He is not Dimon to you”) shared through FBK’s YouTube channel 
and website. While this was not the first video FBK published that exposes cor-
rupt practices by Russian state officials—indeed, there are many—the Dimon 
video gained particular traction online (by December 2019: 32.8 million 
views). More importantly, it served as the occasion for mass anti-corruption 
protests on March 26, 2017, that mobilized thousands of protesters across 
Russia1; the largest demonstrations to take place since the protest movement of 
2011–2012. FBK’s investigations demonstrate how open source data—some 
of which became available as part of the implementation of open government 
ideas—can be effectively used to scrutinize and challenge government practices.
On the sub-federal level, Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Republic of 
Chechnya, is one of the Russian political actors who has most successfully used 
social media to increase his popularity, both in Chechnya and (far) beyond. His 
Instagram account, with posts that blended “discussion of politics with photos 
of himself hugging cats, posing in a knight’s outfit, working out in a gym, and 
throwing snowballs with friends” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 95) collected 
some three million followers, before the platform decided to shut down his 
account. Kadyrov’s posts merged public, political and private spheres to the 
extent that “all of the personal topics contain elements of political framing, and 
most of the public/political topics include terminology that refers to personal 
topics such as friendship and family” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 106). 
Kadyrov’s success exemplifies how social media “can be used to normalize des-
potism, giving a modern-day dictator ‘a human face’” (Rodina and Dligach 
2019, 96). The increasing use of social media in political communication is 
visibly changing the communication strategies used by the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as well, whose official Twitter account incorporates vernacular 
language and actively partakes in online debates (Zvereva 2020). The Ministry’s 
spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, in particular, has adopted a style of communi-
cation that blends formal and informal statements, expressed through multiple 
(and at times parallel) accounts on, for example, Facebook and Twitter.
Digitalization has also changed the rules of the game when it comes to 
political contestation by citizens. The rise of the Russian “blogosphere” and, 
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subsequently, the popularity of bloggers, citizen journalists and vloggers on 
social media and YouTube, brought about novel opportunities for sharing 
political criticism with a wide audience, and for creating communities around a 
political cause (of which Navalny is but one example). Over time, the Russian 
government has responded to this perceived threat in multiple ways. Most 
notably, with the so-called “Bloggers’ Law” (Federal Law No. 97-FZ) it intro-
duced a special register for bloggers with a daily audience of >3000 visitors in 
2014. For bloggers, some of whom published under a pseudonym, the regis-
tration involved, among other requirements, the disclosure of their real identi-
ties to the Russian authorities. The impact of the measure on the expression of 
political criticism online is difficult to ascertain, yet it is known that its intro-
duction did not lead to any blogs being blocked or fines imposed (Soldatov 
2019). Nonetheless, as Oleg Soldatov points out, “the mere existence of the 
public list of popular Internet personalities, administered by and conceived in 
the interests of a governmental body, should have led to a certain number of 
such personalities thinking twice before making public their criticism of the 
government” (Soldatov 2019, 70–71).
The law was repealed in 2017, which can be explained by a combination of 
factors: the ineffectiveness of the register and difficulties in enforcing the law 
(e.g. poor definition of who counts as a blogger, estimation of daily audience); 
a change of policy towards other control strategies (expanding restrictions on 
the publication of particular types of content); as well as the recognition that 
the practice of blogging was rapidly losing ground to other forms of online 
expression, most notably the shift to social media and video sharing platforms. 
Around the same time, the government attempted to co-opt some of these 
online “influencers.” Popular vlogger Sasha Spilberg was invited to address the 
State Duma in May 2017, and soon after a special “bloggers council”—in full, 
Sovet po razvitiû informacionnogo obsêstva i sredstv massovoj informacii (Council 
on the Development of Information Society and Mass Media)—was convened 
on the initiative of Vladimir Vlasov, the youngest member of parliament. The 
council got off to a bad start since only a third of the invited bloggers took 
part, and the most popular Russian vloggers publicly distanced themselves 
from the initiative, including oppositional vloggers such as Kamikadzedead 
(Makutina 2017). The council has since convened incidentally, yet appears to 
be of limited influence and predominantly speaks out in support of govern-
mental restrictions on online speech.
2.4  polItIcal campaIGnInG
Political campaigns in Russia tend to be candidate-centered, rather than focus-
ing on policy issues or political parties, a feature resulting from the constitu-
tionally strong president and other characteristics of the electoral system 
(Ishiyama 2019). As an “electoral authoritarian regime” (Gel’man 2015), elec-
tion outcomes in Russia are deemed important, even if the elections themselves 
are unfair. By extension, political campaigns are a significant feature of Russian 
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politics.2 As is noted by Sergei Samoilenko and Elina Erzikova, “[t]he tradi-
tional boundaries between news and political advertising have eroded in 
Russia” and unfair practices, such as “[h]idden advertising, black PR and biased 
news reporting” have been a common feature since the 1990s (2017, 265). 
Television and print media have played an important role in political campaign-
ing and media ownership is generally seen as an important factor in explaining 
election outcomes, most notably Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential 
elections.3
The parliamentary elections of 2011 were the first in which the Internet 
played a role of significance in how election campaigns were run, resulting 
from both the increase of Internet access and the expansion of online party 
presence in the years preceding it (Roberts 2015; Samoilenko and Erzikova 
2017). While party websites appeared already at the time of the 1999 parlia-
mentary elections, by 2011 political campaigning via social networking sites 
had become a common feature. Edinaâ Rossiâ (United Russia), as the “party 
of power,” was particularly prolific and was active on multiple platforms in 
large measure because it had access to the resources needed to finance investing 
in the online dimension of its campaign. For example, the party’s Twitter 
account (er_2011) “issued an average of over 360 tweets per day during the 
intensive campaign period—more in a single day than the LDPR [Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, led by conservative nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
M.W.] and Yabloko [party of social-liberal orientation, M.W.] managed in the 
whole of the campaign, literally swamping the tweets from other parties,” while 
amassing 600 videos on its YouTube channel by December 2011 (Roberts 
2015, 1235).
On the candidate level, however, a different picture emerges. Analyzing the 
online campaigns of 910 candidates representing the seven political parties that 
were successfully registered for the elections, Sean Roberts found that only 111 
of them (12%) maintained either a website, a Twitter account or a LiveJournal 
blog, while this percentage was markedly higher among United Russia candi-
dates (43%) (Roberts 2015, 1236, 1238). However, a significant number of 
these accounts were dormant during the campaign period, suggesting “that 
United Russia candidates were being forced to use social networks by the party 
leadership making them at best reluctant web users, at worst ‘dissenters’ by 
deliberately failing to maintain their accounts” (Roberts 2015, 1245). 
Notwithstanding United Russia’s more extensive online activities, Roberts 
found “evidence of equalization [a relative leveling of the political playing field 
in favor of opposition parties, M.W.], as the online message of the remaining 
party candidates converged on an anti-United Russia theme” (Roberts 
2015, 1229).
The availability of resources appears to be a key determinant in whether a 
party decides to invest in developing online campaigning strategies. In this 
respect, a clear difference has emerged between the campaigning style of 
United Russia, whose “campaigns have become increasingly professionalized 
and digitized, with expansive media campaigns funded by administrative 
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resources” while its main competitor, the communist party KPRF 
(Kommunističeskaâ partiâ Rossijskoj Federacii, Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation), still “relies heavily on traditional methods of local party 
organization, voter mobilization (particularly older voters), newspaper adver-
tisements, short television spots, public appearances by Zyuganov and other 
KPRF leaders, and campaign flyers and posters” (Ishiyama 2019). Of the 
remaining parties represented in parliament, the LDPR operates more similar 
to United Russia, but without the same access to large budgets, while the cam-
paigning of Spravedlivaâ Rossiâ (A Just Russia) is more alike to the KPRF 
(Ishiyama 2019).
The significance of the availability of digital technologies appears to have 
been the greatest for opposition groups who are not represented in the Russian 
parliament (sometimes referred to as the “non-systemic” opposition) and who 
lack access to traditional media. A closer look at two campaigns run by Alexei 
Navalny—for the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections and 2018 presidential elec-
tions—demonstrates this well. As is argued by Renira Gambarato and Sergei 
Medvedev (2015), Navalny’s mayoral campaign (which build upon the 
2011–2012 protest movement; see Lonkila et al. 2020) introduced a new form 
of political campaigning in Russia that was more grassroots (e.g. through 
online fundraising) and characterized by the use of transmedia strategies.4 
Online tools were essential for spreading information regarding his political 
program—as the opposition candidate, Navalny was and continues to be barred 
access to mainstream media, in particular federal television—and to recruit 
campaign volunteers (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015). These volunteers, in 
turn, campaigned both on- and offline, while social media played an important 
facilitating role in attracting people to these offline events. While Sergey 
Sobyanin won the elections in the first round by garnering some 51 percent of 
the votes, Navalny’s 27 per cent showed the success of the campaigning strate-
gies employed. Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign, which built upon the 
momentum generated following the anti-corruption protests discussed earlier, 
optimized many of these strategies, incorporating sophisticated big data analy-
sis techniques. At the same time, it invested heavily in the creation of a network 
of local headquarters and volunteer groups. Navalny’s campaign activities 
therefore show the continued mutual interdependence of online and offline 
campaigning, and the need to coordinate between and integrate both 
approaches. Contrary to the mayoral elections, the success of Navalny’s presi-
dential campaign cannot be substantiated by election results: in December 
2017, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation decided 
Navalny was not eligible to run for president because of his previous conviction 
in a (much contested) fraud case.5
Notwithstanding the novel opportunities for political opposition, mobiliza-
tion and campaigning provided by digital technologies, it remains difficult for 
those acting outside of the political establishment to be elected to a post of 
political importance or to otherwise effectuate significant political change. 
Gunitsky (2015) furthermore argues that the co-optation of social media by 
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authoritarian regimes in fact serves as a way out of the limitations contained in 
the “dictator’s dilemma” that was introduced above. Social media co-optation, 
he argues, can serve the resilience of authoritarian regimes by enabling, among 
other things, the introduction of alternative frames—for example, counter to 
those formulated by opposition groups—to shape public discourse online.
2.5  votInG
The digitalization of various aspects of the voting process was made possible by 
the adoption of the law “O gosudarstvennoj avtomatizirovannoj sisteme 
Rossijskoj Federacii ‘Vybory’” (On the State Automated System of the Russian 
Federation [called] ‘Elections’, no. 20-FZ, 20 January 2003). “Electronic 
urns,” that is, ballot boxes equipped with a special lid that scans the ballot 
paper when it is entered, counts the votes that have been cast and prints out the 
results, were first introduced in 2004 (kompleks obrabotki izbiratel’nyh bûl-
letenej, referred to in Russian by the abbreviation KOIB). The systems were 
introduced with the stated aim to prevent miscalculations and speed up the 
voting process, while also preventing ballot box stuffing since only one paper 
can be passed through the scanner at a time. E-voting machines (kompleks dlâ 
èlektronnogo golosovaniâ, or KEG) were introduced on a small scale during the 
2007 elections, after having been successfully tested in 2006 in an election in 
Veliky Novgorod. By 2018, most Russian federal districts used KOIB and/or 
KEG systems, albeit on greatly diverging scales; in total 11.1% of votes were 
counted automatically (RIA 2018).
Russia only recently trialed remote electronic voting, and on a modest scale: 
during the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections the voters of three electoral 
districts were given the option to vote online. The experiment did not run 
flawlessly. Already during the preparatory phase, the security of the system was 
questioned; moreover, the fact that it was run by the city of Moscow and vot-
ers’ identity and right to vote were verified by the Moscow Mayor’s portal, 
rather than the Multifunctional Centers for Governmental and Municipal 
Services normally endowed with this task, was criticized (Vasil’chuk 2019). In 
May 2019, the Communist Party filed a case with the Supreme Court in an 
attempt to prohibit the use of online voting in the Moscow elections, citing 
concerns about the violation of voting secrecy and the risk of manipulation and 
coercion of voters (Garmonenko 2019); the Supreme Court found the experi-
ment not to be in violation of the Constitution. On the day of voting, September 
8, 2019, the online voting system experienced multiple interruptions, which 
caused the service to be offline for periods of up to one hour (Kommersant 2019).
In the three districts where it was introduced, online voting appears to have 
worked in favor of pro-regime candidates who received a higher percentage of 
the online votes as compared to the paper votes, while the opposite was the 
case for opposition candidates (Uspenskiy 2019). In one of the districts that 
participated in the trial, the independent candidate would have won on the 
basis of paper votes only, yet lost the election by a mere 84 votes with the 
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addition of votes cast online (Vasil’chuk 2019). The explanation for the fact 
that pro-regime candidates fared comparatively well among those voters who 
voted online has yet to be determined. One thinkable scenario is that the intro-
duction of online voting, and thereby the removal of the controlled conditions 
of the polling station that aim to ensure voter secrecy and freedom of choice, 
makes, for example, civil servants even more vulnerable to coercion. While it 
commonly understood state employees are placed under pressure to vote (to 
increase voter turnout) and support a given candidate, online voting creates 
the opportunity for superiors to directly supervise how their employees vote 
(e.g. by having them vote at the workplace). Whether and to what extent this 
is indeed the case, and to what extent other factors may be able to explain this 
difference, requires further investigation. Moreover, to be able to draw defini-
tive conclusions on how the introduction of online voting may affect political 
outcomes, the empirical base needs to be extended as further trials with online 
voting are conducted.
Apart from the automation of voting and the gradual introduction of voting 
machines, the conditions under which Russians vote has changed through the 
placement of webcams. In response to (proven) accusations of electoral fraud 
committed during the December 2011 parliamentary elections, that gave cause 
to a series of mass protests, the government installed webcams at nearly all poll-
ing stations for the 2012 presidential elections to allow for real-time monitor-
ing via a special website (webvybory2012.ru). In total, 91,000 of the 95,000 
polling stations had a total of 180,000 cameras installed; of these, 80,000 were 
streamed online and with sound (Asmolov 2014). Webcams had been in use 
earlier, but only on a small scale. According to Gregory Asmolov, the actual 
impact of this massive infrastructural investment on increasing the transparency 
and, in particular, the accountability of the voting process was limited by the 
lack of an integrated mechanism for reporting fraudulent behavior, the impos-
sibility of recording live-streamed footage (requiring one to file an official 
request to gain access to centrally stored footage from the webcams) and the 
ill-defined legal status of the recordings. As a result, no “criminal conviction of 
electoral fraud or revision of election results” were made on the basis of the 
videos (Asmolov 2014). Moreover, for volunteer monitors, the sheer number 
of available live streams made it difficult to monitor effectively. Beyond polling 
stations, webcams had earlier been used on smaller scale to monitor the prog-
ress on national projects in 2007, and in 2010 to monitor the reconstruction 
process following the wildfires. According to Asmolov, however, these initia-
tives symbolized rather than truly increased government transparency and 
accountability, as was their supposed aim (Asmolov 2014).
The 2012 presidential elections also saw the first use of a specially developed 
app for election observers called Web-nablûdatel’ (web-observer) (Ermoshina 
2016). The app, developed with the involvement of NGO (non-governmental 
organization) Golos (Voice), provided observers with guidance on how to con-
duct their activities, as well as giving them the ability to report any violations. 
The app was connected to a website hosting a collaborative map and statistics, 
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which provided novel insight into the extent and distribution of suspect and 
fraudulent behaviors. The aggregation of information, as well as the support 
the app provided for individuals volunteering to act as election observers, are 
important for consolidating proper election observation practices and enabling 
follow-up political actions.
In addition to the government, opposition forces have also turned to online 
voting as a means for creating legitimacy. As the 2011–2012 protest movement 
sought to transition from street protests into a sustained political opposition 
movement, an online vote was organized to elect the Koordinacionnyj sovet ros-
sijskoj oppozicii (Coordination Council of the Opposition) (Toepfl 2017). It 
was believed that this strategy would help remedy the lack of internal coher-
ence and coordination (and as a result, credibility and legitimacy) that has 
undermined the success of earlier protests and opposition movements. The 
council was short lived, however, as the legitimacy provided by the voting pro-
cess proved insufficient to remedy the fault lines within the opposition it sought 
to unite and was dissolved in 2013.
2.6  cIvIc tech and cIvIc enGaGement
In addition to the changes described above, digitalization has enabled new 
forms of political participation, among others, through the introduction of 
online consultation platforms. Florian Toepfl (2018, 960) proposes to catego-
rize such digital participatory tools into four groups: tools that allow citizens 
to monitor policy implementation; tools enabling the public discussion of poli-
cies, measures or draft laws; tools that collect citizen preferences; and, forms of 
Internet voting outside of the electoral system. Above, we have already come 
across examples of the first—webcams used to monitor the progress of national 
projects—and second groups—the regulation.gov.ru portal for the public dis-
cussion of draft laws. The third group Toepfl identifies comprises tools that 
collect citizen preferences and thereby allow the government to “gauge the 
intensity of support for, or resistance to, planned measures or policy changes” 
(Toepfl 2018, 960). For example, the Rossijskaâ obsêstvennaâ iniciativa 
(Russian public initiative) portal (roi.ru) that was introduced in 2013 allows 
citizens to submit an initiative to the government and cast their vote for pro-
posals posted by others. If the initiative receives a sufficient number of votes, it 
will be discussed by expert working groups of the relevant federal, regional or 
municipal authorities (at least 100,000 signatures for proposals at the federal 
level or in regions with a population of over two million; or over five percent 
of the registered population for proposals aimed at regional and municipal 
governments). According to data published by the portal on the occasion of its 
sixth anniversary in April 2019, a total of 50,531 initiatives were submitted 
since its introduction, that received 17,970,021 votes in favor and 2,615,479 
against (Rossijskaâ obsêstvennaâ iniciativa 2019). The number of initiatives 
that led to government action, however, is limited: 33 initiatives resulted in a 
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decision, while 19 proposals succeeded in gathering over 100,000 votes in 
support.
The final group outlined by Toepfl concerns forms of Internet voting out-
side of the electoral system. The Active Citizen Platform of the city of Moscow, 
for example, allows inhabitants to decide on questions put before them by the 
city council; from naming metro stations and trains to school vacation dates. 
Citizen budgets—where online platforms are used as a tool for increasing bud-
getary transparency or to facilitate participatory budgeting, in which citizens 
have a say in the spending of state resources—are another example of this cat-
egory. The city of Yakutsk, for instance, provides extensive insight into its 
sources of income and spending, while providing core information concerning 
the budgetary process (openbudget.yakadm.ru). While, in the case of such citi-
zen budget portals, opportunities for citizen participation are limited, partici-
patory budgeting initiatives are more ambitious. In 2016 the city of St. 
Petersburg, for example, launched the Tvoj Bûdžet project (Your Budget, tvoy-
budget.spb.ru) in collaboration with the European University of St. Petersburg. 
Through its online portal, citizens can propose how resources should be spent 
in their neighborhood. Based on the total number of submitted proposals, a 
small number of districts (both inner city and suburbs) is then selected and 
allocated an earmarked budget of up to 15 million rubles for the realization of 
between one and three initiatives. In a special meeting, a budget committee is 
formed from among the initiators (by draw). The members of the committee 
then take part in a series of lectures to learn about, for example, urban planning 
and budgeting, in order to further develop their ideas. The final plans need to 
secure support from the district administration and be voted upon by the 
members of the budgeting committee in order to receive funding (Antonov 
2018). One of the most visible citizen initiatives realized through Your Budget 
is a stretch of cycling lanes along one of the city’s central canals.
Analyzing another example of the last category—the online voting to elect 
members for the President’s Council on the Development of Civil Society and 
Human Rights in 2012—Toepfl argues such tools serve to strengthen, rather 
than weaken authoritarian rule, while simultaneously “convey[ing] to the mass 
public the image of transparent, accountable, and responsive government” 
(Toepfl 2018, 958). Studies of the use of online participatory tools by auto-
cratic regimes elsewhere indicate that we, indeed, should not expect too much 
of a democratizing effect from civic tech. In China, for example, the authorities 
do appear to incorporate citizen input received through online consultation 
platforms, where a higher number of comments demanding a revision is found 
to increase the likelihood of the policy being revised (Kornreich 2019). In a 
similar vein, Jiang et al. (2019, 532) find that “cities that receive a larger num-
ber of online petitions in a year tend to devote significantly higher proportions 
of government reports in the following year to a topic on social welfare,” which 
reflects the majority of concerns expressed in the petitions. Yet, this type of citi-
zen influence remains limited, at best, and does not necessarily translate into 
sustained political change or the upscaling of political participation to other/
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higher levels of politics. As Yoel Kornreich explains, a certain degree of “author-
itarian responsiveness” is to be expected since “[f]ailure to address citizen feed-
back will undermine the regime’s credibility,” while simultaneously undermining 
“citizens’ motivation to participate in consultation, thus depriving the authori-
ties of an important information gathering channel” (Kornreich 2019, 549). 
Since legitimacy and information gathering are the main incentives for imple-
menting civic tech, minimal functionality and effectiveness are insufficient indi-
cators of democratization.
Whereas Toepfl’s categorization captures the governmental side of civic 
tech, digitalization has also enabled novel forms of civic engagement. On the 
local and regional levels, in particular, manifold civic initiatives (portals) have 
been successfully launched aimed at e-participation (e.g., urban improvement), 
at times acting in direct competition with government-initiated e-participation 
portals. Analyzing such “civic apps” in Russia, Ksenia Ermoshina argues that, 
while “a civic application can become a means to overcome the existing dys-
functions in communication between citizens and official institutions,” they 
are still best suited to solving “problems that can be easily classified and are 
regulated by a definite legal basis” (Ermoshina 2016, 128, 137). Successful 
examples include RosYama (Russian pit), an app developed by Alexei Navalny’s 
Anti-Corruption Foundation to map and draw attention to potholes in Russian 
roads or RosZKH (Russian housing and communal services) that “help[ed] 
individuals write petitions to the Housing Inspection Committees responsible 
for oversight of their particular block of flats” (Ermoshina 2014).
The two types—civic tech and civic apps—are not always perfectly sepa-
rated, nor do civic apps always empower citizens vis-à-vis the state. In his study 
of emergency response volunteering platforms, Gregory Asmolov demon-
strates the different shapes the power relations between authorities and/or 
platform administrators and volunteers can take. Rather than enabling more 
horizontal, peer-to-peer forms of (self-)organization, the way platforms for 
citizen engagement operate risk taking on the characteristics of “vertical crowd-
sourcing,” in which,
the structure of activity is defined by the institutional actor, with no space for the 
influence of agency on the system’s structure. In this case the purpose of the 
system, the boundaries, the rules, the right to participate in the community, and 
the division of labor are dictated by the agent who created the platform. In many 
cases the purpose of this type of activity system is primarily to control the activity 
of the crowd and to neutralize the potential for independent forms of activity. 
(Asmolov 2015, 311)
Instead of empowering citizens in their capacity to address societal issues, 
vertical crowdsourcing of resources impedes action independent of state or 





In this chapter, I have examined the impact of digitalization on Russian poli-
tics, covering the spheres of political communication, campaigning, voting, 
civic tech and civic engagement. From blogging politicians to online political 
campaigning, open government data and participatory budgeting—digital 
technologies evidently are shaping how politics is conducted in Russia and who 
can participate in and influence political decision-making. Some of the changes 
and initiatives I have examined are best categorized as digital replications of 
existing political practices or have only limited impact on political practices. 
The introduction of voting computers, for example, is a slow process that, thus 
far, does not appear to affect election outcomes. Most online participatory 
tools lack bite. Yet, it appears that several spheres of Russian politics have 
indeed been transformed as a result of digitalization. This concerns, in particu-
lar, the novel opportunities that have emerged for conducting and organizing 
political opposition, including political campaigning by opposition candidates, 
and civic engagement. At the same time, these transformations do not neces-
sarily result in the strengthening of the democratic degree of political practices. 
Rather, the cases and studies reviewed in this chapter support the claim that in 
many cases digital tools for political participation serve to strengthen, rather 
than weaken, state control.
notes
1. According to police estimates, some 7000 persons took part in the Moscow pro-
test and 5000  in St. Petersburg. Several hundreds of protesters were arrested, 
including Navalny.
2. For an overview of campaign characteristics from 1993–2016, see Ishiyama (2019).
3. On election campaigning and changes in political advertisement, including the 
use of compromising materials (kompromat) in the period 1993–2014, see 
Samoilenko and Erzikova (2017).
4. Gambarato and Medvedev (2015, 176) identify a total of 32 different elements 
to the campaign, ranging from political advertisements, banners and stickers to 
distributing campaign materials on public transport and an online couch surfing 
service for volunteers.
5. Unlike Navalny, former socialite Ksenia Sobchak did succeed in being registered 
as a candidate and ran an oppositional campaign with the motto “Sobchak against 
all.” Boasting a massive following on Instagram, social media were at the center 
of her campaign. Contrary to Navalny, though, Sobchak did receive coverage on 
federal television and participated in the televised debates of presidential candi-
dates (president Putin was conspicuous by his absence).
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CHAPTER 3




Digitalization is a “Faustian bargain” for the state (Owen 2015, 15). On the 
one hand, it lends a promise to raise the efficiency of public administration by 
increasing the speed of bureaucratic processes and decreasing their cost. On 
the other hand, it poses a challenge to preserving the power, authority and 
control, threatening the public system to be “disrupted” by the new actors 
who previously had a limited opportunity to participate in public policy. For 
the government, exploring new forms of governance that relies on new 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is arguably a way to 
navigate this bargain. As a result, in late-1990s, a new concept—electronic 
government or simply e-Government—became prominent on the agenda of 
government reformers (Heeks, R., and S. Bailur. 2007).
According to Layne and Lee (2001, 123), e-Government is “government’s 
use of technology, particularly web-based Internet applications to enhance the 
access to and delivery of government information and service to citizens, busi-
ness partners, employees, other agencies, and government entities.” 
E-government borrowed heavily from applications and managerial approaches 
that originated in the private sector (Systems, Applications, and Products 
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[SAP], enterprise resource planning, portfolio analysis, and the like). This reli-
ance on private-sector, market-based techniques provoked conversations that 
e-Government is a digitally enhanced version of the “new public management” 
(NPM), an ideology and a number of more and less successful reforms that 
were implemented across the world in pursuit of greater government efficiency, 
the reduction of cost of public administration and improvement of public ser-
vices by making the public sector more businesslike (Homburg 2004). Other 
scholars considered “digital era governance” as a reaction (“course- correction”) 
to the new public management through the re-integration of processes and 
functions disintegrated in the course of NPM reforms (Dunleavy et al. 2006). 
ICT is, in short, an option for the government to remain in control while low-
ering the cost of bureaucratic government.
This chapter traces the development of e-Government in Russia from 2002 
to 2020 through the lens of public administration reform. Whereas in many 
countries digitization of the public sphere was implemented on an already 
developed and properly functional government apparatus, in Russia both 
reform projects coexisted for quite some time. The public administration 
reform (2003–2013), led by the Ministry for Economic Development (then 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), at its early stages was pri-
marily focused on developing a new vertically integrated government infra-
structure, reducing the burden of administrative redtape and over-regulation as 
well as streamlining the bureaucratic modus operandi. At the early stages, it was 
more intertwined with the civil service reform, controlled by the Presidential 
Administration, than with the initiatives in the sphere of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) that were championed by the Ministry 
for Communication (then Ministry for Communication and Mass Media). The 
overlap between the two major reforms created internal tensions that affected 
e-Government development trajectory. As a result, in the context of digitiza-
tion and global e-Government development, the Russian case appears to be a 
peculiar instance.
Since its inception, the dynamics in e-Government development in Russia 
has been fluctuating (Zherebtsov 2019, 603). Only in 2012 the outcomes of 
activities pursued by the government became detectable, with Russia improv-
ing its United Nations (UN) e-Government ranking to place 27, having started 
at 58th place in 2003, and improving its eParticipation index for the same 
period from 0.05 to 0.65 (https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb). 
After 2012, the development stagnated again. By 2016, the progress of 
e- Government included user-facing advancements (such as implementation of 
the Multi-Function Centers and a Unified Portal for public services (www.
gosuslugi.ru), as well as introducing common services online such as identifica-
tion, authentication, and payments systems) and “back office” solutions (set-
ting up infrastructure to link different government institutions and establishing 
national databases) (Petrov et  al. 2016, 5). Yet, the citizen uptake of many 
electronic services remained slow, some legislative changes were missing, and a 
significant part of the “back office” remained analogue (Petrov et al. 2016). 
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Despite the ambitious plans and strategies, the implementation of e- Government 
in Russia still lags behind most of the European countries. We argue that the 
level of implementation fell short of projected goals because of the resistance 
of the incumbent public administration system, but also due to the discrepancy 
of e-Government ideas and ideals between the members of the governing elite.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we introduce general considerations 
on the digital transformation of government. Next, we discuss the stages of 
e-Government unfolding in Russia, paying attention to both progress and 
problems. We mainly discuss the federal reforms, allocating only brief remarks 
to the regional and local dimension of the process. The conclusion provides an 
assessment of the past e-Government reforms and an outlook for the near future.
3.2  dIgItalIzatIon and government—Why and hoW?
3.2.1  Motivations for e-Government Uptake
Garson (2006) put forward four theories to analyze the uptake of digital tech-
nology by the governments. First, technological determinism postulates that 
technology is a way (or even the way) of achieving change. It sees technology 
as an unstoppable force to which everyone, including governments, has to 
adapt. Second, the reinforcement theory suggests that technology tends to 
reinforce the existing power structure. ICT has no “magic powers,” but it is a 
tool of control and domination that governments can deploy to maintain their 
authoritative position. Third, the systems theory assumes that while technol-
ogy does not prescribe change, it is the main force that enables change. ICTs 
can be used to integrate organizations, to achieve higher levels of efficiency, to 
improve performance, and this motivates governments to deploy them. Finally, 
the sociotechnical theory suggests that human factors determine the outcomes 
of technological change. ICT can be developed to support centralization or 
decentralization, democracy or autocracy, hierarchy or networks, depending on 
the design choices made by whoever develops and implements the system. 
Following the recent advances in sociotechnical change theorizing, we suggest 
that any technology is not implemented in a vacuum but rather embedded in a 
sociopolitical context and that individual practices and perceptions are indica-
tive of the contextual sociotechnical change. Thus, the uptake and functioning 
of digital technology in public administration will depend on the (political) 
context upon which this technology is superimposed.
In the context of non-democratic political regimes, a further theory of gov-
ernment digitalization has been proposed. Maerz (2016), bridging the rein-
forcement and the sociotechnical theories, has argued that e-Government is 
used by competitive authoritarian regimes, such as Russia or Kazakhstan, as a 
tool for gaining internal legitimacy. She suggested that e-Government allows 
to “simulate” transparency and participation, offering the citizens a number of 
services and engagement opportunities which, nevertheless, remain a façade 
covering the authoritarian core. The study concluded that e-Government 
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facilities shall not be viewed as a sign of democratization, but rather a tool of 
legitimation that helps preserving authoritarianism. Examining the Chinese 
example, Ma et  al. (2005) argued that e-Government can simultaneously 
strengthen administrative control and promote economic development with-
out empowering individual citizens in a democratic sense. In addition, con-
cerns have been raised with regard to privacy and data protection practices that 
accompany digitalization of non-democratic states (Seifert and Chung 2009). 
Greitens (2013) suggested that “authoritarianism online” rests on three build-
ing blocks: control over the online content, citizen surveillance via online 
tracking, and the promotion of regime goals through various internet applica-
tions. E-Government features prominently in both surveillance and regime 
promotion, making it valuable in an authoritarian context (Stier 2015). 
Summing up, there is a potential complex of motivations to adopt e- Government, 
and those have been decoupled from the early “democratizing” perspectives.
3.2.2  Stages of e-Government Development
Layne and Lee (2001) put forward four stages of a growth model for 
e- Government: (1) cataloguing, (2) transaction, (3) vertical integration, and 
(4) horizontal integration. The first stage starts when a government opens 
simple websites that tell about the government, its structure, and functions. 
Next, the experimentation of public sector with digital tools proceeds to trans-
actions, an interaction model where the user (citizen) interacts with the gov-
ernment via an electronic interface (service portal on a government website or 
mobile application) to receive public services ranging from a healthcare 
appointment to filing a tax declaration or registering a marriage. Government 
remains a service provider for citizens and businesses, but their interaction is 
“virtual” and online rather than in-person. The third stage is marked by deeper 
cooperation between various government departments. Different levels of gov-
ernment are also integrated, so that a citizen can contact one governmental 
body and complete any level of governmental transaction, often referred to as 
a “one-stop shopping”-public service provision.
The fourth stage of government digitalization is often connected to the idea 
of “government-as-a-platform” (GaaP). The concept of GaaP was coined by 
Tim O’Reilly (2011), a US (United States) based author, futurist, and entre-
preneur, who envisioned significant benefits from shifting from “state as a pro-
vider” to “state as an enabler” of services. GaaP, which differs from previous 
e-Government initiatives in that the core digital infrastructure is shared between 
public and private sectors, is not a “platform for government,” but a platform 
for governance, where government is one of the participants, service producers, 
and innovators. A similar idea has been presented by Linders (2012) as “we- 
governance” and by Janssen and Estevez (2013) as “lean government”—gov-
ernment provides a platform on which stakeholders deliberate, while the public 
authorities retain their “orchestrating” functions. Another related concept, 
government 2.0 (analogous to web 2.0), was proposed by Taewoo Nam (2012) 
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who has been advocating for crowdsourcing, Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs), and “citizen hacking” as means to improve the democratic 
quality and efficiency of government.
GaaP can be seen as a new package of ideas imported to public sector from 
business management. This time, the intellectual roots are in the “disruption 
theory” originating from the work of Christensen et  al. (2015), which has 
become a mantra of Silicon Valley. Disruption stands for “a form of libertarian-
ism deeply rooted in the technology sector, a sweeping ideology that goes well 
beyond the precept that technology can engage social problems to the belief 
that free market technology-entrepreneurialism should be left unhindered by 
the state” (Owen 2015, 7). The proponents of the concept emphasize its inter-
active character and the enabling potential (citizens as co-producers of public 
services) (O’Reilly 2011). Building new services from scratch means also that 
the old bureaucratic practices are not simply transferred into a digital form, but 
rather that procedures are renewed. The critics argue that the changing rela-
tionship between the state and society mediated by “big data,” software code 
and algorithms is a form of technocratic “solutionism” that effectively under-
mines democratic governance (Williamson 2016).
3.3  russIan government’s dIgItalIzatIon story
3.3.1  Towards an e-Government (2002–2009)
In the early 2000s Russia’s backwardness in the field of digital technologies was 
obvious to the new Russian leadership with the public sector demonstrating 
almost no signs of progress in this sphere. While global leaders were gradually 
transitioning to the new digitization agenda, Russia only had to conduct a full- 
fledged public sector reform. This prompted the reformers to launch both 
reforms simultaneously, yet independent from each other. Under the Federal 
Target Program (hereafter FTP), “Èlektronnaâ Rossiâ (2002–2010)” 
(Electronic Russia) e-Government was first developed as a separate reform. In 
its initial stage, the concept embraced a large agenda of democracy promotion, 
a significant modernization of the general ICT infrastructure, including its 
public sector component. The approach seemed reasonable as both required 
substantial development before they could be merged. The “Electronic Russia” 
program included a full spectrum of measures, necessary to build the complex 
government Information Technologies (IT) infrastructure. Particularly, the 
measures included the development of the systems of identification and authen-
tication as well as digital (paperless) workflow. In addition, the program pre-
scribed the development of solutions to integrate various independently built 
state information systems to ensure a complex services delivery through the 
multifunctional centers. Yet in the first years of the program implementation 
the only visible result of the reform was the increased Internet presence of the 
federal government bodies through a network of interconnected departmental 
websites. The actual building of the e-Government infrastructure had not 
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begun almost until the end of the program. Throughout its implementation 
the program was plagued by multiple drawbacks, including critical underfund-
ing, lack of coordination, inefficient use of budget funds as well as a compara-
tively low prioritization and insufficient political attention to the reform. Since 
its launch, the “Electronic Russia (2002–2010)” Program was revised at least 
five times, substantially narrowing down its scope and ambitious plans due to 
both, a very ambitious and loosely coordinated agenda as well as inefficiency of 
reform management and misappropriation of funds (Rudycheva 
2011, Polenova 2011).
Only by 2006, reformers managed to complete the development of key 
nodal elements of the government IT infrastructure of the government—State 
Automated (Information) Systems “Vybory” (Elections, http://www.cikrf. 
ru/gas/), “Pravosudie” (Justice, https://sudrf.ru/), “Zakonotvorčestvo” 
(Lawmaking, http://parlament.duma.gov.ru/), and “Upravlenie” 
(Administration, http://gasu.gov.ru/)—and proceed to designing elements 
of e-Government, particularly the Single Portal of State and Municipal Services 
(www.gosuslugi.ru), launched in 2010. These systems automate certain signifi-
cant political and administrative processes. Although being independent from 
one another and focused on specific tasks, these systems constitute the infor-
mation backbone of any electronic government and their successful launch and 
further utilization demonstrate a significant step forward in regard with digiti-
zation of the government sphere. The overall inefficiency of the program was 
acknowledged by both the country leadership and key experts. In order to 
increase the effectiveness of the Program, in 2008 the Ministry of 
Communications of Russia conducted a review of the implementation of the 
Program. According to the report, many of the objectives of the Program have 
not been achieved. In particular, interdepartmental electronic interaction was 
not actually realized. In addition, standardization of IT solutions was not 
widely used, leading to the situation when the created hardware and software 
systems were not used to their full potential due to the lack of systems 
interoperability.
In this regard, in 2009, the Program was restarted and complemented by 
the independent “Conception of e-Government development until 2010,” 
emphasizing the strategic priority of e-Government. This was an important 
shift towards the recognition of the leading role of IT solutions in the future 
modernization of the national public sector. This restart coincided with the 
beginning of the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev that was marked by several 
modernization efforts. During 2008, a legal review had been conducted and 
new federal laws prepared. On February 9, 2009, the Federal Law 8-FZ “Ob 
obespečenii dostupa k informacii o deâtel’nosti gosudarstvennyh organov i 
organov mestnogo samoupravleniâ” (On the access to information on the 
activity of the state and local authorities) has been issued, together with an 
Order of the Government of Russia №478 from June 15, 2009, “O edinoj 
sisteme informacionno-spravočnoj podderžki graždan i organizacij po voprosam 
vzaimodejstviâ s organami ispolnitel’noj vlasti i organami mestnogo 
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samoupravleniâ s ispol’zovaniem informacionnotelekommunikacionnoj seti 
Internet” (On the unified system of information and reference support of citi-
zens and organizations on questions concerning their cooperation with the 
state and local authorities by means of the Internet), and the Presidential 
Decree N721 from September 9, 2009, has brought changes into the FTP 
“Electronic Russia 2002–2010” to enable a unified technical infrastructure 
for the Russian e-Government. The evaluation of the program’s unsatisfac-
tory outcomes coincided with the substantial revision of the results of the 
Public Administration Reform. By 2010 it was obvious that the outlined 
reform agenda was exhausted. Like the “Electronic Russia 2002–2010” 
Program, the public administration reform also failed to implement and con-
solidate new principles of public administration, based on the NPM approach. 
The initial strategy to build a triple-layer structure of functionally segregated 
government agencies and thus ensure organizational diversification of the 
Russian public sector did not come to fruition. It was planned to assign the 
policy creation and implementation function to ministries, the control and 
oversight function—to state services, and services provision function—to 
state agencies, which would be politically and administratively independent 
from each other. Instead, the reform resulted in the creation of a vertically 
integrated system of government with the dominant top-down vector of 
bureaucratic accountability. Further modernization in this direction had come 
to a logical standstill and required the revision of the strategy.
3.3.2  Building e-Government (2011–2015)
After six years, the Public Administration Reform had been demonstrating lit-
tle evidence of improving the efficiency of the government and quality of pub-
lic service. The reform failed to achieve most of the measurable targets that 
were laid in it. By the same token, the FTP “Electronic Russia 2002–2010” 
was openly regarded as a failure. In these circumstances, it has become evident 
that the approach to separately implement both modernization projects had 
proven its inefficiency. For the third phase of the Public administration reform 
it was decided to put the development of Information and Communication 
Technologies in the core of the government modernization project. Thus, 
Russia joined a plethora of countries in conversing its public administration 
into e-Government. To ensure that a bigger picture is not missed, the 
e- Government reform was harmonized with another overarching Federal 
Program, “Informacionnoe obŝhestvo 2011–2020” (Information Society, 
Government Decree N 1815-r from October 20, 2010), which set as its key 
objective the digitization of all spheres of the Russian society.
The focus of the reform was made on conversing public services, internal 
workflow and data government into a digital format. In the minds of reform-
ers, e-Government would further extend the single-window access principle of 
public services delivery at the customer end through the united single portal of 
state and municipal services. The portal was aimed to provide information on 
3 E-GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA: PLANS, REALITY, AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
40
available services and government regulations, digital application forms, and 
payment services. To ensure access to multiple services from different federal, 
regional, and municipal government agencies, the portal should be integrated 
with the Unified Identification and Authentication System (Petrov et al. 2016, 
26). Such ambitious goals determined a complete reformatting of the govern-
ment IT back office.
The vector of further modernization was determined by the adoption in 
2010 of the Federal Law No. 210-FZ “Ob organizacii predostavleniiâ gosu-
darstvennyh i municipal’nyh uslug” (On the organization of delivery of state 
and municipal services), which de-jure prohibited government agencies from 
requesting the previously collected and stored personal information of appli-
cants. The clause made imperative interagency collaboration at least in the con-
test of services delivery. In junction with policies to enforce the promotion of 
digital workflow, the main focus of the back-end modernization shifted towards 
the SMÈV (Sistema mežvedomstvennogo èlektronnogo vzaimodejstviiâ, System 
for Electronic Interagency Collaboration). Initially, it was perceived as an IT 
solution connecting the EPGU (Edinyj portal gosudarstvennyh i municipal’nyh 
uslug, Unified Portal of State and Municipal services) with similar regional 
portals and multi-function centers, on the one hand, with services providers–
authorized government agencies, on the other. The functioning of the digital 
government infrastructure also prompted the development of the Unified 
System of Identification and Authentication in order to ensure proper user 
access. Finally, the approach included the synchronization of the system with 
the State Information Systems that were built in the previous period.
Thus, the next step in public administration reform was effectively con-
verted into building e-Government in Russia. Yet despite such significant shift 
in the agenda, the overall approach seemed to remain intact. As with the earlier 
reform, it was decided to focus on the infrastructure development projects with 
the implicit expectation that they would foster policy and operational changes. 
In addition, the approach replicated the earlier and already proven faulty expec-
tations that the infrastructural transformations will prompt the regions to catch 
up. The reformers assumed that regional government would take advantage of 
the developed infrastructure and utilize option of hosting its regional 
e- Government segments.
At the same time, reflecting on past experience, the decision was made to 
ensure a smooth transition to the predominantly online service delivery model. 
To ensure non-disruptive on-boarding, it was decided to enhance the function-
alities of the already built territorial multifunction citizen service centers, which 
were tasked with promoting and facilitating citizen’s use of the online portal. 
However, since the centers were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the 
Economic Development, this decision did not eliminate the dual administra-
tive control over the reform, which had plagued the reform process before. 
Under the new system, the division of authority over the reform was made as 
follows: the Ministry for Communication was predominantly tasked with the 
development of e-Government infrastructure and the Ministry for Economic 
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Development—with policy and oversight over the reform as well as the “off- 
line” on-boarding. This decision not only influenced the efficiency of coordi-
nation but also had a negative impact on the political capital necessary for 
the reform.
In designing the reform, key focus was made on developing normative stan-
dards, prescribing the reform’s end-points, and prioritizing infrastructure 
development over policy transformation. This allows defining the reformers’ 
approach as genuinely technocratic. Reformers refused to account to the exist-
ing capacity of the bureaucracy to influence implementation of the reform not 
only by slowing down its complicated and/or unfavorable aspects but also by 
resisting to certain policy proposals that undermine its control over certain 
policy domains. Following Pournelle’s famous Iron Law of Bureaucracy 
(Pournelle 2006), stating that in any organization some people work to further 
the organization’s goals, while others work for the organization itself, any evo-
lutionary attempts to reduce the size of public administration or level of con-
trol over certain areas through any means of improvement and optimization, 
including digitization, would face with the administrative actions to curtail and 
diminish their effectiveness. Coupled with the lack of precise measurable indi-
cators for the efficiency of the reform, the first reform was inadvertently set to 
demonstrate underperformance. Those implementation and performance indi-
cators, proposed in the documents, did not justify the selected targets. For 
example, implementation has confirmed that the chosen reform methods 
would not lead to the conversion of 70 percent of all state and municipal ser-
vices to the electronic format (Order of the Government No.2516-r, December 
25, 2013).
The implementation of the reform in 2011–2013 revealed the deficiencies 
of the initial reform sign, as it struggled to achieve the designated goals. Despite 
the positive dynamics and ever-growing number of registered online citizens 
and users, coupled with advanced and well-designed United Portal of State and 
Municipal Services, the overall impact of digitization did not meet expecta-
tions. Most popular and frequently used online services were purely informa-
tional (i.e. required further offline actions to proceed) and the majority of 
registered online users opted for the option of simplified registration that 
excluded enhanced user verification and authentication. Subsequently, this per-
mitted only limited access and functionality that, particularly, excluded the pro-
cessing of payments and other operations that required the substantive 
utilization of personal and financial data (for more details refer to 
Zherebtsov 2019).
From the operations perspective, the reformers failed to engage with regions, 
which in practice, resulted in the emergence of two parallel and often unsyn-
chronized systems of e-Government portals—for the federal services, on the 
one hand, and for regional and municipal services, on the other. Speaking of 
the EPGU exclusively, less than fifteen percent of federal and less than ten per-
cent of regional and municipal services were fully available electronically. The 
regular monitoring of regional e-Government development, conducted by the 
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Ministry for Economic Development revealed substantial discrepancy of the 
quality and quantity of services, available on regional portals. The reform 
implied the monopoly of the state-owned corporation, Rostelecom on provid-
ing hosting and infrastructure for e-Government. It was expected that regions 
would “rent” the provided infrastructure; yet the degree of compliance with 
this policy initiatives appeared to be low. Rich regions (such as Moscow, St. 
Petersburg) have already invested in the development of their own portals, and 
poor regions found the Rostelecom hosting prices too restrictive to use the 
infrastructure and realized that building local solutions is cheaper. Coupled 
with technical difficulties that affected the implementation of electronic work-
flow (for example, Internet bandwidth restricted access to regional databases 
and registries) that impacted the interagency collaboration, the first phase of 
e-Government reform in Russia was regarded inefficient.
As a result, substantial changes were made to the design of the reform. After 
conducting the inventory of existing services and analyzing users’ activities on 
the portal, the decision was made to focus on converting the most actively used 
services to a fully online format. The shift of focus from the extensive (quantity 
of services) to intensive (quality of services) development of the Portal was 
accompanied by the change from institution-oriented to user-oriented 
approach. Services, which were previously grouped by institutions, responsible 
for their delivery, started to be aggregated on the basis of user life situations, 
substantially improving the quality and user-friendliness of the portal.
Innovations, visible to the users, were supported by a considerable transfor-
mation of the government back-end functionality. In fact, the entire architec-
ture of e-Government was reconsidered in order to put SMÈV—System for 
Electronic Interagency Collaboration—into the core of the infrastructure. In 
terms of the architecture design, the initial “hardware-based” approach, 
focused on the digitization and webification of the already existing infrastruc-
ture and processes, was replaced with the “solution based” principle that 
focused on supporting IT solutions fostering intra-governmental communica-
tion and data exchange. Reformers refocused on the creation of system of key 
IT gateways around key components of e-Government in an attempt to unite 
and synchronize previously developed objects of government IT-infrastructure.
The “bumpy” road to e-Government was noticed and reflected in Russia’s 
standing in international e-Government ratings. The e-Government develop-
ment index, prepared by the United Nations on a biannual basis, marked a 
significant progress between 2010 and 2012, when Russia moved from 59th to 
the 27th place. Yet, between 2012 and 2016, Russia failed to improve its per-
formance, falling to the 35th position with very limited positive dynamics in 
the index itself, allowing other countries to move forward. The situations 
started to improve in 2018, when the country moved to the 32nd place with 
substantial increase of its index score. This decade-long dynamic correlates 
with the ups and downs in Russia’s e-Government development process.
The period between 2011 and 2016 was marked by moderate actual growth 
and propagation of e-Government services. According to the official statistics, 
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the total number of registered users demonstrated exponential growth from 
just over 3 million in 2012 to 13 million in 2014, to 40 million in 2016. 
However, a more critical analysis reveals a quite different situation. When these 
data are compared with official demographics from Rosstat in the period 
between 2012 and 2014, the number of users registered on the EPGU appears 
to be less than 12 percent of the total population, older than 18 years and less 
than 18 percent of active internet-users from the same age group. Moreover, at 
least one-third of all registered users opted for the simplified registration, thus 
not having full access to the portal. All this reduces the number of Portal users 
with full and unrestricted access to only 8.3 percent of Russian citizens and 
12.5 percent of internet-users.
As demonstrated by Hilov (2014), the reported data on activity dynamics 
was based on the number of submitted, not executed requests. According to 
the author, only 87% of the requests for federal services were executed and the 
numbers for regional and municipal were much lower—36% and 19% respec-
tively. Services delivery also differed substantially between the top ten regions 
averaging 167 requests per 1000 people compared with bottom ten having 
only 13.8 requested per 1000 people. In addition, the quantity of recipients of 
fully electronic services remained relatively low during the same period of time. 
Only about 3.2% of Russian citizens opted for this option in 2015, while others 
still used the walk-in option (Dobrolyubova and Alexandrov 2016). In 2013, 
63% of respondents did not interact with public authorities online because they 
“prefer a personal visit and personal contact” (Rosstat 2014).
In addition to the digitization of services, the e-Government reform pro-
claimed significant improvement of regulatory capacity of the public adminis-
tration, positively affecting the business climate. It was expected that converting 
to the digital format would reduce the administrative and regulatory burden 
on business, thus enhancing the business climate and fostering economic 
growth. Yet existing evidence demonstrates that the business community 
remained disengaged with the government, despite all improvements in the 
IT-infrastructure. The 2015 annual report of the office of the business ombuds-
man to the President (Doklad 2015) stated that the government failed to 
impose any significant changes with respect to the existing regulatory burden. 
Despite the positive feedback on the EPGU, almost 52% of respondents out-
lined in 2015 that administrative burden has been increasing, accounting for 
10 to 20 percent of the total company’s revenue. The business community 
indicated that the reform failed to streamline regulatory activities of the state 
agencies, as some still enforce regulations, the implementation of which would 
inevitably result in fines and other penalties.
It required a substantial review of the initial reform project in order for 
e-Government to catch up and become the leading form of public administra-
tion in Russia. The reform resulted in the creation of advanced and modern IT 
infrastructure of digital government with the most notable transformations 
occurring in the public services delivery aspect and particularly in the context 
of constant modernization of the EPGU.  In this regard, late start (in 
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comparison with the leading countries) leveled the negative consequences of 
the technocratic approach. In reality, the very approach contributed to the 
rapid modernization of the IT infrastructure, as it did not account for how the 
developed infrastructure would be utilized by the bureaucratic apparatus. 
Nevertheless, the reform process revealed substantial flaws in the reform design 
and implementation, whose persistence at the following stages have the poten-
tial to become a very detrimental factor.
3.3.3  Beyond the e-Government—Government as a Platform 
(2016–Now)
The FTP “Èlektronnoe pravitel’stvo” (Electronic Government) was concluded 
in 2016. The citizens gradually accepted the new form of interaction with 
regulators and bureaucrats, in particular young and middle-aged people found 
it convenient, and ever-growing Internet coverage (mobile first) made wider 
adoption possible  (Shipov 2016). As electronic public services started to 
become normalized all over Russia, the most recent iteration of public sector 
digitalization—Gosudarstvo kak platforma (government as a platform)—had 
been presented as a concept in April 2018. The concept has been under devel-
opment since 2016 at CSR (Centr strategičeskih razrabotok, Center for Strategic 
Research), a think-tank curated by Alexei Kudrin, former Finance Minister and 
the current head of the Russian Audit Chamber, belonging to the political 
group of “reformers.” The document outlines how O’Reilly’s concept could 
be transplanted into the Russian public administration. While it is not an offi-
cial governmental program or strategy, it is worth noting that the leading polit-
ical party “Edinaâ Rossiâ” (United Russia) has included GaaP into the program 
for the November 9, 2018, united election day in a few regions. While the idea 
is very new, it has already gained traction among the regional politicians and 
will most probably continue its way into the federal policy-making.
As discussed in Sect. 3.2.2, “government as a platform” is going a step fur-
ther in comparison to e-Government, suggesting innovation in service delivery 
by allowing third parties to re-think public services without the direct interven-
tion of authorities. The model for this is to provide application programming 
interfaces (APIs) to citizens and businesses who can innovate on the formats of 
service production and delivery. Hence, GaaP is “shifting services into new 
digital formats that will allow governments to continually gather huge reser-
voirs of data on citizens’ everyday activities, interactions and transactions—data 
that can then be mined, analyzed and used as insights to shape services—whilst 
simultaneously encouraging citizens to become responsible participants in the 
coproduction and provision of those digital services” (Williamson 2014). This 
set of ideas can be found in the CSR “Gosudarstvo kak platforma” concept 
paper (2018). The concept links to the Digital Economy of the Russian 
Federation program 2018–2024 that focuses on enhanced adoption of digital 
technologies in economic and social spheres (for more, see Lowry 2020).
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The justification of digital public administration is built around a number of 
explicit and implicit problem statements. First, it mentions lack of trust in state 
institutions. The lack of accountability and citizen control over public admin-
istration is regarded as a cause of inefficient bureaucracy. Corruption, mistakes, 
and heavy administrative burden are expected to be alleviated by GaaP. Second, 
lack of trustworthy data and ineffective, slow processes of data acquisition are 
considered to make the state slow to respond to various challenges. Authorities 
are presented as intermediaries between the citizens and their data who stall the 
efficiency and speed of public service delivery. The lack of horizontal, interde-
partmental integration is seen as a further challenge. The resistance of the 
incumbent public administration system leads to “digital feudalism,” meaning 
that each public body develops its own digital systems and processes that are 
not interoperable. The concept also criticizes the Multi-Function Centers and 
a Unified Service Portal, which were introduced as a part of the Electronic 
Government program, claiming that they were a tactical win that turned into a 
strategic loss, since they preserve the existing inefficient system and block fur-
ther development and genuinely new ways of public administration.
The CSR document is interesting because it presents GaaP as a solution to 
a number of problems in the current system of public administration. The con-
cept states that poor public service delivery is the reason for the lack of innova-
tion in Russian economy, while lack of reliable data and data analytics tools 
leads to suboptimal decision-making. The basic assumption is that the global 
competitiveness of a state is a direct consequence of the way the public admin-
istration is run, hence, introduction of GaaP is a way of ensuring Russia’s com-
petitiveness in the global arena.
However, even more revealing is the analysis of implicit problems through 
the analysis of expected benefits. The two key characteristics of GaaP are 
being human-oriented (čelovekoorientirovannyj), yet human-independent 
(čelovekonezavisimyj). These are suggesting that the current system is not ori-
ented towards the citizen but rather towards the state and its offices, while all 
the decisions are dependent on concrete public servants. The idea of auto-
mated, algorithmic, and big data-driven decision-making as fair, neutral, and 
citizen-oriented, emerges throughout the document. “Intellectual agents” 
(intellektual’nye agenty)—artificial intelligence (AI) driven decision-making 
algorithms—are expected to be at the core of public service. Bureaucratic pro-
cess and personal responsibility in decision-making—both seen as problems of 
the current system—would therefore be substituted by an algorithmic process 
that eliminates personal contact. As a consequence, most of the public servants 
will be IT professionals and machine-learning specialists.
What is different in the CSR concept compared to the models developed by 
O’Reilly and other “visionaries” is the state-centric and hierarchical nature of 
developing and governing the transition to GaaP. Unfolding of the architec-
ture, systems, and services is not simply curated by the state, but rather super-
vised. The state is the main developer and could involve third parties to develop 
additional services if it considers this necessary. There is only a marginal role for 
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the citizens who are re-conceptualized as users benefiting from the new 
GaaP.  Each citizen is expected to acquire a “digital twin”—a set of data—
already at birth and the amount of data constituting the digital representation 
of every person will grow with the time. The citizens therefore will be “data-
fied” (Hintz et  al. 2018). Yet, no systems for citizen participation in GaaP 
development and maintenance are proposed. The concept lacks any instru-
ments of accountability or citizen audit (for more on government data, see 
Chap. 22).
As a result, the problems outlined in the concept are not being addressed 
through deliberation or other forms of democratic participation, but automa-
tion and AI are taking the place of digital democracy. The word “democracy” 
(or its derivatives) does not emerge in the concept a single time. Focus on 
technology rather than democratic process is emblematic: the technocratic nar-
rative of information technology as a source of increased efficiency for the state 
has been a prevailing ideology of the ruling elite since 2012 when Medvedev’s 
techno-political modernization agenda was curtailed.
3.4  regIonal and local dImensIon of e-government
The federal government has been the main driver of e-Government reforms 
and the main changes have happened at the federal level. Yet, also at the 
regional and local level, there have been various digital initiatives. Kabanov and 
Sungurov (2016, 85) studied the uptake of e-Government in the Russian 
regions. They argue that “the diffusion of e-Government itself was to a large 
extent the result of a vertical influence of the federal government.” This is well 
illustrated through examining different facets of e-Government. In case of 
public procurement, the new procurement law (94-FZ) introduced at the fed-
eral level mandated the creation of transparent and available information access. 
As a result, all regional governments created portals to implement the law, even 
though almost a half have only done so to fulfill the formal requirements 
(McHenry and Pryamonosov 2010). In the case of e-Government payments, 
there has been no unified legal provisions on their installment, hence, signifi-
cant regional variation can be observed (McHenry and Borisov 2005). While 
today all the regional governments have Internet presence, the functionality of 
the websites differs considerably. Kabanov and Sungurov (2016) suggest that a 
more mature e-Government in a given region is a combination of several fac-
tors, including bureaucracy effectiveness, technological advancement, invest-
ment in ICT, and relatively democratic political regime. Techno-optimistic 
orientation of the regional governing elite, especially the governor, also seems 
to be important, at least judging from the cases of Sakha Republic (Yakutia, 
Ajsen Nikolaev), Moscow (Sergey Sobyanin), Belgorod oblast (Konstantin 
Poležaev), and so on.
Similar dynamics can be observed at the local level. While we have not 
observed relevant empirical studies in Russia, Johnson and Kolko (2010) com-
pared the nation-level and the city-level e-Government initiatives in Central 
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Asia, concluding that local-level initiatives are more citizen-oriented and trans-
parent. This probably is related to the fact that at the local level, governments 
are not mandated to develop electronic services or participation tools. A useful 
illustration is provided by the analysis of civic technology platforms, meaning 
digital platforms for citizen participation and engagement with the govern-
ment, conducted by one of the authors. Civic technology is usually realized as 
an online or mobile application that allows citizen participation in urban man-
agement, planning and design through consultations, opinion polling, ratings, 
requesting repair, complaints, participatory budgeting, and other similar 
engagement forms. For the government, civic technology can perform several 
functions, from creating a new communication channel to get instant input on 
the bureaucratic performance and respond to the daily needs of the citizens 
with improved services, to a scalable method for collecting and analyzing pop-
ular needs, preferences, ideas, and values. According to our estimation, about 
half of the Russian regional capital deployed civic technology platforms over 
the past five years (2014–2019).
3.5  concludIng remarks
This chapter traced the development of e-Government in Russia from 2002 to 
2020 through the lenses of public administration reform. During the first 
period—2002–2009—an FTP “Electronic Russia” was launched in parallel 
with a major administrative reform. While there has been an overlap between 
the two, both reforms failed to implement the principles of New Public 
Management (NPM) to an extent that would yield them success. The second 
period—2010–2015—can be identified within the scope of the next FTP 
“Information Society 2011–2020,” and particularly, its key project “Electronic 
Government (2011–2015).” This project departed from an idea of 
e- Government as a complement or partial substitute to the “real” government 
and focused on the development of infrastructure for electronic public service 
delivery. Finally, the third period—2016–present—started the development of 
“government-as-a-platform” concept, that has so far not been implemented 
but raised much interest among various actors, as well as provoked debates 
regarding the future of data and digital infrastructures for its collection, pro-
cessing, and storage.
These developments were aimed at serving several goals. The first aim was 
to improve the efficiency and decrease the cost of public administration, two 
central ideas of the NPM agenda. The projects cannot be regarded as pure 
“window-dressing,” as much of what has been achieved, in particular in the 
area of electronic service delivery, has had a positive effect on citizen–state 
interactions. In simple terms, for an average citizen in a non-conflictual situa-
tion, it has become more convenient, quick, and simple to communicate with 
government authorities. The e-Government project also had a pronounced 
political economy aspect as one of its goals has been to secure the country’s 
competitiveness internationally, appearing as a more attractive location to both 
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live and do business. Yet, the intentions did not match the reality and busi-
nesses noticed an increased administrative burden as a result of the innovations. 
Eventually, while driven by “good intentions,” the discrepancy between the 
plans and their implementation appeared large.
The review of the near two decades of digitalization of the public sector in 
Russia, performed through three consecutive federal programs/concepts, 
reveals an authentic style of conducting such reforms that can, at least partially, 
explain the observed discrepancy. First of all, there is a highly pronounced 
technocratism of planning and preparing the reform designs. Unlike in most 
democratic countries, e-Government reforms were designed with the state, 
rather than the citizen, at the center. Such unique style of the reforms can be 
regarded beneficial only for vast infrastructure-building projects, when it is 
important to enhance control over multifaceted implementation tasks in order 
to ensure a more or less balanced development of all components of the digital 
government infrastructure. Yet it seems that adhering to the same strategy at 
the following reform stages may result in multiple drawbacks and would require 
multiple corrections of the entire reform design.
Secondly, a significant level of centrality and directive management of the 
reforms is the characteristic of Russian e-Government implementation. The 
top-down approach was even embedded in the design of the reform. The ideas 
emanated from the federal center and were further adopted by the regions. 
There has been only limited opportunity for the subnational units to influence 
the progression of e-Government reforms. The initial inflexible approach did 
not propose cooptation strategies. Regions were given two options: to comply 
with the proposed solutions or to develop their own. This resulted in the emer-
gence of two separate e-Government platforms—federal and regional. 
Moreover, the municipal level of self-government has been completely disre-
garded in the initial plans.
Finally, we identify the resistance of the incumbent public administration 
system (what is called “digital feudalism” in the CSR GaaP Strategy) and clash 
of ideas within the ruling elites with regard to the ways in which e-Government 
should be implemented and what is its ultimate purpose. The former is deter-
mined by the natural lack of the initiative of existing bureaucracy to adhere to 
the notion that digitization improved administration by reducing its size and 
streamlining key policies. The idea of seamless government, coupled with the 
reduced control over exclusive policy domains, does not sit well in the self- 
determination of current public administration leaders. The latter can be 
crudely reduced to the ideological disagreement between Medvedev, who 
started planning for the Electronic Government, and Putin, under whose gov-
ernment it has mainly be implemented.
The transition to the GaaP model has further exposed the flaws of the tech-
nocratic approach, as the emphasis is made on functional and policy changes 
and lesser on the transformation of infrastructure. The latter becomes necessar-
ily distributed and uncontrollable from the single center. This undermines the 
entire top-down ideology of governance in Russia that critically modified the 
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course of the 2003–2013 public administration reform and significantly 
impacted the e-Government implementation at each development stage. The 
prolonged inability to adapt to the new principle of distributed and delegated 
governance over policy domains with blurred administrative boundaries will 
destine the new reform to follow the footsteps of its precursors.
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The impact of new technological innovations is all-pervasive today from alter-
ing consumer preferences in the direction of highly customized on-demand 
products to changing the way companies create, market, and deliver goods and 
services, in particular through increasing reliance on technology-enabled plat-
forms. Currently, digital technologies are changing the business model of com-
panies, especially in the banking and telecommunications sectors, while 
increasing efficiency and revealing new market opportunities. Even traditional 
industries increasingly employ methods for analyzing large volumes of data to 
make effective management decisions. The Internet of Things improves the 
quality of equipment operation, increases productivity of oil and gas fields, and 
makes urban infrastructure more energy efficient. In the next decade, the fur-
ther development of such innovations as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), 
augmented reality, block chain, robotics, and artificial intelligence will open up 
a wide range of opportunities for consumers, business, and governments 
(Aptekman et al. 2017).
In Russia, the digital transformation of the economy is becoming one of the 
main strategic directions of its development (Jakutin 2017). In his address to 
the Federal Assembly in December 2016, President Putin set the task of pre-
paring a digital economy program. The President has repeatedly called atten-
tion to the challenges of Russia’s digital transformation, most notably in his 
speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2017. This provided an 
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impetus for the subsequent discussion of the digitalization strategy at various 
discussion platforms in Russia. Within a month, almost all major Russian busi-
ness associations and scientific communities held meetings, seminars, and con-
ferences on digital issues. The public discussions became the basis of the 
organizational work on the formation of a digital transformation strategy for 
the Russian economy in the government’s program (for more on digital gov-
ernment, see Chap. 3). Approved by the Presidential Council for Strategic 
Development and Priority Projects, the Digital Economy Program acquired 
the status of an official government document already in July 2017. On July 
28, 2017, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a governmental order approving 
the program “Cifrovaâ èkonomika Rossijskoj Federacii” (Digital Economy of 
the Russian Federation).1 Subsequently, national projects in 12 areas of strate-
gic development were established.2 One of these is the national program 
“Digital Economy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the Presidential 
Council for Strategic Development and National Projects3 on December 24, 
2018 (Pasport 2018), and created on the basis of the Digital Economy 
Program (2017).
4.2  PuttIng “dIgItal” In PersPectIve: theorIes 
of technologIcal change
Despite the widespread use of the term “digital economy,” it remains a fuzzy 
and contradictory concept. It is usually understood as all types of economic 
activity based on digital technologies, including e-commerce, Internet services, 
electronic banking, entertainment, and others. However, it is not clear where 
the precise boundary between digital and “analog” economies is now 
(Grammatchikov 2017). Additionally, economists note the contradiction in 
the term itself, suggesting that in economics, all processes have long been 
described, diagnosed, and projected using digits/numbers (Jakutin 2017, 32; 
Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 4).
Digital transformation of the economy occurs under the influence of inno-
vation waves (Aptekman et al. 2017, 21). The first wave of digital innovations, 
starting from the 1960s, involved automation of existing technologies and 
business processes. Starting from the mid-1990s, the rapid development of 
Internet technologies, mobile communications, social networks, and the emer-
gence of smartphones have led to the widespread use of technology by end 
consumers. In the broader scientific context, these innovation waves, or inter-
related radical breakthroughs, form a constellation of interdependent technol-
ogies defined as a technological revolution. Carlota Perez (2002, 2010) identifies 
five such revolutions since the initial Industrial Revolution in England. Each 
technological revolution is accompanied by a set of “best-practice” principles—




In Russian literature, digital transformation is often associated with the tran-
sition to the sixth technological order, or tehnologičeskij uklad (Glaz’ev 1993, 
2010). A technological order is defined as a complex of technologies character-
istic of a certain level of development of production. Each technological order 
encompasses a closed cycle from the extraction of primary resources to all 
stages of their processing to the production of products that meet the relevant 
level of public consumption (Rodionov et al. 2017, 80). In this framework, 
digital economy is understood as a form of economic organization of society, 
resulting from scientific and technological progress, aimed at creating greater 
value with the use of technology of the sixth technological order and enabling 
its long-term sustainable development (Rodionov et  al. 2017, 79). Digital 
transformation is conceptualized as the material embodiment of nano- and bio- 
technologies, artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, robotics, and other 
modern technologies based on electronic devices (Jakutin 2017, 28). With 
regard to the Russian economy, its digital transformation is seen as part of a 
broader task of economic modernization, moving away from its raw-materials 
orientation.
4.3  russIa on the global dIgItal Market
There are a number of studies that seek to identify the leaders of the digital 
economy and calculate its share in the gross domestic product (GDP) of differ-
ent countries. According to the latest McKinsey study (Aptekman et al. 2017), 
Russia’s digital economy accounts for 3.9 percent of its GDP, compared to 
10.9% in the United States (US), 10% in China, and 8.2% in the European 
Union (EU, in 2015 prices). At the same time, digital transformation is one of 
the main factors of economic growth in Russia as well as globally. From 2011 
to 2015, the total volume of Russia’s digital economy increased by 59%, which 
means that it is currently growing at a rate that is 9 times faster than the coun-
try’s GDP. Based on this considerable growth potential, the study suggests that 
it is possible to triple the size of Russia’s digital economy by 2025 from the 
current 3.2 to 9.6 trillion rubles, which would bring Russia to the level of 
developed economies in terms of the relative share of digital economy in GDP 
(8–10%).
To assess Russia’s relative position on the global digital market, it is possible 
to use relevant international indices. The Networked Readiness Index, devel-
oped by the World Economic Forum, measures countries’ preparedness to reap 
the benefits of emerging technologies and to capitalize on the opportunities 
presented by the digital revolution (Baller et al. 2016). It is made up of four 
main categories—environment (political/regulatory and business/innova-
tion), readiness (measured by information and communication technologies 
(ICT) affordability, skills, and infrastructure), usage (individual, business, and 
government), and impact (economic and social). Russia ranks 41st in the 
Networked Readiness Index 2016, far behind the leading countries such as 
Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United States, the Netherlands, 
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Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Japan. Russia’s relatively 
weak position in the ranking can be attributed to the gaps in the regulatory 
framework for the digital economy and the insufficiently favorable environ-
ment for innovation and doing business, and consequently, low ICT business 
usage (Programma 2017, 8).
Another relevant index is the International Digital Economy and Society 
Index (I-DESI) developed by the European Commission to measure the digi-
tal economy performance of EU28 Member States and the EU as a whole 
compared to 17 other countries (Wiseman et  al. 2018). It is a composite 
index that comprises 5 dimensions: connectivity, digital skills, citizen use of 
Internet, business technology integration, and digital public services. Based 
on this index, Russia lags behind the EU average but is still ahead of China, 
Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Brazil (Wiseman et al. 2018, 14). Russia ranked 
above the EU average in terms of human capital (digital skills) but fell behind 
in the other 4 dimensions. It received the lowest rating among the 45 coun-
tries in the study in terms of overall connectivity and was ranked below the 
EU bottom 4  in terms of business technology integration (for more, see 
Chap. 13).
4.4  analysIs of the dIgItal econoMy PrograM: 
defInItIons, goals, and IndIcators
This section provides an analysis of the program’s content in terms of its defini-
tions, goals, and indicators. It focuses on the 2017 state program as a concep-
tual document laying the framework for the subsequent national program 
(2018), which is more target oriented. The analysis also shows how the broadly 
formulated goals of the original program have been redefined and fine-tuned 
in the 2018 national program with more concrete tasks, indicators, and mecha-
nisms of implementation.
4.4.1  Definition of the Digital Economy
The state program defines digital economy as “an economic activity, in which 
the key factor of production is data in the digital form” (Programma 2017, 
4–5). In classic economic theory, labor, capital, and raw materials are consid-
ered the main factors of production. In the context of innovative economy, 
technology and knowledge also play a key role in production. However, it is 
not clear why data in digital form should be considered the main factor of pro-
duction (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 6). The authors of the program provide 
the following explanation: “Currently data become a new asset, mainly due to 
their alternative value, that is, as data are used for new purposes and realization 
of new ideas” (Programma 2017, 5). At the same time, the program does not 
specify these new purposes. A related criticism is that “data in the digital form” 
do not define the essence of today’s digital economy since data have always 
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been used to describe and evaluate economic activity (Jakutin 2017, 32). A 
simpler and more straightforward definition of the digital economy would have 
been as an economy based on digital technologies. Consequently, strategic 
management of the digitalization processes of the Russian economy would 
entail, first, the management of the development of digital technologies and, 
second, the management of the processes of their deployment in the economic 
sphere (Jakutin 2017, 36).
4.4.2  Goals of the Programs
The 2017 program outlines its three main goals as follows. The first goal is 
“creation of the ecosystem of the digital economy of the Russian Federation,” 
which ensures effective interaction between business, scientific and educational 
community, the state, and Russian citizens. This goal is weakly formulated and 
can hardly claim the status of a long-term target of government activities on 
digitalization. The “Strategy for the Development of the Information Society 
in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030” defines the “ecosystem of the digital 
economy” as “a partnership of organizations ensuring the continuous interac-
tion of their technological platforms, applied Internet services, analytical sys-
tems, information systems of public authorities of the Russian Federation, 
organizations and citizens” (Strategiâ 2017, 5). Thus, the creation of the eco-
system of the digital economy entails the creation of “a partnership of organi-
zations.” However, a partnership is not the main element of the digital economy 
(Jakutin 2017, 41). Regardless of whether enterprises-owners of digital tech-
nologies, Internet portals, and servers form or do not form a partnership, the 
economy does not cease to be digital.
The second goal is defined as “the creation of necessary and sufficient insti-
tutional and infrastructural conditions, the removal of existing obstacles and 
restrictions for the creation and (or) development of high-tech businesses and 
the prevention of the emergence of new obstacles and restrictions both in tra-
ditional industries and in new industries and high-tech markets” (Programma 
2017, 2). This goal is too big and too compressed in its content. It can be 
subdivided into two separate strategic objectives: the formation of the institu-
tional environment of Russia’s digital economy and the creation of its 
infrastructure.
The third goal is increasing competitiveness of Russian industries and the 
economy as a whole on the global market. However, this goal cannot be con-
sidered one of the directions of digitalization. Competitiveness is itself a result 
of the development of the digital economy. While improving competitiveness 
is a necessary task, it requires an active and diverse economic policy. The pro-
gram lacks such a policy (Jakutin 2017, 45).
The national program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” (2018), 
developed on the basis of the 2017 program, redefines the goals as follows. 
The first goal is a three-fold increase in domestic spending on the development 
of the digital economy from all sources (by share in GDP) compared to 2017. 
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The second goal is “creating a sustainable and secure information and telecom-
munications infrastructure for high-speed transmission, processing and storage 
of large amounts of data that is accessible to all organizations and households.” 
The third goal is the use of predominantly domestic software by government 
agencies, local governments, and organizations. Thus, compared to the earlier 
program, the national digital economy program has more concrete goals. 
Consequently, the indicators have also been redefined accordingly. They are 
shown in Table 4.1.
The redefined and more concrete goals, with corresponding indicators, of 
the subsequent national program (2018) are a significant improvement on the 
original version of the program. In this regard, the shift from a very broadly 
formulated goal of creating the ecosystem of the digital economy to the more 
concrete objective of increasing domestic expenditures on the development of 
the digital economy, with fine-tuning of the necessary methodology, should be 
noted. Compared to the earlier version, the use of domestic software by gov-
ernment agencies is elevated to one of the main goals of the program. In the 
2017 program, these measures were addressed under the rubric of information 
security with corresponding indicators for decreasing the share of foreign ICT 
equipment and software in the purchases of federal and regional government 
authorities and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The new program uses differ-
ent indicators for government bodies and SOEs but focuses exclusively on soft-
ware, omitting ICT equipment. In sum, the program has been revised so that 
Table 4.1 Main indicators of the national program “Digital Economy of the Russian 
Federation” (2018)
No. Program indicators 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
1.1 Domestic spending on the development of 
the digital economy by share in GDP (%)
1.9 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.3 5.1
2.1 Share of households with broadband access 
to the Internet (%)
75 79 84 89 92 95 97
2.2 Share of socially significant infrastructure 
objects with broadband access to the 
Internet (%)
34.1 45.2 56.3 67.5 83.7 91.9 100
2.3 Availability of data processing centers in 
federal districts (quantity)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2.4 Russia’s share in the world volume of 
storage and data processing services (%)
– – 1.5 2 3 4 5
2.5 Average downtime of public information 
systems as a result of cyberattacks (hours)
65 48 24 18 12 6 1
3.1 Cost share of domestic software purchased 
and (or) rented by federal, regional, and 
other government authorities, %
>50 >60 >70 >75 >80 >85 >90
3.2 Cost share of domestic software purchased 
and (or) rented by state corporations and 
companies with state participation, %




there is a better fit between the goals, specific measures to be implemented, and 
target indicators. However, much of the original criticism regarding the lack of 
measures for streamlining the production of domestic ICT equipment remains 
valid. Similarly, there are no indications in the program that it is aimed at 
addressing import dependence in the component base of hardware or creating 
mechanisms to overcome the rigid sanctions regime applied to Russian high- 
tech companies (Jakutin 2017, 37).
4.4.3  Levels of the Digital Economy
According to the program, the digital economy comprises three levels: markets 
and industries, where the interaction of specific subjects (suppliers and con-
sumers of goods and services) takes place; platforms and technologies, where 
competencies for the development of markets and industries are formed; and 
environment that creates the conditions for the development of platforms and 
technologies and effective interaction of market actors and covers regulations, 
information infrastructure, personnel, and information security. The program 
focuses on “the two lower levels of the digital economy,” and specifically, the 
development of key institutions that create the conditions for the development 
of the digital economy (regulations, personnel and education, the formation of 
research and technological competencies) and basic infrastructural elements of 
the digital economy (information infrastructure and information security) 
(Programma 2017, 2–3).
The levels of the digital economy identified in the program do not corre-
spond to the traditional micro-, meso-, and macro-levels established in eco-
nomic theory (Jakutin 2017, 45). The first, “upper” level, according to the 
program, “markets and industries,” entails the interaction of specific subjects 
(suppliers and consumers of goods and services). In other words, it is the level 
of an enterprise or the micro-level. Referring to the micro-level as the “upper” 
level of the digital economy, the program puts established economic theory on 
its head. The two “lower” levels, according to the program, are platforms and 
technologies, and “the environment.”
The program states that it “focuses on the two lower levels of the digital 
economy” but in practice restricts itself to just one level, “the environment,” 
broken into two components—institutions and infrastructure (Programma 
2017, 2–3). The program thus sees the basic directions of creating the digital 
economy as the development of various institutions and infrastructure. Omitted 
in this statement of objectives is the digital economy itself, or to use the pro-
gram’s terminology, the entire second level—digital platforms and technolo-
gies. This omission is remarkable considering that the digital platform is 
generally recognized as the building block of the digital economy. It is defined 
as the system of algorithmic relationships of a significant number of market 
participants, united by a single information environment, which reduces trans-
action costs due to the use of a package of digital technologies and changes in 
the division of labor (Jakutin 2017, 47). The digital platform, thus, can 
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rightfully claim the status of the main “level” of the digital economy, without 
any reservations about the second, third or lower levels.
4.4.4  Cross-Cutting Technologies
The program provides support for the development of “cross-cutting” tech-
nologies but does not offer a definition of this term. Nine technologies fall 
within the scope of the program, specifically, big data, neurotechnology and 
artificial intelligence, distributed registry systems, quantum technologies, new 
production technologies, industrial Internet, components of robotics and sen-
sorics, wireless technology, and virtual and augmented reality technology 
(Programma 2017, 3). The list of technologies will be updated as new tech-
nologies emerge and develop. The program will also be supplemented with 
relevant sections and road maps in the process of the implementation of specific 
measures in the field of health, creation of “smart cities,” and public 
administration.
In the words of former Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications, 
Nikolaj Nikiforov, who presented the program at a meeting of the Council on 
Strategic Development and Priority Projects, cross-cutting technologies is 
“when a digital technology is developed once and can be used many times in 
various industries” (Zasedanie 2017). However, the program does not specify 
an economic mechanism that makes these technologies “cross-cutting.” If the 
technology was “once” developed by someone, what is the mechanism that 
will allow this technology to “get away” from its owner and find its “cross- 
cutting” application “in various industries”? Jakutin (2017, 50) raises a num-
ber of valid questions in this regard: Who will pay for it? Who will ensure its 
distribution? What about copyright and intellectual property rights? The state 
program does not provide any answers to these questions. The choice of the 
nine “cross-cutting” technologies listed in the program is likewise arbitrary. 
According to Sneps-Sneppe et al. (2018, 38), the nine cross-cutting technolo-
gies identified in the program represent a random collection of modern tech-
nologies, and hardly the most important ones. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
notice the manifestation of these technologies in the program.
Compared to the original version of the program, the revised national pro-
gram (2018) represents an improvement in terms of introducing a number of 
concrete measures for the development of “cross-cutting” technologies, which 
are incorporated into the new federal project “Digital technologies.” These 
measures are aimed at achieving the goal of the national program to increase 
domestic expenditures on the digital economy and include (1) the creation of 
“cross-cutting” digital technologies predominantly on the basis of domestic 
research and development (R&D) and (2) the creation of an integrated system 
of financing projects for the development and implementation of digital tech-
nologies and platform solutions, including venture financing and other devel-
opment institutions. The first objective encompasses a range of policies such as 
designing road maps for the development of promising cross-cutting digital 
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technologies, creation of digital platforms for conducting R&D in these tech-
nologies, support of Russian high-tech companies, which develop products, 
services and platform solutions on the basis of cross-cutting technologies for 
the digital transformation of priority industries, and forming demand for 
Russian digital technologies, products and platform solutions, in part by 
launching digital transformation of state corporations and companies with state 
participation.
4.5  russIa’s dIgItal econoMy PrograM: 
ManageMent systeM
The program’s management system can be characterized as flexible, with mul-
tiple centers of decision-making (Sneps-Sneppe et  al. 2018; Ivanov and 
Malineckij 2017). In governance studies, a system with multiple semi- 
autonomous decision centers operating under an overarching set of rules is 
defined as polycentricity (Aligica and Tarko 2012; Carlisle and Gruby 2017). 
Despite the number of advantages ascribed to polycentric governance systems, 
including suitability for managing complex areas such as science, the concept 
of polycentricity has not been systematically applied in the study of innovation 
systems or science governance. This is somewhat surprising considering that 
the literature on science governance in Russia has framed the issue in terms of 
decentralization. At the same time, this literature acknowledges that the virtues 
of a decentralized science system are far from obvious in Russia or elsewhere 
since “[t]he best science is unapologetically elitist” (Graham and Dezhina 
2008, vii). This section will briefly review these debates on the organization 
and support of science in Russia in the context of the Digital Economy 
Program. The objective is to assess the extent to which its management system 
resembles or differs from a polycentric structure by exploring its main attri-
butes. These are: (1) the multiplicity of decision centers; (2) an overarching 
system of rules; and (3) a spontaneous order created by evolutionary competi-
tion between the various decision centers’ ideas (Aligica and Tarko 2012, 254).
4.5.1  Multiple Decision Centers
The most striking aspect of the program’s management system is the multiplic-
ity of decision centers and the range of participants involved in the program’s 
development and implementation. The governmental commission for the use 
of information technologies to improve the quality of life and the conditions of 
doing business is responsible for the overall control over the implementation of 
the Digital Economy Program (Postanovlenie 2017). Its Sub-Commission for 
digital economy is in charge of reviewing action plans and monitoring their 
implementation, approving methodological recommendations and regulations 
as well as resolving disagreements between participants and reviewing contra-
dictions in draft laws. Relevant ministries oversee their own areas.4 The Ministry 
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of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian 
Federation oversees the formation of research and technological competen-
cies,5 information infrastructure, and security while the Ministry of Economic 
Development administers regulatory, personnel, and educational policy. 1.8 
trillion rubles will be spent in 2019–2024 on the implementation of the 
national program for the development of the digital economy. More than 1 
trillion of these funds will be allocated from the federal budget (Pasport 
2018, 75).6
The Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation acts as 
the project management office for the implementation of the Digital Economy 
Program. It provides organizational and methodological support for the imple-
mentation of the program, including the preparation of guidelines for the 
development of action plans and reports on their implementation. The Center 
also provides information and analytical support for the activities of the Sub- 
Commission and ensures the operation of a system of electronic interaction of 
the program’s participants.
An autonomous non-profit organization (ANO) Digital Economy coordi-
nates the participation of expert and business community in the implementa-
tion, development, and evaluation of the program’s effectiveness. Created by 
Russian high-tech companies (Yandex, Mail.Ru Group, Rambler & Co, Rostec, 
Rosatom, Sberbank, Rostelecom, the Skolkovo Foundation, the Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives, and others), the organization functions as a platform for 
state-business dialogue. It forms and coordinates the activities of working 
groups and competence centers for the program’s areas and evaluates the over-
all implementation of the program. In addition to ensuring the interaction 
with business and scientific community, its functions include support of digital 
technology start-ups and small/medium-sized enterprises (SME) as well as 
foresight and digital development forecasts.
Working groups prepare proposals for action plans and participate in evalu-
ating the effectiveness of their implementation. Competence centers are 
responsible for the preparation and implementation of action plans. The ANO 
Digital Economy initially comprised working groups and competence centers 
in the following five areas: information infrastructure; formation of research 
and technological competencies; personnel and education; regulation; and 
information security. State corporations Rosatom and Rostech served as com-
petence centers for the formation of research and technological competencies 
while Russian Venture Company headed the working group in this area. 
Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, oversaw the development of new 
production technologies, big data, virtual and augmented reality technologies, 
and quantum technologies. State corporation Rostec, which promotes the 
development, production and export of high-technology industrial products 
for civil and defense sectors, was responsible for the development of neurotech-
nology and artificial intelligence, industrial Internet, robotics and sensor com-
ponents, wireless technology, and distributed registry systems (Sistema 2017). 
The competence centers and leaders of working groups for the other four areas 
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were the Skolkovo Foundation/MTS (regulation), the Agency for Strategic 
Initiatives/1C Company (personnel), Rostelecom/MegaFon (infrastructure), 
and Sberbank/InfoWatch (security).
4.5.2  A Single System of Rules
The Russian government has made consistent efforts to develop an overarch-
ing set of rules governing the dissemination and use of information technolo-
gies in different spheres and to coordinate the various digitalization programs 
and initiatives within a comprehensive system of strategic planning. Thus, the 
Digital Economy Program is closely linked to the documents already in force 
on the strategic development of the Russian economy (Programma 2017, 4). 
It complements the goals and objectives of the National Technology Initiative 
and the adopted strategic planning documents, specifically the Forecast of 
Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation for the 
Period until 2030, the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological 
Development of the Russian Federation (2016), the Strategy for the 
Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 
2017–2030, the priority project “Improving the organization of medical care 
through the introduction of information technologies” (2016), and other doc-
uments, including those of the Eurasian Economic Union. The adopted strate-
gic planning documents provide for measures aimed at stimulating the 
development of digital technologies and their use in various sectors of the 
economy. For example, the adopted socio-economic development forecast of 
the Russian Federation envisions the active dissemination and widespread use 
of information technologies in the socio-economic sphere, public administra-
tion, and business (for more, see Chap. 3).
The Strategy for the Development of the Information Society in the Russian 
Federation for 2017–2030 is the closest strategic document to the Digital 
Economy Program in terms of content, with the goals of the Strategy being 
closely related to the program (Programma 2017, 4). Based on the Strategy, 
the program also takes into account its founding acts and legislative frame-
work. These include the Federal Law No. 172-FZ “O strategic ̌eskom planirova-
nii v Rossijskoj Federacii” (On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation, 
2014), “Strategiâ nacional’noj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” (National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2015), “Doktrina informacionnoj 
bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” (Information Security Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, 2016) as well as related legal acts that determine the direction of 
the application of ICTs in Russia (Jakutin 2017, 30–31).
4.5.3  A Spontaneous Order?
Despite the existence of multiple decision-making centers and an evolving 
overarching system of rules governing digitalization—key attributes of poly-
centric governance—the nature of the order generated by this system is 
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ambiguous and remains a subject of controversy. At the heart of this contro-
versy is the question of whether the program’s management system represents 
a move toward a more effective decentralized system of science governance or 
a step toward further bureaucratization of science. Theoretically, this question 
revolves around the nature of entry into the system—free, meritocratic, or 
spontaneous (Aligica and Tarko 2012, 254). Practically, the respective debate 
in Russia has centered on the role of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 
in overseeing digitalization.
The critics of the Digital Economy Program have been quick to note the 
absence of scientific organizations in its management system. They emphasize 
that the RAS, the main scientific organization responsible for determining 
research areas, including in the field of ICT, is not included in the management 
and implementation of the program. The absence of scientific organizations in 
the program’s management system is seen as evidence of an established post- 
Soviet trend of technological development without the involvement of domes-
tic scientific community (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017). The criticism goes 
further by suggesting that the program’s flexible management system with 
multiple centers of decision making is ill suited for governing science in Russia. 
According to Ivanov and Malineckij (2017, 11), such an approach has been 
tried before and proven ineffective in managing Russia’s scientific and techno-
logical complex. It leads to the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
increases its costs while reducing the quality of policy.
An alternative view suggests that the absence of the RAS in the govern-
ment’s digital economy programs and initiatives is not coincidental, and that 
the Academy has traditionally been dismissive of Information Technologies 
(IT) professionals. As a result, information technologies were “pushed out” 
from the RAS. Currently, only a few IT sectors are represented in the RAS such 
as supercomputer computing and onboard software. According to Gorbunov- 
Posadov (2018), the academy cannot keep up with the pace of development of 
the IT industry, which puts its capacity to function as a universal body of 
national scientific expertise into question.
These opposing views were reflected in the controversial RAS reform and its 
public perception. The reform, launched in 2013, originally envisaged the dis-
solution of the RAS, which caused a negative reaction in scientific circles and 
led to a wave of protests across Russia. Without going into the details of the 
reform process, it suffices to note that significant changes in the management 
system of Russian science were made in 2018. The Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education of the Russian Federation was established in May 2018, with 
all institutes of the RAS subsequently falling under its jurisdiction. Amendments 
to the Law on Science and the Law on the RAS redefined and strengthened the 
role of the academy in the management system of Russian science. Specifically, 
the changes reaffirmed a key role of the RAS in the design and implementation 
of Russia’s scientific and technological development strategy (Mehanik 2019).
Pursuant to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 
16 of January 17, 2018, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education formed 
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Councils in seven priority areas of scientific and technological development of 
the Russian Federation (IMEMO 2019). The first priority area and the name 
of the corresponding Council is “transition to digital, intelligent production 
technologies, robotic systems, new materials and methods of design, creation 
of big data processing systems, machine learning and artificial intelligence.” Its 
functions include formulating and monitoring of scientific and technological 
programs and projects in this area as well as providing expert and analytical 
support for the implementation of Russia’s scientific and technological devel-
opment priorities. Among the members of the Council are academicians, rep-
resentatives of leading research centers and universities, big business, federal 
executive bodies, and state corporations (RAS 2018).
Thus, the Council oversees digitalization within the framework of the 
Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian 
Federation but is far from the only institution responsible for the formation of 
Russia’s digital economy. Other programs and initiatives in this area include 
the Digital Economy Program and the National Technology Initiative, with 
their own teams and management systems. Additionally, most ministries have 
their own digitalization programs. Whereas critics insist that the duplication of 
functions and incontinency between various programs within this framework is 
a result of a poorly coordinated system of management (Chujkov 2019), it 
could also be argued that it is a result of a delicate compromise between the 
government, the RAS, and other stakeholders. Even though the role of the 
Academy has been strengthened, the existence of multiple decision-making 
centers prevents the monopolization of scientific expertise and allows competi-
tion between different ideas to take place. Thus, the polycentric structure of 
the Digital Economy Program’s management system is amplified on a broader 
scale of Russia’s digital economy governance where this program coexists with 
other digitalization initiatives.
4.6  crItIcIsM of the PrograM and Weaknesses 
of the governMent’s dIgItalIzatIon strategy
4.6.1  Imitation and Copying of Western Models
In the post-Soviet economy, the practice of borrowing ideas and approaches 
from foreign programs has become widespread. According to Ivanov and 
Malineckij (2017, 4), the Digital Economy Program, which is based on the 
recommendations of the World Economic Forum, was no exception. This 
copying of Western models inevitably affects the content and quality of the 
program. The emphasis is not on essential, critical matters but on external 
issues such as places in the ratings and keeping up with technological trends. 
Furthermore, the program does not proceed from the ability to produce new 
types of products but from the interests of a “qualified consumer.” In the 
broader sense, the common criticism of the program is that it does not deal 
4 RUSSIA’S DIGITAL ECONOMY PROGRAM: AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY… 
66
with the economy as such or, more precisely, changing the technological base, 
which would lead to socio-economic transformations. The program focuses 
predominantly on the development of key institutions and infrastructure of the 
digital economy while “practically nothing is said about production, distribu-
tion or consumption” (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 4). As Loginov (2017) 
notes, “a lot and even too much is said about the ‘digital’ and practically noth-
ing about the ‘economy.’” The program does not provide a clear answer as to 
how the “digital” would fit into the economy.
The fallacy of the catch-up logic of the program is highlighted by the gov-
ernment’s expert council in their conclusion on the program’s first draft. The 
goal of the program, according to the expert council, was not to advance 
Russia’s development but rather to raise the digitalization level of its economy 
to the current level of developed countries by 2025. This means that by that 
time Russia will need a new program for the development of the digital econ-
omy, since one of the fundamental characteristics of the ICT sphere is the rapid 
introduction of new technologies, the emergence of which cannot be foreseen 
today (Demidov 2017).
4.6.2  Emphasis on Services to the Detriment of Production
Since the program is implicitly aimed at raising the digitalization level of the 
Russian economy to that of developed countries, it makes sense to briefly 
examine the industries and services that comprise the high-tech sector in devel-
oped economies. The US statistics, for example, distinguishes five high-tech 
manufacturing industries—pharmaceutical industry, semiconductor manufac-
turing, production of scientific and measuring equipment, production of com-
munication equipment, and aerospace industry. The foundation of all these 
industries is electronics (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 8). There are also five 
service industries that comprise the high-tech sector of the US economy—
business, financial, and communication services, education, and healthcare. 
Looking at the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possible 
to conclude that it is focused on service industries while neglecting the high- 
tech manufacturing sector, the development of which is blocked in Russia.
One of the main criticisms of the program is that it does not provide mea-
sures for the development of Russian electronic components and systems (èle-
mentnaâ komponentnaâ baza). At the same time, many of the program’s 
objectives require the development of electronic components (Loginov 2017). 
Specifically, the digital transformation of industry, or Industry 4.0, cannot 
occur without a national technological base, including the industry of domestic 
micromechanics and nanoelectronics (Sitnikov 2017). Micro-Electro 
Mechanical Systems (MEMS) top the list of technologies necessary for the 
development of Industry 4.0. In Russia, these technologies are developed 
within the framework of Rusnano’s programs.7 Critics consider them ineffec-
tive, lamenting that Russia still has “ancient” technological competencies at the 
level of classical mechanics and limited laser processing capabilities. That is, it 
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is capable of producing parts with an accuracy of 0.1 mm on its equipment 
whereas the standard for global leaders in this field is 0.0001 mm.
One possible initiative in this regard could be the creation of a national 5G 
network based on Russian equipment (Loginov 2017). However, the pro-
gram’s activities in this field are limited to “assessing the capabilities” of the 
domestic industry to produce telecommunications equipment. As Loginov 
(2017) accurately points out, the domestic capabilities of building 4G net-
works were already assessed in 2011, but as a result, the networks were mod-
ernized using Chinese equipment. The program includes a number of target 
indicators for the development of domestic telecommunications industry, spe-
cifically increasing the share of domestic products in the purchases of software 
by federal and regional executive bodies and state-owned companies. However, 
in the absence of concrete measures for the revival of Russian telecommunica-
tions industry, it is unlikely that the program will meet these targets (Sneps- 
Sneppe et al. 2018, 39).
4.6.3  Preservation of Technological Dependence
Most of the communications equipment and software in Russia is of foreign 
origin. Russia is critically dependent on the import of IT equipment (from 80% 
to 100% for various categories) and software (about 75%) (Aptekman et  al. 
2017, 43). In 2016, the volume of sales of smartphones in Russia amounted to 
about 30 million units; the sales of personal computers—about 5 million units. 
The share of products of Russian manufacturers, which are built almost com-
pletely on the basis of foreign components, is miniscule in these volumes, just 
a few percent (Betelin 2017, 24). As another example, the networks of 
Rostelecom, Russia’s largest provider of digital services, have until recently 
been the arena of struggle between two American companies—Cisco Systems 
and Juniper Networks (Sneps-Sneppe et  al. 2018, 37). Rostelecom’s main 
project is a high-speed internet protocol (IP) network built entirely with the 
products developed by Juniper Networks.
The preservation of technological dependence runs counter to the Strategy 
of National Security and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological 
Development of the Russian Federation (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 7). The 
critical dependence on imported components carries serious risks for the 
national security. It also blocks the development of many sectors of the domes-
tic industry. The existing experience of using borrowed solutions in microelec-
tronics indicates that Russian enterprises have access to technology and 
technical solutions with a lag of two or more generations, and the amount of 
payments for their use ranges from 30% to 80% of development costs and up to 
50% in mass production (Betelin 2017, 23). This is one of the main reasons 
why the semiconductor industry in Russia is not significant in economic or 
social terms. There is a risk that the implementation of the Digital Economy 
Program and the related National Technology Initiative will not lead to Russia 
gaining any significant share of the new global high-tech markets. Without 
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developing domestic electronics industry, the transition to the digital economy 
can be considered only in the context of purchases of electronic equipment 
abroad, including for defense and security. This would require addressing an 
additional problem of “non-declared capabilities” or the detection of hidden 
functions of the supplied equipment, permitting unauthorized control (Ivanov 
and Malineckij 2017, 8).
4.6.4  Lack of Scientific Support
One of the criticisms of the program’s management system is the absence of 
scientific organizations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 11). With regard specifi-
cally to the ICT infrastructure, Sneps-Sneppe et  al. (2018, 41) note that 
Russian scientific research institutes, industrial science, and professional scien-
tists are not involved in addressing systemic issues of infrastructure develop-
ment and the preparation of relevant conceptual documents. The lack of 
scientific support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not 
provide sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensur-
ing Russia’s economic leadership.
Available studies suggest that the products of the leaders of the global mar-
kets of semiconductors, electronic products, and software, such as INTEL, 
AMD, IBM, and Microsoft currently form the basis for the development of the 
digital economy (Betelin 2017, 24). In these conditions, the main risks and 
challenges for the formation of Russia’s digital economy stem from the lack of 
similar companies in Russia that carry proportionate economic and social 
weight. While the program envisions the creation of ten large high-tech com-
panies by 2024, it lacks actual measures for stimulating domestic electronics 
industry and relies on modernization of the communications network based on 
imported equipment. Such modernization efforts are likely to result in the 
reduction of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth 
(Loginov 2017).
Even though the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development 
of the Russian Federation (2016) defines the key role of Russian fundamental 
science in ensuring the country’s readiness for grand challenges and timely 
assessment of the risks associated with scientific and technological develop-
ment, in practice the program relies on the use of foreign scientific results and 
technologies (Strategija 2016; Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 12). One of the 
stated objectives of the program is the creation of a support system for explor-
atory and applied research on the digital economy, which is supposed to ensure 
technological independence of each of the globally competitive cross-cutting 
technologies (Programma 2017, 11). However, relevant activities do not 
include basic (fundamental) research. Thus, the criticism of such an approach 
is that it cannot in principle ensure technological independence in ICT because 
new technologies can be created only on the basis of systematic results of 
exploratory and fundamental research (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 12).
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4.6.5  Lack of Reliable ICT Infrastructure
A number of studies note that the ICT infrastructure is relatively well devel-
oped in Russia, with digital services available for the majority of the country’s 
population (Aptekman et al. 2017, 36). On this basis, some analysts even point 
out that it is “completely unnecessary” for the government “to try to control 
or stimulate this process” (Loginov 2017). This view suggests that Russian 
telecom companies are able to deal with the infrastructural issues on their own, 
at the level of their commercial needs.
Sneps-Sneppe et al. (2018) offer an alternative point of view from the per-
spective of telecom professionals. The basis of information and communication 
infrastructure, the information space of any country, is the next-generation 
network (NGN), which provides a user with universal broadband access to an 
unlimited range of ICT services. Has such an infrastructure been developed in 
Russia, and who is building it? The construction of next-generation networks 
in Russia has been carried out by private capital to make a profit from providing 
access to the Internet and related services. This is done without taking into 
account the task of creating the foundation of the country’s digital infrastruc-
ture—a single telecommunications network of the Russian Federation, as 
required by the current law “O svâzi” (On Communications) and the interests 
of the state and society. The result, according to the authors, is the uncertainty 
of the architecture, location, and connectivity of the traffic exchange nodes of 
the composite network and the inability to manage it even in emergency situa-
tions. This “conglomerate of private fragments of the global Internet” cannot 
be used as an infrastructure for the networks that require high reliability and 
security of information exchange, which relates to the objectives of the Digital 
Economy Program (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018, 40–41). The ICT infrastructure 
cannot be developed solely on the commercial basis. It has to meet the needs 
of the state, governance, and national security, in addition to being an increas-
ingly important factor in improving the quality of life of the citizens.
Examining the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possi-
ble to make the following observations. First, despite the emphasis on the 
infrastructure development in the program and the key role of Rostelecom in 
this area, the main efforts are aimed at the provision of new ICT services. The 
program’s activities do not include the development of technical means (Sneps- 
Sneppe et  al. 2018, 40). The program is oriented toward the spread of the 
Internet and higher-level tasks such as satellite communications and 5G net-
work without addressing the prior issue of the lack of a unified telecommunica-
tion network. Second, the risks associated with the ongoing modernization of 
private networks on the basis of next-generation technologies such as Software- 
Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and 5G 
are not adequately addressed in the program. Third, the program focuses on 
the Internet, or regulation of IP packets, whereas the existing law “On 
Communications” is still oriented toward traditional networks and communi-
cation services. The actual meaning of such basic terms of the law as “federal 
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communications,” “a single (edinaâ) telecommunication network,” and “a 
public telecommunications network” has changed dramatically. To date, this 
has not been reflected in the legal framework and mechanisms for regulating 
the development of the domestic telecommunications sector (Sneps-Sneppe 
et al. 2018, 40). Despite the long list of measures in the program aimed at 
improving legal regulation of the digital economy, these specific problems of 
the current legal framework are not addressed.
4.7  conclusIon
The state program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” can be seen 
as the government’s latest attempt to approach the task of Russia’s moderniza-
tion in new technological conditions. For Russia to fully harness the economic 
and social benefits of the digital revolution, digital technologies have to become 
the key factor in the modernization of Russian industries as well as the creation 
of completely new industries and markets, which requires a targeted and sys-
temic state support based on a clear and coherent strategy. In this regard, the 
Digital Economy Program is an important milestone representing the Russian 
government’s concerted effort to envision the medium-term future of the digi-
tal economy in Russia and draft a comprehensive strategy in this area, even as 
it falls short in terms of its potential transformative effect on Russian industry.
Given the current state of development of domestic ICT equipment and 
software, the digitalization of Russian economy deserves the status of a strate-
gic task. Such a strategic orientation, especially in the broader context of a shift 
from the management of hydrocarbon exports to technology governance, is 
extremely important. At the same time, the experience of post-Soviet develop-
ment shows that the main problem lies not in ideas but in their implementa-
tion. One of the main reasons past economic initiatives were not successful is 
that they were made without sufficient scientific assessment based on very gen-
eral considerations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 3). As the analysis shows, 
some of the same mistakes are repeated in the case of the Digital Economy 
Program.
Even though the program’s management system with its multiple decision 
centers and an evolving overarching system of rules governing digitalization 
resembles a polycentric structure, which in theory is suitable for managing 
complex areas such as science, the advantages of this system in Russia’s case 
seem questionable. Alternatively, more attention should be paid to the nature 
of entry into this system. At present, the multiplicity of decision centers in the 
program’s governance structure masks the insufficient involvement of scientific 
organizations, which is reflected in the program’s content. The lack of scientific 
support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not justify the 
role of the digital economy in ensuring Russia’s economic leadership or pro-
vide measures for stimulating domestic electronics industry.
Although the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development 
defines the key role of Russian fundamental science in the assessment of 
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challenges associated with scientific and technological development, in practice 
the program relies on foreign scientific results and technologies. Thus, the 
government attempts to address an important technological problem without 
using domestic scientific potential. This affects the content and quality of the 
program, which proceeds from the interests of a “qualified consumer” and 
focuses on the spread of the Internet and provision of new ICT services while 
neglecting the critical state of Russian electronic components and systemic 
issues of ICT infrastructure development.
The program is too concise and general, and consequently, does not provide 
sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensuring 
Russia’s economic leadership or allow an adequate assessment of possible risks 
and challenges. The program defines multiple target indicators but does not 
provide evidence that the achievement of these indicators will reduce Russia’s 
technological gap with leading countries. Furthermore, it lacks actual measures 
for stimulating domestic electronics industry and relies on the modernization 
of the communications network based on imported equipment. The critical 
dependence on imported components blocks the development of many sectors 
of the domestic industry and runs counter to the Strategy of National Security 
and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the 
Russian Federation. Without developing domestic electronics industry, the 
transition to the digital economy can be considered only in the context of pur-
chases of electronic equipment abroad, which is likely to result in the reduction 
of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth.
notes
1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are author’s own.
2. Presidential Decree No. 204 of May 7, 2018 “O nacional’nyh celâh i strategičeskih 
zadačah razvitiâ Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2024 goda” (On the national 
goals and strategic objectives of development of the Russian Federation for the 
period up to 2024).
3. On July 19, 2018, the Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects 
was reorganized into the Council for Strategic Development and National 
Projects (“Ob uporâdočenii” 2018).
4. The Digital Economy Program (2017) had five areas. In the process of its trans-
formation into the national program (2018), the areas became federal projects 
and their number increased to six.
5. This area was changed to “Digital Technologies” in the national program. The 
federal project “Digital Public Administration” was also added to the areas over-
seen by the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media 
(Pasport 2018).
6. ICT analysts see this amount of funding as insufficient (Ustinova 2019). The 
largest amount of funds is allocated to information infrastructure whereas the 
funding of regulation and information security is quite modest. The final budget 
of the national program is also smaller compared to earlier estimates of 3.5 trillion 
rubles in total funding (Posypkina and Balenko 2018).
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7. Rusnano was the largest investor in SiTime, “an industry leader in development 
of MEMS-based high-performance oscillators and silicon timing solutions” that 
was acquired by Megachips in October 2014 (Rusnano 2011; Yoshida 2014).
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“The law is a seamless web,” states an old metaphor, meaning that law could 
be logically explained and that every new decision affects every legal proposi-
tion to a certain degree (Katsh 1993, 403). This metaphor, which originated in 
the common law context, has recently began to mean something else, that is, 
how we communicate and how we work with information. The shift from print 
to electronic information technologies provides the law with a new environ-
ment, one that is less fixed, less structured, less stable, and, consequently, more 
versatile and volatile. Law is a process that is oriented around working with 
information. As new modes of working with information emerge, the law can-
not be expected to function or to be viewed in the same manner as it was in an 
era in which print was the primary communication medium. Going digital or 
online has profoundly affected the ways we practice law, as well as lawmaking 
and law functioning.
Russian state has been intensively digitalizing in the past decades. In 2009, 
Russian agencies, local governments, courts, and the Department of Justice 
were obliged to provide all information about their activities online, thus final-
izing the process of going digital (Federal Law N 8-FZ 2009; Federal Law N 
262-FZ 2008; Strategy of the Development of Information Society 2008). 
The first steps toward legal provisions for using digital information came in 
1984, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) issued its standard 
for unified systems of documentation—GOST—that outlined requirements for 
documents stored or created using computer technologies (USSR State 
Committee on Standards 1984). The 1984 standard responded to increasing 
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demand on behalf of the Soviet legal system to handle electronic documents 
following the State Commercial Arbitration Court’s guidance on the usage of 
e-documents as evidence and the Supreme Court’s ruling allowing the use of 
e-documents in litigation and pleading (The State Arbitrage of the USSR 
1979; The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR 1982). The country 
entered the 1990s equipped with relevant legislation, which continued to be in 
force even during profound political and legal reforms. Taking a course toward 
democracy, access and openness of information became primary principles of 
legislation, at least on paper. At the same time, pressures from transitions to a 
market economy pushed legislation to accommodate models of electronic 
commerce, facsimile and electronic signatures, and other digital means of 
transactions (Art. 160.2 and 434.2 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation; 
Federal Law N 1-FZ 2002). By the time the concept of open government, that 
is that citizens have the right to access the documents and proceedings of the 
government to allow for effective public oversight (Evans and Campos 2013), 
gained the attention of the Russian government in the late 1990s, Russian 
society and state agencies had sufficient experience in working with electronic 
documents and a good level of computer literacy (Vinogradova and Moiseeva 
2015; Fedorov 2009).
Scholars call the increasing of electronic document processing “technicaliza-
tion” or “electronification” (Gilles 2014). Legal scholarship, both in the sub-
fields of law and technology (i.e., cyberlaw) and law and society (i.e., sociolegal 
studies), has struggled with theorization and analysis of technological change. 
Though largely ignored in sociolegal studies, the law’s relationship to technol-
ogy is central to the field of cyberlaw, where it is portrayed as linear: a new 
technology is presented to society and the law must move quickly to respond 
to the disorder technology creates (Jones 2018). The debate on “technological 
exceptionalism” in cyberlaw was started by Ryan Calo, who explained that 
technological exceptionalism occurs
when [a technology’s] introduction into the mainstream requires a systematic 
change to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or if necessary, dis-
place, an existing balance of values. (Calo 2015, 552)
For any national legal system, this means that law needs to adapt to new 
technologies, which poses the question of to which degree this adaptation 
influences legal contents and legal values (Keen 2010). This question is specifi-
cally important for the Russian legal context in connection with contemporary 
problematic approaches to governance and democracy.
In this chapter, we will focus on legal transformations as a result of two 
important developments in Russia: Russia’s adaptation of the concept of open 
government and Russia’s joining digital economy. Both processes led to the 
development of e-justice, that included not only digitalization of legal docu-
ments, but development of new legal digital platforms, provision of safe legal 
environment for economic transactions online (such as blockchain) and 
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necessity to establish new means of internet control in relation to cybercrime 
and data protection.
5.2  open Government project 
and dIGItalIzatIon of law
In Russia, the concept of open government was introduced in 2002 by the 
federal target program “Èlektronnaâ Rossiâ” (Electronic Russia). The docu-
ment stated that it aimed at
improving the quality of mutual communication between the state and society by 
expanding the access to information about activities of the state agencies, improv-
ing efficiency of providing state and municipal services, introducing unified stan-
dards of population services. (Federal Target Program “Electronic Russia” 2002)
The program followed the notion of open government as closely related to 
information status, where more information is published and, at some stage, 
the quality of information is an indicator of such openness. The program first 
provided legal foundations for extensive utilization of information and com-
munication technologies (ICT) in regard to open government and available 
data, as well as increased communication among all stakeholders. At the time, 
the idea was closely linked with four major dimensions in open government: 
service provision to citizens and businesses, government performance improve-
ment, social inclusion and development, and e-democracy and participation 
(Evans and Campos 2013). Russians quickly learned to be digital citizens 
(Rasskazova and Soldatova 2014). Digital citizens are generally identified as 
“those who use the Internet regularly and effectively” (Mossberger et  al. 
2008). Not only this, but digital citizenship means the ability to use technol-
ogy competently; to interpret and understand digital content and to assess its 
credibility; to create, research, and communicate with appropriate tools; to 
think critically about the ethical opportunities and challenges of the digital 
world; and to make safe, responsible, respectful choices online (Ribble 2015). 
This became evident when digital platforms started working in Russia by 2010. 
The “Electronic Russia” program experienced a number of problems, includ-
ing funding and absence of efficient cooperation between relevant agencies 
(Irkhin 2007). However, it provided a framework for development of 
e- platforms that facilitated access to state services and, as part of it, legal ser-
vices. One of the first platforms—Edinyj portal gosudarstvennyh uslug i funkcij 
(Public Services Portal, https://www.gosuslugi.ru/), or Gosuslugi (StateService) 
for short—which started running in 2010, provided initial access to legal ser-
vices such as facilitating the issuance of a variety of ID papers (international and 
domestic passports, driving license, and so on), or access to any court’s deci-
sion in relation to them. Russians were initiated into e-law by allowing them to 
review and pay traffic and other penalties via Gosuslugi online without dealing 
with the authorities in person. These days, the majority of state and law-related 
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actions could be initiated or done online with a Gosuslugi account, including 
launching a criminal or civil complaint, or submitting evidence to the commer-
cial courts (see the next section). Since its launch and initial 335,000 users, 
Gosuslugi has developed into an e-service of everyday use with 86 million users 
and 582 million logins every day in 2018 (Tadviser 2019).
Together with Gosuslugi, main legal actors, as per the 2009 law, opened 
their webpages for interactional use. In 2006, GAS (Gosudarstvennaâ avtom-
atizirovannaâ sistema, State Automated System) “Pravosudie” (Justice, 
https://sudrf.ru/) was launched: it includes digital copies of decisions and 
judgments of all level courts in the Russian Federation. In 2016, commercial 
arbitration courts in the Russian Federation launched Moi Arbitr (My Arbiter, 
https://my.arbitr.ru/) portal, which allows for the submission of all paper-
work related to a pending case online. In 2017, the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation also opened an online possibility (http://www.supcourt.
ru/appeals/) to launch a complaint via its website using a Gosuslugi account. 
Once the possibility to use e-services became available, Russians started 
increasingly using them: in 2019, almost 70 percent of all complaints, 
addresses, and requests to state agencies are communicated online (Upravlenie 
Prezidenta po rabote s obraŝeniâmi graždan i organizacij [Administration of 
the President for Work with Citizens and Organizations] 2019; for more, also 
see Chap. 22).
Political scientists point to a lack of democracy and classify the Russian 
regime as authoritarian (Ambrosio 2016). Linde and Karlsson suggest that 
authoritarian regimes set up e-government as a response to pressures of global-
ization, as well as to demonstrate modernity and legitimacy to the international 
community (Linde and Karlsson 2013). At the same time, others argue that 
this hypothesis does not account for variations of e-government across differ-
ent types of authoritarian regimes. Maerz (2016), in her qualitative assessment 
of four post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, points to crucial differences of how 
e-government is used to legitimate authoritarianism. While the noncompetitive 
regimes of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan create their web presences primarily 
for an international audience, she finds a surprising citizen-responsiveness on 
websites of the competitive regimes of Kazakhstan and Russia. Russians exer-
cise their rights by extensive use of digital services and online participation in 
state, electoral, and judicial institutions, thus proving their interest in active 
citizenship (for more, see Chap. 3).
5.3  e-justIce: dIGItalIzatIon and leGal procedure
The concept of e-justice can be interpreted in multiple ways. A broad definition 
of e-justice can cover ICT usage in the areas of crime prevention, administra-
tion of justice, and law enforcement (Xanthoulis 2010). Furthermore, e-justice 
for the administration of justice contains multiple subareas. These include 
usage of information technologies (IT) in general, electronic methods for com-
munication (e.g., e-mail, videoconferencing), electronic case management 
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systems, and court room technology. E-justice can even offer citizens elec-
tronic services such as online access to case files. The Russian e-justice system 
developed via incorporating these subareas and trying to deal with difficulties 
in managing open access and data protection policies at the same time.
The development and implementation of an e-justice system entails, by its 
own nature, the reshaping of “institutions,” norms, and conventions that pro-
vide an implicit context for the performance of practices. In a process that 
Giovan Francesco Lanzara (2009) tries to capture with the concept of assem-
blage, e-justice systems are built linking and reshaping heterogeneous compo-
nents and building blocks of technological, which are organizational and 
normative in nature. The new system comes from reusing, copying, adapting, 
and hooking together existing components, more than developing from scratch. 
In this process, different uses of technical, organizational, and normative com-
ponents generate more or less visible shifts in their features and meanings of law 
and legal values, features and meanings (such as, for example, the very notion of 
justice) that are often invisible and taken for granted by the community of prac-
titioners dealing with them. New actors, such as technological partners and 
network providers, make their appearance. Power and organizational borders 
alter, as “who-does-what” changes in the translation of procedures from paper 
to digital and from one form of digital to another (Velicogna 2011).
In Russia, the assemblage in terms of e-justice works quite efficiently. Russian 
e-justice system includes two key units. The first is a secured videoconference 
net, connecting all courts of the Russian Federation with direct access to the 
Internet through overt streaming video broadcasting channels, such as popular 
video hosting. The second is a group of portals of GAS “Pravosudie” on the 
Internet providing access for any person anywhere in the world with up-to-date 
information of the work of federal courts. The key principle of this portal’s 
functioning is to ensure transparency of justice, both in respect to procedures 
and access to the judicial acts in controversial cases. The system of commercial 
arbitration courts also has its own videoconference net and portal—Moi Arbitr 
(My Arbitrator). Both change ways and practices of administering justice and 
access to justice.
In terms of administering justice, the e-justice system in Russia allows for 
effective and cost-efficient notification of the date, time, and place of court 
hearings to all parties of a particular proceeding. There is a mailing system 
through e-mail on the portals of the GAS “Pravosudie,” Moi Arbitr, and 
Gosuslugi. One can download mobile applications supporting push notifica-
tions for new events and documents. Experts note that wide-scale adoption of 
these information technologies into work practices of the justice system has 
another advantage: it offers wide opportunities for court statistics to be auto-
mated and hence, early detection of court red tape and other procedural viola-
tions. When every judge in Russia is under restrictions to provide procedural 
documents in due time and up-to-date information of cases available on servers 
of the system, the court procedure and administration become more respon-
sible and performance discipline sustainable on the proper level (Soloviev and 
Filippov 2013; Bykodorova 2015; Bonner 2018).
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With electronic access to courtrooms both in civil and criminal justice that 
opened on January 1, 2017, Russian citizens could easily launch an e- complaint 
via already-existing systems Gosuslugi and GAS “Pravosudie.” Since 2017, the 
number of complaints using GAS “Pravosudie” has doubled and now comprise 
more than 10 percent of all complaints to Russian courts (Epifanova 2019). 
The majority of complaints come from businesses. However, using digital plat-
forms increased the demand for attorneys who now become intermediaries 
between citizens and courts: it is often them who file an electronic complaint, 
so their skill set has changed to include digital literacy and technical ability to 
navigate digital services. The possibility of launching a complaint online also 
generated a debate on the future of Russian justice system: if the country was 
heading toward “digital judges” and “digital attorneys.” In January 2017, 
Vadim Kulik, the deputy head of the executive board of Sberbank, announced 
that legal robot, which Sberbank had launched in 2016, would result in 3000 
positions being vacated.1 German Gref, the chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Sberbank, also confirmed that they would stop hire lawyers without digital 
skills (Savkin 2017).
The most crucial improvement with introduction of e-justice as legal profes-
sionals see it is an automated process of assigning cases which should increase 
judicial independence and transparency (Nagornaja 2019). However, the con-
sensus is that while artificial intelligence (AI) -based technologies are a positive 
improvement, they cannot substitute a human legal professional (Kurash 
2017). At the same time, digital economies and legal provisions for online 
transactions have demonstrated that in the processes that could be automated 
via using algorithms, the usage of AI-based legal technologies is warranted. 
Russian government has been quite apt to push for legislation that supports 
commercial and business digital environments by introducing such notions as 
“digital rights” into its civil legislation and allowing “smart-contracts,” which 
is essentially automated service for execution of legal contract. These changes 
have been happening at the background of Russian e-justice debate and are 
discussed in the next section in more detail.
5.4  law and dIGItal economy: BlockchaIn 
and crowdfundInG
The original digitalization of economic transactions required fundamental 
changes in laws protecting data and ensuring the safety of emerging digital 
economies. Moving to cryptocurrency and online transactions using block-
chain involved serious changes in civil, business, and commercial law that regu-
lated market economy not only in Russia but also globally. Economic 
relationships involving cryptocurrency and blockchain tokens have become 
more organized and less volatile. Several countries are attempting to create a 
comfortable business and regulatory climate for prospective actors in this 
sphere (On the development of the digital economy 2017; Cryptocurrency 
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Offerings 2017). In October 2017, Vladimir Putin instructed the government 
and Central Bank of Russia to draft provisions regulating blockchain, crypto-
currency, smart-contracts, and tokens (Presidential Instruction On Digital 
Economy) by July 1, 2018. In March 2018, State Duma received draft laws 
“Ob al’ternativnyh sposobah privlečeniâ investirovaniâ” (On alternative means 
for attracting investments) and “O cifrovyh finansovyh aktivah” (On digital 
financial assets).
Discussions on the legal nature of blockchain tokens intensified in Russia as 
it became the subject matter in a bankruptcy proceeding in the case of Car’kov 
v. Financial manager Leonov. Car’kov, an insolvent individual, possessed a cer-
tain amount of bitcoins. A bankruptcy proceedings manager discovered the 
bitcoins and asked the commercial court of the city of Moscow to include them 
in bankruptcy assets. The court denied the request because Russian legislation 
does not regulate cryptocurrencies. The Ninth Commercial Appellate Court 
rectified this mistake. The court considered that Car’kov could exercise similar 
rights regarding bitcoins on his account as a property owner would exercise 
toward one’s property. The court noted that the Russian civil procedure legis-
lation establishes a list of property that cannot be levied. Cryptocurrency does 
not fall under such exceptions. Therefore, the court decided to include crypto-
currency in bankruptcy assets. Despite the issue being resolved by the courts, 
bankruptcy proceedings were only one sphere, alongside taxation and inheri-
tance, affected by the lack of regulation of blockchain-based relations 
(Sannikova and Haritonova 2018, 88; Bessonova and Kasianov 2018, 69; 
Kuznecov and Chumachenko 2018, 100).
State Duma hesitated to pass the laws on the digital economy until in 
February 2019 Putin issued another Instruction setting the deadline for such 
laws for July 2019 (Presidential Instruction On implementing the Presidential 
Message to the Federal Assembly). In March 2019, State Duma amended the 
general part of the Russian Civil Code, the foundational source of civil law, 
with provisions aimed at regulating the digital economy. The legislator intro-
duced Art. 141.1 “Cifrovye prava” (Digital rights) to the Civil Code. Digital 
rights are a new object of civil rights in Russia. State Duma did not follow the 
draft law “On digital financial assets” or Russian legal commentaries suggesting 
to regulate cryptocurrencies as digital money, securities, or property (Sazhenov 
2018, 108; Kuznecov 2018, 99; Fedorov 2018, 54). The amendment defines 
digital rights by using a model that is rather close to the definition of securities 
in article 142 of the Civil Code. That decision follows the line outlined by 
Putin and Russian Central Bank representatives, that ruble will remain the only 
legal tender currency in Russia.
These amendments to the Civil Code introduced regulations for the smart- 
contracts—computer protocols that facilitate the execution of a contract. 
Formally, Russian legislator implemented the Presidential Instruction—the 
Civil Code regulates smart-contracts. At the same time, this amendment does 
not change Russian contract law. It introduces smart-contracts as a contractual 
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provision and not as a separate type of contract. A provision that parties could 
have agreed for prior to the amendments.
Establishing the category of digital rights and regulating smart-contracts in 
the Civil Code laid a foundation for the development of further regulations on 
the digital economy. The Government of Russia announced the aim to develop 
this sphere in the 2016 strategy for the development of small and mid-size 
businesses. In Clause IV(4), the strategy declares a goal of developing new 
solutions for alternative sources of financing, including crowdfunding, for 
high-tech companies. The 2017 Presidential Instruction on Digital Economy 
required to draft the laws regulating Initial Coin Offering (ICO) by July 2018. 
ICO is a fundraising method used by companies primarily offering blockchain- 
connected products or services. The draft law stated the goal of following the 
approaches that successfully implement developed countries (Explanatory 
Note to Draft Law on Crowdfunding). By October 2019, the law “On attract-
ing investments using the investment platforms (crowdfunding)” passed the 
third reading in the State Duma and enters into force from 2020. Before enact-
ment of this law, there were already companies acting as crowdfunding plat-
forms in Russia (Nekrasova and Shumejko 2017, 115). They needed to comply 
with the law by July 1, 2020.
A company can raise funds in an ICO by using different types of blockchain 
tokens. Most common types are utility tokens, investment tokens, and crypto-
currencies (Hacker and Thomale 2018, 108; Zetzsche et  al. 2018, 11–12). 
The crowdfunding law only regulates utility tokens. Investment tokens and 
cryptocurrencies fall out of its scope and remain in the legal vacuum. The cur-
rent law creates an ambiguity. On the one hand, it aims to regulate the relations 
in connection to investment—that is essential to attract investments. On the 
other hand, the law only defines utility tokens and avoids introducing invest-
ment tokens. The crucial component that distinguishes an investment token is 
the expectation of profits. In defining utility tokens, the Russian legislator 
excludes expectation of profits from what can be offered by utility tokens. The 
law thus creates a device whereby investors enter into investment relations 
without being able to receive an “investment” (in the true meaning of this 
term) in exchange for their contribution to a fundraising project. Such activity 
on behalf of the investors cannot be called investment. What they do is a pur-
chase of goods or services paid upfront.
The law does not account for the technological realities of current block-
chain crowdfunding platforms and excludes them from being recognized as an 
investment mechanism, denying legal protection to investors. Following Art. 
13(8) of the Crowdfunding law, investments on the investment platform can 
only be done using noncash money. The Committee on Economic Policy, 
Industry, Innovational Development, and Entrepreneurship pointed out (Draft 
federal law N 419090-7 2018), that such limitation will exclude platforms 
offering Initial Coin Offering (ICO) services. Those platforms are technically 
not capable of handling regular money and can only operate with investors 
who exchange their money into cryptocurrency first. The circle 
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closes—following Art. 8(7) of the law, utility digital rights can only originate 
within the investment platform and investment platforms can only operate with 
noncash money. ICO platforms cannot operate with noncash money and thus 
cannot become investment platforms.
The initiatives for implementing the digital economy and creating the infra-
structure for working with cryptocurrencies, smart-contracts, and ICO came 
from Vladimir Putin. In implementing these initiatives, State Duma failed to 
create a predictable regime that could compete with the leaders of digital econ-
omy like the United States, Switzerland, or Singapore. To reach the goal of 
securing alternative sources of financing for Russian small and mid-size busi-
nesses and reduce the capital flight from Russia, the legislation needed the 
introduction of investment digital rights. The law on crowdfunding could have 
done that. The Russian legislator took a cautious path by avoiding the regula-
tion of investment tokens. Such partial regulation will likely alarm investors 
and start-ups from setting up their business in Russia.
5.5  cyBerlaw and reGulatIon of runet
Moving online also requires new approaches to the regulation of cyberspace. 
Personal data protection becomes of primary concern (for more, see Chap. 6). 
The Russian government has tightened its control and supervision of cyber-
space significantly in the last decade. The academic literature often sees this 
process in the context of containing opposition and political protest (Maréchal 
2017; Ramesh et al. 2020). However, at the same time cyberspace faces chal-
lenges on its own and provides new opportunities for criminal or civil misbe-
havior, including the following: spreading of computer worms, viruses, bots, as 
well as other malware and spyware; illicitly accessing computers; exceeding 
authorized access; trafficking in information; enabling or facilitating unauthor-
ized activities in cyberspace; and using information, communications systems, 
and networks to embezzle, commit fraud, stalk and harass, or invade the pri-
vacy of others (Ryan et al. 2011). Therefore, regulating cyberspace falls under 
a variety of control tools that the government uses for both censorship and 
crime prevention.
Several government authorities actively participate in regulating and super-
vising the telecommunications sector. The most important ones include: 
Minkomsvâz’ (Ministry of Communications and Mass Media), Roskomnadzor 
(Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology 
and Mass Media), Rossvâz’ (Federal Communications Agency), and Rospec ̌at’ 
(Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications of the Russian 
Federation). As a result of administrative reform, conducted in 2004, minis-
tries define state policy and perform regulatory activities, while state services 
and agencies perform executive and supervisory functions (Bogdanovskaya 
et al. 2016).
Roskomnadzor is the main watchdog over the Runet and manages the 
information controls regime in Russia. It is tasked with a wide range of 
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competences, including silencing of mass media and audiovisual platforms, as 
well as management of a list of operators. In December 2011, the Ministry of 
Communications issued a new administrative regulation “O vedenii reestra 
operatorov, osusêstvlâûsîh obrabotku personal‘nyh dannyh’” (On introducing 
the register of operators processing personal data), which significantly 
increased data protection control. In 2012–2016, Federal Law N 149-FZ 
“Ob informacii, informacionnyh tehnologiâh i o zasîte informacii” (On 
Information, Information technologies and Protection of Information) was 
significantly amended to accommodate changes in relation to (1) a package of 
protectionist legislation prohibiting promotion of nontraditional sexual rela-
tions among minors and dissemination of information harmful to health and 
development of minors and (2) a package of security legislation known as 
“Yarovaya laws” (for more, see Chap. 6). The latest 2019 controversial 
amendment added Art. 15.1-1 limiting access to “indecent” information that 
insult human dignity and offend public decency, express blatant disrespect for 
the public, the state, official state symbols of the Russian Federation, 
Constitution of the Russian Federation (RF), or state agencies. These amend-
ments produced an increasing amount of complaints to Roskomandzor and 
Russian courts.2
Nathalie Maréchal (2017) argues that Russia does not view internet gover-
nance, cybersecurity, and media policy as separate domains, which enable 
strong information controls. Other scholars identify Russian policies as “decen-
tralized control” due to the lack of direct ownership of Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) by government authorities. This lowers their ability to unilater-
ally roll out technical censorship measures, instead pushing the state to enact 
controls via law and policy, compelling their network owners to comply, which 
subsequently significantly increases censorship (Ramesh et al. 2020).
5.6  conclusIons
Digitalization of law and legal services has positive and negative effects on 
human rights and everyday lives of citizens. Following global going online, 
Russia has achieved impressive results in providing e-services, as well as access 
to state and private digital information and resources. Access to e-courts 
removes certain barriers in accessing justice for vulnerable groups and makes 
litigation more transparent and effective. Digital citizens have a wide range of 
strategies to navigate cyberspace to improve their quality of life. However, 
these achievements have come at significant cost for law, the legal system, as 
well as public and private individuals, especially in an authoritarian political 
framework.
The ongoing legalization of judicial or procedural phenomena by the cre-
ation of e-justice or e-procedural norms also represents a strong move toward 
what is here called “formalization” or even hyperformalization, to an extent 
never before seen in history (Gilles 2014). This hyperformalization is needed 
for smoothing the work of ICTs and for efficiency of administering justice 
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online, but it often lacks flexibility and has a profound impact on quality and 
content of law. In the Russian case, law had been formalistic before the digital 
turn; it has become even more so since. This hyperformalization is positive for 
business and market economy, especially in a global dimension, but might be 
harmful for private citizens.
Digitalization of law has brought a new level of surveillance, censorship, and 
information control that has not been available before. The law once again 
serves as an instrument of political manipulation, which leads to even further 
formalization of procedures and uses of e-justice to curtail freedoms of speech 
and other human rights. High levels of securitization will demand a further 
increase in censorship and surveillance as Russia heads toward creating an 
internet “kill switch.” This would allow the Russian state to disconnect the 
Runet from the global network “in case of crisis,” without specifying what such 
a crisis might entail beyond vague allusions to the internet being shut off from 
the outside (Duffy 2015; Nocetti 2015). This uncertainly and mistrust of due 
process and the government’s intentions create further anxiety in civil society 
(for more, see Chap. 8), which consolidates its activism online, but feels a 
tightening surveillance and prosecution of its activities due to instrumental use 
of digital law. In this respect, Russia is an example of successful usage of e-gov-




2. According to the Roskomnadzor’s reports, the amount of complaints increased 
significantly between 2012 and 2013 from 26,287 to 86,274; by 2019, 154,914 
complaints had been filed. See Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, 
Information Technology and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. Report on 
the processing of communications from the citizens of the RF for 2018, available 
here: https://rkn.gov.ru/treatments/p436/.
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CHAPTER 6
Personal Data Protection in Russia
Alexander Gurkov
6.1  IntroductIon
Data protection is a recent area of law in Russia. The Russian State Duma 
enacted data protection laws only in 2006. Before that, the Russian 
Constitution’s (1993) articles 23 and 24 laid the foundations for data protec-
tion. Starting in 2014, the Russian legislator introduced major amendments to 
data protection regulations, allowing for more control by governmental agen-
cies over data flow.
The ideas of the Russian legislator are not unique in the global arena and 
were in some form implemented in other jurisdictions. This chapter uses EU 
conceptions of personal data protection as a point of reference. In 2018, the 
EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect and influ-
enced the development of the data protection sphere around the globe. As one 
of the most comprehensive data protection legislations implemented in the 
world, the GDPR is a good point of comparison.
After the introduction (Sect. 6.1), the chapter provides an overview of the 
legal framework of data protection in Russia (Sect. 6.2). This lays the founda-
tion for the next sections, which explain three important changes in Russian 
data protection legislation. These changes provided governmental agencies in 
Russia with more control over transferring information: introduction of a data 
localization requirement (Sect. 6.3), the Yarovaya law (Sect. 6.4), and regula-
tions aimed at creating a sovereign internet (Sect. 6.5). The chapter ends with 
a section analyzing the influence of a political case on the understanding of 
personal data by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, 
Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) and showing the 
A. Gurkov (*) 
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: alexander.gurkov@helsinki.fi
96
vague nature of legislative definitions that gives public authorities vast free-
doms in the application of regulations (Sect. 6.6).
Many Russian data protection legislative initiatives fall outside of world 
trends. Yet, some initiatives align Russian legislation with global trends, with 
the caveat that changes can be implemented when the government needs them 
to win a political case. This chapter shows the growing role and authority of 
Roskomnadzor, which will soon receive the potential to control the entirety of 
internet traffic in Russia and the ability to isolate the Russian internet. Some 
requirements of Russian data protection legislation are unprecedented in the 
world and are very costly for companies. Overall, the Russian legislator and 
various enforcement agencies act not with the aim of protecting individual 
rights in the sphere of personal data protection but with the aim of providing 
Russian authorities with more power to monitor and control the flow of data 
in Russia. This can be a legitimate aim given the fast development of personal 
data threats, but such an aim should be stated clearly and openly.
6.2  Ground rules
6.2.1  Legal Framework
Articles 23 and 24 of the Russian Constitution (1993) already show that the 
main subjects to which data protection legislation is directed are data subjects 
and data operators. These same ideas were reflected in the legislation.
Article 23 provides that “Everyone is entitled to privacy of personal life, 
personal and family secrets, protection of one’s honor and good name.” Privacy 
is the right to control information about oneself. The right to privacy is a uni-
versal human right and is recognized as such by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. It is the foun-
dation for the right to data protection. The right to data protection originates 
from privacy but is not a universal human right. It is aimed toward operators of 
personal data to ensure its fair processing. Correspondingly, article 24 of the 
Russian Constitution addresses operators of personal data. It requires that the 
“collection, storage, usage, and distribution of information on private life are 
not permitted without the approval of a person.” Before the enactment of spe-
cialized legislation, in December 2005 Russia ratified the 1981 Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (Council of Europe Convention). The Council of Europe Convention is 
a foundation on which several countries have built their data protection 
legislation.
In July 2007, the State Duma passed two laws dedicated to data protection: 
Federal Law No. 149-FZ “Ob informacii, informacionnyh tehnologiâh i o zasîte 
informacii” (On information, information technologies and data protection, 
Data Protection Act) and Federal Law No. 152-FZ “O personal’nyh dannyh” 
(Personal Data Law). The provisions of these acts were conventional and simi-
lar to those of the 1995 European Data Protection directive (Garrie and 
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Byhovsky 2017, 239). The Personal Data Law is the principal law regulating 
this sphere in Russia. It sets the purpose of personal data protection—securing 
the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen in processing one’s data 
(article 2).
Up until 2014, Russian data protection regulations did not stand out from 
the Council of Europe Convention. Following the terrorist acts in the city of 
Volgograd in 2013, the State Duma passed an anti-terrorist packet of legisla-
tion. A part of that package was the Federal Law of July 21, 2014, No. 242-FZ 
(Localization law), which introduced the localization requirement (more on 
that in Sect. 6.3). Apart from the Russian legislator, several authorities are 
competent to create data protection regulations. The Russian President, the 
Russian government, and Federal Services take active roles in this sphere (for 
more, see Chap. 3).
6.2.2  Enforcing Authorities
Among public authorities, Roskomnadzor plays the most active role. Dmitry 
Medvedev established Roskomnadzor in 2008 (Decree of the President No. 
1715). Roskomnadzor reports to the Ministry of Digital Development, 
Communications and Mass Media (Ministry of Communications). It has many 
important competencies such as monitoring mass media and keeping the reg-
istries of data operators and prohibited websites (Resolution of the Government 
on Roskomnadzor). When it comes to specific powers of Roskomnadzor, the 
vector of activity of this Federal Service derogates from the direction in which 
personal data protection is aimed—securing individual rights and freedoms. 
Following article 23 of the Data Protection Act, Roskomnadzor can investigate 
and initiate control and supervision of data operators, without regard to viola-
tion of personal rights of individuals. It acts without regard to whether those 
individuals whose data is processed have any claims to data operators. As a 
result, the activity of Roskomnadzor is directed toward the protection of data 
as such and not toward the protection of individual rights affected by data 
processing (Tereshhenko 2018, 146).
Apart from Roskomnadzor, a few other authorities exercise their power in 
enforcing data protection policy in Russia. The Office of the Prosecutor is 
responsible for prosecuting criminal actions related to infringement of data 
protection. The Federal Service on Technical and Export Control is responsi-
ble for supervising the safety of personal data within the informational infra-
structure of Russia.
6.2.3  Main Categories of Data Protection Legislation
The main categories that define data protection legislation in Russia are data, 
personal data, data operators, data processing, and transfer of personal data. 
Article 2(1) of the Data Protection Act defines information as any data irre-
spective of its form of representation. Following article 3(1) of the Personal 
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Data Law, personal data is any information directly or indirectly related to a 
certain or identifiable individual (data subject). The law will not protect data 
that does not relate to an identifiable individual (anonymized data). Following 
this definition, it could be hard to differentiate between technical data and 
personal data, as almost any transaction made on the internet will constitute 
personal data (Bauer et al. 2015, 2).
When it comes to establishing the criteria of what counts as an identifiable 
individual, Roskomnadzor’s practices may create some ambiguity. For exam-
ple, in 2017 the Pension Fund of Russia leaked information containing full 
names and surnames of its clients, their taxpayer numbers, and information 
about their pension savings. As per the response of the Pension Fund, these do 
not constitute a data breach, as such data does not allow to identify a person 
(Tereshhenko 2018, 152). Roskomnadzor did not respond to this breach with 
any action. As much as the Pension Fund wanted to keep the breach harmless, 
information that contains names, surnames, and identity numbers is without a 
doubt personal data. Senior officials of Roskomnadzor stated in a 2015 com-
mentary to the Personal Data Law that an individual taxpayer number allows 
to clearly identify a natural person (Gafurova et al. 2015, 16).
The Personal Data Law differentiates between categories of personal data. 
According to article 10 of the law, a special regulation applies to data relating 
to racial and national identity, political views, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
health conditions, and intimate life. The processing of such data can only be 
done in cases prescribed by the law, for example, if a data subject gives written 
consent to processing the data.
Following article 3(2) of the Personal Data Law, an operator is an authority, 
a company, or an individual that organizes and (or) performs processing of 
personal data. An operator also defines the purpose of personal data processing 
and composition of personal data to be processed, as well as actions toward 
personal data. Data protection legislation applies to all operators of data and 
third parties authorized by the operators. A general rule is that data operators 
need to notify Roskomnadzor of their intent to process data before engaging 
in data processing (article 22). There are certain cases where such notification 
is not necessary, for example, where data processing is done under labor legisla-
tion, if the data only includes a surname, name, and paternal name of the data 
subject, or if the data subject revealed the data in open access.
When collecting personal data, operators need to inform subjects about cer-
tain required aspects of data processing. For example, following article 18.1 (1)
(2), operators need to publish a data processing policy. The law takes a reason-
able approach by imposing this obligation on operators that are legal entities. 
In practice, this means that natural persons, as well as individual entrepreneurs, 
do not need to publish their processing policy.
Data operators need to set up security measures. According to article 18.1 
of the law, data operators are free to choose measures that they need to take to 
comply with the law. The recommended measures under the law are 
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appointing a data protection officer, implementing certain organizational and 
technical measures aimed at securing the data, and performing internal control 
and audit.
What is interesting is that the list of such measures does not include an obli-
gation to notify of a data breach, to either Roskomnadzor or data subjects. 
There was an attempt to amend the legislation and introduce the obligation to 
notify Roskomnadzor, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even relevant data sub-
jects of data breaches, but the draft law has not been passed by the State Duma 
since 2017 (Draft law No. 416052-6).
Data processing is any action or combination of actions associated with per-
sonal data (with or without the means of automation), including collection, 
recording, systematization, storing, extracting, and transferring. Processing 
should be adequate, relevant, and not excessive to the purpose for which the 
data is processed. Following article 5(7) of the Personal Data Law, one of the 
principles of data processing is that once the goal for which the information 
was processed is reached, the operator needs to anonymize or destroy the data 
unless there was any agreement to the contrary. At the moment, there are no 
detailed rules on how data should be destroyed. However, corresponding 
amendments authorizing Roskomnadzor to establish such detailed rules are 
being considered by the State Duma (Draft law “On termination of per-
sonal data”).
The consent of data subjects is an essential part of processing personal data. 
Following article 9 of the Data Protection Law, an individual should give one’s 
written consent for data processing. The consent should be specific, informed, 
and deliberate. It can be acquired in any form that can confirm that it was 
given, including filling online forms. The data subject can later change one’s 
mind and revoke consent for data processing. Data operators bear the burden 
of providing proof that a data subject provided her consent.
Following article 9(4)(4) of the law, in certain cases, including when pro-
cessing data related to political views, religious beliefs, health conditions, and 
intimate life, consent should be given in writing. The written form of consent 
should include the purpose of data processing. The law does not specifically 
require that the data processor ask a data subject to provide separate consent 
for each purpose of data processing. Data processors often construe this provi-
sion in such a way as to list different purposes of data processing in one form. 
Yet, since construing the law in the other direction is possible, there is a mate-
rial risk that Roskomnadzor will require written consent from a data subject for 
every purpose of data processing. This was the case in a dispute between a 
limited liability company (LLC) Skartel and Roskomnadzor (LLC Skartel v. 
Roskomnadzor Administration of the Central Federal Circuit). The commercial 
court of the city of Moscow and then the appellate court confirmed the posi-
tion of Roskomnadzor. The clients of Skartel signed terms and conditions that 
listed certain purposes of data processing. After doing that, some of the clients 
made additional agreements online. Such agreements included more purposes 
of data processing. The courts agreed with Roskomnadzor that consent for 
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such additional purposes of data processing, following verbatim reading of the 
law, should have also been given in paper-based writing form. To address this 
situation, the Ministry of Communications drafted amendments to the law on 
data protection that, among other measures, would allow receiving single con-
sent of a person for multiple purposes of data processing (Draft law “On single 
consent form”). This is one of the examples where the aim of amendments is 
to ease the burden for data operators, as opposed to creating numerous new 
regulations introducing limitations and obligations in the sphere of data pro-
tection, as will be shown in further sections of this chapter.
Personal data can be processed without the data subject’s consent in certain 
cases (article 6). For example, consent is not needed when data processing is 
necessary for a professional journalistic activity or when it is necessary for the 
enforcement of a court or a public authority decision.
6.2.4  Transfer Outside of Russia
Data operators can transfer personal data outside of Russia. Before making 
such transfer, the operator has to make sure that the rights of the personal data 
subject will receive adequate protection in the receiving country of the transfer. 
Article 12(1) of the Personal Data Law provides that all signatories to the 
Council of Europe Convention provide adequate protection to personal data. 
Apart from this, Roskomnadzor keeps a regularly updated list of countries that 
provide such protection (Order of Roskomnadzor on the list of countries with 
adequate personal data protection).
6.2.5  Territorial Scope of Application
The internet spreads across national borders. Russian citizens can access web-
sites of operators located all around the world (except for those blocked by 
Roskomnadzor). This does not mean that all of those operators need to com-
ply with Russian localization requirements. The Data Protection Law does not 
specifically establish the territorial scope of its application. At the same time, 
when defining operators of personal data, the law does not limit operators to 
only companies registered in Russia. In view of Roskomnadzor, the Personal 
Data Law is binding upon foreign companies that process personal data in 
Russia (Roskomnadzor 2019a). The territorial scope is defined by data pro-
cessing that (1) either takes place or is aimed at Russia or (2) concerns the data 
of Russian citizens. What is important is not where a company/person is based 
but the territory at which the actions of such a company or a person are 
directed. Companies incorporated outside of Russia may nevertheless be sub-
ject to Russian data protection regulations. In a similar fashion, article 3 of the 
GDPR establishes that its data protection requirements are binding not only 
for companies established in EU member states but also for companies located 
anywhere in the world if they process the data of EU citizens. The importance 
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of the territorial aspect of Russian data protection regulations is amplified with 
the adoption of the localization requirement for data operators.
6.3  localIzatIon requIrement
The personal data localization requirement was a part of the 2014 anti-terrorist 
legislation package (Localization Law). Before the enactment of these amend-
ments, there were no limitations on localization—processing and storing infor-
mation of Russian citizens could be done on servers located anywhere in the 
world (Garrie and Byhovsky 2017, 242). The purpose of the localization 
requirements, according to the head of Roskomnadzor, is to “provide an extra 
protection for Russian citizens both from misuse of their personal data by for-
eign companies and from surveillance of foreign governments” (Savelyev 2016, 
138; Zharov 2014).
From an economic standpoint, the introduction of the localization require-
ment is a self-imposed sanction that seriously weakens Russia’s ability to attract 
investments (Bauer et al. 2015, 3). The localization rules affect many compa-
nies, including giants like Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Twitter as 
well as big companies such as eBay, PayPal, Booking.com, and Reddit 
(Zhuravlev and Brazhnik 2014, 26). When enacted, these regulations disincen-
tivized some companies from entering the Russian market. Such was the case 
with Spotify, which canceled its plans to launch services in Russia in 2015 due 
to the localization requirement (Garrie and Byhovsky 2017, 244).
The law imposes obligations for data operators and provides new compe-
tences to Roskomnadzor. When collecting and processing online data regard-
ing Russian citizens, an operator must use databases (servers) that are located 
in Russia. Roskomnadzor received expanded competences while the entities 
that it supervises lost some guarantees. Following article 3 of the Localization 
Law, Roskomnadzor in its control and supervision over personal data protec-
tion no longer follows the guarantees provided to legal entities and sole entre-
preneurs by the Federal Law “O zasîte prav ûridičeskih lic i individual’nyh 
predprinimatelej” (On the protection of businesses). In practice, this means 
more freedom to Roskomnadzor and less control over its actions from other 
public authorities. For example, the Public Prosecution Office controls public 
authorities by approving their plans for inspections of businesses. Following 
Section II of the Roskomnadzor Inspection Rules, Roskomnadzor now plans 
its inspections without coordination with the Prosecution Office and has more 
freedom in making changes to inspection plans. 
Roskomnadzor has defined priority spheres of interest where it most dili-
gently monitors compliance with localization requirements. These spheres 
include, but are not limited to, recruiting agencies, credit companies, hotel 
businesses, and insurance companies (Roskomnadzor 2017). In these niches, 
by the very nature of business (recruiting agencies) or due to legislative require-
ments (insurance and credit companies), companies have to collect customers’ 
personal data.
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6.3.1  Subjects of the Obligation
Following article 18(5) of the Personal Data Law, when collecting personal 
data of Russian citizens, data operators should provide for recording, system-
atization, accumulation, and storage of data by using databases (servers) located 
in Russia. It is important to note that the localization requirement is limited to 
only some of the actions that constitute data processing—collecting the per-
sonal data of Russian citizens. Correspondingly, other actions of data proces-
sors, including usage, anonymization, erasure, and destruction, are not subject 
to this requirement.
Roskomnadzor has issued a clarification on when a data operator needs to 
comply with regulations. Such instances include using a domain name that is 
connected to Russia, like ru, рф, or su; having a Russian-language version of a 
website; and/or performance in Russia of a contract made on a website. In 
practice, this means that if an online store offers delivery to Russia, it needs to 
use a Russian server to process the data of Russian citizens.
6.3.2  Registry of Infringers
Roskomnadzor keeps a constantly updated Registry of Infringers of the Rights 
of Personal Data Subjects. In August 2016, it filed a claim to include the social 
network LinkedIn in the Registry of Infringers for failures to comply with the 
localization requirement and other data protection laws (Roskomnadzor v. 
LinkedIn Corporation). After winning the case in the court of first instance and 
the court of appeal, Roskomnadzor blocked LinkedIn. LinkedIn is not the 
only major internet service that received the attention of Roskomnadzor. 
According to the commentaries of Roskomnadzor representatives, Facebook 
and Twitter also did not comply with the regulations. However, a differenti-
ated treatment was given to LinkedIn due to “repeated reports of data leaks 
from LinkedIn” (Bondarev et  al. 2016). Perhaps the Russian government 
expected LinkedIn to comply given that LinkedIn located its servers in China 
to avoid the ban (Mozur and Goel 2014). Twitter and Facebook failed to com-
ply with localization requirements in China and were banned there.
6.3.3  Amplification of Fines for Infringement
Article 13.11 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) estab-
lishes penalties for the infringement of Russian data protection regulations. 
Currently, it does not contain penalties for failing to comply with the localiza-
tion requirement. Because of this, when Roskomnadzor was trying to pressure 
Twitter and Facebook into localizing their databases, the federal service had to 
fine the companies only for failing to provide information about the localiza-
tion of their databases—an infringement provided in article 19.7 of the 
CAO.  The maximum fine in this article is 5000 rubles (approximately 70 
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euros). Correspondingly, Twitter and Facebook were fined 3000 and 5000 
rubles, respectively.
To influence this situation, the State Duma is considering the Draft Federal 
law “On amending the Code of Administrative Offences of Russia.” The draft 
introduces special provisions for the violation of the data localization require-
ment and substantially increases fines—up to 18 million rubles (approximately 
252,000 euros). Roskomnadzor will likely not attempt to block Twitter and 
Facebook for several reasons. First, Twitter and Facebook already demon-
strated in the Chinese market that they are not willing to compromise under 
the risk of a ban. Second, blocking them will cause a bigger international 
response than that of LinkedIn. Third, Roskomnadzor does not have the tech-
nical means to properly implement a ban against such giants, as the futile 
attempt to block Telegram messenger demonstrated (discussed in Sect. 6.4).
6.4  YarovaYa law
In 2016, the State Duma enacted two laws that are commonly referred to by 
the name of one of their authors—Irina Yarovaya—Federal Law 374-FZ and 
Federal Law 375-FZ (Yarovaya law). As per the Yarovaya law, organizers of 
data distribution are bound to store transferred information and provide 
Russian enforcement authorities with encryption keys (for more, see Chap. 5).
6.4.1  Storing Requirement
According to the newly introduced article 10.1 of the Data Protection Act, 
from July 2018, organizers of data distribution on the internet should, first, 
store text messages, voice communications, images, audio, video, and other 
messages of users in Russia for six months and, second, store all these mes-
sages’ and users’ metadata for one year. To top this off, in April 2018 the 
government of Russia issued a Resolution binding telecommunications pro-
viders to store all internet traffic data for 30 days (Resolution on Internet 
Traffic). As per the report of the Analytical Credit Rating Agency of October 
2018, the aggregated cost for implementing these measures just for Russian 
mobile networks will exceed 250 billion rubles (approximately 3.5 billion 
euros) (Tishina 2018). The volume of stored data for 2019 is estimated at 
60 exabytes (60  billion gigabytes), which is challenging to implement 
(Kolomychenko 2016).
A more controversial part of these amendments is the duty of the organizer 
of data distribution to provide state intelligence and surveillance authorities 
with access to the above-listed information. Data organizers will have to pro-
vide Russian enforcement authorities access to sensitive information without a 
court order. The aforementioned April 2018 Resolution of the Government, 
in clause 4, officially includes technical means of data accumulation into com-
munications equipment of intelligence and surveillance operations. By this 
inclusion, the Resolution provides unmonitored access for enforcement 
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authorities to stored data of telecommunication providers. Communications 
equipment of enforcement authorities is constantly connected to data accumu-
lation centers. Authorities do not need to ask for access to this information or 
even notify service providers. The GDPR does not provide for any comparable 
duty. Such obligation is clearly aimed at easing state control and not toward the 
protection of individual rights for personal data.
Similar regulation for internet organizers of data distribution was issued on 
October 29, 2018, by the Decree of the Ministry of Communications. Clause 
III(4) of the Decree sets up a upfront requirement for data distribution orga-
nizers—technical means should provide search, processing, and transfer of 
stored data to FSB (Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service). 
Roskomnadzor keeps a Registry of Organizers of Data Distribution. As of 
October 2019, the registry contains 182 entries. Among the companies that 
are listed as organizers (and, correspondingly, bound to comply with the tech-
nological requirement of providing access to the Federal Security Service) are 
services like social network VKontakte, public email services Mail.ru and Mail.
Yandex, cloud storage service Disk.Yandex, dating service Tinder, and classified 
advertisements website Avito. Being on that list and refusing to provide access 
to data can lead to blocking of the corresponding company’s website.
Even before enactment of the Data Protection Act and Personal Data Law, 
regulations required Russian mobile operators to install devices providing 
access to Russian enforcement authorities to messages transmitted over mobile 
networks. These provisions were the subject of a dispute resolved by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Roman Zakharov v. 
Russia. Roman Zakharov (applicant), the editor-in-chief of a publishing com-
pany, filed a claim against Russian mobile telecom companies for violating his 
right to privacy of telephone communications. The mobile companies pro-
vided access for the FSB to install equipment intercepting all telephone com-
munications. After losing this case in Russian courts, on October 20, 2006, 
Zakharov applied to the ECtHR.
In its judgment of December 4, 2015, the ECtHR noted that the legislation 
in question requires mobile operators to install equipment allowing the FSB to 
intercept communications of all users. The FSB does not need to notify users 
or telecom companies of such intrusion. The ECtHR indicated that the inter-
ception of telephone conversations can be justified by the aims of protection of 
national security, public safety, and prevention of crime. Such was the case in 
Russia. At the same time, legislation should provide adequate safeguards 
against abuses and guarantees that such a system will only be used when these 
measures are necessary. In view of the ECtHR, Russian legislation allowed such 
secret measures “in respect of a very wide range of offenses.” Telephone con-
versation interceptions can be applied not only in regard to suspects but also 
toward persons that might possess information about an offense. The secrecy 
of interceptions was subject to court control. As a general rule, any intercep-
tion needed a prior court order. Yet, some information, for example, about 
undercover agents or about the organization and tactics of conducting 
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operational-search measures, could not be submitted to a court. As a result, 
courts were not able to assess how reasonable the measures were. Courts could 
also order measures that were very wide in scope—like authorizing the inter-
ception of all conversations in the area where a crime was committed, without 
limiting it to specific persons. Enforcement authorities are not bound to notify 
telecom users that their conversations are intercepted. In light of the above- 
mentioned argument, the ECtHR found that Russian legislation “did not pro-
vide adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk 
of abuse.”
The very same day that the ECtHR made this ruling, the State Duma 
approved the draft law amending the Federal Constitutional Law “On the 
Constitutional Court of Russia.” The amendments allow the Constitutional 
Court to consider whether enforcement of an ECtHR decision will be contrary 
to the Russian Constitution and allow refusal of performing such a decision.
6.4.2  Encryption Keys
Having access to stored information does not necessarily allow enforcement 
authorities to reach their goals. The majority of transferred data is encrypted. 
To get access, for example, to the messages of the users, the enforcement 
authorities will need to possess encryption keys. Following article 4.1 of the 
Data Protection Act, when organizers of data distribution use encoding, they 
have to provide the FSB with keys for decoding electronic messages. The most 
notorious case based on the implementation of this rule was the conflict 
between FSB and Telegram messenger. In July 2017 Roskomnadzor included 
Telegram into the registry of organizers of data distribution. FSB requested 
Telegram to provide it with encryption keys. Telegram refused and 
Roskomnadzor applied to the Taganskij district court of Moscow to fine and 
block Telegram (Roskomnadzor v. Telegram Messenger Limited Liability 
Partnership). The court ruled in favor of Roskomnadzor. The Supreme Court 
of Russia upheld the decision. For technical reasons, Roskomnadzor was not 
able to block Telegram. In its crusade against the messenger, Roskomnadzor 
blocked over 50 virtual private network (VPN) services and anonymizers 
(Tereshhenko 2018, 148). The services of Yandex, Viber, Google, and 
VKontakte had interruptions or were blocked for some time in the implemen-
tation of these measures (Suharevskaja 2018). Yet, these measures turned futile.
The FSB requested Yandex, Russia’s largest technology company and fifth 
largest search engine worldwide, to provide it with encryption keys 
(Kolomychenko 2019). Yandex offers over 70 services in Russia that include 
public email, cloud storage, and online map services. At first, Yandex made a 
public refusal to provide FSB with the keys. Later, Yandex and the head of 
Roskomnadzor reported that Yandex and the FSB were able to find a solution 
to comply with the Yarovaya law but did not disclose the details of such solu-
tion (Kuznecova and Vyrodova 2019).
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6.5  sovereIGn runet
6.5.1  Russian Informational Security
Since 2016, the protection of personal data is no longer a priority direction of 
Russian informational security doctrine. Personal data protection lost its place 
to countering the threats of informational security from foreign countries and 
actors. This conclusion can be made by analyzing the 2016 Presidential Decree 
of Vladimir Putin, which set up a new Doctrine of informational security in 
Russia (Doctrine). Following Clause III of the Doctrine, the President sees the 
main threats to Russian informational security coming from hostile geopoliti-
cal, military-political, terrorist, extremist, and criminal aims of unnamed for-
eign countries and actors. The Doctrine is predominantly focused on 
establishing protection and responses in the military sphere. The Doctrine 
replaced the 2000 Doctrine of Informational Security, which was also intro-
duced by Putin. What is interesting is that the 2000 Doctrine set the protec-
tion of interests of a person as the first goal.
The 2016 Doctrine aims to protect the “critical informational infrastruc-
ture” of Russia. In 2019, in the implementation of the Doctrine, the State 
Duma has introduced amendments to the Data Protection Act and the Federal 
Law on Communications (Sovereign Runet law). The amendments introduce 
a set of measures aimed at ensuring the stable operation of the Russian internet 
(Runet). According to article 56.1(1) of the Law on Communications, the 
obligation to ensure safe, steady, and integral functioning of the Runet falls on 
the communications operators and owners of communications networks. 
Roskomnadzor will be carrying out primary state policies in this area (for more 
on Runet, see Chap. 16).
6.5.2  Runet Law
Internet providers need to install in their network the technical means (black 
boxes) for countering threats to stability, security, and integrity of the internet 
in Russia (article 46(5.1)). Roskomnadzor will provide the black boxes. The 
same article directly relieves internet providers from the obligation to limit 
access to prohibited websites. This is now the function of the black boxes.
Roskomnadzor receives centralized control over the entire Runet in cases of 
discovering a threat to the functioning of the networks (article 65.1). The gov-
ernment of Russia is yet to define what types of threats qualify for empowering 
Roskomnadzor with centralized control (article 65.1(5)). According to the 
head of Roskomnadzor, even a mere ban of a website already constitutes such 
a threat (Suharevskaja 2019). Thus, for now, it is not clear what should be the 
scale of the threat to transfer centralized control to Roskomnadzor. The legis-
lator, by changing the heading of the encompassing chapter of the law, signals 
that a non-exceptional threat could be sufficient. The name changed from 
“Managing communication networks in cases of emergency and the state of 
emergency” to “Managing communication networks in certain cases.” Thus, 
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the state of emergency was downgraded to “certain cases.” Roskomnadzor will 
have centralized control over Runet beyond emergency cases.
Once the black boxes are installed, the Russian government will be able to 
control domestic traffic and, if needed, turn off incoming foreign traffic.
6.6  a new InterpretatIon of personal data
In December 2018, Roskomnadzor presented its new vision of personal data 
by including cookies in the scope of the term. Cookies collect certain data 
about the users to, for example, tailor advertisements to the user’s location and 
browsing activity. The use of cookies on a website in terms of data protection 
is a controversial issue at the moment. The Russian legislation does not define 
the term “cookies.” The legal analysis of cookies stems from the definition of 
personal data in Russian law. As discussed earlier, to be considered personal 
data, user data needs to allow a natural person to be identified. Roskomnadzor 
representatives themselves, in a 2015 commentary to the Personal Data Law, 
stated that the data should not be considered personal data if it does not allow 
identifying a natural person without the use of additional information (Gafurova 
et  al. 2015, 15). It took a political case for Roskomnadzor to change the 
opinion.
The use of cookies was one of the subject matters in the dispute involving 
the “Smart voting system” of Russian political activist Alexei Navalny 
(Roskomnadzor v. Gandi SAS). Navalny’s goal was to prevent the domination 
of United Russia party candidates in the regional and municipal elections of 
2019. The system was built with the idea of uniting pro-opposition votes in 
each voting district for a single candidate that has the highest chance of win-
ning the election against United Russia’s representative. Voters could register 
on the website and on the day of elections would receive a text message with 
the name of an opposition candidate that has the highest winning chance. The 
website, https://2019.vote/, was registered to Gandi SAS. Roskomnadzor 
claimed a violation of data protection legislation by the website and applied to 
a court. Among the violations, Roskomnadzor stated that by using the services 
of Google Analytics and Yandex Metrica the website collected and processed 
personal data of its users.
Google Analytics and Yandex Metrica collect the data of users. Such data 
can include the location of the user, the device used to access a website, browser, 
and internet protocol (IP) address. This data itself, without the use of addi-
tional information, does not allow identifying a natural person. Nevertheless, 
in the eyes of Roskomnadzor and the court, using cookies through the services 
of Google Analytics and Yandex Metrica constituted data collection and pro-
cessing. Navalny appealed the decision but with no success. In this understand-
ing, Roskomnadzor goes against its commentaries on the scope of personal 
data. At the same time, if compared to the way other countries apply data 
protection legislation with regard to cookies, the measure is appropriate. For 
example, the GDPR specifically states that cookies may allow identifying a nat-
ural person (Recital 30).
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6.7  conclusIon
The law gives a vague definition of personal data. It allows Roskomnadzor to 
include in personal data new types of data without ever needing to amend leg-
islation. The inclusion of cookies into the scope of personal data is one such 
example. This step, although following the understanding of personal data in 
the GDPR, differs from Roskomnadzor’s former understanding of the term. 
The duty of data distributors to store users’ data substantially eases monitoring 
of data for Russian enforcement authorities. This duty is not an invention of 
the Russian legislation. The 2006 EU Data Retention Directive introduced 
similar measures. The major difference from Russia was that the EU Directive 
required data operators to store the metadata (e.g., telephone numbers and IP 
addresses), not the data itself. Russian legislation, apart from that, creates con-
venient conditions for the enforcement authorities to obtain access to data. In 
2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the Directive for 
violating fundamental rights (Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for 
Communications).
Fines for breaches of data protection legislation will be increased to provide 
Roskomnadzor with an additional instrument of pressure. Blocking websites 
can be an effective measure, but blocking giants like Google will be noticeably 
harmful to the Russian economy itself, as many Russian companies use Google 
cloud services. Trying to ban Twitter and Facebook might prove futile since 
Roskomnadzor was not able to block a much smaller messaging application, 
Telegram. Once the black boxes are fully implemented, Roskomnadzor will 
have much more capabilities in blocking services and websites with great preci-
sion. At the same time, the law “On the Sovereign Runet,” despite being 
enacted, still needs substantial time before it can be properly implemented.
Among the expected novelties of Russian legislation is the introduction of 
the Big Data concept. Big Data allows re-identifying a person from a data set 
that seems to have no direct link, as well as extracting personal data that an 
individual did not provide, through the analysis of vast amounts of information 
(Gruschka et al. 2019, 5027). An example of such re-identification is the 2006 
release by Netflix of a data set including a user ID and movie ratings connected 
to such ID. By itself, this data does not allow identifying a person. When com-
bined with other information however, such as user movie ratings of the 
Internet Movie Database, the data allowed identifying a Netflix customer 
(Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008, 121–124). Currently, Big Data does not fall 
within the scope of personal data in Russia. At the same time, the definition of 
personal data in article 4 of the GDPR allows including Big Data in the scope 
of personal data (Bonatti and Kirrane 2019, 7).
The Russian legislator is very active in the sphere of data protection. Almost 
all novelties grant new powers to controlling authorities and increase the bur-
den of compliance even for companies located outside of Russia if their activity 
is aimed at Russia. Roskomnadzor plays a central role in this sphere. 
Roskomnadzor does not need to comply with the rules and limitations for 
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conducting inspections that are obligatory for other public authorities. Instead, 
the Federal Service follows a set of rules especially established for its activities. 
In the nearest future, Roskomnadzor will strengthen its position by receiving 
the power to exercise centralized control over Runet. Legislative grounds for 
the state monitoring over the data flows grow alongside the technical capabili-
ties of Russian government to exercise such control.
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gosudarstv, ne âvlâûsîhsâ storonami Konvencii Soveta Evropy o zasîte fizičeskih lic 
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CHAPTER 7
Cybercrime and Punishment: Security, 
Information War, and the Future of Runet
Elizaveta Gaufman
7.1  IntroductIon
Cybersecurity is notoriously hard to define (Salminen 2018), especially given 
the possible macro and micro incarnations from cyber war to individual pass-
word theft (Nissenbaum 2005). This chapter operates from the assumption 
that digital security is a complex process of intertwining of practices and tech-
nology that ensure the undisturbed functioning of information and communi-
cation technologies for the everyday needs of individuals, protected from 
breaches of confidentiality and anonymity. While most countries’ daily func-
tions depend on their invulnerability to cyber disruptions, a state’s potential to 
discipline and punish its citizens through digital surveillance has hardly been 
underestimated as well (Dupont 2008; Teboho Ansorge 2011; Morozov 
2011). This chapter explores the influence of digitalization on security in 
Russia, touching upon the issues of governmental control, surveillance, infor-
mation war, as well as the issue of (Russian) internet sovereignty. This chapter 
aims to show the discrepancies in Russian cyber politics at home and abroad, 
highlighting its struggle for more internet regulation that is seen by the Russian 
government as a panacea against perceived external attempts at regime change. 
At the same time, this chapter shows that despite seemingly formidable “cyber 
army” capabilities for external use, domestic surveillance and attempts to build 
a Great Russian Firewall are still lacking even though the law on the isolation 
of the Runet has been passed in April 2019 (for more, see Chap. 2).
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An image of a hacker with a thick Russian accent hastily typing something 
into the computer has become a staple trope in popular culture from James 
Bond movies to Late Night Comedy shows. Despite the fact that cybernetics 
was considered for a long time a “reactionary pseudoscience that appeared in 
the United States of America (USA)” (Peters 2016), Soviet Union and later 
Russia discovered “possible military applications for computers.” Since then, 
Russia has been consistently ranked as one of the dominant cyber powers 
around the world (Clarke and Knake 2014) ostensibly capable to disrupt dem-
ocratic elections, organize a protest movement, or shut down a government. 
As in many cases in Soviet Union, military needs propelled the development of 
an industry that soon spilled over into civilian use with unexpected conse-
quences. Russian Internet, or Runet, has become a threat to “regime stability” 
in Russia to such a degree that Soviet practices of dissident citizen surveillance 
and banning of anti-regime statements have found their way back to 
Russia today.
Externally, Russia enjoys a status of a cyber superpower (Musgrave 2016), 
but domestically it is still struggling to create a fully national, digitally sover-
eign Runet (Ristolainen 2017) reinforcing the digitized reason of state regime 
(Bauman et al. 2014). So far, governmental attempts at policing and censoring 
the digital space have made its infrastructure more vulnerable to traffic disrup-
tion for private users and have slowed down the development of Russia’s inter-
net industry. Moreover, increased government control that aims to rid the 
Russian cyberspace of “servers hosted in California,” has negative consequences 
for civil society, freedom of speech and privacy that would potentially restrict 
the services and flow of information to regular Russian internet users. This is, 
however, so far of little concern to the Russian government that aims at creat-
ing a fully Russian Net by the end of 2021 that would be completely indepen-
dent from international internet infrastructure (Vedomosti 2016)
Even though destruction of critical infrastructure has always been a staple 
part of military strategy, it has been gradually conceptualized as a matter of 
national security during the Cold War and especially after 9/11 (Collier and 
Lakoff 2008; Aradau 2010). In the digital age, the notion of critical infrastruc-
ture has been expanded to mean not just power plants and bridges, but also 
banking systems and e-government with both “old” and “new” infrastructure 
susceptible to outside threats that, in turn, take the form of not only missiles 
and troops, but also computer malware and the proverbial hackers. If in the 
times of Lenin, one had to physically take over the telegraph station in order to 
organize a successfully revolution (Lenin 1969), nowadays a person with a 
messenger app like Telegram or WhatsApp installed in a smartphone far away 
from the social movement can seemingly do as much damage (Kow et al. 2016).
Third World War, according to numerous Russian scholars, is supposed to 
be informational-psychological (Samokhvalova 2011; Vladimirov 2013; 
Markov and Nevolina 2018; Kiselev 2015), which stands in sharp contrast with 
the Western fears of “Digital Pearl Harbors” and “Weapons of Mass 
Disruptions” (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). Russian Military Doctrine has 
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emphasized the need to develop armed forces and means for an “information 
confrontation” since 2010 (Kremlin 2010). This belief is partially rooted in 
various conspiracy theories that argue that “the West” is on a quest to destabi-
lize Russia through corrupting Russian core values and its society (Gaufman 
2017; Yablokov 2018). Russian conspiracies have their counterpart conspiracy 
in the West—the already-retracted Gerasimov Doctrine that is supposed to 
explain Russian information warfare as part of long-standing Soviet origin 
“active measures” that are supposed to undermine Western countries (Sanovich 
2017; Galeotti 2018). The US Defense Intelligence Agency’s report on Russian 
Military Power even talks of how “Information Confrontation” is “strategically 
decisive and critically important to control its domestic populace and influence 
adversary states,” encompassing “Informational-Technical” (defense, attack, 
and exploitation) and “Informational-Psychological” (changing people’s 
behavior or beliefs in line with Russian’s government agenda) strategies 
(Defense Intelligence Agency 2017).
Moreover, continuous securitization of terrorist attacks has paved the way 
for governmental overreach in surveillance and the expansion of cyber capabili-
ties—and not only in Russia (Eriksson and Giacomello 2007). Encryption 
technology and the Internet in general have been framed as a cesspit of, for 
example, terrorists and pedophiles—a rhetoric remarkably similar among sur-
veillance proponents in the United States and in Russia (Gaufman 2017; 
Monsees 2019). Discursively linking the Internet with crime has worked 
remarkably well across the world, justifying the surveillance and policing of 
“trembling creatures” who use it. No wonder that the notion of security has 
become inextricably linked with the cyberspace. This chapter outlines the digi-
tal turn in the Russian government’s understanding of security that is primarily 
concerned with regime stability and curbing outside influence. Hence, its focus 
is on governmental control of the Internet, surveillance, cyber war, and the 
struggle for global internet governance à la Russe.
7.2  Freedom oF Speech vS. the Governmental control 
oF the runet
Most analysts contend that the Arab Spring was a driving force behind the 
Russian government’s attempts to put the Russian Internet under more strin-
gent control emulating a Chinese model (Soldatov and Borogan 2015). Images 
of toppled dictators whose grip on their countries seemed unwavering must 
have sent shockwaves through the Kremlin, where it was now obvious that the 
Internet could be more than just kitchen talk 2.0. Evidence of massive resources 
that have been invested in regulating and penetrating the Russian blogosphere 
since 2010–2011 shows that the Russian leadership was also keenly aware of 
the influential role played by new media in shaping public opinion and wasted 
no time trying to “manage” them. The government’s attitude toward new 
media would appear to be encapsulated by the famous phrase used in early 
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2012 by Stanislav Govoruhin, then head of Putin’s reelection campaign staff, 
who described the Internet as “a rubbish-dump controlled by GosDep (the US 
State Department).” And yet, the Russian government wastes no time making 
sure that the “dump” is under control.
Even before the protest wave of 2011–2012, there has been evidence of the 
government’s involvement in Runet albeit not on a grand scale. During the 
2011–2012 elections, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on oppo-
sitional websites, seemingly with state involvement, were registered by numer-
ous independent organizations (Mikhaylova 2012). The 2012 “Kremlingate” 
scandal also showed that the Russian authorities had in fact gone much further 
than merely obstructing oppositional media, and that millions of rubles had 
been spent by the government with the aim of channeling online discussions in 
the desired direction (Karimova 2012; RFE/RL 2015; for more on history of 
this period of Runet, see Chap. 16).
The hacked correspondence between then head of the Agency for Youth 
Affairs Vasily Yakemenko and his deputy Kristina Potupchik demonstrated as 
early as 2011 and 2012 that a significant amount of budgetary funds was being 
spent on paying an “army of bots”—people paid to write online comments and 
posts on themes of interest to the government. These online warriors report-
edly took their cue at least in part from the current discourse on Russia Today 
(RT) and Pervyj kanal (Delovoi Peterbrug 2014). An ad hoc 50-ruble com-
mentary has transformed into a large company—the now-infamous Internet 
Research Agency—that employs people on a regular basis and supplies pro- 
Kremlin content at home and abroad. Pro-Kremlin-paid internet commenta-
tors are the frequent butt of jokes. For example, a cartoon by an oppositional 
caricaturist Ëlkin shows an internet user measuring his online speed based on 
the number of “Kremlin-bot” comments appearing on a particular post (Radio 
Svoboda 2014). The amount of financing that went and is still going into pay-
ing for pro-Kremlin commentators and bloggers shows that the Kremlin con-
siders online public sphere an important battlefield. Only the battlefield has 
also moved outside of Russia as well, with the so-called Kremlin trolls “invad-
ing” other countries (see below Cyber War).
The Russian government has been steadily trying to tighten the grip on the 
Internet for the fear of violent regime change reminiscent of the Arab Spring. 
The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information 
Technology and Mass Media or Roskomnadzor that is tasked with implemen-
tation and enforcement of laws on mass media is the Russian federal executive 
body that in practice carries out censorship in media and telecommunications, 
encompassing electronic media, information technology (IT), and telecom-
munications. Technically, Roskomnadzor is also supposed to be overseeing 
compliance with the law protecting the confidentiality of personal data, but, in 
reality, it cooperates with state law enforcement agencies such as FSB 
(Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service) in order to carry out 
surveillance tasks (Soldatov and Borogan 2013; Ermoshina and Musiani 2017), 
often under the guise of anti-terrorism measures.
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However, a more radical to date attempt to enforce the “anti-terrorist” con-
cerns on the Runet was far from successful. “Telegram” is a cloud-based instant 
messaging app developed by the creator of Russia’s most popular social net-
work VKontakte Pavel Durov. Telegram is one of the most popular messaging 
services in Russia and especially in Moscow, with many media personalities and 
celebrities having their own “channel.” On April 13, 2018, Telegram was 
banned in Russia by a Moscow court, due to its refusal to grant the Federal 
Security Service access to encryption keys needed to view user communications 
as required by federal anti-terrorism law. On the morning of April 16, 
Roskomnadzor began sending out requests to providers to block Telegram.
At first, the department demanded to stop access only to the Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses of the servers of the messenger itself. In the first days, 
millions of Amazon and Google cloud services IP addresses were added to the 
registry of banned websites, which Telegram ostensibly used to bypass block-
ing. Gradually, these addresses were unlocked, but Roskomnadzor’s attempts 
created a lot of disruptions in the everyday life of ordinary Russian businesses 
from flower delivery to online education and had a “Barbra Streisand effect” 
on the popularity of Telegram itself: Telegram’s traffic increased by a third in 
the first month, while the number of app downloads for Android jumped twice 
(Meduza 2019a). The Telegram ban debacle has shown that Russia is deeply 
integrated into the global digital ecosystem, and because international finance 
and commerce rely heavily on automated solutions that generate cross-border 
traffic, it would be difficult and costly to create an Internet kill switch. 
Moreover, with a wide availability of Virtual Private Network (VPN) technol-
ogy, it is easy to circumvent the ban by getting access to transnational traffic, 
thus making Runet far from being behind a great wall.
From a governmental point of view, however, this represents a major security 
risk. Most of the legislation aimed at tightening the regulation of the Runet is 
presented as a means to protect the public from dangerous information or coun-
ter terrorist activity; for instance, the 2012 laws “O zasîte detej ot informacii, 
pričinâûsêj vred ih zdorov’û i razvitiû” (On Protecting Children from Information 
Harmful to Their Health and Development and Other Individual Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation on the Issue of Limiting Access to Unlawful 
Information on the Internet). The same packaging was applied to the so-called 
Yarovaya law of 2016, a set of Internet regulations that took effect in July 2018. 
According to the new regulations, Internet and telecom companies are required 
to disclose communications and metadata, as well as “all other information nec-
essary,” to authorities, on request and without a court order. However, amid the 
attempts of Roskomnadzor to ban Telegram, even some governmental officials 
and the head of Russia Today Margarita Simonyan kept using the messenger. 
Ordinary citizens have quickly realized that noncompliance with Internet laws 
has led to selective “like” and “share” persecution (Verkhovsky 2018, for more 
on digital law, see Chap. 5).
Several court cases highlight a selective application of punishment for digital 
“crimes.” Aleksandr Gozenko was convicted for “inciting hate speech” after 
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posting four comments in VKontakte, where he allegedly wanted to “organize 
a vata1 Holocaust.” Other convictions, which information and analysis center 
SOVA for the monitoring of xenophobia deemed as “Inappropriate enforce-
ment of anti-extremist legislation,” included posts or memes that contained 
political messages opposing the annexation of Crimea or proclaiming indepen-
dence of some Russian subjects of federation (Verkhovsky 2018). One of the 
examples of “Like, Share, Repost, Prison” became particularly prominent when 
famous Russian rapper Oxxxymiron publicized a case against a 23-year-old 
Maria Motuznaya, who posted several anti-religious memes (Novaya gazeta 
2018). It is also notable that the overwhelming majority of cases of “digital 
extremism” that are being prosecuted were committed in VKontakte, which is 
obligated by law to share private information with the law enforcement agen-
cies. At the same time, social networks (Facebook and Twitter) presumably do 
not cooperate with Russian security forces and are being prosecuted for non-
compliance with the Federal Law No. 242-FZ, which obligates foreign compa-
nies to store data of Russian users on servers within Russia (Burgess 2019).
Persecution and punishment of digital “crimes” are in part made possible 
due to cooperation between the Russian government and the internet infra-
structure owners (Sivetc 2018) such as hosting providers or other large IT 
companies. A similar infrastructure connection was observed during the crisis 
in Ukraine, when no sophisticated information warfare tools could be neces-
sary given that Russia could gain physical control over the internet infrastruc-
ture in Crimea (Giles and Geers 2015). Most importantly, Russian government’s 
hold on the Runet is administered through control on three infrastructural 
levels. Firstly, Rostelecom, one of the main providers of broadband internet, 
already cooperates with Roskomnadzor, which means that Rostelecom would 
filter and block the content that violates Yarovaya law for instance. Secondly, 
given that local companies and platforms such as Yandex or VKontakte are 
much more popular than Google and Facebook, Roskomnadzor can regulate 
access to information through the Netoscope project, a database of unlawful 
websites on the Runet, in which both Yandex and VKontakte and a host of 
other Russian IT giants participate. Netoscope markets itself as a database of 
“malicious” websites and offers the service of “checking” a domain name to 
establish whether it can harm a user or not. Lastly, Roskomnadzor also has 
secured the cooperation of Technical Center “Internet,” which operates Main 
Registry of Runet’s Domain Name System (DNS) (Sivetc 2018), which would 
be morphed into a national one under the new “sovereign internet law” 
(Stadnik 2019). But even without the sovereign internet, Roskomnadzor can 
already have a say in the information flows as DNS translates Uniform Resource 
Locators (URL) into IP address and acts as a type of “phonebook” that 
Roskomnadzor is allowed to edit. Thus, governmental control of the Runet is 
much more tangible, and “surgical strikes” of digital speech prosecution create 
a lot of press coverage, but at the same time the Russian government lacks the 




During the Soviet era, a seemingly omnipotent ability of the state to spy on the 
population became a source of numerous precautions and jokes. Soldatov and 
Borogan (2015) even preface their book The Red Web with the Russian saying 
“It’s not a telephone conversation”; this reflected a Soviet-era fear of surveilled 
device communication and general distrust of technology that was operated by 
the state. Jokes about microphones hidden in ashtrays and electric plugs where 
“Comrade Major” is listening to the conversations people have in the privacy 
of their kitchens have survived to this day. It turned out, however, that 
“Comrade Major” has been listening not only in the Soviet Union.
In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked a cache of documents to the media that 
documented the existence of classified surveillance programs run by the US 
National Security Agency (NSA) in cooperation with secret services of other 
major Western powers. Snowden revelations became a turning point in the 
discourse on digital security and surveillance (Bauman et al. 2014). Proponents 
of the “net delusion” argument (Morozov 2011; Paltemaa and Vuori 2009; 
Dupont 2008; Golkar 2011), who argued that the Internet represents an easy 
tool for the government to surveil and control the population, were vindicated 
given the scope and reach of the surveillance programs and their potential for 
governmental overreach, including opposition repression as opposed to 
“Twitter Revolution” techno-optimists who believed in the purely emancipa-
tory power of the Internet.
Soldatov and Borogan note that the Russian state does not have the capa-
bilities to carry out mass surveillance that would be comparable to the scope of 
the NSA’s reach (Soldatov and Borogan 2015). Russian “SORM” (Sistema 
tehničeskih sredstv dlâ obespečeniâ funkcij operativno-razysknyh meropriâtij, 
System for Operative Investigative Activities) is the system designated for law-
ful interception interfaces of telecommunications and telephone networks that 
enables the targeted—but not mass—surveillance of both telephone and 
Internet communications in Russia. SORM was first implemented in 1995 to 
allow access to surveillance data for the FSB, but during Vladimir Putin’s first 
week in office on January 5, 2000, the law was amended to allow seven other 
federal security agencies (apart from the FSB) to access to data gathered via 
SORM, including Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border patrol and customs, 
Police and Russia’s tax police. The legality of the SORM legislation has always 
been questioned, and in December 2015 the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled unanimously that that Russian legal provisions “do not provide 
for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse 
which is inherent in any system of secret surveillance,” especially given that this 
risk “is particularly high in a system where the secret services and the police 
have direct access, by technical means, to all mobile telephone communica-
tions,” thus violating Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
that stipulates a right to respect for one’s “private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence” (European Court of Human Rights 2015).
7 CYBERCRIME AND PUNISHMENT: SECURITY, INFORMATION WAR… 
122
Nevertheless, even the aforementioned “Yarovaya Law” and the expansion 
of the grounds for addition to the list for blocked Internet sites in Russia were 
supplemented with further legislation and measures. The national project 
“Cifrovaâ èkonomika” (Digital Economy) is yet again framed as an initiative 
that would ensure that the Runet does not contain dangerous sites for chil-
dren, and at the same time identify customers of communication services and 
protect the users of the Internet of Things devices. An innovation in the trillion 
ruble national project is an obligatory installation of domestic antiviruses on 
personal computers manufactured and imported to Russia that already raises 
concerns that this measure would further commercial interests of select few 
governmentally approved companies that would most likely cooperate with 
security services (Zhukova et al. 2018). In the course of the project, a national 
traffic filtering system with a “white list of Internet-friendly resources for chil-
dren” is supposed to be created by December 31, 2021, executed by 
Roskomnadzor and security agencies such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the FSB.
Also, according to the state program “Informacionnoe obsêstvo” (Information 
Society), the goal is to have 90% of Internet traffic transmitted domestically (as 
opposed to 70% in 2014). Russian Minister of Culture Medinsky even stated 
that in the future, he guarantees that people will have to show their passport to 
“enter Internet,” not just in Russia, but around the world as well (Kommersant 
2019). Medinsky offered the one option for the Internet policing that is being 
developed in the Digital Economy national project that would potentially work 
like parental control on devices—only the Russian government and 
Roskomnadzor being the “parents.” Another option, however, remains, which 
is the Chinese “Great Firewall”—completely encapsulating and monitoring the 
Runet, creating a Russian digital panopticon with endless possibilities for gov-
ernmental overreach (Veeraraghavan 2013; Teboho Ansorge 2011). Experts 
agree that both options seem to be on the table in the Kremlin (Soldatov and 
Borogan 2013; Zhukova et  al. 2018). In either case, these measures will 
increase the possibilities and capabilities for mass surveillance.
7.4  cyber WarFare vS. InFormatIon WarFare
An apocalyptic vision of cyber war that involves financial market crashes, power 
plant meltdowns and financial collapse came to be as a warning tale from mili-
tary experts amid the overwhelming enthusiasm about the Internet (Clarke 
and Knake 2014). This vision, however, has been amended in the policy world 
by the notions of “hybrid war” and “active measures” (Charap 2015; Johnson 
2018; Seely 2017; Biscop 2015). The latter one references a Soviet-era term 
for the actions conducted by Soviet security services such as KGB (Komitet 
gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security,) by means of 
media  manipulation and various degrees of violence (Johnson 2018). Most 
scholars contend that “hybrid war” is not new or unique to Russia (Galeotti 
2016; Renz 2016; Polese et  al. 2016) and should not lead to panic over 
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YouTube cartoons about girls and bears2 that can somehow indoctrinate its 
audience to love Putin (Galeotti 2017). While cyber warfare has been viewed 
in Clausewitzian terms of critical security infrastructure strikes (Rid 2012), 
information warfare or its more Russia-specific designations such as “hybrid 
war” and “active measures,” common among Kremlin critical journalists, had 
had much less coverage until 2007.
The Estonian Bronze Soldier controversy has become patient zero in the 
modern cyber war discussion (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). In 2007, 
Estonian authorities decided to remove Alëša, a bronze statue in the center of 
Tallinn that commemorated the Soviet soldiers who fought against Nazi troops 
in World War II. The statue was widely seen as a symbol for Soviet occupation 
by many Estonians (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008). After the statue was 
relocated to a military cemetery, there were several waves of protest, both in 
Estonia and in Russia (Herzog 2011). Demonstrations in front of the Estonian 
embassy organized by the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi (Our people), 
an attack on the Estonian ambassador in Moscow, and finally a cyberattack on 
the Estonian government showed a certain degree of popular outrage, in which 
the role of the Russian government was seen as encouraging, if not sponsoring 
(Ottis 2008; Herzog 2011).
Ottis identified a clear political angle of the malicious traffic that was the 
core of cyberattack (Ottis 2008). For instance, malformed queries directed at 
the Estonian government included Russian-language swearwords calling the 
Estonian prime minister a “faggot” and a “fascist.” At the same time, instruc-
tions of how to attack Estonian governmental websites were scattered across 
Russian-language websites and even relatively primitive denial of service attack 
(the so-called ping flood) could have caused considerable trouble. While Ottis 
did not identify Russian government’s direct involvement into the attacks, he 
also notes that it did nothing to mitigate them, that is, to dial down the public 
outrage about Estonia and condemn the “patriotic” cyberattacks. Herzog also 
emphasizes that the Estonian cyberattack milestone showed that virtually 
untraceable “hacktivists” may now possess the ability to disrupt or destroy 
government operations. Alternatively, Rid (2012) has pushed against the des-
ignation of Estonian cyberattacks as “cyber war” as it fails to meet Clausewitz’s 
war criteria of being violent, instrumental, and politically attributed. Balzacq 
and Cavelty (2016) also offer the conceptualization of “cyber incidents” 
instead of “cyber war” with the latter notion being the result of a securitization 
process of deliberate disruptions of normalized cybersecurity practices.
While other cyberwarfare weapons, such as Stuxnet,3 have significantly 
changed the way policy and academia discuss cyber war (Langner 2011; Collins 
and McCombie 2012), it is Russian “disinformation campaigns” that have 
made headlines all over the world, spurring the development of different work-
ing groups and projects that assess the impact of pro-Russian narratives in 
Western countries, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), 
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE), 
Center for European Policy Analysis, Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
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(ARENA), and numerous computational propaganda projects. The most 
widely publicized ones had at best murky methodology (such as Hamilton 68) 
or were quickly discredited (such as PropOrNot). However, as Sanovich notes,
tools like bots and trolls were developed … to jam unfriendly and amplify friendly 
content and the inconspicuousness of trolls posing as real people and providing 
elaborate proof of even their most patently false and outlandish claims. The gov-
ernment also utilized existing, independent online tracking and measurement 
tools to make sure that the content it pays for reaches and engages the target 
audiences. Last but not least, it invested in the hacking capabilities that allow for 
the quick production of compromising material against the targets of its smear 
campaigns. (Sanovich 2017)
According to several journalistic investigations (Delovoi Peterburg 2014; 
Seddon 2014; RFERL 2015), there is a special “troll army,” that is, a team of 
fake internet bloggers who are hired to promote pro-Kremlin discourse. After 
the leak of the “bot manuals,” even a regular internet user is able to track identi-
cal comments that pollute social networks (Gunitsky 2015). Kremlin trolls are 
not “classic” trolls identified in the literature: even though Kremlin trolls may 
end up emotionally provoking the audience, their main purpose is an ideological 
one, while regular trolls are usually devoid of ideology (Hardaker 2010). Kremlin 
trolls are real people who are paid to promote Kremlin-friendly discourse.
NATO StratCom COE identifies six criteria for Kremlin trolls (2016), 
including being consistently pro-Russian and posting repetitive messages and 
not purpose-made context. Some of these criteria are helpful, but again require 
close-reading, which is usually impossible in large-scale data sets and still 
employ are rather high level of bias (NATO StratCom COE 2016). Moreover, 
these criteria are not applicable to targeted advertising on Facebook that was 
allegedly part and parcel of the Russian interference in the American presiden-
tial elections in 2016. Apart from IP data that StratCom COE used, it is hard 
to determine whether the person is a paid troll or not definitively. This was one 
of the caveats that was problematic for PropOrNot and partially for Hamilton 
68. Moreover, the cited study analyzed specifically comments to popular 
Latvian news agencies, such as DELFI, and this methodology is not always 
applicable to the analysis of social networks due to design of these platforms.
Attribution in cyberspace remains one of the main challenges. It normally 
follows the “cui bono” (“to whom is it a benefit?”) logic, but one would always 
be uncertain about the identity of the perpetrator(s) (Baezner and Robin 
2017), especially given that some cyber activists do not act on governmental 
orders—which has been the official line of the Russian government when 
accused of acts of cyber war. “Patriotic Hacking” is not unique to Russia as 
evidenced by #OPvijaya cyberattack on Pakistani governmental websites and 
governmental initiatives in several Asian countries to promote cyber privateer-
ing (Hare 2017). However, it was an issue related to Russian foreign policy 
that put cyber war on international security and NATO’s radar.
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The “hacktivist” defense was used also in the case of alleged Russian inter-
ference in the US elections in 2016. US intelligence agencies and several pri-
vate cybersecurity firms identified two groups with alleged ties to FSB and 
GRU (Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie, Main Intelligence Directorate), 
that were involved in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC). Two groups, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 29, aka Cozy Bear, 
and APT 28, aka Fancy Bear, penetrated the servers of the DNC and leaked 
private communications that had a damaging effect on Donald Trump’s rival in 
the presidential campaign—Hillary Clinton (Polyakova and Boyer 2018). 
During the 2018 Helsinki summit between President Trump and President 
Putin, Russian president insisted that the Russian state has never interfered and 
does not interfere in elections in other countries. Further, he admitted that 
some Russians could have sympathized with Trump, since during his election 
campaign he was in favor of improving ties with Moscow, and those people 
acted on their sympathies (Khimshiashvili 2018).
The Report by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
“Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” claimed 
that it was President Putin who directed the hacking activities, with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirm-
ing this with “high confidence” and the NSA with “moderate confidence.” 
Moreover, the Report went even further and documented not only hacking 
activities and trolling by the Internet Research Agency, but also some of the 
articles and reporting by Russia Today and Sputnik (Defense Intelligence 
Agency 2017). The report’s assessment of RT’s “Occupy Wall Street” docu-
mentary and critique of the US political system as “anti-American rhetoric” 
played into the hands of Russian interference skeptics: if a country prides itself 
in its freedom of speech, what kind of damage is a documentary on an anti- 
establishment movement supposed to do to a democracy? As Sanovich notes, 
maintaining the reputation of mainstream media and ensuring their objectivity, 
fairness, integrity and professionalism would be a much more effective defense 
against any kind of “active measures” (Sanovich 2017).
Sanovich’s argument rings especially true because the Russian government 
also relies on flooding technique in its information war effort, that is, govern-
mentally affiliated mass media as well as Internet Research Agency trolls pro-
vide such an overwhelming amount of contradictory information that is 
difficult to parse (Roberts 2014). As Farrel and Schneier note, the goal is “to 
seed public debate with nonsense, disinformation, distractions, vexatious opin-
ions and counter-arguments” (Farrell and Schneier 2018, 2019), and create, in 
Russian terms, “info-noise” that would fragment social reality and undermine 
public deliberation with a flurry of “alternative facts.” The problem here is that 
flooding is not a uniquely Russian or Chinese technique; it has become com-
mon place even in established democracies, with the United States being the 
birthplace of the “alternative facts” catchphrase in the first place. Can flooding 
on foreign ground be considered a cybercrime that warrants punishment? This 
is probably the assumption that led the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
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report to include Russia Today and Sputnik into the report on Russian interfer-
ence into the American elections. Sanctioning content, however, is an authori-
tarian technique that most democratic countries cannot afford, and IT giants 
only recently began filtering outright false information such as anti-vaccine 
conspiracies (Matsakis 2019).
At the same time, the long arm of the Kremlin is often overestimated. The 
botched assassination attempt on the former Russian secret agent Skripal, in 
Salisbury, is a case in point, as the alleged killers’ identities were established in 
a matter of days because of inadequate data protection (Bellingcat 2018). The 
“information noise” on the assassination attempt was performed in a much 
more efficient way with some journalists describing no less than 19 theories of 
the assassination and the head of Russia Today conducting an interview with 
the disclosed alleged assassins who pretended to be fitness coaches and duti-
fully described the beauty of Cathedral’s spear in Salisbury.
While some departments of Russian Secret Services seem to possess a 
remarkable expertise (or a possibility to outsource it) in cyber warfare tech-
niques including hacking, others have much less impressive record in informa-
tion security. At the same time, the prosecution of hacker Hell (Sergej 
Maksimov) in Germany, who hacked and released private emails of the Russian 
oppositional politician Alexei Navalny, shows that outside of Russia cybercrime 
often ends in punishment. Similarly, in the United States, former US attorney 
for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara prosecuted the infiltration 
and cyber theft of personal information from the database of J.P.  Morgan 
Chase (Reuters 2015), as well as drug trafficking cases on the so-called dark 
web. These and several other cases show that despite the need to trace intricate 
trails of digital evidence across multiple international jurisdictions attribution 
and punishment for cybercrimes is possible.
7.5  Internet SovereIGnty
After Edward Snowden blew the whistle on the scope of American mass sur-
veillance, the US government charged him with theft of government property 
and two counts of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 through “unauthorized 
communication of national defense information” (Espionage Act, section 
793(d)) and “willful communication of classified communications intelligence 
information to an unauthorized person” (Espionage Act, section 798(a)(3)). 
Eventually, he found temporary political asylum in Russia, a country hardly 
famous for its liberal internet governance, but probably one of the very few 
countries that does not have an extradition agreement with the United States 
and granted Snowden asylum. By harboring Snowden, Moscow seemingly had 
a good hand to renegotiate global Internet governance as he provided first-
hand data of governmental surveillance overreach that extended well beyond 
US borders and threatened other countries’ digital security.
The Russian government has a realist state-centric understanding of the 
cyberspace that is supposed to have its borders, sovereignty, and 
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nonintervention (Nocetti 2015), a type of digital Westphalia (Zinovieva 2013) 
with separate “national” Internets and principles of nonintervention. This view 
is not uniquely held by Russia; the Snowden revelations did indeed push many 
countries around the world to engage in digitized geopolitics, where cyber-
space is a battlefield and each country needs to build up their cyber defenses 
(Bauman et al. 2014). Hence, it was rather frustrating for the Russian authori-
ties that the United States had a joint responsibility with Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to carry out the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) overseeing global IP address allocation until 2016. 
This perception of the Internet was vocalized by Putin, who called it a “CIA 
project” and by numerous Russian officials who had blamed Russian waves of 
protest on social networks “whose servers are hosted in California.” With 
ICANN’s headquarters being indeed in California, its independent nongov-
ernmental status is questioned by other countries as well (Becker 2019).
Runet can, however, potentially do without the overseas servers. Most 
researchers note that Runet is a self-contained linguistic and cultural environ-
ment with its own well-developed search engines, social networks, and mes-
senger services and software products often imported to other countries (Price 
2017; Asmolov and Kolozaridi 2017). Introduction of Cyrillic domain 
addresses was a notable breakthrough after years of Latin script domination. 
The preparation and testing of the .рф domain started in 2007 by registrar RU 
center and proceeded as an application to ICANN. In January 2010, ICANN 
announced that the domain was one of the first four new non-Latin country 
code top-level domains to have passed the Fast Track String Evaluation and the 
domain became operational on May 13, 2010, with two websites: for the presi-
dent of Russia and for the government of Russia. As of the moment of writing, 
the .ru domain is still approximately five times more popular than its Cyrillic 
counterpart. While the introduction of Cyrillic domain names could be seen 
(and framed) as an emancipatory move to decolonize the Internet (Leslie 
2012; Farivar 2011), so far it just implemented a higher level of Russian state 
influence that does not necessarily have an emancipatory agenda.
Moreover, Russian government tried to forge alliances with China, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates in order to promote a more central-
ized and controlled vision for the global Internet, specifically trying to intro-
duce global Internet governance at an International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) conference in 2012. This attempt was unsuccessful given the 
opposition from most Western countries including the United States, whose 
representative insisted that the conference was not supposed to deal with the 
issue of internet governance or the fact that it was supposed to be carried out 
through ITU, because that would potentially open the door to content censor-
ship (Fitzpatrick 2012). Even further, when Russian Minister of Communications 
Nikiforov provided remarks in Brazil’s NETmundial conference calling to hand 
over the power from ICANN to ITU in light of the Snowden revelations about 
American mass surveillance, his speech was not even included into the confer-
ence documents. Even though several authoritarian countries are eager to 
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support Russian proposals for a more regulated cyberspace, with the United 
States so far standing behind an “Internet Freedom” agenda (Price 2017), it is 
unlikely that Russian suggestions will be implemented. Moreover, Deputy 
Head of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass 
Communications of the Russian Federation Aleksej Volin remarked during a 
MediaForum in Shanghai, that Russia and China are looking at creating “alter-
native” social networks and messengers that would rival its Western analogues 
(RIA Novosti 2018) if Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook keep on filtering 
Russian and Chinese media out.
7.6  concluSIon
Cybersecurity à la Russe is marked by the authoritarian nature of the state that 
is primarily concerned by the question of regime survival. This logic motivates 
both external and internal double-pronged strategy of digital security, or, as 
Yatsyk succinctly puts it, “to hack abroad and ban at home” (Yatsyk 2018). 
While externally Russia enjoys an image of a cyber superpower, seemingly capa-
ble of unseating heads of state, Russian government’s attempts at controlling 
the cyberspace have not been quite as successful yet; that is why the govern-
ment relies not only on filtering content, but also on flooding the information 
space both at home and abroad. Governmental surveillance capabilities are 
much less formidable, and filtering content is not particularly effective as the 
recent struggle to ban Telegram showed. Current attempts by the Russian 
government at making Runet independent from foreign traffic are especially 
worrisome because without the reliance on the “servers in California,” the 
ones in Moscow can be switched off albeit with significant political and eco-
nomic costs. In the end, using the Internet is a matter of national security, 
according to Putin:
They [the Western intelligence agencies] are sitting there, it’s [the Internet] their 
invention. And everyone listens, sees and reads what you say, and accumulates 
defense information. And [once we have sovereign internet] they won’t. 
(Putin 2019)
This chapter provided the overview of the digital security strategy in Putin’s 
Russia. The law that is supposed to isolate Runet is officially on “ensuring safe 
and sustainable functioning of the Internet” on the Russian territory, echoing 
digital security’s stated main concerns (Meduza 2019b). At the moment of 
writing, it seems that the main purpose of the Russian government is to emu-
late the Chinese model and create the self-sustaining sovereign Runet that is 
independent of foreign infrastructure. This is in part motivated by the consid-
erations of regime stability and the overwhelming perception in the Russian 
government that the Internet and social media could be used as a “crowbar” 
for regime change facilitating social mobilization of opposition groups. Viewing 
the Internet as a tool of criminals is not unique to Russian authorities but, at 
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the same time, this perception leads to the continuous securitization of cyber-
space in Russia and legitimizes acts of information war and cyberattacks. 
Moreover, existing difficulty in prosecuting digital security offences will likely 
leave alleged cybercrimes of Russian secret services without punishment.
noteS
1. Somewhat derogatory term that is supposed to mean the supporters of the 
Kremlin’s Ukraine policy, including Crimea annexation. The court decision 
“translated” this term as “Russian patriots,” thus interpreting “vata” as a social 
group against said hate speech was used.
2. “Maša i medved’” (Maša and the Bear) is a Russian fan fiction version of the 
Goldilocks fairytale, and is extremely popular on YouTube with over 26 million 
channel subscribers.
3. Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm, allegedly developed by American and 
Israeli intelligence service and first uncovered in 2010. Stuxnet is believed to be 
responsible for causing substantial damage to Iran’s nuclear program.
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Sanovich, Sergey. 2017. Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins of Digital 
Misinformation. Working Paper.
Seddon, Max 2014. Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America. BuzzFeed 
News. Accessed September 21, 2019. http://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/
documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america#.nxEvk1YVWZ.
Seely, Robert. 2017. Defining Contemporary Russian Warfare: Beyond the Hybrid 
Headline. The RUSI Journal 162 (1): 50–59.
Sivetc, Liudmila. 2018. State Regulation of Online Speech in Russia: The Role of 
Internet Infrastructure Owners. International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 27 (1): 28–49.
Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. 2013. Russia’s Surveillance State. World Policy 
Journal 30 (3): 23–30.
———. 2015. The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the 
New Online Revolutionaries. Hachette UK.
Stadnik, Ilona. 2019. A Closer Look at the ‘sovereign Runet’ law. Georgia Tech. https://
www. in t e r ne tgove r nance .o rg/2019/05/16/a-c lo se r- look -a t - the - 
sovereign-runet-law/.
Radio Svoboda. 2014. Karikatura dnâ na Radio Svoboda [Caricature of the Day on 
Radio Svoboda]. Accessed December 15, 2019. http://www.svoboda.org/con-
tent/article/26648017.html.
Teboho Ansorge, Josef. 2011. Digital Power in World Politics: Databases, Panopticons 
and Erwin Cuntz. Millennium 40 (1): 65–83.
Vedomosti. 2016. Runet budet polnost’û obosoblen k 2020 godu [Runet will be 
Completely Independent by the Year 2020]. Vedomosti. https://www.vedomosti.
ru/technology/articles/2016/05/13/640856-runet-obosoblen.
Veeraraghavan, Rajesh. 2013. Dealing with the Digital Panopticon: The Use And 
Subversion of ICT in an Indian Bureaucracy. In Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development, Full 
Papers—Volume 1.
Verkhovsky, Alexander. 2018. Nepravomernoe primenenie antièkstremistskogo 
zakonodatel’stva v Rossii v 2017 godu [Improper Use of Anti-Extremist Legislation 
in Russia in 2017]. SOVA. Center for Information and Analysis.
7 CYBERCRIME AND PUNISHMENT: SECURITY, INFORMATION WAR… 
134
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CHAPTER 8
Digital Activism in Russia: The Evolution 
and Forms of Online Participation 
in an Authoritarian State
Markku Lonkila, Larisa Shpakovskaya, and Philip Torchinsky
8.1  IntroductIon: EvolutIon of onlInE ActIvIsm 
In russIA
The development of digital technology, particularly Internet, social media 
applications, and mobile communications has in many ways changed the nature 
of activism: citizens’ ways of addressing and resolving social, cultural, and polit-
ical issues. For an individual citizen it is today cheaper and faster to seek, debate, 
and distribute news, facts, and falsehoods worldwide concerning a wide variety 
of issues.
Digitalization has also enabled new, “connective” and horizontal modes of 
mobilizing citizens, which has changed the role of social movement organiza-
tions (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Numerous examples from the Zapatistas, 
Occupy Wall Street, Arab Spring, and the #metoo-movement to color revolu-
tions of Eastern Europe and the Russian opposition protests of 2011–2013 
have demonstrated the importance of online actions in informing and mobiliz-
ing citizens. These actions may be carried out by one person or by twenty 
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million people; they may—depending on the context—be legal or heavily sanc-
tioned, result in praise or imprisonment, start revolts, and overthrow govern-
ments (cf. Gibson and Cantijoch 2013; Theocharis 2015; Earl 2016; Kaun and 
Uldam 2018).
On the darker side, digital technology may also be used to obstruct and 
annihilate human and political rights as the persecution of Rohingyas in 
Myanmar or Russia’s meddling in the 2016 United States (US) elections have 
illustrated. Moreover, digital technology also enables completely new ways of 
monitoring citizens both by profit-seeking enterprises and governments. Video 
surveillance, automatic face recognition, and accumulating databases on users’ 
health, consumption habits, and movements enable new modes of control: 
data given out voluntarily or unknowingly on social media platforms make it 
possible to predict users’ sexual orientation, political affiliation, ethnicity, and 
many other things with a high degree of accuracy (Kosinski et al. 2013).
In democratic countries the misuse of digital technology can be exposed and 
countered by independent professional media and democratic political institu-
tions. In authoritarian countries lacking such counterforces, new digital media 
have provided governments with unprecedented tools for regulating and con-
trolling citizens’ on- and offline behavior.
Russia is a specific example of an authoritarian country with a well-educated 
population, widely available broadband access and a social media ecosystem 
dominated by domestic applications. Russia is, for example, one of the few 
countries worldwide, where Facebook is not the leading social network site, 
losing clearly in popularity to its Russian counterpart VKontakte (“In contact,” 
more commonly known as VK). In political terms, Russia is an example of 
“electoral authoritarianism”: a system of political governance where unfair 
elections are organized to furnish the ruling elite with a veneer of democratic 
legitimacy (cf. Gel’man 2017).
During his first term in office, President Vladimir Putin subjected Russian 
traditional media to state control while the Russian-language sector of the 
Internet (often dubbed Runet by the Russians—for more, see Chap. 16) 
remained practically free. Before the opposition protest wave in 2011–2013, 
lively discussions on social, cultural, and political issues took place on the 
Runet; well-known opposition activists from across the political and cultural 
spectrum deliberated on the LiveJournal blogging and social networking site, 
which, prior to the protest wave, was considered the hub of political debate in 
Russia (Etling et al. 2010).
The magnitude of the opposition mass protests in fall 2011, that erupted 
in response to the falsification of the results of the parliamentary elections 
and swapping of chairs by Putin and Medvedev,1 came as a surprise to pro-
testers and the Kremlin alike, which for the first time felt the political force 
of social media. The years 2011–2018 were marked by an intensive, state-led 
campaign to regulate Runet and curtail freedom of expression, which we 
have dubbed the “occupation of Runet” (Lonkila et al. 2020; for more, also 
see Chaps. 5 and 2).
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The occupation marked a transition from lively online political debate and 
activism to a mode of oppressed activism in which expressing openly anti- 
Kremlin views in Russia has become risky. This has resulted in a “nymphosis” 
of activism: many former anti-government protesters have left politics (e.g., 
Pussy Riot member Maria Alyokhina) or turned inwards to family life in a 
Soviet manner; others have emigrated (e.g., Yevgeniya Chirikova, Boris Akunin 
and Ilya Ponomarev) or turned to less dangerous topics. However, as sug-
gested by Svetlana Erpyleva (2019), a new generation of Russian activists may 
be emerging which merges politics and solving concrete, daily life problems.
Compared to the situation ten years ago, in 2020 Russia has only a handful 
of anti-Kremlin activists openly expressing their views on Runet. LiveJournal, 
which banned political agitation in 2017, has lost its position as the hub of 
activist debate to Facebook, YouTube, Telegram, and Instagram.
In the next section we will present our notion of online activism, define the 
focus of this chapter, describe the variety of forms of online activism and dis-
cuss these with reference to the theory of connective action (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2012). In Sect. 8.3 we will first present survey results concerning 
Russians’ participation in various forms of activism and then investigate in 
detail two of the most noteworthy recent cases of contentious online activism 
in Russia. These two cases address first, the campaign conducted by Alexei 
Navalny and his FBK (Fond bor’by c korrupciej, Anti-Corruption Foundation), 
and second, the battle by the Telegram messenger service to provide online 
communication services that are protected against state monitoring. Telegram 
is a messenger application which works on many platforms, among them 
mobile applications (Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android) and desktop applications 
(Windows, Linux, and MacOS). It offers communication via text messages or 
voice calls and claims to be the most secure messenger on the market because 
of its custom encryption protocol and end-to-end encryption in secret chats. 
This means that the content of a secret chat can only be decrypted by the 
recipient of the message but not by a third party, including Telegram person-
nel. This feature makes Telegram a pivotal application for activists challenging 
the powers of the Russian state.
8.2  thEorIzIng onlInE ActIvIsm
8.2.1  Defining Online Activism
We define online activism, modifying the term “digitally networked participa-
tion” by Yannis Theocharis (2015, 6) to cover citizens’ voluntary actions to 
raise awareness about or exert pressure in order to solve a political, cultural, or 
social problem.2 Our definition thus covers a wide variety of issues from social 
and environmental problems to human rights, local disputes, and more. In 
terms of organizational forms, it governs a continuum of actions and activists 
ranging from lone hackers and sporadic flashmobs organized by anonymous 
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individuals to established movements with their entrenched social movement 
organizations.
The definition excludes institutionalized party politics and politicians, as 
well as political actions by the state (e.g., state-organized trolling, individuals 
affiliated with or sponsored by the state, covering also indirect sponsorship and 
informal approvals),3 but includes actions by citizens, such as opposition leader 
Alexei Navalny who have been excluded from institutionalized politics but who 
nevertheless try to influence the political process.
The attribute online refers to a mode of web-based activity that has become 
possible and ubiquitous thanks to digital technology, Internet, social media, 
and mobile communications.4 Although our focus is on activities conducted 
completely or partly on the Internet, we do not consider online to be an onto-
logically separate sphere since the boundaries between on- and offline are 
becoming increasingly blurred.
Some forms of online activism resemble and overlap with their offline coun-
terparts. A politician may, for example, be contacted either through social 
media, via email, or personally, and a petition can be signed both on a website 
and on paper. Notably, our definition includes posting, commenting, sharing, 
and “liking” various items in social media, but not merely reading a post or 
watching a video.5
Other forms of online activism are, however, qualitatively different from the 
traditional means of protest and are only feasible online, for example, creating, 
reworking, and distributing Internet memes or hacking into a computer data-
base. Similarly, some forms of offline activism have characteristics which cannot 
be transferred online—for example, the feeling of a riot policeman’s stick hit-
ting a citizen’s jaw.
In this chapter we first present in detail two cases of contentious action 
which explicitly challenge the Kremlin. We have selected these cases because 
they are among the most prominent and well-known forms of Russian online 
activism, and have also managed to incite related street protests. In addition, 
we will present examples of visible and significant, but non-political forms of 
activism.6
Although the focus of this chapter is on online activism, one should remem-
ber that an important part of the political activism in Russia is still conducted 
entirely offline. During the campaigns of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, for 
example, volunteers distribute printed leaflets in the staircases of apartment 
blocks in Russian cities to inform people about forthcoming street protests.
8.2.2  Types of Online Activism
There are multiple types of online activism. The list of new forms is continu-
ously growing with the development of technology, and various forms have 
been actively employed by both international and Russian activists. Among the 
most prevalent forms are the posting, debating, and sharing of relevant infor-
mation online in various social media applications such as social networking 
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sites. Another important form of online activism is mobilizing and coordinating 
actions, for example, setting up an event or group site on Facebook. Through 
witnessing activists transmit information about events ignored by the state-
controlled media in Russia, for example, by streaming videos of opposition 
street protests in real time. The video On vam ne Dimon (He is not Dimon to 
you) published by Alexei Navalny’s team and accusing prime minister Medvedev 
of corruption also utilized social media doxxing: finding and publishing private 
information about an individual—this time the prime minister of Russia—on 
the Internet.7
Crowdfunding and crowdsourcing have been used, for example, to collect 
money to fund Boris Nemtsov’s pamphlets about Putin, to support the inde-
pendent channel TV Rain (Dožd’), to raise money for Navalny’s anti-corrup-
tion project RosPil, to pay the fines imposed by the court on the Russian liberal 
magazine New Times and to investigate the downing of Malaysian Airline flight 
MH17 (cf. Sokolov 2015).
Still other forms of online activism include, among others, leaktivism (e.g., 
wikileaks), hashtag activism (raising awareness of an issue across various social 
media platforms; e.g., the #metoo movement, #Navalny2018) and hacking 
and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
To manage this growing multitude of types of online activism, we propose, 
modifying Sandor Vegh’s (2013) classification, to divide online activism into 
communicative activism and technoactivism. Communicative activism refers 
primarily to human-to-human interactions: exchanging information and rais-
ing awareness of societal problems and issues among people. The second form 
of communicative activism includes mobilizing and organizing people to act 
either on- or offline—for example, to sign an e-petition or to participate in a 
street protest. Communicative activism usually takes place on widely available 
platforms, such as popular social networking or video sharing sites. Since it 
requires no sophisticated technical skills, it is the most common type of online 
activism.
By technoactivism we refer to the actions by humans to manipulate techno-
logical systems. These may include hacking into a central bank database, pro-
gramming bots, or mounting digital resistance as in the case of the instant 
messaging service Telegram’s efforts to avoid blocking by the Russian state (see 
Sect. 8.3). A second form of technoactivism is data activism, by which we mean 
the use of either publicly available or open, but not widely known, datasets to 
bring about a change in society. In comparison to communicative activism, 
technoactivism typically presupposes technological know-how and compe-
tences, which exceed those of an average Internet user.
Russian examples of data activism include exposing corrupt state-sponsored 
purchases, such as buying luxury cars for the Ministry of Emergency Situations 
instead of fire trucks8 or publishing data on expensive property belonging to 
modestly salaried Russian state employees. Still another example concerns 
using data available in a specific industry (e.g., a list of blocked Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses and websites) to publish unfair or erroneous actions by 
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state agencies such as the Internet watchdog Roskomnadzor (see http://rkn.
gov.ru/).
In empirical cases, different forms of online activism may blend into a com-
bination of these types. In their anti-corruption campaigns Navalny’s staff, for 
example, combines forms of communicative activism (YouTube videos and 
blog posts) with forms of data activism and social doxxing (using public data-
bases to identify and disclose assets and properties of Russian politicians or 
oligarchs at home and abroad).
8.2.3  Online Activism as Connective Action
We relate online activism to Lance Bennett’s and Alexandra Segerberg’s theory 
of connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). The authors contrast tra-
ditional collective activism to the “connective” variety, the latter being only 
possible via new digital media.
In traditional collective action the advocates of a cause share the same col-
lective action frame and the actions are coordinated by a social movement 
organization in a top-down manner. To put it bluntly, the members of the 
traditional communist movement shared the Marxist ideology and the move-
ment’s problem consisted of selling this common ideology and action frame to 
followers.
In connective action, by contrast, the participants may find their own, easily 
personalized action frame and entry point to activism with no obligation to 
adhere to a clear-cut ideology. The volunteers and supporters may only share a 
vague and inclusive action frame (e.g., “we are the 99%,” “for fair elections”)9 
and their grass-root actions are not dictated from above but there is room for 
creativity and improvisation.
Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 756) distinguish between three forms of 
connective action. In the first (“self-organizing networks”) the action is com-
pletely grass-roots based and mobilized horizontally by the users via Internet 
without a central coordinating organization. In the second form (“organiza-
tionally enabled networks”), there is an organization coordinating action in the 
background but giving leeway for users to find their own, personal ways to 
participate. In the third form (“organizationally brokered networks”), there is 
strong organizational coordination of action.
In our empirical cases of online human and technoactivism presented in the 
next section, the three-fold classification above can be thought of as a variable 
of increasing organizational coordination. In the crowdfunding instances of 
Russian activism (e.g., saving the magazine New Times, initiatives conducted 
through change.org), there is usually little or no organizational coordination 
since the action consists of donating money through a ready-made online plat-
form. In other instances, such as in the campaigns by Navalny’s team described 
in the next section, hierarchical organization coordination is combined with a 
horizontally networked group of volunteers.
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8.3  onlInE ActIvIsm In todAy’s russIA
In this section we first present empirical data on the on- and offline forms of 
activism in Russia based on the 2016 European Social Survey data in compari-
son to four European countries. Second, we illustrate communicative and tech-
noactivism based on two case studies. The two cases are selected because we 
consider them to be among the most prominent and successful campaigns so 
far in a struggle against the Russian state’s “occupation” of Runet (Lonkila 
et al. 2020). The first case is an example of communicative activism conducted 
by Alexei Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation and the second an 
example of technoactivism conducted by the Telegram messenger service.
8.3.1  Empirical Data on Russian Activism
Table 8.1 summarizes Russians’ participation in various forms of activism based 
on the results of the eighth round of the European Social Survey in 2016—the 
first year when a question explicitly measuring online participation (“have you 
posted or shared anything about politics online”) was added to the survey.
According to the table, the Russians were lagging behind in most of the 
traditional forms of activism compared to Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and Finland, with the exception of working in a political party 
or action group, where the Russians were as passive as the citizens of the four 
European countries. In addition, the Russians were only slightly less keen to 
wear a campaign badge or sticker than the Germans. They also took part in 
lawful public demonstrations less frequently than the French and Germans, as 
often as the British but more frequently than the Finns.
Table 8.1 European Social Survey questions on various forms of activism (European 
Social Survey Round 8 Data 2016)
Germany Finland France UK Russia
Voted in the last national election 72.1 75.3 54.9 70.2 46.8
Contacted politician or government official last 
12 months
15.7 18.8 12.9 17.3 4.9
Worked in a political party or action group last 
12 months
4.1 3.3 2.8 3.1 2.9
Worked in another organisation or association last 
12 months
29.0 38.1 13.7 7.4 3.8
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 
12 months
5.2 19.8 10.1 9.7 4.3
Signed a petition last 12 months 35.4 35.6 30.5 44.1 7.4
Took part in a lawful public demonstration last 
12 months
10.3 3.8 14.9 5.3 5.2
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 33.3 36.9 30.8 21.1 2.3
Posted or shared anything about politics online last 
12 months
21.5 20.9 20.7 29.9 4.7
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Most interestingly from the viewpoint of this chapter, only 4.7 per cent of 
the Russians—three to four times fewer than the Germans, French, Finns, and 
the British—had posted or shared anything about politics online during the 
12 months preceding the survey.
However, the mean percentages presented in Table 8.1 hide the polarization 
of Internet use: heavy Internet users are typically young urban Russians, while 
Internet use is less prevalent in the rural areas and among the elderly. Moreover, 
the European Social Survey (ESS) questions do not cover the wide variety of 
non-political forms of civic activism. According to Sobolev and Zakharov 
(Sobolev and Zakharov 2018), for example, increasing numbers of Russians 
have been participating in recent years in charity, volunteering, and also in 
actions to improve their immediate surroundings.
8.3.2  Communicative Online Activism: Alexei Navalny 
and the Anti-Corruption Foundation
Alexei Navalny is a Russian lawyer, anti-corruption fighter, and political activist 
born in 1976, who rose to fame on the Russian political scene during the 
opposition mass protests in 2011. In 2019 he remains the only credible chal-
lenge to Vladimir Putin from outside the political establishment and the only 
opposition leader who can mobilize nation-wide demonstrations in major 
Russian cities.
Navalny’s online activism is conducted and coordinated by his profes-
sional social media team at the Anti-Corruption Foundation on several plat-
forms such as his blog (https://navalny.com/) Facebook, VKontakte, 
Twitter, Odnoklassniki, Instagram, Telegram, and YouTube (for more, see 
Chap. 16). In his campaigning, Navalny has utilized several variants of 
online activism ranging from data activism and crowdsourcing (the anti-
corruption project RosPil, https://fbk.info/projects/), witnessing via 
YouTube videos, to hashtag activism (#Navalny 2018), social media doxx-
ing, and educating users on information security issues (NavalnyLIVE/
cloud YouTube channels).
According to Dollbaum et  al. (2018), Navalny’s campaign for the 2018 
presidential elections, from which he was banned, combined a strictly hierar-
chical coordination of action by the Anti-Corruption Foundation and its 
regional offices with the work of a large network of volunteers all over the 
country. The core of the campaign consisted of a broad anti-corruption stance, 
which allowed various political actors with a common interest in opposing the 
ruling regime to participate. In terms of “organizationally enabled connective 
action” (Bennett and Segerberg 2012), the campaign offered a low threshold 
for participating:
It required little prior knowledge, and participation was framed as fun, hip, and 
sociable. Each of the 80 regional offices recruited several dozens of active volunteers, 
most in their teens and early twenties, who distributed flyers, gathered signatures, 
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and registered supporters. Furthermore, the offices evolved into hubs for civic activity, 
connecting to other oppositional activists on the ground, hosting lectures, film screen-
ings, and discussions. Besides nurturing a collective identity and strengthening 
social ties, this activity was explicitly aimed at involving young people in political 
discourse, combating apathy and depoliticization. (Dollbaum et al. 2018, 5)
One indication of Navalny’s success in reaching out to young Russians is the 
new law signed by Putin on December 28, 2018, which clearly connected to 
the fact that the street protests of 2018 saw the participation of many teenag-
ers: The law punishes the organizers of unsanctioned public gatherings with 
participants under 18 years of age with 15 days’ imprisonment or fines (Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018).
However, although Navalny’s campaign utilized a wide variety of social 
media platforms and its broad anti-corruption message gave supporters much 
leeway for personalized connective action (e.g., in the form of constructing 
and sharing Internet memes), its hierarchical organization led to an inbuilt ten-
sion in the campaign. At the heart of this tension was the clash between the 
logics of goal-oriented political action and a movement of volunteers and activ-
ist recruited through street protests. (Dollbaum et al. 2018, 6).
A unique feature of Navalny’s online presence is a series of exchanges of 
YouTube videos with the Russian political elite. The Russian oligarch Alisher 
Usmanov as well as the head of the Russian National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, 
have responded to Navalny’s provocative YouTube videos exposing their 
alleged corruption by publishing their own YouTube video replies—to which 
Navalny has retaliated with further videos. This exchange of public videos 
stands in stark contrast to Putin’s and Medvedev’s total ignoring of Navalny in 
their public appearances.10
Navalny’s 2019 campaign “umnoe golosovanie” (“smart voting”, https://
vote2019.appspot.com/) targeted the 2019 Moscow city council elections and 
some regional elections, which happened at the same date, September 8, 2019. 
In the related instructional YouTube video, he urged people to vote for the 
candidate of the party—with the exception of the ruling party United Russia—
which polled the most votes during the last election in their voting district. 
Exact candidates to vote for were suggested by Navalny’s team, which followed 
the results of their own polls. The suggestions were sent to voters by email, 
made available via Telegram bot, and at the campaign website.11
In all, the particularity of communicative online activism in Russia consists 
of a cat-and-mouse game between activists and the Kremlin. In this game, the 
Kremlin has succeeded in recreating an atmosphere of fear where all anti- 
government expression online in Russia has become risky.
Alexei Navalny is one of the few who, thanks to his popularity, can afford to 
run this risk, and continues to speak directly to the people through social 
media, thereby circumventing his ban on state-controlled media. Navalny’s 
political campaigning strategy seems to more or less consciously implement a 
strategy dubbed “the cute cat theory” of online activism by Ethan Zuckerman 
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(2007). According to Zuckerman, under authoritarian conditions opposition 
activists should rely on popular platforms (on which non-political pictures of 
cute cats are posted). Due to the popularity of these platforms, their shutting 
down by the government is risky since it may annoy a large part of popula-
tion—also those previously not interested or involved in politics.
8.3.3  Technoactivism: The Example of Telegram
In addition to Navalny’s campaigns, the battle waged by the Telegram mes-
senger service against the Russian state has been among the most noteworthy 
events of Russian online activism in recent years. In this conflict the Russian 
state tried to block the messenger service, whose global image and marketing 
campaigns focus on encryption and privacy. In particular, Telegram assures its 
users that, unlike other messengers, it is able to protect the users’ chats from 
strangers’ eyes and denies any cooperation with secret services. In line with 
this, the company refused to collaborate with the Russian security service. It 
therefore allowed activists to continue publishing and distributing their anti- 
governmental views anonymously.
The case of Telegram constitutes the most significant example of a successful 
struggle against Internet control by the increasingly authoritarian Russian 
state. Telegram used its knowledge and understanding of Internet protocols, as 
well as mechanisms for updating smartphones from mobile application stores 
to circumvent blocks. Telegram combined this with a major crowd-sourcing 
initiative to fight for the free exchange of information protected against state 
monitoring.12
This section sheds light on the legal, technological, and societal aspects of 
the struggle which also had an offline form of mobilization: On April 30, 2018, 
thousands of protesters marched in Moscow and threw paper planes—the sym-
bol of Telegram—to protest against the state’s decision to block the service. 
Because of its visual nature, the action succeeded in gaining media attention 
and in showing support for Telegram. However, unlike the technological 
online resistance described later in this article, this offline public support action 
had no sequels and was ignored by the Kremlin.
8.3.3.1  Telegram’s Legal Battle Against the Russian Security Service
Although state pressure on free expression and on Telegram’s founder, Pavel 
Durov, have a longer history, the actual start of the conflict between the com-
pany and Russian state can be traced back to July 2017. In July, the Russian 
federal security service FSB (Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti) required 
Telegram to create a way for the FSB to intercept communications on Telegram. 
To be more precise, the FSB asked Telegram to hand over the encryption keys, 
that is, digital passwords, without which it is impossible to read communica-
tion content. The security service justified its requirement by the need to 
decrypt terrorist messages sent via Telegram in connection with the terror 
attack on a St. Petersburg metro train on April 3, 2017. Telegram responded 
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by stating that the company did not have the keys because the application keeps 
them only on users’ devices. In addition, the founder and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Pavel Durov, noted that the FSB’s request was contradictory to 
the protection of privacy of communication guaranteed by the Constitution 
of Russia.
In October the FSB filed a formal complaint with the court, which fined 
Telegram for non-compliance with the FSB’s request (Bryzgalova 2017). The 
FSB defended its position claiming that providing the FSB with a technical 
capability to decode messages still required the FSB to seek a court order to 
read correspondence from specific individuals (Pis’mennye vozraženiâ FSB 
2017). On March 20, 2018, Russia’s Supreme Court rejected Telegram’s 
appeal, after which the Russian Internet watchdog Roskomnadzor announced 
that the messaging service had 15 days to provide the required information to 
the security agencies—otherwise access to Telegram in Russia would be 
blocked.
8.3.3.2  Technological Resistance by Telegram
On April 13, 2018, the Taganskij court in Moscow ruled that access to 
Telegram in Russia should be blocked due to the failure of Telegram to provide 
the FSB with the encryption keys. In technical terms, the FSB required 
Telegram to rewrite their messaging application from scratch to enable the FSB 
to read all messages sent via Telegram. The requirement was based on the fed-
eral law “on information, information technologies, and the protection of 
information.” Refusing to comply, Telegram deemed the law and its imple-
mentation unconstitutional.
How did Telegram resist the state’s attempts to block the use of the service?
When Roskomnadzor told the Internet service providers (ISPs) the addresses 
of the Telegram servers, the ISPs disabled the connections to these servers. As 
a response, Telegram assigned them different addresses, making it challeng-
ing to discover the new addresses and to communicate their location to the ISPs 
fast enough. (ISPs in Russia are obliged to download a register of addresses to 
block daily, and Telegram can change addresses several times per hour).
However, Telegram cannot assign random addresses to its servers because 
they  must be in a range owned by the company at which Telegram keeps 
the servers, such as Google or Amazon. Thus, Roskomnadzor’s attempts to 
block large ranges of addresses belonging to these companies led to a tempo-
rary block not only of Telegram but also of many other websites. Google and 
Amazon, for example, provide hosting for many companies worldwide, includ-
ing companies operating in Russia. Internet services not related to Telegram 
were merely affected because they had servers in the same range of addresses as 
Telegram.
 As a wealthy company Telegram could afford to rent many large ranges of 
addresses from giant hosting providers. Blocking all of them would have meant 
collateral damage to Internet services, which are essential for many people in 
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Russia. Thus, Roskomnadzor was able to block only some of them, and 
Telegram used the remaining part.
In addition to the actions described above, Telegram took several steps to 
avoid blocking imposed by Roskomnadzor.
First, the company encouraged users worldwide to run so-called proxy serv-
ers, that is, intermediary services with ample capacity to forward Telegram 
traffic to actual Telegram servers. Pavel Durov, the CEO of the company, even 
announced a grant program promising financial support to individuals who 
develop and run proxies for Telegram users on their own or rented servers.
Second, Telegram encouraged people to use virtual private networks (VPN). 
VPN allows establishing an encrypted connection from a laptop or smartphone 
to a location outside their country. A VPN server there serves as an intermedi-
ary allowing connection to Telegram from that location.
Third, Telegram uses so-called push updates (similar to message notifica-
tions in messengers such as WhatsApp) to notify the Telegram application of 
any server address changes. If Roskomnadzor had blocked the push notifica-
tions, it effectively would have blocked all notifications from Apple and Google 
servers to all applications on all Android and iOS smartphones in Russia.  It 
would have disrupted many services, including popular online banking applica-
tions, which Roskomnadzor did not dare.
In sum,  Telegram’s technoactivism is a form of activism intended to 
resist attacks on civil rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of com-
munication. Technoactivism often requires extensive technical expertise and 
money to build a technical solution and a relatively large community ready to 
support, popularize, crowdfund, and help technically with its implementation. 
Its success depends on technical abilities, expertise, and the limitations of its 
opponents.
8.3.4  Non-contentious Forms of Online Activism
Our definition of online activism includes forms of action which are not con-
tentious or political in nature. They do not directly challenge state power but 
are rather targeted at resolving social, cultural, or local problems. Such activi-
ties are relatively common in Russia; they address a wide variety of issues and 
usually do not require an organization to coordinate operations. These activi-
ties may, however, become politicized and transformed into protests when, for 
example, the discussions approach the fields of healthcare, education reforms, 
taxation, or parental interests; when residents start opposing the planning of 
new garbage dumps nearby, or when apartment owners begin to mobilize 
against the replacement of a neighborhood park with an apartment block. 
Nevertheless, some topics such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) rights, gender identities or sexual and domestic violence have already 
been politicized in official discourse in Russia regardless of the initial nature of 
the public debate or intentions regarding contentious mobilization.
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The range of non-political issues and social problems addressed by online 
activists covers a wide variety of everyday problems from animal rights to 
parental movements, car owner rights, and so on. Below we will illustrate some 
of the most noteworthy examples of non-political online activism related, first, 
to environmental and housing issues and, second, to women’s and LGBT rights.
The issues related to environmental topics and problems related to real estate 
ownership rights (e.g., five-storey building renovations in Moscow) were not 
originally politicized in public discourse. Activism around these topics usually 
begins as an attempt to solve local problems and becomes politicized in the 
course of events (cf. Erpyleva 2019). Numerous small local environmental ini-
tiatives in the middle of the 2010s, mainly aimed at cleaning green zones in 
urban areas, shared the ideology of “small steps,” which implied the idea of 
making life better by improving the immediate surroundings. One of the first 
big ecological movements was the defense of the Khimki forest (Moscow 
region) 2007–2011. It became politicized relatively quickly, but involved 
negotiations with the authorities, communication with them, and even their 
sporadic support for the movement. The garbage protests (2018–2019) in 
Moscow region and Shies (Arkhangelsk region) had clear anti-government sig-
nificance right from the outset, and with this agenda and the use of social 
media (Facebook and VK) and thematic sites (Шиес.рф, Bellona.rf) they easily 
reached a nationwide audience.
Examples of the movement defending real estate ownership rights  include 
joint action by apartment owners of the same block of flats, who create groups 
on the social networking site VKontakte to solve various housing management 
problems, such as maintenance and repair of the building’s infrastructure (water 
pipes, heating, elevators, etc.) or construction of a playground in the yard. This 
type of activism has been common in campaigns organized by local residents 
against urban construction projects and for the protection of parks and green 
urban zones in Russian cities (see Gladarev and Lonkila 2012 and 2013 for an 
example in St. Petersburg). In Moscow, protests against the plan initiated by the 
city government to demolish and rebuild whole neighborhoods of Soviet-era 
tenements were coordinated through thematic Internet sites (for example, 
http://renovation.tbcc.ru) and Facebook groups in 2017–2018 
(Rosenblat 2018).
The disputes concerning women’s and LGBT rights present, by contrast, an 
example of online activism on a topic that has already become highly politicized 
as part of conservative and nationalist political rhetoric, also at the state level. 
Domestic violence and LGBT rights have been discussed not only by liberal 
activists, but also by conservatives, who reported websites to the Russian 
Internet watchdog Roskomnadzor for allegedly containing prohibited “gay 
propaganda.” In particular, the group Deti-404. LGBT-podrostki (Children 404. 
LGBT teens) on the popular Russian social network site VKontakte was blocked 
by a court order in 2015 after being found guilty of propagating “non- traditional 
sexual relationships.” Elena Klimova, the founder of the group and a project 
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bearing the same name, was sentenced to pay fines and she and other partici-
pants of the project became targets of online hate speech (Children-404 n.d.).
Another case of activism in defense of women’s and LGBT rights was the 
#yaNeBoyusSkazat (I’m not afraid to speak) movement—the Russian equiva-
lent of #metoo—in 2017, which was a hot topic among Russian users of 
Facebook. Victims shared their accounts of sexual harassment in an attempt to 
create visibility for the sexual and domestic violence agenda (Zhigulina 2016; 
Dviženie #MeToo god spustâ 2018). These actions were repeatedly commented 
on by high-ranking state officials and Duma (the lower house of the Federal 
Assembly of Russia) deputies, who denied the relevance of the issue, referring 
to traditional Russian family values, such as patriarchal family relations.
The examples presented above of online activism demonstrate its signifi-
cance in protecting human rights, solving everyday problems, and making the 
authorities aware of them. They also highlight the thin and easily permeable 
line between non-political and political activism in Russia. (cf. Erpyleva 2019)
8.4  conclusIons
In this chapter we have illustrated through selected cases the ways digitaliza-
tion has affected activism in Russia. The two cases of contentious activism pre-
sented above describe variants of “organizationally enabled” connective action, 
where central coordination is combined with grass-root activism in digital 
media. In the case of the communicative activism of Alexei Navalny, the coor-
dination was implemented by his team at the Anti-Corruption Foundation. 
Although Navalny’s team also engages in data activism—for example, when 
investigating the property of Russian politicians abroad—the ultimate aim of 
its digital activism is to gain support and raise awareness in order to exert pres-
sure on the government and ultimately to gain political power.
Telegram and Pavel Durov lack similar political ambitions. The technoactiv-
ism of Telegram showed that with sufficient technical expertise and financial 
resources it is possible to develop relatively sophisticated and distributed pro-
tection against the blocking of web resources by the state. Before the battle 
between Telegram and the Kremlin, all efforts of the Russian state to block 
Internet content had been successful: the torrent tracker  rutracker.org, for 
example, was blocked due to multiple copyright violations, and the service 
remains inaccessible from Russia unless its user connects to it via VPN. The 
success of Telegram showed technoactivists that digital technology can be used 
not only for state monitoring and control, but also to protect freedom of 
expression and users’ right to private communications.
Both of these two cases have been rare examples of visible and contentious 
online activism enabled by digital technology in Russia. In both cases hierarchi-
cal coordination was combined with grass-root actions by citizens who could 
develop their own ways of participating under fairly general slogans against 
corruption (Navalny) or for freedom of expression (Telegram). Both 
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campaigns have also managed to recruit young Russians into contentious 
online activism.
In addition, our examples of the non-contentious forms of online activism 
illustrate the flexible and contested line between non-political and political 
forms of activism. Some topics, such as those related to sexuality, marriage, and 
religion have already become politicized in official discourse and through leg-
islation while other, at first sight non-political problems, such as those related 
to parenting or housing, may become politicized when people start to view 
them as examples of bad governance.
In a country as large as Russia, nationwide contentious action is not realistic 
without the Internet and modern digital technology. The acid test for online 
activism is, however, how to influence the societal and political affairs offline. 
Jennifer Earl (2016) suggests that online activism has added to the traditional 
repertoire of social movements an alternative, “flash-based” power—rapid, 
temporally limited, and massive, but not necessarily continuous mobilization—
which may also die out quickly. According to Earl, online mobilization may 
draw a greater number of people to flash activism, which reduces the cost of 
participating in otherwise high-risk offline demonstrations. This kind of flash- 
based power was manifested at the beginning of the Russian opposition mass 
protests in 2011 and it has been shown to be able to overthrow governments, 
for example, during the Arab Spring—even though many of the uprisings were 
subsequently repressed.
In the traditional model, the power of protest emanates from continuous 
mobilization and pressure exerted upon the state. This requires transforming 
grievances into stable political programs, institutions, and structures and thus 
a transition from connective activism to more traditional forms of collective 
action. Such a transformation was attempted in Russia, for example, during the 
protest wave in 2012, when over 80,000 people participated in the online elec-
tions of the opposition coordinating council. However, both as a result of 
internal tensions within the council between the nationalists, leftists, and liber-
als and the tightening repression by the state, the resistance faded at the end of 
the one-year term and the council was dissolved (Toepfl 2018). Another and 
partly successful attempt to transform online actions into offline political capi-
tal and structures was Navalny’s initiative of “smart voting”, which very likely 
contributed to the poor performance of United Russia in the Moscow city 
council elections on September 8, 2019.
In 2019, with the Russian state continuously introducing new constraints 
on freedom of expression, online participation in Russia has become risky 
(Lonkila et al. 2020). As a consequence, many activists have ceased to partici-
pate in online discussions, many have moved to social media platforms based 
outside Russia, such as Twitter or Facebook, and others have opted for emigra-
tion. Still others have directed their energy and attention towards the non- 
political problems of everyday life.
However, Russians’ struggles to solve local daily life problems are often the 
results of policy failures and the online connections made through social media 
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between similar local struggles elsewhere may result in the generalization and 
politicization of individual and local grievances (cf. Gladarev and Lonkila 2012, 
1386–7; Erpyleva 2019). Digital technology offers both new means to mobi-
lize people and share these grievances, as well as new tools to monitor and 
repress them. The outcome of this tension between emancipatory and repres-
sive aspects of digitalization is uncertain and merits further research.
notEs
1. This expression refers to the statement in the fall 2011 announcing that Prime 
Minister Putin would run for president in 2012 and, if successful, would appoint 
the then president Medvedev to prime minister.
2. Cf. Theocharis’ original formulation: “digitally networked participation can be 
understood as a networked media-based personalized action that is carried out 
by individual citizens with the intent to display their own mobilization and acti-
vate their social networks in order to raise awareness about, or exert social and 
political pressures for the solution of, a social or political problem” (Theocharis 
2015, 6; see also Van Deth 2014; Ohme et al. 2018).
3. There are individuals and groups of citizens involved in “online vigilantism” 
with diverse ideological convictions and ties with state organs in Russia. An 
account of such organized groups as the Molodežnaâ služba bezopasnosti (Youth 
Security Service) sponsoring an emergent “cyber Cossack movement” and the 
Liga bezopasnogo Interneta (Safe Internet League) can be found in Daucé et al. 
(2019). The authors also discuss the hearings at the Russian Civic Chamber on 
a bill on “kiberdružiny” (cyber patrols). They find a tension between politically 
involved organizations and duma members supporting the bill and the experts 
criticizing the bill for its inefficiency.
4. A non-exhaustive list of terms in literature trying to cover the phenomenon of 
online activism includes digital activism, cyberactivism, Internet activism, web 
activism, digital campaigning, online organizing, electronic advocacy, 
e- campaigning, social media activism, and e-activism.
5. On the debate on slacktivism and “liking” in social media see Earl 2016, 374–5; 
Theocharis 2015, 8–9.
6. Our focus does not imply that we consider non-political forms of activism less 
important in Russia. First, many forms of social and cultural activism are indis-
pensable as such—e.g., in taking care of social or health care services not pro-
vided by the state. In addition, the non-political forms may function as 
substitutes for political action; as ways to create alternative cultural framings 
which mirror, ridicule, and contest dominant cultural codes (Flikke 2017); and 
as platforms to form horizontal ties in civil society (Gladarev and Lonkila 2013) 
which may later on serve as precondition for explicitly political resistance. 
Finally, as explained later it this chapter, the boundary between political and 
non-political activism is fluid and contested: from the viewpoint of the Kremlin 
any independent action organized by civil society may potentially threaten the 
current status quo and turn into contentious action.
7. In September 9, 2020, the video had 36.2 million views, see https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g.
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8. h t t p s : / / a u t o a s s a . r u / n o v o s t i / m c h s - z a k u p a e t - s l i s h k o m - 
roskoshnye-avtomobili/.
9. “We are the 99%” was the slogan of the Occupy social movement, referring to 
the income inequality in the United States. “The movement for fair elections” 
refers to the mobilization of citizens against the rigging of Duma elections in 
the fall 2011.
10. The strange and unique exchange between Navalny and one of the Russia’s rich-
est oligarchs Alisher Usmanov started from a video On vam ne Dimon (https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g) published in March 2017. In this 
video, which by September 9, 2019, had 31.8 million views, implied that 
Usmanov had bribed Dmitry Medvedev—something that Usmanov denied. In 
response to this denial Navalny published a follow-up video with almost 5 mil-
lion views (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xn0Ah0J5p5Y). Usmanov, in 
a move unheard of a Russian billionaire, replied to Navalny in his own YouTube 
video, which, however, got only 12,735 views (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=XfWB1cKtFws), whereas Navalny’s further reply to Usmanov’s reply 
had collected 3.8 million views (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YwlrKfLeRfs).
11. Though it is difficult to measure accurately the results of smart voting, it seem 
to have worked in the Mosgorduma (Moscow City Duma) elections in 2019: 
United Russia lost 13 seats ending up with 25 seats in the 45-seat council, 
whereas the Communist Party was the greatest beneficiary with 13 seats—8 
seats up from previous elections (cf. Pertsev 2019).
12. For a critical look on the political history of Telegram see Maréchal (2018); for 
a comparison between political uses of Telegram in Russia and Iran see Akbari 
and Gabdulhakov (2019).
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CHAPTER 9
Digital Journalism: Toward a Theory 




The digital turn has made a profound impact on journalism, ranging from the 
ways in which journalists collect and display information to how journalistic 
items are perceived by the publics in regional, national and transnational con-
texts. Among other things, the proliferation of digital technologies has allowed 
for a number of transformations, including new genres of journalistic output 
(for example, reports organized and presented as questionnaires), new forms of 
collaboration among journalists (for example, files sharing and remote uploads 
of content which makes communication and reporting instantaneous) and new 
methods of carrying out journalistic investigation (for example, the use of data-
bases and information available on digital networks in the public domain). 
Moreover, new models for journalistic entrepreneurship emerged (for example, 
setting up media outlets in “non-geographic” areas such as offshore areas and 
tax-free zones and outsourcing content production to individuals in other 
countries). At the same time, new regimes of exploitation imposed by owners 
of the media outlets and resistance by journalists became apparent (for exam-
ple, zero-hour contracts and situations when journalists are exposed online 
making them objects of public shaming and threats).
In addition to the changes in terms of how journalists work, there have been 
changes in terms of journalistic agency, institutions and drivers of innovation. 
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For example, the increased speed with which reports are released is a hallmark 
of digital journalism, and it has led to an even greater competition among dif-
ferent media outlets, each aiming to be the first to report an event. Contrary to 
this trend, some media outlets have chosen to focus on “slow news,” that is, 
analytical reports which are aimed at reflective consumption by the users.1
Innovative organization of the news flow and innovative use of new tech-
nologies have helped re-define the relationship between content producers and 
content consumers. For example, on one level (micro-)blogging is just a new 
form of journalistic output. On another, it refers to a new relationship among 
producers and users of news items. As a result, the traditional notion of “audi-
ences” has been re-considered to include networked, de-centralized and geo-
graphically unbound agency. These audiences are not simply more “active,” 
rather they are more dynamic and diverse in terms of how they relate to news 
items and reports.
Similarly, as a result of digitalization, there are entirely new players on the 
field such as media institutions and tech companies. The former include orga-
nizations that focus on other sectors but utilize sophisticated tools that affect 
other media. This is evident in the proliferation of Russian media interests in 
other countries.2
In terms of technical companies, Microsoft and Google have been influen-
tial in the Russian Federation (the RF), especially after the introduction of 
localized versions of their software. Their Russian competitors, Mail.ru and 
Yandex, have been backers of journalistic innovation such as live streaming. For 
example, Yandex, which builds products and services powered by machine 
learning, has a video stream for live and on-demand video on the company’s 
streaming content platform, Yandex.Live. By circuiting live-streaming in digi-
tal realms controlled by Yandex, the company has increased demand for new 
content, including journalistic outputs and entertainment pieces (for more on 
social media, see Chap. 19).
Not all Russian services have been built as “alternatives” to western tech-
nologies, that is, Yandex versus Google. There are many examples of transna-
tional convergences and collaborations, too. In terms of live streaming and 
video content sharing, Rutube, which belongs to Gazprom, is a competitor to 
YouTube; however, in terms of built-in videos, its strategic partner is Facebook. 
At the same time, Rutube is used by Russia Today (RT), the government- 
backed television and online platform, which has been accused of disinforma-
tion and propaganda. RT uses Rutube as one of its main channels of content 
dissemination. The analysis of these digital ventures—in this case Facebook- 
Rutube- RT—reveals a somewhat unexpected mix of national and transnational 
corporate and government interests.3
Mail.ru has benefited from the mutability of digital media, for example, 
when they make use of convergent flows of news reporting and banking. This 
is when the news agenda is organized in ways that advance public interest in 
financial instruments, and vice versa. This reveals not only a convergence across 
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platforms but also across perceptions of media genres and information per se, 
thus pushing boundaries between different kinds of journalism.4
To account for all the changes in journalism that had occurred thanks to the 
proliferation of digital technologies would be an impossible task. Hence, in this 
chapter, I reflect on the processes of digitalization of journalism, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, on digital forms of investigative journalism. The latter 
means journalism which is native to digital realms and which utilizes digital- 
only means to conduct research and publish reports. So, my account supplies 
not a survey of technical innovations and cultural forms, but a conceptualiza-
tion of transition from legacy to digital journalism in the RF and Russophone 
world. To confirm, I pay special attention to how in journalistic practice, the 
use of digital technologies had emerged from being an auxiliary tool to being 
the main—and only—method of producing, delivering and consuming news. 
My approach allows the following definition of “digital journalism.” The term 
designates the transition from one technological base to another and the trans-
formations in the profession and practice of journalism which had occurred 
during the process. The term does not designate the broad field of contempo-
rary journalism which is extremely diverse in terms of technologies, forms, 
“audiences” and other factors.
Western scholarship has focused on the economic and technological impli-
cations of the shift (see, for example, Jones and Salter 2011), often citing chal-
lenges in terms of identity politics, power structures and professional networks 
(see, for example, Anderson 2013; Bradshaw and Rohumaa 2013). A critique 
of Western neoliberal order from the perspective of the changing dimensions 
of journalistic profession is available in a number of publications, too (see, for 
example, Franklin 2017). Most recent debates have been about the automation 
of news (Diakopoulos 2019) in the context of populist political campaigns in 
the USA (Bucher 2018; Wahl-Jorgensen 2019). In their most recent publica-
tion, Bob Franklin and Lily Canter (2019) offered a classification of possible 
fields of application of digital technologies in journalism, thus broadening the 
notion of journalism per se. This corpus of literature complements numerous 
critical anthologies assessing skillsets of journalists in the digital era (for exam-
ple, Hill and Lashmar 2013; Zion and Craig 2014). These publications reveal 
the complexity of digital journalism as a phenomenon; they also signpost the 
developments exclusively in the Western context. Hence, my discussion con-
tributes to the existing debate by deliberately internationalizing the phenom-
enon of digital journalism and offering alternative modes of conceptualization. 
These modes stem from the analysis of the context, producing an original para-
digm (Sects. 2 and 3). Moreover, the emphasis is on the transnational charac-
teristics of Russian digital journalism, thus avoiding the redundancy of the 
“West-versus-the rest” approach (Sect. 4). Finally, the proposed typology 
(Sect. 5) helps categorize digital journalism and also social, political and cul-
tural phenomena in the Russian context, thus offering a more universal model 
for consideration.
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The chosen understanding of digital journalism has informed the selection 
of the cases and the organization of the discussion. To confirm, the first subsec-
tion provides a theorization of Russian digital journalism from the perspective 
of its evolution and types of activity. In subsequent subsections I analyze cases 
that shed light on pivotal moments in the development of Russian digital jour-
nalism. In the conclusion I summate the discussion, arguing that the digital 
turn has provided Russian journalists with new opportunities such as setting a 
transnational media company and building and engaging with translocal com-
munities in the RF and abroad, as well as new challenges such as increased 
surveillance by the state and security services and new regimes of exploitation 
such as unregulated job markets.
The discussion is based on my research of Russian digital media and journal-
ism5 and on interviews with journalists and editors which I collected during a 
major study of contemporary Russian media in 2014–2018.6 The discussion is 
additionally informed by my survey of literature on new media, digital media 
and contemporary journalism available in specialized publications.7 I am grate-
ful to all the journalists, editors and media practitioners who had agreed to talk 
to me about their transition to digital journalism.
9.2  “AlternAtIve” JournAlIsm
Initial studies of digital journalism (e.g., Thorsen and Jackson 2017) focused 
on the ways in which journalistic materials were produced and presented to the 
public. Journalists had to make a choice about which platform to use to publish 
their story. This practice was multimodal insofar as it included multiple plat-
forms to deliver content and also multimedia to present it. For example, writ-
ing in Novaya Gazeta about local elections,8 Lilit Sarkisian uses text, 
photographs, scans and videos to provide a report about the role of political 
parties in the RF. The piece is written in the documentary style whereby the 
analysis of the situation is mixed with documentation and evidence. All cita-
tions are carefully attributed and all pictures are geo-tagged thus making the 
user feel like they are part of the investigation. The piece includes multiple 
hyperlinks enabling the user to check some other facts to view related content. 
The piece is easily sharable on multiple platforms. All of these elements of digi-
tal journalism are incorporated in the story, thus making it not only about the 
use of technologies but also about the ways in which to narrate about an event 
or a social concern.
Journalists would also invite comments and feedback from the users and 
would customize their outputs to meet expectations of specific groups of users. 
Between 2005 and 2015, user commenting was a common feature in online 
media outlets; it has been gradually phased out as the media outlets shifted 
discussions and user interactivity onto social media, making them responsible 
for the user-generated content, on the one hand, and on the other, making 
them part of the story-telling. So, when posting texts online journalists would 
use hyperlinks to connect their story to others and to build news archives. For 
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example, Sarkisian folds her story about local elections in Novaya Gazeta’s 
publications about United Russia, the dominant party in the RF which has 
been accused of corruption on all levels. She links her argument to other stories 
and requires that the user should carry out the work of putting the evidence 
together by following this and other stories. Thus, the political stance of 
Novaya Gazeta emerges not from a single publication but from a database of 
publications on a specific topic.
Thus, in the period of early digital journalism, multimediality, interactivity 
and hypertextuality were key methods with the help of which to produce con-
tent, including engagement with users (for more on hypertext, see Chap. 15). 
Eventually, digital journalism emerged to encompass a wide variety of ways in 
which digitalization has influenced news production. Nowadays, digital jour-
nalism also incorporates related areas and forms of activity, arrangement and 
engagement, including communication among journalists, their work environ-
ment, and so on. This means that digital journalism should be considered as an 
entirely new practice and institution of journalism, not just a particular practice 
of writing and publishing. In many ways, digital journalism has supplanted 
“analogue” journalism of the twentieth century.
Some commentators have described these changes as “the death of journal-
ism,” meaning that journalism as it was known in the twentieth century had 
seized to exist. For others, just like with the previously announced death of the 
novel and death of cinema,9 the digital turns mean a re-interpretation and rein-
vigoration of journalism. To go on with the analogy, just like celluloid cinema 
is perhaps dead, but post-celluloid, digital cinema is thriving, supplying new 
genres, stories and visual regimes, and using new platforms for content distri-
bution, digital journalism is an emerging and expanding field of activity aimed 
at informing the public about current events and providing political, social and 
cultural commentary along with organizing and maintaining new spaces for 
information sharing and collaboration among the publics, in the national and 
transnational, and local and global settings.
One of the principal outcomes of the death and re-birth of journalism in its 
digital phase is the emergence of “alternative journalism.” I define alternative 
journalism in the following way. The difference between professional and alter-
native journalists is in how people understand their objectives and acceptable 
levels of responsibility. The former group—professional journalists—includes 
any kind of journalists whereby individuals, associations of individuals and offi-
cially accredited companies engage in journalism as their primary activity. For 
example, it can be an individual with a university degree in journalism, or 
someone without formal education in journalism,10 for whom still journalism is 
a professional occupation. They can be members of a professional society such 
as the Russian Association of Journalists, or, they can belong to an informal 
network of individuals and companies involved in similar activities. They can be 
on a permanent contract with one company or work part-time or as freelancers 
for a number of media outlets.
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The latter group—alternative journalists—encompasses individuals and 
companies that are responsible for news content but who do not consider 
themselves reporters per se. For example, it can be an arts organization—like 
London-based Calvert and its equivalents in Russia such as Afisha.ru and The 
Village—that informs the public about events concerning contemporary arts 
and culture in the national and international context. Or, it can be an individ-
ual who makes regular posts on current affairs in social media and attains a high 
level of visibility and credibility in their circles. For example, in the late 2010s, 
Dr. Ekaterina Schulmann emerged from an academic active on social media 
into an important, liberally minded political commentator appearing on federal 
channels.
Indeed, in the twentieth century there were individuals and organizations 
that attempted to create their own news flows,11 yet it is with the arrival of the 
digital era that the opportunity to build their own news flow and provide media 
content to a niche or general audience became available. As the Schulmann 
example demonstrates, the boundaries between professional and alternative 
journalism are fluid and transitions from one to another are enhanced thanks 
to the digital media. Some organizations like universities encourage alternative 
journalism when it serves the needs of the organization. Others, for example, 
banks are nervous about the release of any data by their employees.12
To be absolutely clear, the difference between professional and alternative 
journalism is not that of quality, but that of the relationship of an individual or 
an organization to the broader journalistic field. In other words, alternative 
does not mean “amateur,” a term which implicitly designates poor quality of 
content. Instead “alternative” stands for the new ways of organizing produc-
tion and circulation of content which is possible thanks to digital 
technologies.
In this framework, alternative is also different from grassroots journalism. In 
the early new media parlance and digital criticism, the term meant journalistic 
practice stemming from the activities of “ordinary users.” It was believed that 
these users were happy to “share” their (local) insights and independently pro-
duce content with professional media companies. Eventually, it became appar-
ent that grassroots journalists would not only collaborate but also compete 
with professional journalists in terms of salaries, contracts, awards, visibility, 
authority, and especially symbolic capital. These were no longer grassroots 
reporters but media content producers of significant influence in their own 
right. The shift was noticeable in how major media companies such as the 
(British Broadcasting Corporation) Russian Service went from inviting user 
comments, that is, building news stories on the basis of “grassroots journal-
ism,” to disabling user comments altogether, that is, aiming to maintain “a 
professional stance” as a marker of journalistic quality. This way they differenti-
ated themselves from the range of new media outlets that had carved out their 




Thus, alternative journalism signifies new arenas of journalistic activity, both 
in terms of production and consumption of materials, and new forms of con-
tent, user engagement and circulation patterns. In the beginning, alternative 
journalism carried hallmarks of mainstream digital culture, that is, it was mark-
edly different from professional journalism. However, eventually, the boundar-
ies between the two became increasingly blurred. This was one of the 
transformations that led to the decline of legacy journalism in the late 1990s–
early 2000s. Some Russian media outlets easily adapted to the new realities of 
digital journalism; others were less successful and have disappeared from the 
Russian market or have developed into completely new projects. In the end, 
what has remained is digital journalism: nowadays virtually all existing Russian 
media outlets function according to the logic of digital journalism. This allows 
me to suggest that in the RF all journalism is digital journalism, if not in terms 
of technology used but in terms of structure and processes.
9.3  All JournAlIsm Is dIgItAl JournAlIsm
The transition to digital journalism means more than a greater use of digital 
tools. It encompasses major transformations of media flows, systems of author-
ity and trust, business arrangements, everyday practices of journalistic work, for 
example, opportunities to work remotely, and so on. In the RF, the transition 
to digital journalism occurred at the same time as in developed economies in 
the Anglophone West, which means that the processes and practices of digital 
journalism are not dissimilar in these countries.
For example, because of the changing fabric of the journalistic profession 
including the spread of digital technologies, we see the rise of influential female 
journalists in the RF and the United Kingdom. For example, Èlina Tikhonova 
is a business and culture reporter on RBC (Russian Business Consulting), a 
principal Russian-language media outlet for business reporting, and Laura 
Kuenssberg is a political editor on the BBC, the United Kingdom’s most 
important public broadcaster. The authority of these journalists had been 
established thanks to their activity on social media such as Twitter and 
Facebook.13 To confirm, having built a reputation in social media, they gained 
greater visibility in their respective media outlets. In return, the media outlets 
have started to use the authority of these journalists to advance their agenda in 
social media, which signals a convergence of digital spaces and tools. Their case 
exemplifies a transfer of alternative and professional strands of journalism 
within their professional career. The fluidity of agendas, forms of reporting, 
modes of expressing an opinion, and relationship to and within their media 
outlets points to a new system of journalism.
This new system of journalism provides individuals with new opportunities. 
For example, both Tikhonova and Kuenssberg have used their professional 
reputation in order to advance emancipatory agenda. Kuenssberg has pro-
moted the issue of gender equality and diversity, making it one of the most 
visible social concerns in the United Kingdom. Conversely, Tikhonova took 
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part in the Russian spin-off of the global #metoo campaign, urging RBC and 
other journalists to boycott reporting from the State Duma (lower house of 
the Federal Assembly of Russia) after allegations of sexual harassment against 
its deputy Leonid Sluckij became public. Kuenssberg and Tikhonova have 
operated in realms that are highly politicized in the United Kingdom and RF, 
thus straddling the traditional arenas of reporting and activism. We observe a 
convergent of national and transnational realms of journalism and activism, and 
a transfer of agendas from essentially the journalistic domain to that of broader 
societal concerns (for more on digital activism, see Chap. 8).
This case demonstrates that currently the processes and practices of digital 
journalism in the RF and other western countries are not dissimilar. Yet, there 
is a big difference in terms of the general evolution of journalism and what it 
means to the respective societies. The point I wish to emphasize here is that in 
the RF, the rise of digital journalism coincides with the rise of Russian journal-
ism per se. To confirm, modern Russian journalistic practice is based on the 
neoliberal form of journalism that was imported from the West as part of 
Gorbachev’s perestroika of the 1980s and Yeltsin’s privatization campaigns of 
the 1990s. This journalistic practice had supplanted the system of media orga-
nization and journalism that had existed in the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). The transfer was complete by the start of the twenty-first 
century when digital technologies were becoming mainstream. So, in the 
United Kingdom, the transfer to digital journalism was a gradual process of 
transformations of journalistic practice; in the RF it signified a radical break 
from the tradition of Soviet journalism.
To elaborate, these reforms introduced during the perestroika period and 
the 1990s included the abolishment of censorship, greater freedom of expres-
sion and more emphasis on the protection of journalists. This was a positive 
outcome of the reforms. The negative outcome was in that these reforms put 
journalists on a collision course with private business which, in order to grow, 
employed aggressive and sometimes brutal methods of control. These reforms 
also gave rise to unregulated lobbying and the use of illegal and semi-legal 
promotional campaigns, especially during political elections. Early digital jour-
nalism—in the spirit of digital utopianism—attempted to eradicate two prob-
lems at the same time: the old practices of Soviet journalism, on the one hand, 
and on the other, the new practices installed as a result of the neoliberalization 
of journalism in the 1990s. The attempt was partially successful: propagandistic 
features of Soviet media were carried over to Russian state-funded television 
channels and also to the international broadcaster RT,14 and commodification 
of information in the 1990s gave rise to sensationalist and click-bait media. At 
the same time, Russian contemporary understanding of privacy is informed by 
the notions and practices formulated in the digital realm, which, to remind the 
reader, remained completely unregulated for a significant period of time, rely-
ing on self-regulation instead.
As a result, many problems of contemporary Russian journalism are 
accounted for by the gap between legacy and digital journalism, and between 
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professional and alternative journalism. For example, the safety of journalists in 
Russia is a recurring concern. Western media and scholarship have addressed 
this issue from the perspective of the oppression of journalists by the state (see, 
for example, Oates 2006). The case of Anna Politkovskaya, who was murdered 
in 2006, is indicative. However, researchers have overlooked other aspects of 
oppression, resistance and safety such as corporate controls over journalists, 
privacy, wellbeing and intellectual property. Indeed, my interviewees had com-
plained about their experience of working in small and medium-size media 
outlets.15 In terms of the digital realm, they noted that, due to the lack of train-
ing provided by the media outlet owners, they are exposed to threats such as 
harassing in social media, data breaches, illegal file sharing, and so on.
How did these concerns develop? What were the pivotal moments in the 
development of digital journalism? In the subsequent sections I answer these 
questions from the perspective of the evolution of digital journalism (Sec. 4), 
and from the perspective of its form and functionality (Sec. 5).
9.4  HIstorIcAl overvIew of russIAn And russopHone 
dIgItAl JournAlIsm
I have established that in case of the RF, the emergence of digital journalism is 
a complex process that signifies a lot more than the transition to new technolo-
gies employed in the production, circulation and consumption of journalistic 
items. In this regard, what has the evolution of digital journalism been like? Is 
it possible to identify significant trends and phases that help us understand 
these transformations?
In previous publications, I have argued that the proliferation of digital tech-
nologies in the RF includes four distinct stages, each defined by the type and 
frequency of use.16 In this section, I intend to use the historical periodization 
of the evolution of digital technologies to develop a periodization of digital 
journalism in the RF. I identify four stages that correspond to and underpin 
four stages in the development of digital journalist that I outline below.
The first phase—the early 1990s—was characterized by the experimental use 
of digital technologies. At that time, scientific labs, artistic collectives and cre-
ative individuals began to use advanced digital technologies. Soviet-era com-
puters had become most obsolete, with users relying on technologies imported 
mostly from the West. Users would engage in the exchange of data, including 
news, across the Russophone space of the internet. Cross-border, politically 
unhindered exchange of information was particular to this period of the evolu-
tion of digital technologies. For example, the art collective known as net.art 
were responsible for building first international networks, sharing information, 
pieces of news and pieces of code.
During the second phase, the experimental users of the 1990s became estab-
lished in their professional circles, including journalism, giving rise to what I 
have labeled (Strukov 2014) the elite user of the late 1990s–early 2000s. For 
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example, in the 1990s Anton Nosik was based in Israel working as a program-
mer and running a number of internet-based projects among Russian speakers. 
In the 2000s, thanks to his proven record of successful media projects, he 
relocated to Moscow in order to direct major web-based news agencies such as 
Lenta.ru. Together with other elite users, all of whom were journalists and 
programmers living in large urban centers and being in charge of the strategic 
development of media, culture, science and technology, Nosik was responsible 
for building what was to emerge as the Runet. During this phase, technological 
innovation provided elite users with significant symbolic capital (for more on 
history of Runet, see Chap. 16).17
The third phase relates to the late 2000s when digital technologies includ-
ing mobile phones became commonplace, and different kinds of users started 
using digital technologies for work, socializing and networking. The mass user 
challenged the authority of the elite user, effectively diversifying Russian digital 
system. During this phase, the Russian government became more active on the 
internet, launching a series of “national projects” aimed at stimulating eco-
nomic and cultural activity in certain sectors of the digital technologies. The 
government was responsible for the technological upgrade of the Russian 
media system. For example, it set deadlines for the digital switch-over, compel-
ling Russian companies, media outlets and users to accept new technologies 
such as digital television (see Strukov 2011). During this period, individuals 
such as Nosik switched from building their authority online to monetizing 
their symbolic capital. For example, Nosik was the director of high-profile 
investment projects concerning digital media such as his company SUP which 
purchased LiveJournal and transferred it to the RF.
The most recent period—the late 2010s—is characterized by “total” digita-
lization. Around that time, digital technologies and media had been firmly 
established as the main means of communication among the majority of users, 
with “old” media and non-digital technologies increasingly playing an auxiliary 
role, especially in urban centers. During this phase, the government has been 
extremely active on the digital field launching a few initiatives that have effec-
tively nationalized the Runet, for example, precluding “foreign” companies to 
own solely media in the RF. The purpose of this activity was to make the Runet 
less transparent to the Western observers and to protect the economic interests 
of the Russian political elite. During this period, the role of the elite users such 
as Nosik has diminished whilst the new trends have been set by Russian major 
tech corporations such as Yandex and social media influencers such as Yury 
Dud’, the editor of the principal sports outlet Sports.ru who had built notori-
ety due to posting his controversial interviews with celebrities on YouTube. In 
fact, this example reveals the merger between tech and media giants such as 
YouTube and individual content producers such as Dud’. It blurs the boundar-
ies between individual and corporate agency, between news reporting and life-
style media, between customized and universally available content, and so on.
These stages of technological and media development correspond to the 




 (a) exchanges of essential information and news items through email and 
messaging on personal and professional networks, including transna-
tional exchange; emerging digital networks remain completely unregu-
lated until the intervention of the government and security services at 
the start of the twenty-first century;
 (b) the emergence of alternative media outlets taking advantage of the 
unregulated realms of the early internet; these encompass web sites and 
mail lists that circulate information and news items to a target group 
such as subscribers to a service; by the start of the new millennium these 
services emerge into big players on the Runet; state-backed and corpo-
rate media scramble to increase their presence on the internet in order 
to catch up with services such as Lenta.ru;
 (c) lifestyles media and media outlets based on personalized media flows 
such as LiveJournal proliferate, effectively diluting the impact of online 
investigative journalism; with the launch of (Russophone) social media 
at the end of the decade, the media landscape is entirely transformed 
with legacy media such as official television channels playing a catch-up 
game with digital media; and
 (d) the government begins to regulate aggressively the digital realm in 
order to protect the interests of large digital corporations18; it intro-
duces legislation which effectively “nationalizes” the Runet, that is, 
makes it possible to separate domestic and transnational media flows. 
Alongside government regulation, digital media corporations such as 
RBC and Mail.ru bid to increase their share on the internet, including 
mergers and collaborations with global media companies. For example, 
Mail.ru becomes one of the flow amplifiers for the BBC World Service 
and Yandex taxi service merges with Uber. At the same time new for-
mats of news and lifestyle media emerge on the internet, especially on 
services that enable streaming audio-visual content such as YouTube. 
They impact the processes of information gathering and presentation 
styles on legacy media; digital natives begin to dominate professional 
and alternative forms of journalism.
This cross-check of technological, social, political and cultural developments 
allows an historical, dynamic consideration of digital journalism. In this system, 
the ways in which digital journalism works become apparent. It reveals the 
realms and modes of digital journalism, the role of government and corporate 
regulators, and the role and expectation of digital audiences. It also signposts 
areas of innovation which can be used in both the progressive and regressive 
manner by individual, state-aligned and corporate agents. In this process, the 
question of practice of digital journalism becomes important. In the final sec-
tion of the chapter, I attempt to conceptualize these practices from the per-
spective of their function, not form or outreach or frequency.
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9.5  typologIcAl overvIew of russIAn And russopHone 
dIgItAl JournAlIsm
In the previous section I apprehended the realms of digital journalism by con-
sidering the principal areas of impact in the historical context. In the conclud-
ing section, I consider digital journalism in its most contemporary form by 
analyzing a number of interrelated phenomena. I account for the nature and 
configuration of each of them by introducing a particular case. It is meant to 
reveal current debates and help me relate back to the discussion presented at 
the start of the chapter. Thus, I wish to argue that digital journalism defines 
new spaces of activity and problematizes existing social, political and cultural 
concerns such as the notion of privacy and geographical distribution of data.
Digital journalism has problematized the notion of media and media outlet 
through the use of new platforms. Platforms are digital realms identified by a 
particular distribution model, content organization and visual language that 
allow new modes of production and distribution of content. For example, 
Telegram is an instant messenger that was created by entrepreneurs Pavel 
Durov and his brother Nikolaj in the early 2010s. Since then it has emerged 
into one of the most powerful platforms for messaging, micro-blogging, story- 
telling and channeling of information including audio-visual materials. Created 
to assist communication, Telegram is nowadays used by many journalists to 
enhance their professional activities such as secure communication with other 
journalists. Telegram advocates complete privacy of communication, that is, 
information distributed on its platforms cannot be filtered by security sources.19 
For many journalists in the RF, Telegram symbolizes freedom of communica-
tion and freedom of speech. And so, Telegram is considered by many to be a 
means to protect human rights. As a result, Telegram is used to launch and 
sustain independent alternative media outlets such as Telegram groups, for 
example, LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) groups. 
(The highly private nature of Telegram means that it is also used to deliver 
questionable content such as pornography.)
Groups on messengers are a form of news delivery which, when applied at a 
mass scale, can be employed as a powerful tool for distribution of content. 
They are related to news aggregators, meaning they provide information 
including news in a structured and/or customized way. These are algorithms 
and networks that allow the collection and distribution of items on a massive 
scale; news aggregators blur the boundaries between original and unoriginal/
re-published content, thus posing the question of authorship and intellectual 
property in the digital age. The proliferation of aggregators in Russian and 
Russophone media is due to the weakness of the Russian law and its ability to 
protect intellectual property. At the same time, news aggregators advance the 
culture of sharing, collaboration and mobilization by creating a sense of com-
monality and belonging among users. In some cases, the use of aggregators has 
enabled media startups to grow so that eventually they are able to produce 
their own content. A good example is the Riga-based Meduza who, in the 
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beginning, re-posted reports and news items from established media, for exam-
ple, Kommersant, and eventually developed into an independent information 
producer, sharing content across a range of platforms and outlets.
The emergence of news platforms such as Meduza is possible to increase 
datafication of all aspects of life. Datafication is the process through which, on 
one level, journalists make use of digital tools such as computer-assisted report-
ing, digital indexing and database researching, and on another, they present 
their findings in the form of data such as data visualizations. In other words, 
datafication defines the omnipresence of data—the data turn in journalism—
whereby journalists use data to present information about the world and to 
conceive of the world as data. In terms of journalistic output, nowadays there 
is less emphasis on story-telling and more on organizing information as banks 
of data whereby the user is expected to do their own research and arrive at a 
conclusion. In this respect, there is a growing problem with verification of 
information, resulting in abuses of data and spread of conspiracy theories. 
There is also a problem with the assumed neutrality of data: in the early 2000s, 
in reporting, data was considered a means to achieve impartiality; in the late 
2010s, data is seen to contain its own ideologies, impacting how data is gath-
ered, processed and stored. Recently, the rise of affective journalism—the use 
of deeply personal experience such as sexual problems to account for the 
changes in the world—can be attributed, in many ways, to the backlash against 
datafication of journalism.
Datafication accounts not only for new technologies and new ways of struc-
turing information and communication but also for new ways of thinking 
about ourselves and our world. Reading the world as data results in the new 
position of the subject in the physical world and the world of data whereby the 
boundaries between the two become increasingly blurred. In some cases, this 
new ambiguity reveals the complexity of the use of digital tools in journalism 
such as mapping and surveillance tools and recognition tools. Mapping and 
surveillance tools are gadgets and applications that help journalists gather 
information that is otherwise not available. For example, Alexei Navalny, who, 
in the West, is routinely described as the Russian opposition leader, uses leaked 
and hacked documents, and open source investigation to counteract corrupt 
elements in the Russian government. For example, he uses drones to survey 
properties of the members of Russian political establishment. He incorporates 
footage obtained by these means—which would be illegal in the West—into his 
investigative reports about the wealth and corruption of Russian nomenclature 
which he releases on his channel on YouTube. This kind of practice occupies a 
gray zone from the point of view ethics of journalism and legal framework 
(arguably, Navalny uses loopholes in existing legislation). And recognition 
tools are applications that allow journalists to identify subjects and maintain 
effective networks. For example, those working in big media organizations 
have reported using apps that help them catalog contacts including their own 
colleagues. For example, they use feature recognition tools to “recall” the 
names and positions of their peers and contacts. Findface was a media startup 
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that launched a free service in 2016 enabling users to identify passers-by by 
taking their pictures and linking the individuals to the profiles on social media. 
Very soon Findface closed its operations; however, online communities dis-
cussed how their services were acquired by security and commercial enter-
prises. For example, in June 2018, S7 Airlines, the chief competitor of Aeroflot, 
started using face recognition tools in its lounges allowing passengers to check 
in automatically. This event was reported neutrally in Russian progressive 
media,20 meaning that digital innovation of this type has been securitized in 
popular imagination.
These developments signify that in digital journalism, various platforms, 
tools and databases are employed to carry out journalistic investigations and 
produce and deliver content across a wide range of networks. This creates and 
sustains a constantly evolving news world so that the user is continuously 
engaged in this world on all available platforms. This form of transmedia story-
telling (Jenkins 2007) blurs the boundaries between “real” events, media 
events and mediated events, on the one hand, and on the other, advances new 
social interactions and cultural phenomena. All of them foreground digital 
journalism as a new system of complex social and political realities.
notes
1. By occupying a particular section of the market, namely, the publication of ana-
lytical reports in the evening, in just three years Meduza has emerged from a 
niche media outlet to one of the most important Russophone content producers.
2. For example, Calvert is a London-based arts foundation directed by Nonna 
Materkova, a Russian entrepreneur and investor. In addition to exhibitions 
showcasing the arts of the New East, Calvert runs an online magazine about art 
and culture in the former communist countries. Thanks to an appealing design 
of the journal and innovative approach to news selection—they tend to write 
about new trends in fashion, music and architecture, as well as provide critical 
reflections on social and political transformations in the region—Calvert Journal 
has become an influential media outlet. Their impact is evident on how the 
Guardian and other British media re-publish items from Calvert Journal and/or 
respond to the available items. In other words, through its innovative focus on 
the creative industries of the New East which has been attained with the help of 
digital collaborations with artists, musicians and photographers from the region, 
the Calvert Journal has broadened the agenda of other media. Indeed, writers 
working for the Calvert Journal also work as freelancers for other media, thus 
building a specific circuit of exchange whereby journalists no longer have to be 
present in an office and instead work from multiple locations for multiple media 
outlets.
3. In fact, mail.ru is used as an amplifier by the BBC World Service.
4. For example, news items published on mail.ru tell a story about events in Russia 
and abroad, and this is a traditional concern of journalism; however, these items 
are linked to financial data, including Mail.ru online banking services, thus, 
impacting the range and applicability of traditional reporting and other activities 
such as investment and banking, and so the realm in which journalism exists in 
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the digital era is big and complex. From introducing “native advertising” to 
developing and incorporating elements of machine learning and artificial intel-
ligence, Mail.ru, Yandex and digital startups have transformed the processes and 
practices of journalistic work in the Russian Federation, as well as in other coun-
tries through their subsidiaries.
5. See, for example, Strukov 2011 and 2014.
6. Fifty semi-structured interviews with media practitioners were collected. Their 
duration varies between sixty and ninety minutes.
7. See, for example, interviews with Russian journalists and media practitioners 




9. See, for example, Boxall 2015.
10. I deliberately do not call these individuals “amateurs” insofar as their activities 
are professional albeit lacking recognized formal qualifications.
11. The notion of citizen journalism is a related concept.
12. Stories about how Sberbank controls the use of mobile phones by its employees 
are a common feature in Russian media.
13. This assertion is based on my interviews with the RBC and BBC journalists and 
editors (2014–2019).
14. See, for example, Hutchings 2018.
15. Citation.
16. The classification is based on my analysis of Russian transition from Soviet to 
Western digital technologies and computational system presented in 
Strukov 2014.
17. See my discussion of Nosik’s LiveJournal activities in Strukov 2010.
18. For example, the so-called Yarovaya Law which introduced “counter-terror and 
public safety measure” but in fact allowed Russian companies and security ser-
vices to control economic aspects of media flows such as data mining and sale of 
personal data.
19. Telegram’s refusal to share the code with the government had led to attempts to 
shut down the service in 2018 which were unsuccessful.
20. https://www.the-village.ru/village/city/news-city/355649-pass.
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CHAPTER 10




Digital technology has become an integral part of public schooling across 
countries since the 1980s (Selwyn 2018), driven by the combination of tech-
nological innovation and political determination for efficient governance. 
Russia is no exception and the recently intensifying introduction of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) into different aspects of 
education manifests Russia’s convergence with the rest of the world. 
Digitalization increasingly draws the attention of the government, non-state 
sector and philanthropic organizations (for more, see Chap. 3). They view 
technology as a solution to a wide range of problems including the lacking 
and often uneven resources of educational institutions, low or unequal learn-
ing outcomes, outdated and unmotivating pedagogies or lack of a consistent 
monitoring of student progress. In addition, ICT and related skills are per-
ceived as a defining feature of future professional and societal life as well as a 
means to ensure efficient governance. As a novel and strengthening focus of 
education policy and pedagogical practice, as well as an increasing source of 
private revenue, the introduction and actual use of digital education tech-
nologies deserve critical academic scrutiny. Scholars of education policy call 
for studies on the implications of digitalization for education governance, 
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seeing it in the context of the profound turn in the governance of education 
to “new modes of government and governing where power is not confined to 
the state or to the market but is exercised through a plethora of networks, 
partnerships and policy communities who ‘consensually’ work with stake-
holders to produce more flexible, responsive forms of service delivery” 
(Wilkins and Olmedo 2018, 5).
We focus particularly on two interrelated changes in education governance 
that have been widely attributed to the rise and operation of digital education 
technologies. First is the reconfiguration of old and proliferation of new, par-
ticularly non-state actors (e.g. Williamson 2017; Hartong 2018) in performing 
regulation on behalf of or in collaboration with the national governments. 
Second, we are interested in how digital education technologies act as connect-
ing devices between actors and how they constitute or reconstitute spaces of 
governance (e.g. Gulson and Sellar 2019; Hartong 2018).
We distinguish between four forms of education digitalization. First, ICT is 
a resource for teaching and learning in the format, for instance, of online 
courses that use digitalized textbooks and other virtual materials. Second, digi-
talization rises to prominence through the teaching of technology as a subject 
or an extracurricular activity in its own right or as a cross-curriculum theme. In 
addition, there is overall a growing emphasis on acquiring ICT-related knowl-
edge and skills as a core learning competence (curriculum in coding or robot-
ics). Third, we categorize datafication defined as the “transformation of 
different aspects of education (such as test scores, school inspection reports, or 
clickstream data from an online course) into digital data” (Williamson 2017, 5) 
as a distinct but entangled manifestation of digitalization. Fourth, digitaliza-
tion entails resourcing educational institutions with hardware, software and 
other digital infrastructure, so it changes the material environment of educa-
tion in unprecedented ways. What brings these four forms of digitalization 
together is the fact that the actors who make them possible “gain increasing 
control over the field of judgment in education” (Takayama and Lingard 2018, 
2). Thus, scholars claim that the governance of education is displaced towards 
new digitalized sites of expertise (Williamson 2017): “while ICT have become 
translated into the field of education, they simultaneously act as a core medium 
through which new actors have become authorized as key players to shape 
output- and accountability-based policy and practice” (Hartong 2018, 135).
Lewis et al. (2016) have urged researchers to acknowledge the complexity 
of emerging power relations and governance structures and to examine them 
beyond topographical imaginaries. This is particularly so due to the prolifera-
tion of data collection and use enabled by digital technologies that have turned 
metrics, calculations and comparisons into new means of governance in educa-
tion enabling new visibilities and proximities. We deploy Harvey’s (2012, 77) 
useful distinction between the topological and the topographical in the ensuing 
analysis: “[i]n topographical mapping, the boundaries of state power appear as 
commensurate with a clearly defined territorial boundary, and such categorical 
mappings are echoed in the spatially nested structures of administrative 
 N. PIATTOEVA AND G. GUROVA
173
division.” Topologization, by contrast, draws attention to multiple new spatial 
figures where borders “do not coincide with the edges of a demarcated terri-
tory, and where it is the mutable quality of relations that determines distance 
and proximity, rather than a singular and absolute measure” (Harvey 2012, 
77–78). Datafication produces novel connections between the governing and 
the governed actors and thus “create(s) and sustain(s) dynamic political and 
moral spaces” (Harvey 2012, 88). In other words, new possibilities for action 
and the exercise of power (Lewis et al. 2016) are facilitated by the fact that 
“presence and proximity (are) no longer simply a question of physical distance” 
(Allen 2011, 295; Gulson and Sellar 2019).
Situated in relation to an international body of literature and the two argu-
ments pertaining to the contribution of digitalization to the (changing) gover-
nance of education, we proceed as follows: we first map the general education 
policy context within which the earlier and current digitalization efforts have 
unfolded. The next two sections present analyses of the ongoing policies and 
practices of education digitalization. First, we show how digitalization changes 
the character of traditional actors and enables new actors and actor assemblages 
to enter the scene of education governance and provision. Second, we look 
specifically at datafication as extending spaces of governance in both a topo-
graphical and a topological manner. Topographically, some practices of datafi-
cation follow established administrative structures and enable tighter vertical 
control over regions and education institutions by the federal authorities. But 
datafication also generates spaces that overcome topographical distance 
through relationality and connectedness. These manifest, first, in the possibili-
ties of “intimate” governance (see Gorur 2018) reaching into individual sub-
jectivities and, second, intensifying proximities to the global level of education 
governance bypassing the national authority. Needless to say, we are only able 
to scratch the surface of the ongoing developments, partly due to the scarcity 
of existing research and partly because we are dealing with a rapidly moving 
target. The analysis builds on diverse sources, including our own and others’ 
studies on the digitalization and datafication of Russian education, as well as 
recent policy documents, media reports and websites of central actors.
10.2  PolIcy context
Information technologies first entered the Soviet schools as a focus of teaching. 
Already in 1959, some schools in Moscow and Novosibirsk, the cities best 
resourced with computers, started teaching the basics of programming and 
computational mathematics in the name of international competition and effi-
ciency of national economic planning. Political and economic prerogatives, 
coupled with increased accessibility of computers, transferred education in 
technology from a subject taught in specialized and elite schools into a com-
pulsory curriculum area. Soviet schools started to teach the course “Principles 
of Information Science and Technology” in 1985, and in 1990/1991, it was 
declared a compulsory subject for grades 10 and 11 throughout the Soviet 
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Union. The course and the overall introduction of computer technology to 
schools raised enormous interest among educators, and the proposed new cur-
riculum included topics related to both the technical and mathematical sides of 
computing, as well as discussion on the role of computers in society more 
widely. The “computerization” of education was viewed as a necessary step to 
keep up with progress and to start a pedagogical change away from the “chalk 
and talk” teaching method (Muckle 1988). The compulsory ICT course 
retained its socio-political and economic relevance: “Progress in modern elec-
tronics, computer technology, and robot technology is not only a critical con-
stituent of the scientific and technological revolution, but also an area in which 
two societal and economic systems come into direct confrontation” (Vinokurov 
and Zuev 1985 as cited in Monakhov 1986, 143). In other words, teaching in 
and with technology was a means of making a contribution to the Cold War 
arms and space race between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
and the “capitalist West.” It is also important to mention the anticipated impact 
of technology on students’ worldviews. The newly introduced school subject 
had to foster a “communist upbringing” and to enhance students’ understand-
ing of the world through objective mathematical models (Monakhov 1986, 
148). Prerequisites for international collaboration existed long before the 
USSR “opened up” to the West, as Soviet pedagogues and programmers con-
tinuously studied, for example, US-developed programmed instruction and 
other international experiments in computer-based learning (Davydov and 
Rubtsov 1991; Afinogenov 2013; Tatarchenko 2019). Moreover, despite the 
fact that the late-Soviet developments in education technology were short- 
lived due to the collapse of the Soviet regime, these experiences continue to 
shape current expertise in and imaginaries of digital technology and its role in 
society (Tatarchenko 2019).
In 1992 the new Law on Education permitted education institutions more 
freedom in choosing curriculum and pedagogy, and in making financial and 
operational decisions. They were also allowed and even encouraged to seek 
private sources of funding. At the same time, a severe economic crisis caused 
abrupt cuts in state subsidies and pushed schools and universities to raise money 
through tuition fees, tutoring services and even by renting out premises. Many 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities were transferred from central to 
regional and local authorities in order to enable regionally and locally tailored 
solutions and in some cases survival strategies. In practice, decentralization led 
to increasing inequalities between regions and within them—between rural 
and urban areas—and made the education sector less transparent to the federal 
center (Polyzoi and Dneprov 2010).
In the 2000s the Russian Ministry of Education and Science issued several 
strategic and legislative documents that stressed the role of education in ensur-
ing national economic growth, global competitiveness and human capital 
development, promoted the introduction of market mechanisms into the edu-
cation sector, and called for the efficiency, transparency and accountability of 
education institutions (Gounko and Smale 2007). Tackling economic 
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deficiencies in education, the government used loans from the World Bank for 
particular education reforms, including those enhancing “efficient use of digi-
tal learning resources and electronic tools” (World Bank 2004), to comple-
ment federal funding for education. The government then introduced measures 
of centralized control, such as state standards, accreditation, licensing and cen-
tralized examinations, and a scheme of funding tied to the attainment of 
nationally determined indicators and outcomes. Reforms were designed to 
increase governmental and organizational efficiency, stimulate cost optimiza-
tion, reduce space for lobbying and corruption in public funds allocation and 
ensure the overall realization of state priorities through outcome monitoring 
(Yastrebova 2013; OECD 1999). Further prerequisites for the digitalization 
and datafication of Russian education were thus created on the one hand by the 
opening up and commercialization of the education sector that started in the 
early 1990s, and on the other hand by the state’s embracement of the New 
Public Management (NPM) paradigm since the 2000s.
A significant latest leap in digitalization policies was prompted by the re- 
election of Vladimir Putin and the publication of his “decrees” of May 2018. 
These include the task of “ensuring an accelerated implementation of digital 
technologies in the economic and social spheres” (Prezident 2018; see also 
Kolesnikova 2018).1 Specifically for education, the task is to create a “modern 
and safe digital education environment which ensures high quality and access 
to education at all levels” (ibid.). The decree continues and expands the 
“Digital educational environment” project (neorusedu.ru) launched in 2016, 
but takes digital education to the next level. The aim of education moderniza-
tion for 2018–2024 is to ensure international competitiveness of Russian edu-
cation and Russia acquiring a position among top-10 leading countries with 
the best quality of education according to international education rankings 
(Government of Russia 2018). “Development of digital education environ-
ment” is outlined as one of ten priority sub-projects, while the other nine sub- 
projects also feature different aspects of digitalization (ibid.). What is worth 
highlighting is the aim to establish a federal center for digital education trans-
formation, to create a centralized federal platform that would compile informa-
tion on and services in education, the related call to increase the provision of 
online courses and digitalize education administration and federal support for 
an increasing number of in-school and extra-curricular activities related to 
teaching ICT.
10.3  the rIse of new Actors And Actor AssemblAges
In this section we document some examples of the entry of for-profit actors 
and philanthropies into the field of education by means of education digitaliza-
tion. Their contribution is vital for the federal government to realize its politi-
cal prerogatives of digitalization. At the same time, for-profit organizations are 
becoming increasingly attracted to the education sphere due to the prospect of 
new revenues and the opportunity to reach out to young people as future 
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employees and consumers. Growing proximity to the decision-makers through 
new actor assemblages enables these actors to communicate their visions of the 
future, and their political and economic interests, to legislative and executive 
bodies. Both more traditional education actors, such as textbook publishers 
and new actors, such as Internet service providers, the banking sector and 
industry, promote digitalization. Co-operation with multinational technology 
providers and international intergovernmental organizations manifests the 
growing entanglement between national and international actors.
Publishing houses promote digital learning materials and develop online 
platforms for teachers and students. A major education publisher Prosvesênie 
(Enlightenment, https://prosv.ru/)—exclusive supplier of standardized edu-
cation literature in the Soviet Union—has lately regained its central position 
and holds a 40 per cent share of the country’s educational market (Prosveŝenie 
2017). Some commentators claim that it has (re)monopolized the textbook 
market (ibid.) and that its substantial revenues come solely from state contracts 
(Bryzgalova 2017; Becker and Myers 2014). By now Prosvesênie has digitalized 
the entire spectrum of its textbooks, though questions are raised about the 
actual availability of ICT infrastructure in schools and the danger of growing 
inequalities among schools and students as to their access to digitalized educa-
tion products. Prosvesênie contracted Microsoft to enable access to digital edu-
cation on Microsoft tablet personal computers (PC), but the agreement was 
terminated due to international sanctions on the company’s former chair of 
board Arkady Rotenberg (Microsoft zamorozil 2014). However, the task was 
taken over by Samsung with the successful sale of tablets starting in the sum-
mer of 2017. In 2017, Prosvesênie also signed a US$ 1.1 million deal with the 
Russian Internet service provider Yandex to develop an online platform for 
schoolchildren, teachers and parents with self-proclaimed elements of machine 
learning and personalization. Yandex has been actively developing education 
services and products, including prep materials across compulsory school sub-
ject areas (Gerden 2017; Analiz dannyh n.d.; Yandex uc ̌ebnik n.d.).
Several large Russian high-tech companies with mixed ownership (such as 
AFK Sistema, Rosnano, Sberbank, Bazovyj Element) have launched influential 
philanthropies that claim to improve school and higher education particularly 
via access to and provision of education technologies. Bazovyj èlement’s (Basic 
Element) charity Vol’noe Delo (Voluntary Work) runs a large-scale program for 
schools on new pedagogical methods (http://volnoe-delo.ru/directions/
education/inzhenery-novogo-pokoleniya/), and Rosnano (Russian 
Corporation of Nanotechnologies) offers schools and higher education institu-
tions an online platform with distance education courses in science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects, calling it “a large-scale 
online project that forms the professions of the XXI century.” The project 
includes support and recommendations to teachers (https://edunano.ru/
stemford/).
For-profit players, government actors, academic institutions and intergov-
ernmental organizations form novel assemblages that increase their influence 
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and opportunities for action in the arena of education digitalization. An exam-
ple of such an assemblage can be found in the flagship project Competencies of 
the 21st Century of Sberbank’s (a state-owned Russian banking and financial 
services company headquartered in Moscow) philanthropy Vklad v budusêe 
(Investment in the Future, https://vbudushee.ru/). The project sponsored 
the preparation of a research report that makes “recommendations for the 
transformation of Russian school that would enable to close the gap between 
the education system and the demands of real life.” The report was prepared in 
2018 by a major Russian think tank in education policy, the Institute of 
Education at the Higher School of Economics, in co-operation with the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Education 2030 group and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) experts (Kompetencii 21 veka n.d.). The 
report has been widely cited in the Russian media and presented on various 
public and government forums. The number one “new literacy” advocated in 
the report is digital literacy (Kompetencii i gramotnost’ n.d.). Simultaneously, 
Sberbank’s CEO announced that the corporation is developing a digital learn-
ing platform to be ready for use in 2019. The platform will be open to schools 
free-of-charge, and will enable personalized learning, pupil’s choice of peda-
gogy, study outside of school, and continuous monitoring of educational 
achievement (Sberbank rabotaet 2018).
Other active players include EdTech startups, small and medium-sized edu-
cation businesses, startup accelerators (e.g. Skolkovo Innovation Center or 
Russian Venture Company, RVC, https://www.rvc.ru/en/), and business 
forums that promote the EdTech agenda, such as the yearly EdCrunch exhibi-
tion (https://2019.edcrunch.ru/). In 2018 the head of RVC announced the 
creation of a new investment fund that will focus solely on education technolo-
gies (Futur’e 2018); and a government representative commented at the Open 
Innovations Forum in autumn 2018 that the government will stimulate EdTech 
initiatives and assist their access to schools, universities and state-owned com-
panies in order to facilitate their development, since Russia has good potential 
for becoming a global-level player on the EdTech market.
10.4  dAtAfIcAtIon extendIng sPAces of governAnce
Education digitalization manifests particularly as a process of encoding ever 
more complex educational processes into software products (Williamson 
2017), which has led to and is entangled with another major development, 
namely education datafication. Digitally produced or analyzed and visualized 
data can be inserted into databases, allowing different actors and their perfor-
mances to be measured, evaluated and re-presented, and decisions to be made 
on the basis of data and their analysis. Education administration at different 
levels of governance and across educational institutions is increasingly data- 
driven, underpinned by the need to both produce and use indicators, data 
analytics and other forms of “objective evidence.” This is the development to 
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which we next turn. We perceive datafication as both entangled with and dis-
tinct from digitalization. Datafication manifests as a process of data collection 
and deployment in its own right, for instance, through the exercise of quality 
evaluation and testing of learning outcomes and intensifies through the deploy-
ment of digital technologies, such as students’ engagement with electronic 
teaching materials and games and teachers’ reporting in electronic journals. 
Datafication is likely to intensify in the coming years, opening the door further 
to new actors and actor assemblages (as discussed in the previous section) and 
extending governance practices topologically, that is, cutting across established 
spatialities and composing new proximities and continuities, and thus spaces of 
governance, by means of datafication (Allen 2011).
In the environment of both the intended and the unintended diversification 
of education (see Sect. 10.2), the federal government has realized the potential 
of controlling education by means of data. The proclaimed demand for output 
data reproduces arguments about the need to increase efficiency and account-
ability of federal and sub-national executive authorities, to close the policy 
implementation gap and to fight against corruption and thus to pave the way 
for meritocracy and equality of opportunity (Piattoeva 2018). The develop-
ment of centralized examinations and national surveys of education quality 
were strongly recommended by international actors such as the OECD and the 
World Bank. Russia participated in international large-scale assessments of 
learning outcomes to compare its educational achievements to international 
standards and to students’ performance in other (Western) countries (PISA, 
TIMMS, PEARLS; PIAAC; TALIS).2 On a smaller scale, managerial and mar-
ket approaches prompted educational institutions to become more customer- 
oriented, to collect regular feedback from students and parents and to test 
students to monitor their progress “objectively.” All these activities involve the 
gathering and analysis of data of rising quantity and breadth with the help of 
computers and software (for more on government data outside education, see 
Chap. 22).
The key driver and the first manifestation of the datafication of education, 
the Unified State Exam (USE), was introduced on an experimental basis in 
2001 and was launched nation-wide in 2009. The examination combined the 
functions of the school graduation test and the national university entrance 
test, then gradually became a central source of information on educational 
achievement. The USE now serves as a means of external quality control of 
schools and universities, promotes national education standards and closer 
proximity between the official curriculum and actual classroom practices 
(Piattoeva 2015). Since 2009, USE as a measure of quality and a source of data 
about schools has been supplemented with the annual VPR (Vserossijskie 
proveroc ̌nye raboty, All-Russia Examinations) and a sample-based NIKO 
(Vserossijskie Nacional’nye issledovaniâ kačestva obrazovaniâ, National Study of 
Education Quality). These studies multiply federally driven education datafica-
tion and show how the federal center intensifies new topographically bordered 
proximities between the federal authorities and the regions through data, 
 N. PIATTOEVA AND G. GUROVA
179
rendering different actors not only amenable to control by making them more 
transparent, but also by attaching sanctions and rewards to quantitative out-
comes, thus guiding the actors “softly” towards particular political ends 
(Piattoeva 2015; Hartong and Piattoeva 2019). In this manner, the govern-
ment makes its presence felt at a distance, enabling “powers of reach” and 
“powers of connection” to create specific political spaces (Allen 2011).
The emergence of government-sponsored datafication has given rise to 
state-level organizations responsible for data-driven education quality control, 
such as Rosobrnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision in Education and 
Science), that gradually gained such powers that it rivaled the Ministry of 
Education and Science in the decisions about closing down education institu-
tions deemed inefficient in terms of assessment results. In this sense, internal 
state structures, too, are being adjusted—and empowered or disempowered—
by data-driven education governance. Simultaneously, experts in education 
measurement, psychometrics and software are gaining in power: for example, a 
small private association, the Moscow Center for Continuous Mathematical 
Education (www.mccme.ru) has gained the status of a prominent expert after 
developing NIKO (see above) and publicizing the ranking tables of Russian 
schools on a contractual basis with the federal government. Simultaneously, as 
regions, schools and even individual teachers are increasingly controlled 
through the practices of data production, small-scale paid-for services emerge 
to offer, for example, commercial diagnostics of student achievement, paid-for 
student academic contests and a variety of local ranking exercises providing 
documentary proof of “high performance.” In this manner, government- 
sponsored datafication initiatives, carrying high stakes, feed the emergence of 
supplementary datafication services to help students, teachers and schools to 
manage the pressure, amplifying data collection exercises and the volumes of 
data produced (see Gurova et al. 2018).
While intensifying data collection through national tests intends to make 
educational affairs in regions and schools transparent and thus legible to 
federal- level governance and its attempts to standardize and unify, other devel-
opments speak of simultaneous differentiation in the system. In 2016, the city 
of Moscow initiated its participation in the “PISA for schools” international 
large-scale assessment (Lučšie iz lučših 2016). Following the prototype of the 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Achievement (PISA), PISA for 
schools enables school-to-school comparisons (Lewis et al. 2016). This bench-
marked Moscow against schools in top-ranked countries and metropolises and 
enabled the Moscow authorities to proclaim that “Moscow school education is 
among the six best systems in the world, in terms of reading and mathematical 
literacy and among the top 20 in terms of scientific literacy.” The study not 
only highlighted that the quality of education in Moscow is much higher than 
in Russia on average, but also, and importantly for this paper, showed how 
local authorities can initiate alternative or complementary data collection exer-
cises for their own political and administrative aims (Six facts 2017). Through 
PISA for schools, the Moscow administration bypassed topographically defined 
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administrative borders and initiated topological relations with one of the key 
actors in global education governance and established proximity between its 
(successful) system of education and world “best performers,” while distancing 
itself from the rest of the country. Moscow’s success in PISA for schools was 
partly attributed to its advances in education digitalization, and a recent initia-
tive promotes partnering between Moscow schools and schools around Russia 
to disseminate Moscow’s experience on a school-to-school basis, setting up 
Moscow as an example to emulate. The “Moscow electronic school” project 
has been marketed as an outstanding innovation even capable of arousing 
international interest in Russian education among world education leaders 
(https://www.mos.ru/en/news/item/48603073/; https://hundred.org/
en/innovations/moscow-electronic-school). In this example, we see how 
commensurative practices enable topological relations that produce new conti-
nuities between disparate education systems by locating them on a common 
metric—Moscow alongside international high-performing systems and cities, 
but also connecting schools across regions, bypassing the usual regional and 
municipal levels of education governance. But these new continuities also con-
dition the production of discontinuities within the national space of gover-
nance—that is, marking out Moscow as a system in its own right and distinct 
from the rest of the country due to documented international success. These 
new dis/continuities facilitated by data create new spaces of and opportunities 
for educational governance—possibly contradicting the federal officials’ efforts 
to create a unified national education space.
Finally, in an attempt to envisage the future, we want to highlight the inten-
sifying interrelationship between digitalization and datafication, enabling their 
mutual enhancement and complex governance arrangements that will increas-
ingly work on and pervade individual subjectivities. The government-initiated 
organization Agency for Strategic Initiatives, ASI (Four Years of Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives 2017) plays the role of the government’s champion of the 
digitalization of all economic and social spheres and aspires to be the modera-
tor for other private and public actors. It enjoys significant financial resources 
and symbolic support from Vladimir Putin and the Presidential Administration, 
and makes recommendations in the format of roadmaps to major actors such 
as federal and regional ministries and professional associations. ASI runs the 
project of the University for the National Technological Initiative (https://asi.
ru/news/85128/) in which digital platforms and tools mediate all educational 
activities from the school level to adult education (Koncepciâ universiteta n.d.). 
In 2018 ASI showcased digital education in a pilot education event for over 
one thousand participants. To gain admission, participants had to participate in 
several online tests, questionnaires and computer games, which assessed their 
performance and personal qualities by means of artificial intelligence (AI). AI 
simultaneously used these data for training the algorithm. The successful par-
ticipants received personal online profiles, appraisal of their individual potential 
and recommendations for further learning in one of the six professional direc-
tions—presumably those which, in ASI’s estimation, would be most relevant in 
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the future: data analyst, technologist, entrepreneur, organizer, community 
leader and ecosystem architect. During the event, every participant’s activities 
were continuously assessed and digitally documented. Their biometric data 
such as stress levels were also stored. On the basis of these data, participants 
were awarded points which they could use to gain access to education activi-
ties; they were also grouped according to their profiles and given recommenda-
tions for individual educational trajectories. The system analyzed which 
contacts would be most useful for each participant and connected participants 
with each other. After the event the organizers boasted about the vast amount 
of data collected (through audio and video records, participants’ logs into the 
digital platform, bracelets that tracked biometric data, and so on). The data are 
to be used in the assessment of all participants’ competencies and literacies and 
to make recommendations for their future jobs and education, as well as for the 
further development of artificial intelligence to guide future educational activi-
ties. The aim is that digital tools would enable direct co-ordination of personal-
ized learning activities rather than continue to organize educational institutions 
that “teach everyone the same way” in an outdated “industrial époque” fash-
ion. The tools and approaches piloted by ASI are expected to provide guidance 
for the development of other educational institutions, primarily universities, 
but also schools, professional colleges and extracurricular education 
organizations.
10.5  conclusIon
This chapter has documented the ongoing expansion of education digitaliza-
tion and datafication that affects how Russian education is governed—who the 
important actors are in setting and implementing education priorities and how 
these priorities are put into practice. Digitalization creates space for an array of 
new actors to have a say in Russian education, though it must also be noted 
that the prerequisites for their involvement have been established by the federal 
state throughout the post-Soviet period and even earlier. Digitalization has led 
to an increased role of the philanthropic, business and voluntary sectors of 
society in the processes of education policy-making and delivery, while simul-
taneously changing the nature of and instruments available for more traditional 
players such as textbook publishers or executive-level authorities.
Whereas on the one hand, digital technologies help to re-center national 
authorities in the governance of education, the processes of digitalization, 
enjoying considerable support from current national policies across sectors and 
public discourse, do not entirely emanate from and are therefore are not 
entirely controlled by the national authorities. The examples documented here 
show how they also unfold as a loose and spontaneous grassroots process, as a 
development promoted and steered by multiple public, private, mixed, indi-
vidual and collective actors and their respective interests. Therefore, we pro-
pose that further digitalization of Russian education is likely to produce two 
co-existing realities: one in which certain aspects of education are 
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re-centralized by means of digital technology and in turn re-center the state in 
the activity of education governance, and the other, in which the proliferation 
of digital technologies leads to further diversification, raptures and inconsisten-
cies in the education system. Both, however, manifest and generate novel gov-
ernance relations between actors that elude description in a solely traditional 
topographical manner. As actors create complex arrangements between old and 
new state, private for-profit, academic and international intergovernmental 
organizations, they make the sphere of education governance in Russia more 
complex.
If the plans of the government materialize, Russian education system will 
soon produce increasing amounts of data far beyond what has been deliberately 
generated through systems of examinations and national assessments of educa-
tion quality and learning outcomes. This also means that the governance of 
education will shift from human actors using data to govern to the governed 
actors engaging with the data that govern—what Williamson (2017) has called 
“digital education governance.” More data production will be possible by 
means of students’ continuous engagement with the digital environment 
through online learning resources and databases, as well as the more regulated 
and regular participation of schools and other educational institutions in qual-
ity monitoring exercises. The production, analysis and utilization of (numeri-
cal) data within the new regimes of education governance present a whole 
range of mechanisms that enable governance at a distance. In addition, new 
kinds of connectivities will emerge and effectively change the co-ordinates of 
governance as data increasingly reach individuals and groups that may have 
been beyond (topographical) reach (see Lewis et al. 2016). Local authorities 
and schools are now in a situation where they are rendered quantifiable and 
visible through intimate data (Gorur 2018). Transparency potentially renders 
them legible and amenable to control and intervention at any time. Moreover, 
by means of producing and publicizing data on themselves, institutions are 
guided towards aligning their work with a particular set of expectations 
(Piattoeva 2015). The plans to create individual digital portfolios for every 
teacher and student reflect a desire to reach these individuals by uploading 
their data and tracking their activities at every step of their educational lives. 
Penetrating the motivation structures and choices of teachers and students 
(e.g. by tracking and AI-analyzing their activities in the digital educational 
environment; by gamifying education and assigning scores and bonuses for 
certain activities) seek a similar intimate effect on subjectivity.
notes
1. All translation from Russian are ours unless stated otherwise.
2. These abbreviations stand for the following international large-scale assessments: 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), OECD’s 
PIAAC (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies); 
IEA’s (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) 
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TALIS (Teaching and Learning International Survey;) IEA’s Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS), and IEA’s Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS).
references
Afinogenov, Gregory. 2013. Andrei Ershov and the Soviet Information Age. Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14 (3): 561–584.
Allen, John. 2011. Topological Twists: Power’s Shifting Geographies. Dialogues in 
Human Geography 1 (3): 283–298.
Analiz dannyh. n.d. [Data Analysis]. https://academy.yandex.ru/events/data_analy-
sis/. Accessed 8 Jan 2019.
Becker, Jo, and Steven Lee Myers. 2014. Putin’s Friend Profits in Purge of Schoolbooks. 
The New  York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/world/europe/
putins-friend-profits-in-purge-of-schoolbooks.html. Accessed 14 Jan 2019.
Bryzgalova, Ekaterina. 2017. Samsung vypustil obrazovatel’nyj planšet na baze 
učebnikov  Prosveŝeniâ [Samsung Launched an Educational Tablet on the Basis of 
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CHAPTER 11
Digitalization of Religion in Russia: Adjusting 




Facing religious life and religious practices that are traditionally conservative or 
even archaic, the “digital” has not yet transformed the field of religion in Russia 
as radically and visibly as some other areas, such as business, media, education, 
or culture. Nevertheless, the analysis of the digital in the religious sphere does 
not fit into simple statements, such as that religion is ancient, traditional and 
therefore—“natural,” while media are modern, upgrading and therefore—
“artificial”; it is far more complex (Lundby 2014).
Helland (2000) has made an important and heuristically promising distinc-
tion between “online religion” and “religion online”: religion online means 
the adoption of digital formats for conveying traditional religious information 
(dogmatic texts, worships, preaching, institutional information of all kinds), 
whereas online religion engages users in spiritual activity via the Internet, and 
this activity may be not in line with traditional religious practices and some-
times is in open opposition to them. This distinction, when applied to Russian 
religious life, gives a picture that is overwhelmingly dominated—quantitatively 
and qualitatively—by religion online, i.e. traditional discourse “repacked” into 
digital form and distributed through digital channels; online religion is mar-
ginal and almost invisible. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) more and 
more effectively uses digital technologies, but still utilizes the Old Slavonic 
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language during liturgies. Muslim and Jewish communities use smartphone 
apps to calculate the correct time for prayers but pray in Arabic or Hebrew as 
in ages before. The inner, sacral religious space remains untouched by the 
“digital.”
Normatively, digitalization as such does not contradict the dogmatic of any 
traditional religion. In Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism, it is theo-
logically considered to be a neutral process with good or bad consequences 
depending on human will. Therefore, functionally digital technologies are seen 
by religious communities first of all as one more facility (channel, tool, space, 
network) for effective preaching, or Propaganda Fidei (the Propagation of the 
Faith) (Campbell 2005).
This chapter consists of three basic units. The first discusses religious orga-
nizations in Russia. The second analyzes religious digital practices, while the 
third section examines challenges for digitalization in religious sphere. Starting 
from a short description of the Russian religious landscape, we analyze norma-
tive and practical aspects of digitalization in the context of religion and then 
examine problematic areas of this process in Russia—the digital remapping of 
sacred and profane, the marginalization of religious minorities, forms of anti- 
digital resistance and extremism in the digital space.
11.2  russIan relIgIous landscape
The Constitution of the Russian Federation is considered by experts to be lib-
eral and democratic. It provides equal rights: “The state shall guarantee the 
equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, 
origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convic-
tions, membership of public associations or any other circumstance. Any 
restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or reli-
gious grounds shall be forbidden”; and also the freedom of religion “Everyone 
shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, to freedom of religious 
worship, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any 
religion, or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate 
religious or other beliefs, and to act in conformity with them” (Constitution of 
the Russian Federation 1991).
The Government generally respects these rights in practice; however, in 
some cases authorities impose restrictions on certain (religious) groups.
The Russian law on religion (1997) recognized for all citizens the right to 
freedom of conscience and faith. It underlined the spiritual contribution of 
Orthodox Christianity to the history of Russia, and respect to Christianity, 
Islam, Buddhism and Judaism as so-called traditional religions.
When it comes to determining the numbers of followers of these religions, 
different approaches often give contradictory results. Moreover, the most nat-
ural approach, which is based on self-identification data, works well in most 
Western countries but fails in Russia. In practice, only a minority of citizens 
actively participate in any religion. Many who identify themselves as members 
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of a religious group participate in religious life rarely or not at all. There is no 
single set of reliable statistics about the religiosity of the Russian population.
According to the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians are Orthodox 
Christians, 15% are not religious, 10% are Muslim, 2% are Christians of other 
denominations, and 1% belonged to other religions (Religious Belief 2017). 
But those who claim themselves to be Orthodox Christians, do not fit any tra-
ditional criteria of religiosity, such as church attendance and familiarity with 
basic dogmas of their faith. Radically different results are obtained by estimat-
ing the number of practicing adepts. For example, even though up to 70–80% 
of the Russian population identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, less than 
10% of them attend church services more than once a month and only 2–4% 
are considered to be integrated into church life. Moreover, the coverage in 
mainstream media strengthens the ethnic background of the religious identity. 
According to the Levada-Center, a correlation between “I am Russian” and “I 
am an Orthodox believer” has become stronger over the last two decades 
(Obŝestvennoe mnenie 2013, 118). Russian sociologist D. Furman suggested 
that the increase in ideological uncertainty and eclecticism, with beliefs in rein-
carnation and astrology, ufology, energy vampires, witches, shamans and so on, 
demonstrates that atheism still dominates in Russia (Furman and 
Kaariajnen 2006).
The Russian government evidently favors “traditional” religions, and most 
of all the ROC with budget financing of constructing and restoring church 
buildings and educational and social projects, which faces critique in the public 
sphere. For example, human rights activists quote the Russian Constitution 
and insist that the ROC and other religious organization should be separate 
from the state. Non-traditional religions, on the other hand, are marginalized, 
suppressed and even persecuted as sects (for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses).
According to the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, the trend of 
increasingly restrictive policies toward Protestants and new religious move-
ments, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses intensified in 2019:
Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses has become more large-scale and severe. 
Criminal prosecution for continuing the activities of an extremist organization, 
de facto for continuing the profession of religion, has already affected more than 
300 people. 18 of them were sentenced, half of them to prison time, including 
three who received six years in penal colony. This is the first time since the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses organization was banned that its believers were tortured dur-
ing criminal investigations. Numerous rough searches and arrests and confisca-
tion of community property continued. (Sibireva 2020)
Experts do not expect any liberalization in government policy as the year 
2020 started off with new imprisonment sentences and instances of Muslim 
communities that suffer as a result of the enforcement of so-called anti- 
extremism legislation. In addition, religious groups continue to face problems 
in the construction of new and continued use of existing buildings, risk 
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criminal prosecution based on the restrictions on missionary activities and are 
confronted with discrimination.
11.3  dIgItalIzatIon and relIgIon: normatIve aspects
The impact of digitalization on religious organizations and practices in Russia 
is best understood in the framework of mediatization. The notion of mediati-
zation has been applied to religion by Danish scholar Stig Hjarvard (2008). He 
suggested that in the digital era religion can no longer be studied separately 
from the media, because (a) media are for most people the primary source of 
their religious knowledge and religious imagination; (b) some social functions 
of religion are now primarily the functions of media; and (c) religious institu-
tions use media logic and media framing for their actions (Hjarvard 2008).
There are three main ways of mediatization of religions:
• Media allow, enable and assist the self-presentation of religions, observe 
their activities in the public interest by maintaining religious formats 
(broadcasting services, funerals, weddings, etc.)
• Media cover religious life (news reports, feature stories, etc.) and may 
have a critical approach towards some social activities or religious 
institutions.
• Media outlets may use religion for their own aims: selectively importing 
well-known religious symbols into entertainment, keeping out sacral 
meanings and secularizing the essence of religion. This process is out of 
the control of religious authorities and therefore causes many complaints 
and conflicts (Thomas 2015).
The first way of mediatization mentioned above is more or less self-evident 
and depends on the goodwill of media institutions and on audience demand. 
In most cases it keeps the religious format “untouched” and the media are used 
more as a channel of transmission rather than actively interacting with the sub-
ject. The second and the third ways presume a more active role of journalists 
covering religion. The process becomes more important and at the same time 
more problematic. Conflict and scandals are rooted in misunderstanding or in 
poor reporting on religious issues.
The historical analysis of religious media in Russia explicitly shows two 
stages: (a) a rapid development of all religious media (1990–1997) and (b) 
their stratification after the division of religions in 1997 into so-called tradi-
tional (Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist) and non-traditional (Catholic, 
Protestant, Hindu, new religious movements and others). Orthodox media are 
supported by the state, on national and regional levels. For example, Orthodox 
TV channel “Spas” is included into a number of federal channels transmitted 
all over Russia. Some of “non-traditional” religious media decided to choose 
the strategy of “self-silencing.”
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The situation in Russian news media and public sphere regarding religious 
issues differs from the situation in traditional Western democracies. The differ-
ences are rooted in the understanding of press and religious freedoms. To illus-
trate: while up to a million French people gathered to express their solidarity 
with the Charlie Hebdo journalists who were killed in Paris in January 2015 by 
terrorists who claimed to be Muslims, a few days later 1 million Russian citi-
zens—mostly Muslims and Orthodox Christians—came together on the streets 
of Grozny (the capital of Chechnya) to show their support for “Islamic values.”
In the Russian context, the mediatization of religion faces (1) ignorance 
towards ethics and social accountability of digital media practitioners, (2) a 
normatively disoriented audience with a low level of media literacy and reli-
gious practice, and (3) a predominantly secular public sphere with problems in 
social dialogue processing.
In ethical perspective, the Congress of Russia’s Journalists adopted a Code 
of Professional Ethics (1994). Journalistic standards listed in the Code are sim-
ilar to those adopted by journalists worldwide. However, its norms are hardly 
applied or respected by the majority of journalists.
TV remains the most important medium, and it does not appear that it will 
lose its prominence in the near future. Russia has become a “watching nation” 
instead of a “reading nation,” therefore for any actor seeking to have an impact 
on the general audience TV remains a strategic resource. Yet, contrary to 
European “success stories,” the history of the attempts to create Public TV in 
Russia and implement it into the existing media system in the last two decades 
has been marked by a series of failures.
The lack of journalistic self-reflection, the low level of media’s comprehen-
sion of their social mission and the ignorance concerning possible consequences 
sometimes led external structures (political, economic, social) to raise their 
warning voices. For example, the State Duma (Russian Parliament) on January 
23, 2015, called upon all journalists for more accurate and professional cover-
age of religious life in Russia and abroad. “The State Duma calls on all media 
and all journalists in Russia and foreign countries in covering events of a reli-
gious nature to be guided by the principles of ‘do no harm,’ to refer to the 
publication of materials that may affect and offend the religious feelings of citi-
zens with special responsibility and sensitivity,” the Duma statement says 
(Gosduma 2015).
The main dysfunctions in the coverage of religious life in Russia have been 
confirmed by different researchers (Kashinskaja et al. 2002; Khroul 2012):
• a biased approach among journalists, tolerated by their colleagues;
• a lack of education on religious issues and therefore a lack of understand-
ing of what is really going on;
• an urgent need of specialized media focused on religious life;
• secular media’s dependence on political and influential Russian Orthodox 
Church elites;
• the marginalization of religious minorities in the public sphere.
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From a religious perspective, the lack of knowledge about and experience of 
religious life among digital media practitioners gives much more space for 
myths and stereotypes in digital platforms. Moreover, not only the mass media 
but also religions themselves have to contribute to agenda setting and to elabo-
ration of digital mediatization mechanisms in this very sensitive sphere. In 
addition to difficulties of translation from the archaic language of the religious 
ghetto into a modern one and problems with understanding the internal func-
tionality of religious organizations, there are some social expectations religions 
do not meet.
At least two problematic areas in Russian society—“religious illiteracy” of 
journalists and “media illiteracy” among faith communities—could be opti-
mized with the clarification of mutual expectations from the perspective of 
“pluralism—dialogue—consensus” logic (Habermas 1989) (see Table 11.1).
11.4  relIgIous responses to the challenge 
of dIgItalIzatIon
Digitalization of religion is even more complex in Russia because of its poly- 
confessional and poly-ethnic social structure. The set of values promoted by 
ROC is questioned by many Russians. Yet, the ROC remains one of the most 
highly trusted social institutions and some anti-ROC campaigns and scandals 
(“Pussy Riot” punk prayer in Moscow Cathedral and others) have not signifi-
cantly decreased the trust in the ROC. Experts agree that, “a common trope 
Table 11.1 Religions and digital media normative expectations
Religions Digital media
Pluralism •  Try to ensure religious values 
transparency, availability of texts 
representing them clearly;
•  Seek correct articulation of their 
faith, use adequate symbolic 
systems, language and cultural 
codes.
•  Give platforms for complete spectrum 
of religions and normative models 
(with respect to minorities);
•  Optimize channels and information 
flows.
Dialogue •  Tolerate other approaches to 
religion with which they are not in 
agreement;
•  Use the framework of common 
cultural code;
•  Commit themselves to participate 
in the dialogue, send experts to be 
active in the public sphere.
•  Organize and support the search for 
new subjects of the dialogue;
•  Mediate, moderate, create forums for 
discussions;
•  Expand—quantitatively and 
qualitatively—the space for dialogue in 
various forms of communication.
Consensus • Are seeking the common good;
•  Are optimizing the “preaching,” 
the presentation of their vision 
from the perspective of consensus.
•  Consider consensus to be one of the 
most important goals of media;
•  Are peacemakers during conflicts and 
tensions;
• Develop openness and solidarity.
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for self-positioning of the Church is that the ROC is a ‘state-shaping’ religion, 
and as such it weaves its own historical narrative with the narrative of the 
Russian state” (Suslov et  al. 2015). Researchers emphasize the political and 
geopolitical components of Russian Orthodoxy and the importance of the con-
cept of “symphony”—harmonious relations of mutual support and mutual 
non-interference—between Church and state (Engström 2014; Papkova 2011; 
Simons and Westerlund 2015).
In order to make ROC more active in the digital space, Patriarch Kirill after 
his election and enthronization in 2009 announced the establishment of a new 
Sinodal’nyj informacionnyj otdel (Synodal Department of Information). In 
2010, an Orthodox video channel on YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/
user/russianchurch) was launched, and the Department of religious journalism 
and public relations at Russian Orthodox University was established.
Not all of more than 1000 Orthodox media outlets (most of them have digi-
tal versions) are in line with the ROC position, and some of them have a differ-
ent approach in commenting on everyday life. Some non-official outlets, like 
the magazine Tat’ânin Den’ and journal Foma—both founded in 1995—are 
not official and enjoy a larger degree of freedom of discussions than what is 
allowed at the official resources. Web portal “Pravoslavie i mir” (Orthodox 
Christianity and the World, www.pravmir.ru), launched in 2004, is currently the 
leading Orthodox multimedia portal publishing news and analytical reviews, 
comments and interviews, audio, video, info graphics. The audience of the por-
tal is around 2.5–3 million visitors per month, or 100–120 thousand per day.
According to Anna Danilova, the Editor-in-Chief of Pravmir.ru, there are sev-
eral essential negative presuppositions in Orthodox religious identity that affect 
the missionary work within digital media. “Still for a religious community the 
process of exploring new media normally is connected with at least these poten-
tial obstacles: (1) tendency of any religious institution to be conservative in 
everything including the media; (2) unclear impact of the new media on the 
psychological state, society and interpersonal relationships; (3) tendency to inter-
pret many innovation as ‘diabolic ones’ (one of the best cases of which was shown 
in the fear of many people in Russia to accept personal tax identification code, 
even though the Church has officially stated that it had nothing to do with the 
number of the Antichrist),” writes the Orthodox journalist (Danilova 2011, 20).
Chief editor of the portal “Bogoslov.ru”, archpriest and theologian Pavel 
Velikanov, mentioned three pros for digital activity of the Church: (1) the pos-
sibility of Christian witnessing, the ability to communicate with people looking 
for answers to their questions in social networks; (2) the possibility of Christian 
charity—according to the priest, “charitable organizations are active in net-
works and live through networks,” and (3) the rapid dissemination of informa-
tion. Contras, according to the theologian, are the reverse side of the pros: (1) 
it is very difficult to verify information; it often comes from not-trustworthy 
and strange sources; (2) discussions are conducted in a manner that is not 
appropriate for Christians; (3) people spend a lot of time on the social networks 
and come into the real world “just to eat” (Khroul 2015; quotations below see 
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ibid.). Danilova considered as positive the fact that social networks make it pos-
sible to get out of the “ghetto” of just the Orthodox audience and to under-
stand the agenda, to find out what people are now interested in. A negative 
point is the lack of information accuracy and difficulties with verification: 
“fakes” rapidly spread through social networks. On the negative side Danilova 
also mentioned the fact that social networking presumes too quick a reaction: 
“People react while they still do not really understand the situation, and rela-
tionships become strained,” Danilova said and called for general “Internet 
hygiene.”
Well-known Russian Orthodox journalist Sergej Hudiev suggested that it is 
difficult to divide the “plusses” and “minusses,” because most of the advan-
tages are at the same time disadvantages. The advantage of anonymity is that 
many people are able to overcome the exclusion zone between them and the 
clergy, but the disadvantage is that the question of anonymity removes inhibi-
tions of the people in the network: they cease to control what they say.
Russian TV commentator Elena Žosul, speaking about the advantages, 
noted that social networks are main sources of news; they allow to establish 
useful contacts and professional relationships and allow quick collective reflec-
tion about what is happening. On the negative side, she mentioned “the over-
flow of information and inability to concentrate on some issue, therefore long 
texts are so unpopular in the network.”
In order to prevent cybercrimes and the use of the digital space for pedo-
philia, pro-Orthodox organization “Liga bezopasnogo interneta” (League for a 
Safe Internet) was established in 2011 with support from the Ministry of 
Communication of the Russian Federation. “This organization set itself the 
task of fighting pedophilia and extremism on the internet, mostly by hands of 
the so called ‘cyber-warriors’ [kiberdružinniki], who provoke and expose 
pedophiles, and report about contentious websites to the law-enforcement 
bodies,” underlines Russian scholar Mihail Suslov (2015, 13).
The ROC has a leading position among religious communities involved in 
online communication; Muslim activity is not as expanded. The biggest and 
most influential Muslim digital resource in Russia is the Internet portal Islam.
ru, whose main goal is to protect the interests of traditional Muslims, as well as 
popularize the works of traditional Islamic values. It launched the first daily 
Islamic news feed and opened 13 thematic sections along with a full-fledged 
English version of the site. Beside news, Islam.ru publishes analytical articles, 
religious texts (in particular, prayers) and provides psychological, legal and 
theological advisory. The resource has pages on all popular social networks 
through which feedback from readers is maintained. Islam.ru opened the pos-
sibility to become a member of the Muslim community virtually. “People 
become Muslims because of their convictions and sincere faith. On the site, 
they can leave their data in order to inform the world about their decision,” 
said the chief editor of the Islam.ru Rinat Muhamedov (Luchenko 2008). 
There is a button “I accept Islam” on the Islam.ru website; pressing it is equal 
to publicly pronouncing the formula “There is no God but Allah, and 
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Mohammed is His prophet.” In addition to Islam.ru there are some indepen-
dent Muslim socio-political channels, such as “Voice of Islam,” “Russian 
Islamist”, as well as educational projects.
Jewish, Catholic and Protestant digital resources are focused mostly ad 
intra, serving local communities and those who show some interest in them. 
Together with other non-traditional religious media and networks, they are 
marginal and less visible in the Russian public sphere in comparison to the 
dominant Orthodox and Muslim religious communities.
The only major television project for Russian Protestants is “Television of 
Good News,” which began as part of the global Trinity Broadcasting Network 
(TBN) and now is positioning itself as an independent public broadcaster. 
Without any doubt, this is the biggest Protestant media resource that broad-
casts via satellites and cable networks. Protestant radio “Teos” lost its frequency 
and is now a fully Internet-based station. Nevertheless, it is developing, invit-
ing interesting presenters, such as Orthodox journalist Sergej Hudiev and a 
number of others, trying to be interesting and relevant to a wide range of audi-
ences, not only for Protestants. Newspaper “Mirt” is a serious newspaper for 
ministers and parishioners, publishing reflections and sermons, sometimes not 
understandable to non-Protestants. There are also a number of successful 
printed media outlets outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg: newspapers in 
Yaroslavl, Penza, Yoshkar-Ola, Voronezh, Vladivostok, Irkutsk, and other cities 
of Russia. Among the Internet portals the leading project is Protestant.ru that 
presents a good example of successful migration from a printed newspaper to 
web portal. The press secretary of the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith 
(Pentecostals) in Russia Anton Kruglikov pointed out two major visible trends 
in Protestant media: (1) to move content from printed media to digital plat-
forms and (2) to address the general public, not only those who already are 
Protestants.
Generally speaking, there are several problematic areas in religious digi-
tal media:
 1. Subordination of journalism to public relations (PR). Many of the employ-
ees of religious media in Russia find themselves serving the religious 
institutions in terms of public relations and advertising much more than 
following journalistic standards. Both the employers and the employees 
do not find such a situation strange.
 2. Out of touch with mission and target audience. Digital religious media fall 
into the trap of thinking that their structure would be “media for all,” 
but in reality, they find themselves with an unclear mission and tar-
get audience.
 3. Populism and primitivism. In order to be closer to common people, digi-
tal religious media sometimes pursue populism through primitivism of 
the message. Such a simplification creates a distorted image of the reli-
gious reality and also “corrupts” the religious view of cultural and social 
issues in Russia.
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 4. Conflict of formats. Digital religious media lack a language that is clear 
and understandable for the general public. In many cases, because of the 
language secular journalists have the impression that religious world is 
strange and hard to cover, therefore it is underexposed and finds itself ad 
marginem of the national media system.
 5. Religious media as the “ghetto”. Religious media still do not realize the 
need to be part of social dialogue. Meanwhile, media and digital culture 
is increasingly becoming a space of public life and cognition.
 6. Lack of professionalism is not understood as a problem. The lack or total 
absence of professionalism in religious media often is not considered to 
be something inappropriate.
 7. Religious media are still run mostly by enthusiasts. In many cases the edi-
torial staff ’s enthusiasm does not receive any moral (and more material) 
support and understanding from the hierarchy of religious organizations, 
and that makes synergetic strategic planning and systematic work 
hardly possible.
So, from a religious perspective there are evident problems with news pro-
duction, channeling, transmitting, broadcasting, with interaction and under-
standing; therefore, the voices of religious leaders are hardly heard in society 
(for more on digital journalism beyond religion, see Chap. 9).
11.5  sacred and profane: dIgItal remappIng
In the Russian digital sphere, there are two major contextual challenges for 
Durkheim’s sacred-profane dichotomy (Durkheim 1915, 47): the enforced 
atheization during the Communist time and, after it, the religious revival in the 
context of secularization. Digitalization speeds up the remapping of the social 
space with sacred and profane markers: some profane objects and social prac-
tices have been sacralized, while some traditional religious ceremonies and 
sacred objects have been profanized. Digitalization can also lead to re- 
sacralization, to the creation of new sacred objects, new mysteries, and new 
explanations for events of supernatural origin.
The last two decades of the digital era have been a time of continuous 
sacred-profane remapping in Russia. Russian feminist punk rock group “Pussy 
Riot” staged a performance in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 
February 2012, which was stopped by church security guards. Online video 
sharing was essential for Pussy Riot’s performance to reach an audience and 
create the scandal it created. Six months after, three members of Pussy Riot 
were convicted of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and sentenced to 
two years imprisonment. Different ecclesiastics reactions followed the “punk- 
prayer” by Pussy Riot. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin appealed to “criminal 
sanctions for everyone, who affronts the faithful sense,” while at the same time 
deacon Andrei Kuraev commented on the event on his LiveJournal in the 
opposite way: “If I were a sacristan of the Cathedral I would feed them with 
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pancakes, give a cup of mead to each of them and invite them to come round 
for a confession. And if I were an old layman, I would pinch them a bit at part-
ing … Just to make wise” (Kuraev 2012).
The more recent debate on “Matilda,” a film directed by the Russian film- 
maker Aleksei Uchitel, which tells the story of a romance between the future 
Tsar Nicholas II, canonized by the Russian Orthodox church in 2000, and 
Matilda Kshesinskaya, a teenage prima ballerina at the Mariinsky theatre in St. 
Petersburg, is a good example of the “sacralization” trend in the Russian public 
sphere and how it is supported by media. Radical Russian Orthodox move-
ments warned that “cinemas will burn” if Matilda was screened, because the 
film portrays the “holy tsar” in love scenes. In response to the threats, the larg-
est network of cinemas in Russia in September 2017 refused to screen the film 
because of safety reasons. Various other spontaneous, grass-roots public initia-
tives in Russia (e.g. icons of Stalin painted with the nimbus as a saint, protests 
against digitalization in order to avoid the “number of devil” appearing in the 
documents) are not in line either with Church teaching or with government 
intentions, but widely covered by media, inspiring the sacralization of, for 
example Stalin or Ivan IV Terrible.
Another example—heavily rooted in digital media support—is the process 
of “sacralization” of Epiphany bathing (ice swimming). Ice swimming has been 
practiced in Russia for centuries and some historians suggest that the practice 
was a popular pagan tradition. Every year on Epiphany (January 19 in Russia), 
Russian Orthodox believers are plunged into a blessed section of frozen water 
three times in remembrance of Jesus’ baptism in the river Jordan by John the 
Baptist. In 2019, almost 460 thousand people took part in the Epiphany bath 
in Moscow, and over 2.4  million in Russia (for comparison—in 2018: 150 
thousand in Moscow and over 1.8  million in the entire country). Russian 
President Vladimir Putin traditionally, year-by-year, attends a religious service 
and also participates in Epiphany bathing. Even the US ambassador to the 
Russian Federation John Huntsman, a Mormon by faith, took part in Epiphany 
bathing in 2018 and called this ritual “the great Russian tradition.” The 
Moscow authorities published on the Mayor’s website the “rules of baptismal 
bathing,” which did not contain a word about the religious character of the 
act. And the mayor of the city of Yaroslavl, with the words “you are Orthodox 
people”, convincingly asked the officials to lead the bathing. Generally speak-
ing, Epiphany bathing has become a huge media event covered by all the major 
media in Russia and abroad—covered as religious tradition, as something all 
Russian Orthodox Christians are called to do, as a ritual blessed by the Church.
In fact, many Russian Orthodox bishops and priest condemned this ritual 
and called on believers not to take part in it and invited them to attend Epiphany 
liturgy instead. Bishop Evtikhy of Domodedovo put forward four reasons for 
this: (1) ice swimming is dangerous for the health, it contradicts the Gospel 
and therefore it is a sin; (2) bathing is a profanation of the sacred—blessed 
water; (3) bathing is not traditional for the Russian Orthodox Church and (4) 
it strengthens not faith, but superstitions (Evtikhy (Kurochkin) 2019). Such a 
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negative approach to Epiphany bathing was evident in previous centuries. 
“Bathing violates the sanctity and contradicts to the spirit of true Christianity; 
therefore, it cannot be tolerated and must be condemned,” wrote priest Sergij 
Bulgakov in the end of nineteenth century (Bulgakov 1913).
This opinion is low profiled both by media and state authorities and there-
fore not heard in the public sphere. Both media and politicians gain symbolic 
capital during Epiphany bathing ignoring the position of priests and bishops 
who have never been in fact proclaimed loudly “ex cathedra,” and therefore 
the ROC’s ecclesial approach to Epiphany bathing is not clear and understand-
able for the general public in Russia.
As Kseniya Luchenko mentioned, high-quality Church-related discussions 
are conducted not in mainstream media, but predominantly in digital social 
networks. “The answer to that question is closely linked to the analysis of dia-
logue culture in Russian society as a whole. Social institutions and mechanisms 
that are supposed to ensure and sustain that dialogue are overwhelmingly out 
of order. However, the need to discuss, share experiences and monitor publica-
tions is still there. And social networks make it possible,” the Russian scholar 
suggested (Luchenko 2015, 130). Almost all of the largest Orthodox websites 
have pages on social networks, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki and Facebook. 
On these social networks there are special pages of ecclesiastics, groups con-
nected to parishes, with Orthodox public associations or churches.
The analysis of the self-expressions and discussions on religious topics in the 
digital platforms shows that young Russians, in matters of belief/disbelief, rely 
mainly on their own experience and the experience of other people (family and 
friends), and not on faith, authority or tradition, as would be expected (Khroul 
2015). The most convincing is the socio-historical explanation for this phe-
nomenon: the Russian tradition of faith that was consistently eradicated over a 
fairly long period of time. Minimizing appeals to faith, tradition and authority 
is a “birthmark” of Russian history, which can be described in terms of “post- 
atheism trauma.”
Paradoxically, the Internet users in their self-expression make evident their 
mostly positive attitudes towards God and predominantly negative attitudes 
towards Orthodox Christianity and Russian Orthodox Church. The social and 
political activity of the ROC faces more criticism than Orthodox Christianity as 
a religion: for example, “ROC proposal to impose a dress code for the people 
of Russia,” “ROC proposes to create a criminal penalty for heresy.” This sug-
gestion may be proven not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, with the 
rhetoric of users’ voices: “ROC is a business project”; “ROC, in most cases do 
not care about people, but about the godless government,” “I love the 
Orthodox religion and Orthodox culture, myself, am an Orthodox man, but 
terribly hate ROC.” The arguments of those who are in favor of ROC and 
defend it are mostly rooted in ethnic and geopolitical discourse: “I am Russian 
and therefore I am an Orthodox. It is natural”; “ROC is an integral part of the 
thousand-year history of Russia, she has always supported our morals and I will 
always be with her, as the rest of the true believers.”
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In 2012, a content analysis study of Russian digital Internet communication 
texts found observable “traces” of mainstream media publications (predomi-
nantly TV) against so-called non-traditional religious organizations (Khroul 
2016). Consider, for example, some opinions on Jehovah Witnesses’ (JW) 
activities published on the website lovehate.ru: “According to news shows, 
journalists covered how some sect engaged in raping children”; “Recently in 
the news on TV it was said that a 50-year-old man, a Jehovah’s Witness, set 
himself on fire. He considered himself a great sinner who had allegedly had to 
wash away his sins. Thus, we see what this sect leads us to”; “This is a false 
religion, which is no good and kills a person (religiously destructive sect)”; 
“This is the most vile of sects, posing as Christianity. In fact, what we have is a 
simple case of Freemasons.” The analysis of the texts makes visible two impor-
tant things: (1) behavioral attitudes of intolerance with respect to the JW, and 
(2) the willingness of people to take tough repressive measures against JW from 
the state. In sum, this “explosive mixture” is already provoking a request to the 
authorities, as in the case of aggravating state–religious relations or the case for 
a need to find another “enemy”. It can become a “trigger” for negative mea-
sures taken not only against the JW but also against other so-called non- 
traditional religions, who at the current juncture come across as an easy target. 
Indeed, JW were banned in Russia in April 2017 by the decision on the 
Supreme Court, and in February 2019 the Russian court for the first time 
found a Jehovah’s Witness, Danish national Dennis Christensen, guilty of 
extremism and sentenced him to 6 years behind bars (Russian Court 2019).
From a journalistic perspective, there is a visible problem of journalistic 
autonomy. According to recent studies, journalists in Russia do not enjoy 
autonomy because of their political and economic dependence. Secondly, the 
challenge of objectivity is apparent, which leads to a poor and stereotyped cov-
erage of religious life in secular media. Agenda-setting process in media is not 
ethical-oriented: the main players are mostly focused not on the audience or on 
public interest, but on political subordination and commercial profit, therefore 
moral issues are secondary. Therefore, religious media are not able to change 
the content management: “infotainment” and “advertainment” oriented 
media decision makers do not seem to be concerned with fitting their products 
into even secular moral norms, so religious norms as more strict are ever more 
ignored.
11.6  challenges of dIgItalIzatIon 
In relIgIous perspectIve
For religions in Russia, all visible and invisible challenges and threats of digital 
communication—non-hierarchical structure, lack of authority, dogmatic cor-
ruption, information noise, fake news dissemination—seemed to be not so 
dangerous in comparison with their advantages and benefits and therefore 
manageable. Therefore, the concerns of Russian religious leaders with regard 
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to digital technologies are mostly (with some rare exceptions) focused on mis-
uses of them in particular cases (the spread of heresies, online pornography, 
gaming addiction, playing Pokémon Go in church, etc.).
Nevertheless, there are visible “grassroots” protests among Russian 
Orthodox fundamentalists against digitalization in general. According to these 
fundamentalists, digitalization in the context of religion is not limited to its 
technological side, as it is always a threat. Moreover, for some ultraconservative 
Russian Orthodox Christians the “digital” as such has ontologically negative 
connotations related to “the number of the beast” and the process of the digi-
talization is seen as a visible sign of the Apocalypse, the end of the world.
Therefore, digitalization was accompanied with protests against, for exam-
ple, the “barcode” or “666” digits in the passport numbers of some Orthodox 
believers. Paradoxically, the campaign against individual tax numbers (INN) in 
2000 became the first civil action of a religious nature in Russia, in which the 
Internet was used as a tool of influence, the main mean of information exchange. 
Individual tax number opponents using digital platforms and channels brought 
this topic onto the agenda of mainstream media and of church–state relations 
(Luchenko 2008). The movements against electronic control and globaliza-
tion processes are widely using one of the main tools of globalization—the 
Internet. While widely rumored, these views still are marginal in Russian media 
and public sphere.
Various semi-pagan cults and self-proclaimed “prophets,” who previously 
were not known beyond the regions of their activity, nowadays cover the entire 
territory of the country, thanks to digital network channels. In 2008, the case 
of the so-called Penza hermits—a group of believers who reject the founda-
tions of modern society and the state and spent more than half a year, having 
closed themselves in in a dugout in the Penza region, became widely known 
(New Cult 2008). The spread of myths about the “sanctity” of Ivan the 
Terrible, Grigori Rasputin, Russian Emperor Pavel I, and voices demanding 
their canonization by the ROC would not be so successful without digital net-
works. Moreover, some informal groups that hold completely different views 
and have completely different goals can act in the digital space on behalf of the 
Orthodox or Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant communities. The general 
shift of these movements toward greater radicalism seems to be consequent; 
since the center of social and political discussion in the digital world is shifting 
towards oppositional radical structures, it is easier to act on the Internet, exag-
gerating their ideology.
Yet, the biggest concern in terms of social security in the digital space is 
raised by radical extremist networking. After Twitter closed more than 300 
thousand accounts on suspicion of spreading extremist ideology in 2015, the 
followers of the so-called Islamic state (IS) became more embittered on 
Telegram messenger (total number of users exceeded 100 million). Telegram 
officials informed that they suppressed activities related to extremism in public 
channels, but do not monitor private chats (encrypted and secret). On 
November 18, 2015, Telegram announced the blocking of 78 public channels, 
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connected with the IS extremist group (banned in Russia). Fundamentalists 
used 12 languages for digital extremist propaganda. After that case, the FSB 
(Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, Federal Security Service) head Aleksandr 
Bortnikov considered the possibility of restricting Russians’ access to Telegram 
(RBC 2015), but this initiative was not implemented at that time.
At the same time religious organizations use various digital channels of mass 
communication with missionary goals, as well as to maintain the integrity of 
the religious community and its development, to ensure the necessary informa-
tion exchange in modern conditions. For the ROC, one of the main functions 
of the Internet is an electronic document management system that allows its 
structures and administrative units to more effectively coordinate their activities.
Despite the use of tablets and smartphones in order to follow the worships 
and using digital TV for live transmissions of religious events (some of which 
also became media events), and despite being involved more actively in web- 
based content production and consumption, for many Russians the core of 
religious practices still remains based on interpersonal communication.
11.7  conclusIon
In spring 2020, the reactions of Russia’s various religions communities to the 
coronavirus pandemic were noticeably different, once more confirming the 
diversity of practices sketched in this chapter. While most places of worship 
were closed or switched to online services, some bishops in the Russian 
Orthodox Church insisted they would not stop in-person services or the tradi-
tion of kissing icons. Another traditional ritual in times of emergency took 
place in Moscow on 3 April: Patriarch Kirill took a miraculous icon of Maria, 
Mother of God, and made a round trip through Moscow, praying to save the 
city from the coronavirus.
Digitalization had a tremendous impact on religions practices during the 
pandemic as believers got a chance to participate in worships digitally at a dis-
tance. For example, Catholic masses all over Russia were broadcast online. 
Moreover, in the opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church, even the sacra-
ment of confession became possible online. If a person wants to confess during 
self-isolation because of the coronavirus, then “in exceptional circumstances 
they can confess by phone or Skype,” said Metropolitan Hilarion, the head of 
the ROC Synodal Department for External Church Relations (RIA 
Novosti 2020).
The use of religious apps has brought about a diverse range of religious 
practices (e.g. confession by smartphone) that often fall outside traditional 
thinking, yet the rituals performed with these apps are felt to be authentic 
(Scott 2016). The digital network structure also frees users from the need to 
integrate into strict hierarchical systems and rigorously participate in rituals—
that is, from important elements of institutionalized religions. In the wake of 
the turn from religiosity to spirituality, user practices have become increasingly 
diverse, sometimes deviating from church (in the case of Christianity) 
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doctrines. Moreover, the individualization of religious practices leads to a situ-
ation in which church authorities lose their status as the final ethical and dog-
matic referee.
Opening new channels and platforms for information flows, the digital era 
created opportunities and challenges both for religious institutions (new for-
mats, genres, packages for preaching and communications) and for individual 
religiosity (variety of information sources, shift from interpersonal to digitally 
mediated communication). As this chapter has shown, digital technologies as a 
shaping force make religious life more transparent (challenging hierarchical 
information filters and church secrets), more liquid (after centuries of stability), 
and more ambivalent and pluralistic in terms of values and practices.
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CHAPTER 12




In contemporary Russia, online discourses on gender reflect the complex lega-
cies of the Soviet and post-Soviet attitudes and approaches to masculinity and 
femininity. These complexities are defined by the seemingly contradictory 
combination of Russia’s cultural matrifocality (i.e. reliance on women to run 
households in the absence or less significant presence of men in family life) and 
patriarchal social order (Kon 1995). They have also been affected by the new 
gender identities which evolved during the temporary liberation of Russian 
society in the 1990s. The appearance of the concept of “sexual freedom” in the 
post-Soviet Russia, as well as the critical rethinking of the Soviet gender roles—
the “emasculated” men (Kay 2006) and the desexualized “masculinized” 
women under the “double burden” (Stella and Nartova 2015, 37)—led to the 
emergence of new gender contracts. These included the “housewife” and the 
“sponsored contract”—a type of relationship between wealthy men and women 
where the former sponsor the latter by paying their bills and offering gifts in 
return for sexual and romantic encounters (Zdravomyslova and Tyomkina 
2007; Pilkington 1996; Stella 2015), as well as the new aesthetics and ideology 
of “glamur” (“glamor”) (Goscilo and Strukov 2011). The emergence of grass-
roots feminist and LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) rights 
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movements led to the rise of the visibility of new types of masculinity and femi-
ninity in public discourses—that is, queer, gay, lesbian and transgender identi-
ties. The shift from the command to mixed economy and the overall 
democratization of the public sphere, in general, also led to the increase in 
women’s involvement in various forms of civic activism, which in Russia tends 
to be historically associated with maternal care (Salmenniemi 2008).
While Russian women explored new opportunities and fought the chal-
lenges of the new capitalist society, Russian men appeared to be even deeper 
impacted by the radical social shifts and especially by the economic and political 
turmoil of the 1990s. The dramatic changes in Russian masculinities are rooted 
in the Soviet gender order which consisted in men being deprived of the patri-
archal status in the family by the state patriarch. In the post-Soviet times, the 
paradox of masculinity (Kaganovsky 2008, 4) was complicated by men losing 
their positions on the economic and political arenas to women, as well as by the 
rise of nationalism and militarism in socio-political life (Yusupova 2018; Sremac 
and Ganzevoort 2015). Russian men faced a new crisis of masculinity, this time 
being deprived of their professional dignity and achievements (Goscilo and 
Hashamova 2010; Kay 2006).
The current discourses on gender, despite the post-Soviet socioeconomic 
changes, continue to maintain the patriarchal matrifocal dichotomy, which in 
its turn affects the digital construction of gender. The Internet is seen as a pre-
dominantly male activity (Huppatz 2012), monopolized by men as part of 
gendered masculine capital (Bourdieu 2001), that is, a patriarchal digital space. 
Early internet scholars while explaining the relative absence of women online 
pointed to how the World Wide Web (WWW) was constituted dominantly as a 
“white male playground” (Green and Adam 2001). They made evident how 
men took over discussions online, even when they were directly related to 
women and their gendered experiences. Other scholars often hailed “cyber-
space” as an arena where individuals could escape social shackles of their bio-
logical gender. In their vision, digital technologies facilitated bodily 
transcendence, catalyzed new ways of engaging in gender politics and provided 
new contexts whereby individuals could reconstruct their identity free from 
bodily stereotypes (Castells 2010; Plant 2000). Contemporary researchers take 
this discussion to a different level by looking at the Internet and related digital 
technologies (such as social networks and online platforms) as material actors 
that perform important tasks within dynamic settings, that is, a form of digital 
work that creates, maintains and transforms human institutions alongside new 
information technologies (IT) uses (Arvidsson and Foka 2015). These 
approaches are particularly relevant to booming digitalization in Russia, where 
women and men go online to perform a material-discursive translation of digi-
tal technologies and their cultural use to enable and constrain certain activities, 
roles, and identities (Hodder 2012). In other words, women and men take 
their materiality with them into cyberspace, which often becomes further 
oppressive rather than liberating.
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Thus, mirroring the gendered discourses on masculine and feminine roles 
and patterns of behavior, digital media spaces impose similar restrictions and 
expectations on female users as those experienced by women in their offline 
activities. Therefore, female activists operating online tend to be seen as trans-
gressing the accepted gendered behavioral norms solely by the fact of their 
leadership in digital media. When engaging in any interaction or activity online, 
women are expected to employ their feminine emotional capital in socially 
acceptable ways (i.e. providing emotional labor for the benefit of others), and 
the failure to do so tends to cause disapproval and criticism. At the same time, 
digital spaces attract female users interested in civic activism, which on the 
contrary is seen as non-transgressive. This paradox creates a complex environ-
ment for individual users and for virtual communities engaged in constructing 
alternative gendered identities online, both feminine and masculine.
This chapter offers an analysis of how the World Wide Web and digital tech-
nologies influence gender identity politics in contemporary Russian society. We 
look at the ways Russians construct gender online, how their practices become 
means of resistance and activism, and how they adapt and shape digital tech-
nologies to perform their gender identities and communicate with the State in 
the situation of increasing surveillance and control of material and cyberspaces.
12.2  constructIng gender onlIne
One of the responses to the post-Soviet crisis of masculinity and the emerging 
feminist movements that are perceived as a direct personal threat by some 
Russian men has been a rise in radical anti-feminist and masculinist movements 
operating primarily in online, digital spaces. Fuelled by the state-sponsored 
ideology of “traditional values,” misogyny became a part of any online debate 
(see also Lokot 2019). New versions of and new views on masculinity have 
been shaping up, with the gendered masculine identity being rethought 
through the opposition to “woman” as the “other” and reimagined in a world 
where women would not exist at all or would play a less prominent social role. 
These new views on masculinity can take relatively harmless forms, such as 
Internet memes. For example, since approximately 2012 there has circulated a 
popular meme “We don’t need chans” (“tân ne nužny”).1 It was first applied 
by fans of Japanese anime, hence the use of the Japanese suffix ちゃん, Eng. 
“chan” / Rus. “tân” (a form of reference to children, female family members 
and female friends), but soon gained viral popularity on Runet. Oftentimes the 
new masculine identities are not only openly misogynist but are borderline 
extremist: one such example is the radical misogynist online community MD 
(Mužskoe dviženie, Masculine Movement; over 34,000 followers in March 
2020).2 The community’s motto is “We are not fighting against women—we 
are fighting for men’s rights.” The MD public accepts female members pro-
vided they do not post any content or comment, that is, have no voice, and the 
content circulated by the public consists mostly of misogynist hate speech and 
discussions of what is perceived by the public community members as violation 
of men’s rights.
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Radical masculine movements existing as offline groups or online communi-
ties are by no means a specific feature of Russian society—in this respect, Russia 
is fully included into the global trends of anti-feminist backlashes. Another 
example of Russia following the global developments in terms of renegotiating 
gender roles and gender (in)equality is the popularity of the extremist move-
ment of incels,3 or “involuntary celibates,” which started in 1997 as an online 
community where its members shared their life experiences. It soon developed 
into a radical anti-feminist misogynist movement and is currently being spread 
across the globe, including Russia.4 There, one of the best-known incels is 
probably Aleksej Podnebesnyj (aka Alex Undersky)—a Nizhny Novgorod- 
based anarchist and civic rights activist notorious for his misogynist social 
media posts calling for the end of women’s rule, which he refers to as “vagino-
capitalism,” and for physical violence against women and, especially, feminists. 
As a result of Podnebesnyj’s activity on social media, in December 2019 a court 
case was started to investigate into the man’s extremist rhetoric against women.5
The accessibility of various social media platforms has enabled Russian men 
to explore their gendered identities through the construction of online hoped- 
for selves (Bouvier 2018) and outside of the agendas of grassroots movements. 
For these alternative masculinities the visual representations of gendered iden-
tities are particularly important, and picture- and video-based platforms—Ins-
tagram, TikTok and YouTube—have become a primary digital space for 
expressing those alternative masculinities (Kudaibergenova 2019). For exam-
ple, the October 2019 ratings of top-twenty Instagram accounts and TikTok 
bloggers showed that the number two position in the rating was taken by the 
blogger Sima (@alexmymymy; over 31.1 million followers in March 2020) 
with almost three million followers.6 Young and bold, Sima experiments with 
camp visuality, representing a queer take on masculinity, for example, through 
the use of make-up and feminine clothes.7
The popularity of bloggers like Sima is not a one-off success but rather a 
social media trend, with openly gay queer bloggers like Andrei Petrov attract-
ing thousands of subscribers (in March 2020, Petrov’s YouTube channel had 
1.05 million subscribers).8 Petrov, who identifies as a gay cisgender man and 
uses his channel primarily to offer advice on beauty products, make-up trends 
and fashion, positions himself not only as a beauty and lifestyle blogger but also 
as a spokesman for the LGBTQ communities. Thus, on November 27, 2019, 
alongside five other openly gay celebrities and public figures, he participated in 
the YouTube TV show “Ostorožno, Sobčak!” (Beware of Sobchak!) hosted by 
the oppositional pro-LGBTQ celebrity politician Kseniya Sobchak. The epi-
sode was called “Coming-outs, gay-lobby and banning of propaganda: six gays 
and Sobchak” and was devoted to a range of issues connected with LGBTQ 
rights in Russia.9
The examples of Sima and Andrei Petrov demonstrate that Russian social 
media have become a relatively safe digital space for constructing transgressive 
non-heteronormative masculinities as far as adult audiences are involved. The 
online practices applied by Russian women also include transgressive patterns 
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of gendered behavior, which is consistent with the emergence of new gendered 
identities over the post-Soviet decades and which reflects the ongoing renego-
tiations of gender inequality and the relationships within the binary dichotomy 
“men–women.” For example, resisting the neo-conservative socio-political 
turn which took place in Russian public discourses throughout the 2000s and 
2010s (Cucciola 2017), women have been challenging the imposed gender 
stereotypes about women’s primary social roles being those of mother and 
wife. On the Russian social networking site VKontakte, public online commu-
nities like “Ŝast’e materinstva” (Ze joy of motherhood; over 75,000 subscrib-
ers in March 2020)10 and “Ŝast’e byt’ ženoj” (Ze joy of being a wife; over 28,000 
followers in March 2020)11 aim to disclose the truth about the challenges, 
difficulties and obstacles women face when performing the “traditional” gen-
der roles, including domestic violence, mental health problems, financial strug-
gles and broken relationships. Female inclusivity bloggers on platforms like 
Instagram, for example, Eleni (@loukoumh; over 65,500 followers in March 
2020) or Ekaterina (@ekaterinaxiii; over 23,900 followers in March 2020), 
share digital images representing body-positive non- stereotypical concepts of 
female physicality and beauty.12 Feminist bloggers like Tatyana Nikonova (@
nikonova.online; over 243,000 subscribers on Instagram in March 2020), who 
is active across various social media platforms—Telegram, VKontakte, Facebook 
and Instagram—tackle various aspects of female sexuality and desire, offering 
open and honest advice on a range of issues, from choosing a sex toy to resolv-
ing the problem of sexual incompatibility between partners.
These insta-gender practices represent non-violent resistance or quiet activ-
ism women have been employing in the past decade to carve out their 
online space.
12.3  dIgItal servIces for (wo)men: creatIng 
gender-specIfIc spaces
Challenging gender binaries and traditional gender roles is also achieved by 
translating socio-economic materiality into digital spaces. With the rapid digi-
talization of services Russian state has been offering, women move online to 
perform their femininities and “traditional” roles of motherhood by using digi-
tal services to take care of their health, diet, body politics and, even, protect 
themselves from abuse. Women first organized around internet or web forums 
that served as an online discussion/message boards specialized around certain 
themes. Eventually those evolved into full time web resources and communi-
ties for women to exchange experiences and get help and information. Forums 
such as www.myjulia.ru (launched in 2008) or www.woman.ru (based on inter-
net magazine launched in 2016) cater to different groups of women and cover 
a wide range of topics on health, beauty, personal relations, intimacy, family 
and sex. More specialized forums include www.baby.ru (launched in 2009) or 
www.materinstvo.ru (in existence since 1999) that provide health and 
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educational advice for expecting and experienced mothers, but also provide a 
discussion space for women. While these online spaces are tagged by scholars 
as “traditional” (Gnedash 2012), they can also be viewed as a site of quiet 
activism (Pottinger 2017) where women manage and practice their femininity 
the way they see appropriate to them.
Women have also quickly learnt the advantages of digital citizenship, that is, 
using state-provided digital platforms to improve their wellbeing. One of these 
digital platforms—omnipotent Gosuslugi (Public services portal)—offers a 
range of services to make women’s lives better. Thus, everyone can make an 
appointment with health services, that is often important for women with small 
children, that they could do it from home and not call or go in person. Another 
service—enrolling children into kindergarten or school—is supposed to remove 
obstacles for disadvantaged families and make the procedure more transparent. 
While these services are positioned as gender-neutral—any one of the parents 
could use them—in reality it is still women who are tasked with everything 
related to motherhood and family obligations. Therefore, women not only 
become active digital citizens, they also are the ones who provide a feedback to 
the state to make these technologies better (see also Vivienne et al. 2016).
The IT industry has recently moved to create gender-specific apps to gain 
additional markets and better appeal to the user. In this move, gender dynamic 
remained essentially the same and even has been further re-enforced by push-
ing women to use more health apps (such as mHealth, dieting, yoga, fitness 
and other apps) and reproductive apps (such as baby.ru app to monitor preg-
nancy and breastfeeding or time-factor app to monitor monthly periods, both 
created by men). This distribution of apps promotes the healthy female subject 
who is embodied in three types of subject positions: (1) Barbie; (2) Earth god-
dess, and (3) entrepreneur. These themes fix White, middle-class, skinny, 
young, and fertile female bodies as the standards for health. Women are encour-
aged to achieve these bodies through practices of self-surveillance, disclosure, 
and self-advocacy, which are encouraged and normalized through routine use 
of apps. Thus, apps allow women to actively participate in choosing traditional 
subject positions, revealing the postfeminist sensibilities of this form of 
technology- based embodiment (Doshi 2018). At the same time, maternity 
apps help women self-survey their reproduction and claim autonomy by avoid-
ing medical professionals for frequent check-ups.
By contrast, male apps reproduce masculinity, healthy male body, sexuality 
and grooming. In Russia, app market is especially full of barber and other 
grooming apps (such as Muzhikipro app) that claim to turn men into “real 
men.” Other apps such as Yourbro app are reinforcing heterosexual male iden-
tity by exploiting porn and female body. Sex is central for new digital technolo-
gies. Dating apps occupy a significant segment of Runet: alongside international 
Tinder and Grindr apps, Russia developed their own dating services such as 
Rambler dating app or the newly produced by VKontakte’s owners the Lovina 
app. Scholars suggest that while hetero-apps have a power to reinforce gender 
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stereotypes and heteronormativity, they empower and compromise women at 
the same time (Solovyeva and Logunova 2018; Chan 2018). Women receive 
opportunities to challenge traditional feminine behavior as chaste by arranging 
multiple and anonymous dating as well as sharing their experiences about dat-
ing apps (as above-mentioned blogger Tatyana Nikonova does). At the same 
time, they put themselves in a position of criticism and vulnerability.
Women’s safety has become a part of Russian public discourse, thanks to 
massive online campaigns and activism, which we will look in detail in the fol-
lowing sections. The app market responded by creating safe apps (such as 
Between Us from Vodafone) for women that allow to share locations, make 
fake calls, and push the emergency button. The feminist non-governmental 
organization (NGO) Nasiliu.net (Stop violence), that has a very prominent 
presence online and provides services to survivors of gender-based violence, 
created their own app (bit.ly/NasiliuNetIOS for IOS and bit.ly/
NasiliuNetAndroid for Android), which has the complete information regard-
ing shelters, crisis centers, legal aid and other useful information for women, 
but mostly importantly has an SOS button that allows to alert people who the 
user trusts about danger at home and on the street. The developers hope that 
the app radically contributes to women’s wellbeing.13
Assessing women’s presence online, cyberfeminist theoretical framework 
offers to look at it as an “alliance” or “connection” between women and tech-
nology by exploring the intersection between gender identity, culture and 
technology (Mohanty and Samantaray 2017). Digital space liberates women 
and challenges binary gender order by its very process of transgressing material 
reality into digital one. Women increasingly use online and social networking 
for activism and mobilization in ways that were not possible before. One of 
those ways is to make women visible via feminitivy (feminitives)—feminine 
gender counterparts of all lexical terms denoting professional occupations used 
by Russian feminists to fight against the invisibility of professional women in 
public discourses (Guzaerova et al. 2018). In linguistics, the category of gen-
der includes grammatical, lexical, referential and social gender (Hellinger and 
Motschenbacher 2015, 6), and the fact that Russian is a language with a gram-
matical gender means that all nouns fall into a gender category—masculine, 
feminine or neuter. Masculine and feminine gender nouns are unmistakably 
recognized by Russian speakers as referring to the social categories of feminin-
ity and masculinity. Although most terms denoting occupations have both 
masculine and feminine forms, quite a few nouns do not have a feminine coun-
terpart, which aggravates the already existing issue of higher frequency of mas-
culine–male expressions in Russian public communication (Hellinger and 
Bussmann 2001, 261). In the 2000s, to overcome the “androcentric perspec-
tive” of the Russian language (Hellinger and Bussmann 2001, 270), feminist 
activists started introducing into their online communication new feminine 
counterparts of masculine nouns formed with the suffix “k” and feminine gen-
der ending “a,” for example, “doktor—doktorka.” These words were used in 
cases when the Russian lexicon did not have a feminitive to refer to a female 
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professional: for example, “avtorka” (authoress), “redaktorka” (editoress), 
“direktorka” (directoress). Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, discussions 
about effectiveness and urgency of feminitives were mainly conducted within 
the Russian feminist movement, primarily online but also in offline spaces. As 
of the late 2010s, these debates have entered mainstream public discourses, 
both in digital and offline spaces, and have polarized Russian society into sup-
porters of such linguistic visibility for women and opponents, who are worried 
about the purity of the Russian language affected by feminist linguistic 
innovations.
12.4  women’s and Queer onlIne actIvIsm
When it comes to challenging and transgressing patriarchal discourses on 
women’s gendered behavior and social roles, digital media offer Russian 
women invaluable opportunities for activism. In the same way that digital 
media have impacted politics in general, transforming top-down political hier-
archies into participatory networks (Dartnell 2006), social movements and the 
notion of social activism have also evolved in the Internet era. Protest voices 
(Couldry 2010) have been amplified by social media campaigns (Jenkins et al. 
2016; Kaun 2017) and citizen journalists generating amateur media-content 
on social media have come to be considered a reliable and trustworthy source 
of information (Bewabi and Bossio 2014). Since their appearance in the global 
media landscape, social networking sites, or social media, have evolved from 
focusing on “bonding social capital,” that is, social bonds within a family or a 
small local or ethnic community, to “bridging social capital” by providing links 
across ethnic groups or between various communities and “linking social capi-
tal” by offering a new means of communication between political elites and the 
general public and between different social classes (Flew 2014, 66–67). Social 
networks have become an integral part and a valuable tool of participatory 
media cultures across the globe (Flew 2014, 77–78). Like other internet 
resources, social networking sites can be viewed as dynamic horizontal com-
munication spaces (Youngs 2013, 176), which, due to the shared internet 
tools’ characteristics of multiplicity and interactivity, are often perceived as 
resources with “radical liberatory potential” (Curran et al. 2012, 151).
Despite Runet being prone to state surveillance and political monitoring 
(Uldam 2018), its users nevertheless enjoy a high level of participation and 
autonomy (Curran et al. 2012, 164), which is especially high on social media 
platforms. Taking political and social protest to social networking sites provides 
activists with wider opportunities for contacting like-minded people and pro-
moting individually framed agendas. Social networking sites thus afford a 
means of coordinating and boosting collective action of various social move-
ments: “collective actions are also becoming more inclusive, that is, they 
encourage participation of those who would not want to commit to the inter-
pretations of a formal group and who would traditionally not be the target of 
organizational outreach efforts” (Schumann 2015, 55). Although the digital 
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divide still has a gendered dimension, in that women have suffered from 
inequalities in terms of access to the internet and other ICT (Ross and Byerly 
2004, 187), the Internet has also enabled a considerable empowerment for 
women through cyberpolitics and cyberfeminism (Ross and Byerly 2004, 
197–198). This is especially so for women involved in grassroots and commu-
nity groups, whose activism increasingly takes place on the internet (Ross and 
Byerly 2004, 200). Internet-based activism has become vital for feminist activ-
ists and activist groups promoting the rights of lesbian, bisexual and transgen-
der (LBT) women (Brown et al. 2017; Serano 2013).
Online feminist activism in Russia is developing fast and evolving consis-
tently, comprising a variety of platforms and employing various strategies, 
among them—those of emotional capital and of “do it yourself” (DIY) brand 
identity (Turner 2010). Social media platforms offer Russian feminists such 
important tools as opportunities for transgressing patriarchal discourses, creat-
ing safe digital spaces in the form of emotional communities, and managing 
their own online identity as personal celebrity or influencer brands. On the 
other hand, activism performed online entails potential threats in the form of 
cyberbullying. For example, the case of the 2019 “Lushgate” campaign in sup-
port of prominent Russian feminist and lesbian activist Bella Rapoport, intro-
duced into media discourses a debate on what kinds of online emotional 
expressions are acceptable for a woman. In March 2019, in an Instagram story 
Bella expressed her disappointment in the Lush handmade cosmetics brand 
which claims to be pro-feminist but failed to extend its support to her, that is, 
rejected her offer to collaborate. This made Bella a subject of cyberbullying 
across various social media platforms: she received hate mail via direct messag-
ing on Instagram; Twitter users (both personal and corporate accounts) started 
a flashmob making a ridicule of Bella’s correspondence with Lush; the activist 
received hateful and threatening comments and messages on her personal 
Facebook page.14 The cyberbullying was further promoted by multiple online 
media and mainstream media. The emotions shared in the Instagram story 
were interpreted as a transgression of socially acceptable feminine emotional 
boundaries by an overdemanding and self-absorbed feminist: a “good” woman 
does not use her emotions to demand benefits for herself but uses them to 
provide benefits for others. The example of “Lushgate” is only one of the 
numerous cases where Russian feminist activists faced a backlash of complex 
societal responses to their transgressive emotional expression and gendered 
behavior while performing their activism online.
Hashtag campaign mobilizations work to make women’s and feminist voices 
heard in situations of aggressive misogyny. Similar to emotional management, 
hashtags provide a form of active and quick mobilization as an immediate 
response to abusive actions. A hashtag, created as a means of structuring con-
tent in social networks, is increasingly used to attract attention to social and 
political issues and events. After its emergence, hashtag campaigns were consid-
ered mainly in the context of protests against government actions and deci-
sions. Nowadays more and more attention is being attracted to hashtag 
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campaigns, which are against existing social practices, behavior and norms. In 
these cases, the protest is addressed not so much to the state as it is to power 
in a broader sense. Such campaigns often take the form of discursive activism 
that was described by Shaw (2012) as “speech or texts that seek to challenge 
opposing discourses.” Here the issue of participants’ choice of discursive strate-
gies might be raised (Arbatskaya 2019).
Russian feminists and activists have started using hashtags increasingly after 
a very powerful “flashmob” #yaNeBoyusSkazati/t (in Ukrainian and Russian, 
respectively; “I am not afraid to tell”) started by a Ukrainian activist, Anastasiya 
Melnichenko, in Summer 2016. In response to a Facebook post blaming 
women for becoming victims of rape, Melnichenko shared her own story of 
sexual assault with the hashtag. The post went viral across Ukrainian- and 
Russian-language social media: hundreds of women shared their own stories of 
sexual assault and sexual harassment at work. In the first two months alone, 
there were 12,282 original posts and over 16 million views (Aripova and 
Johnson 2018). Following the success of #yaNeBoyusSkazati/t, other hashtag 
campaigns followed: #etoNePovodUbit’ (#ItIsNotaReasonToKill) in 2018 and 
#yaBoyusMuzhchin (#IAmAfraidOfMen) in 2019. All of them represent an 
example of participants’ attempt to challenge patriarchy by sharing stories of 
abuse that women are not supposed to talk about. By articulating trauma and 
translating it into narratives, these campaigns also provided therapeutic effect 
as well as solidarity and space for sharing.
At same time, there is plenty of online resistance to feminist and women’s 
activism. Conservative social movement organizations (SMO) utilize online 
spaces for their own brand of activism to claim legitimacy by supporting tradi-
tional values that include stereotypical gender roles, the heteronormative fam-
ily, protection of the family, and attacking anyone who says different. They 
efficiently use tools that are similar to those used by feminist activists: exclusive 
online spaces and hashtags as a response to what they see as a threat to “authen-
tic Russia.” The SMOs such as Sorok Sorokov (www.soroksorokov.ru) and All- 
Russian Parental Resistance (RVS, www.rvs.su) have very visible online presence 
by conducting aggressive mobilization campaigns and organizing fake media 
events. Their media is de-personified by using the pronoun “we”; they rarely 
mention any representatives by names, instead hiding behind webpages and 
hashtags. Their most recent campaign is resistance to passing prevention of 
domestic violence law in the Russian Federal Assembly (Russian parliament). 
Not only they started an abusive and aggressive media campaign against the 
law and its authors (all women), they also mobilized online using hashtag 
#zaSemyu (#ProFamily) to encourage their supporters to participate in an 
online discussion of the draft at the Council of Federation (upper house of the 
parliament) webpage.
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12.5  conclusIon
Mirroring the complex discourse on gender roles and gender equality in con-
temporary Russian society, digital spaces have evolved into a battleground for 
new gender politics and identities. Early cyberfeminists and activists considered 
those spaces safe, safer than actual public spaces for protest (see, e.g., Rollestone 
Collective 2014), which has resulted in the existence of a wide and diverse 
variety of online communities, activist public accounts, and personal blogs with 
a solid potential to influence and shape offline debates on the feminism, non- 
heteronormative identities, men’s and women’s rights. However, the example 
of Runet together with other “nets” suggests that people take their politics and 
their materiality to virtual spaces that, in turn, are becoming even more dan-
gerous due to illusion of safety. Cases of cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and sim-
ple online campaigns calling to “deal” with feminist and LGBTQ+ activists 
make us revisit the concept of cyberspace. In Russia, the situation is further 
aggravated by selective but tight state-imposed control and censorship over 
internet as well as state’s official patriarchal discourse.
Yet, the development of gendered online practices, tools and strategies point 
to an emergence of mosaic virtual reality in which multiple identities debate 
and negotiate but remain fluid in its discursivity. Russian feminist and anti- 
feminist and anti-gender conflict online mirrors a global backlash against femi-
nism in digital media. Online spaces and digital platforms reproduce materiality 
of “real-life” conflict with serious political consequences. In Russia, gender 
politics online and offline indicates the debates and negotiations important for 
constructing identities in situations when freedom of expression can be limited. 
Russians use online and digital platforms as a strategy to communicate their 
difference to the State and to their fellow Russians.
notes
1. Source: https://memepedia.ru/tyan-ne-nuzhny-tnn/, accessed December 
4, 2019.
2. Source: https://vk.com/mensrights, accessed March 27, 2020.
3. See, for example, “Not as ironic as I imagined: the incels spokesman on why he 
is renouncing them,” by the Guardian, published on July 19, 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/incels-why-jack-peterson-left-
elliot-rodger, accessed December 13, 2019.
4. See, for example, “Tân ne nužny: agressivnye devstvenniki stanovâtsâ novymi ter-
roristami [We don’t need chans: aggressive virgins become new terrorists],” by 
Russian TV channel NTV, published on November 16, 2019, https://www.ntv.
ru/novosti/2255780/, accessed December 13, 2019.
5. See “Women must provide sex for everyone: The most famous incel of Russia to 
be trialed for the ideas of vaginocapitalism,” by the Russian newspaper 
Komsomol’skaâ pravda, published on December 12, 2019, accessed December 
13, 2019. https://www.kp.ru/daily/27062.5/4130982/.
6. Source: https://www.mlg.ru/ratings/, accessed November 27, 2019.
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8. Source: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0UK9eo_m6v4DDGX-
QKQf5Ww, accessed December 4, 2019.
9. The episode is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksdptbnbu8c, 
accessed December 13, 2019.
10. Source: https://vk.com/zaiki_luzhaiki, accessed March 27, 2020.
11. Source: https://vk.com/prelesti_braka, accessed March 27, 2020.
12. “9 inclusivity activists from Russia you need to follow on Instagram,” by the 
Calvert Journal, published on March 9, 2019, https://www.calvertjournal.
com/articles/show/11058/9-inclusivity-activists-from-russia-you-need-to-
follow-on-instagram, accessed December 13, 2019.
13. Source: https://nasiliu.net/nuzhna-pomoshh/mobilnoe-prilozhenie/.
14. See, for example, “Lush vs. activist: a serious debate about feminism born out of 
a Twitter craze,” by the RT’s multimedia project Russia Beyond, published on 
March 26, 2019, https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/330157-lush-vs-activist-
serious-debate-feminism, accessed December 13, 2019.
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CHAPTER 13
Digitalization of Consumption in Russia: Online 
Platforms, Regulations and Consumer Behavior
Olga Gurova and Daria Morozova
13.1  IntroductIon
Digital consumption is a complex field that can be defined as “online retail, 
marketing approaches, or seen as an expanding field of technological platforms 
and mobile applications that advance various forms of production, distribution, 
and consumption” (Ruckenstein 2017, 562). Within Russian studies, this is a 
still emerging field. At the moment, scholarship on digital consumption in 
Russia is quite limited, although think tanks and marketing companies have 
been following the situation closely and provide the most up-to-date data.
In this chapter, we focus on two main topics within digital consumption 
which have emerged from the two main areas of scholarly interest: online shop-
ping and the sharing economy. Research into online shopping has examined 
e-commerce business models (Doern and Fey 2006), barriers and drivers of 
e-commerce (Daviy et al. 2018; Daviy and Rebiazina 2015), effects of national 
culture on e-commerce acceptance (Kim et al. 2016), and the emergence of 
one of the biggest Russian e-retailers—Ozon (Hawk 2002). The sharing econ-
omy has been studied from the point of view of its barriers and drivers in accep-
tance of services (Rebiazina et  al. 2018) and of socio-cultural meanings of 
particular sharing platforms, such as the gift-giving platform DaruDar.org 
(Polukhina and Strelnikova 2014; Strelnikova and Polukhina 2014; Polukhina 
and Strelnikova 2015; Bocharova and Echevskaya 2014; Ivanenko et al. 2014). 
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Whereas marketing researchers mainly apply online quantitative surveys, soci-
ologists utilize qualitative methods—in particular, netnography or online eth-
nographic research (Kozinets 2010) complemented by face-to-face interviews. 
Of the marketing companies and think tanks providing data, we are drawing 
upon studies conducted by Morgan Stanley (2018), PayPal Inc. (2018), 
Russian Association of Internet Trade Companies (2017) and Data Insight 
(2014, 2017, 2018, 2019). Therefore, for this chapter we utilized three types 
of data: academic articles on the subject; research produced by think tanks and 
marketing companies; and media publications to identify the current trends in 
digital consumption in Russia.
The first section of the chapter focuses on e-commerce, while the second 
section sheds light on the sharing economy. Each section contains definitions 
and brief theoretical concepts related to the phenomena and concrete empirical 
examples taken from the context of digital consumption in Russia. In conclu-
sion, we summarize the findings and suggest directions for future research.
13.2  E-commErcE, m-commErcE and onlInE ShoppIng
Digital transformations of retail and shopping are linked to the shift from 
offline to online retail (e-commerce, m-commerce) and various forms of their 
co-existence. E-commerce is broadly defined as “using the internet to sell 
products and services” (Doern and Fey 2006, 315). M-commerce refers to 
purchases made from mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. These 
transformations are enabled by the emergence of digital solutions for retailers 
and consumers, which transform the traditional offline retail and shape the 
everyday shopping experience. Digital transformations of retail and shopping 
occur in the context of a broader transition to the “service economy,” where 
retailers act as “integrators of services” based on knowledge-intensive service 
innovations (Pantano and Gandini 2018, 1). This results in a new concept of 
retail that “overcomes the traditional physical boundaries of the store … to 
foster the growth of new forms of commerce strongly based on the usage of 
technologies such as online and mobile for shopping” (ibid., 1).
Digital transformations of retail in Russia can be approached through the 
concept of “liquid retail,” that is an open metaphor that helps to problematize 
the dynamics of retail, with the purpose of shedding light on the current cir-
cumstances in which retail stakeholders and consumers navigate the accelerated 
transformations (de Kervenoael et al. 2018, 417–418). Following this frame-
work, in this section we pay attention to macro-level changes of market trans-
formations, normative shifts, techno-economic (infra)structures and meso- and 
micro-level activities of multiple actors (new retail formations, changing con-
sumption practices, etc.) (ibid., 418) in order to reflect upon how digitaliza-
tion has changed retail and shopping in Russia.
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13.2.1  E-commerce, M-commerce
E-commerce has been acknowledged as one of the fastest growing markets in 
Russia. According to Statista, e-commerce is expected to show an annual 
growth of 7.5% in the coming years (Ecommerce Foundation 2018). In 2018, 
it was considered to be in an emerging state, with high potential for contribut-
ing to the development of the Russian national economy (Daviy and Rebiazina 
2015, 4). As for m-commerce, statistics (Ipiev 2018) show the share of mobile 
payments by July 2018 rose by 11% compared to the first half of the year. At 
the same time, the number of payments from desktop computers dropped by 
4%. Nevertheless, 55% of e-commerce purchases were made from desktop and 
45% from smartphones and tablets. Yet, the number is expected to change in 
favor of m-commerce, since retailers actively continue developing shopping 
apps and platforms for mobile devices (ibid.). In addition, shopping with an 
emphasis on “social commerce”—meaning shopping on social media—has 
become a noticeable phenomenon (Pantano and Gandini 2018, 2). According 
to research conducted by Yandex.Kassa and Data Insight, near 39  million 
Russians made purchases in various peer-to-peer platforms, such as social media 
and messengers (Yandex Kassa and Data Insight 2018).
There was virtually no e-commerce in Russia prior to 1998 (Hawk 2002, 
702). It started to gain popularity after the Russian financial crisis of 1998, 
which forced many people to become self-employed and turned out to be a 
catalyst for entrepreneurial activities. The crisis was one of the reasons for the 
companies to start to operate more efficiently and develop e-solutions. As for 
other factors, such as internet penetration rate and access to computers, Hawk 
(2002, 703) mentions that the Internet usage in Russia was still very low at the 
time. Interestingly, the majority of those who accessed Internet did it at work 
(57%), whereas only 27% accessed it at home. Between 1998 and 1999, the 
number of dot-com companies in Russia grew from 50 to 400 (Doern and Fey 
2006, 317). Compared to the developed economies of the United States, 
Canada and Western Europe at this time, in developing countries such as 
Russia, India and countries in Latin America, e-commerce was miniscule 
(Hawk 2004, 181).
In the years that followed, e-commerce developed rapidly and continued to 
boom in Russia up till 2013, though its growth slowed down during the finan-
cial crisis of 2008–2009 (Daviy and Rebiazina 2015, 9). As for the situation in 
the second half of the 2010s, the economic recession followed by the Crimea 
crisis in 2014 had a significant effect on the development of Russian e- commerce 
(Sadyki 2017, 1). On the one hand, these changes included a drop in gross 
domestic product (GDP), a decrease of buying capacity of consumers, and 
increased political risks for Western companies to operate in Russia due to sanc-
tions and counter-sanctions implemented after the annexation of Crimea. At 
the same time, these changes helped push Russian companies into the 
e- commerce market (ibid., 1).
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According to global ratings, Russia lags behind in terms of Internet penetra-
tion (23rd in 2017), reaching an estimated 62% in 2018 (Ecommerce 
Foundation 2018, 13), with the majority of users concentrated in Moscow and 
major cities (Sadyki 2017, 2). The country was placed 99th in the United 
Nation’s logistical performance list, 35th in its ease of doing business list, and 
35th in e-government Index (ibid., 14). In addition, there is a substantial gap 
in regional development across the country (Morgan Stanley 2018, 3). 
Considering these barriers, the Russian e-commerce market is characterized as 
under-developed and fragmented—for instance, the four major e-commerce 
players in Russia account for 27% of the market compared to 63% in the United 
States and 84% in China (ibid., 6), it is regionally highly disproportionate, and 
dominated by cash payments and poor quality of service, especially delivery 
(Sadyki 2017).
One of the drivers of e-commerce has been the increase of the quality and 
availability of Internet connections in Russian regions. There have been signifi-
cant improvements in the services provided by the Post of Russia—the main 
operator of delivery services. Further, the development of numerous services, 
online payment platforms, digital signatures and a general increase in trust 
towards these types of tools contribute to e-commerce progress (ibid., 11).
13.2.1.1  Russian E-commerce Retailers
Digitalization and the development of e-commerce and m-commerce have 
affected retailers of all sizes, from large- to small-scale. According to a report 
by Morgan Stanley (2018, 1), “Russia is the last major emerging market with-
out a dominant online retailer.” In the same report, it is estimated that the 
Russian e-commerce market will reach 31 billion dollars by 2020. In 2018, the 
two most influential actors on the Russian market were Yandex (the largest 
technological company specializing in internet products and services, including 
the search engine Yandex.ru) and the Mail.ru Group (a major technological 
company, operating the most popular Russian social networking sites 
VKontakte.ru, Odnoklassniki.ru and “Moj mir” [My.mail.ru]). Yandex joined 
forces with the largest state-owned bank, Sberbank, in order to create “a lead-
ing e-commerce ecosystem” based on the existing Yandex marketplace (Henni 
2017). On the other hand, Mail.ru Group partnered with Chinese retail giant 
Alibaba, the owner of Aliexpress.com—the most popular online platform in 
Russia—to develop a “one-stop platform for social communication, gaming 
and shopping” (Henni 2018).
Meanwhile, some of the largest international e-commerce retailers have not 
been successful in their attempt to conquer the Russian market. eBay.com 
entered Russia in 2011, but so far has failed to gain significant traction. JD.
com—China’s second largest e-commerce player—left Russia in 2016 after just 
one year of operating. Among the main challenges, the executives of the com-
pany listed cross-border logistics and high marketing expenses (Sun 2018). In 
2018, a number of German e-commerce giants such as Otto, Quelle and 
Westwing ceased their activity in Russia due to reduced purchasing power of 
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consumers and significant revenue drops after converting funds from rubles 
into euros (East-West Digital News 2018). This latter phenomenon resulted 
from serious Russian ruble depreciation after 2014 (Urbanovsky 2015). The 
notable exception is Aliexpress.com, which has been one of the leaders on 
Russian online market, and will be discussed in more detail in the section on 
cross-border shopping.
At the same time, digital transformations in retail gave a significant boost to 
Russian small-scale innovative companies and startups—for instance, in fash-
ion. Online retailing has various benefits: it allows these companies to reduce 
costs associated with launching and operating their businesses; it gives the 
opportunity to be discovered by consumers more quickly; it allows using new 
business models and flexibility in adjusting to fluctuations of the market; it 
gives data and instruments for the immediate analysis of consumer behavior; 
and, it also provides tools for immediate interaction with consumers through 
videos, blogs, messages. In a separate study, we noticed a “boost” in small-scale 
fashion businesses (Gurova and Morozova 2018) when startup companies cre-
ated formal and informal businesses through social networks, using Instagram 
or VKontakte as sales channels.
13.2.1.2  New Retail Platforms
Digital transformations have globally led to the development of online retail 
platforms (Daviy and Rebiazina 2015; Doern and Fey 2006). The fastest- 
growing and most highly valued e-commerce platform in Russia has been 
Wildberries.ru, an online platform for selling clothes, accessories, home goods 
and so on. The platform operates in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
and has plans to enter the European Union market in 2019, starting with 
Poland (Ganzhur 2019). By 2019, Wildberries was ranked number one among 
online fashion retailers worldwide with the highest traffic volume, followed by 
H&M and Zara (Popova 2019). Wildberries’ revenues have soared, showing 
85% growth in the first three months of 2019 compared to the same period in 
2018 (Intellinews 2019). Their fastest growing segments have been electron-
ics, office equipment, gardening equipment and kitchen equipment 
(Kommersant 2019). The co-owner of Wildberries, Vladislav Bakalchuk, 
admits that their strongest advantages are the wide network of delivery points 
across Russia (with fewer couriers and the possibility to try clothes on the 
spot), and its commission model in which a supplier/producer pays commis-
sion for every sale (Kommersant 2018b). In 2018, the second and third most 
popular e- commerce sites in Russia were Ozon.ru (one of the leading multicat-
egory retailer, offering goods in about 20 categories, including electronics, 
household appliances, clothes, food, Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs) and 
Citilink.ru (an online platform that positions itself as an electronics discounter), 
respectively (Kommersant 2018c).
Online retail platforms in Russia can be classified into seven categories (see 
Table 13.1). We have taken mostly examples from the list of top-100 compa-
nies in e-commerce in Russia in 2018 (Data Insight 2019) to illustrate the 
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platform types. According to the top-100 list, among the top-10 companies are 
online marketplaces (Wildberries.ru, Ozon.ru), price-based online platforms 
(Citilink.ru) and “category killers”1 (Mvideo.ru for electronics, Lamoda.ru for 
clothes and Petrovich.ru for homeware).
In 2011, Darrell K. Rigby wrote about “omnichannel retailing.” It refers to 
retailers who are “able to interact with customers through countless chan-
nels—websites, physical stores, kiosks, direct mail and catalogs, call centers, 
social media, mobile devices, gaming consoles, televisions, networked appli-
ances, home services, and more” (Rigby 2011). Retailing in Russia is develop-
ing in the direction of omnichannel retailing. Therefore, in addition to 
traditional brick-and-mortar stores, companies operate as click-and-mortar 
stores, merging offline and online formats of retail in different ways. For 
instance, the online retailer Lamoda expressed its interest in opening the first 
offline store (Kommersant 2018a). Offline supermarket Perekrestok voiced a 
plan to launch a “shop-window” on its website where consumers can order 
commodities unavailable in the stores and offered by partners, and then pick 
them up in one of Perekrestok stores (Ishchenko 2018). Clothing online 
retailer Aizel.ru opened a pop-up store in the Moscow department store 
Atrium in 2018 (Utesheva 2018). However, managing director of KupiVIP.ru 
Table 13.1 Classification of online retail platforms in Russia
No E-Format Description Examples
1 Price-based online 
platforms
Platforms that have price as the 
main strategy for differentiation
Citilink.ru (electronics discounter);
KupiVIP.ru (discounter of 
premium garment brands);




Platforms that incorporate 
community activities, such as 
forums and discussion boards
Exist.ru, the biggest retailer for car 




Platforms that offer an online 
retail infrastructure for other 
companies to sell their products
Wildberries.ru sells clothes, 
accessories, home goods;
Ozon.ru offers goods in about 20 
categories
4 Online department 
stores
Online equivalent of brick-and- 
mortar department stores
Tsum.ru, an online shop of Central 
Universal Department store in 
Moscow
5 “Category killers” Price-aggressive retailers selling 
a certain category of 
commodities




6 Niche retailers Websites selling a particular 
type of goods
Yamaguchi.ru offers massage 
equipment
7 Micro-retailers of 
social commerce
Micro-companies that operate 
predominantly on social media
Roseville.ru is a fashion brand 
selling women’s clothes (being a 
micro-brand, it is not included in 
the top-100 list)
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Miroslav Zubačevskij noted that although the omnichannel retailing is emerg-
ing in Russia, it is still underdeveloped and faces various problems, ranging 
from inconvenient Information Technologies (IT) solutions to logistical issues 
(Fashion United 2014).
An important dimension of the service economy is the consumer experi-
ence. Therefore, retailers use technological solutions to address the needs of 
retail and shopping as part of the experience economy (Pine and Gilmore 
1998). Retailers actively use online tools to enhance the experiential dimension 
of shopping online with videos, blogs and other interactive formats. For exam-
ple, Bonprix.ru has a rubric “Fashion and life” featuring news on current fash-
ion trends and useful advice regarding fashion and lifestyle from editors and 
bloggers. At the same time, they aim at individualization or customization of 
experience and products. For instance, Vsemayki.ru offers to “construct” your 
own T-shirt with chosen print, while Holodilnik.ru offers the option of cus-
tomizing the color and adding exclusive decorations on fridges, washing 
machines and dishwashers.
Augmented reality and virtual reality technologies are emerging trends in 
retailing, also in Russia (Utesheva 2018). For instance, the Russian company 
Mirow (Mirow.ru) developed a touch-screen mirror that is able to identify 
which items are taken to a fitting room and to give personal recommendations 
on what is usually bought or may suit with those items. It can also provide 
information about discounts, including personalized ones, offer to call a con-
sultant or ask for a different size/color of an outfit, and to arrange the issuing 
of a loyalty card. Another technological solution, Tardis (Tardis3d.ru), helps to 
identify a customer’s clothing size and the way outfit will look on their figure 
with the use of a selfie and a short questionnaire. There is also a startup, Fittin.
ru, that has developed virtual fitting for shoes. Although these solutions are to 
a large extent at the experimental stage, they are in line with global trends, with 
a direction towards “smart retail”—that is, the search for digital solutions for 
retail and further consumer acceptance of these solutions (Dacko 2017).
13.2.2  The Profile of Online Consumers
Between 2011 and 2014, major indicators of e-commerce in Russia were on 
the rise, including the quantity of orders and average purchase amount, fol-
lowed by a substantial drop in 2015 (Data Insight 2017). However, after a 
steep decline, Russian e-commerce started to slowly recover, and as of 2018, 
65% of the country’s online users have shopped online at least once (Data 
Insight 2018).
As far as socio-economic characteristics are concerned, between 2011 and 
2017, Russian trends remained typical for developing countries, where factors 
such as place of living, income and education have more influence on internet 
activity than physical access to the Internet (van Deursen et al. 2011; van Dijk 
and Hacker 2003). On the other hand, immaterial resources such as the knowl-
edge of a foreign language and availability of free time may also influence the 
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popularity of the online shopping (Firsova 2013, 47). Interestingly, gender did 
not show significant correlation with the frequency of online shopping for a 
household; therefore, the researchers suggest that inconspicuousness of the 
online shopping (e.g. sitting alone in front of the monitor versus trying new 
clothes in public) might challenge the stereotype of shopping as a female pre-
rogative (ibid., 48).
The leading group of online consumers, particularly in terms of frequency, 
are residents of megacities with higher education and above-average incomes, 
while poorer rural dwellers with less than 10 years’ education lag behind (Data 
Insight 2018). However, experts (Morgan Stanley 2018; Data Insight 2018) 
assume that the current growth in online purchases is driven by shoppers from 
small towns, residential communities and villages who are quite price-conscious 
and have embraced online shopping in search of a better deal. Additionally, 
Russian rural settlements are now better equipped with pick-up points for 
online orders: in January 2017, 76% of all delivery points were located in small 
towns and villages (Data Insight 2017). Furthermore, over half of Russian 
internet users make online payments and transfers: this indicator equals 61%, 
55% and 44% for large cities, middle-sized cities and the rest of the settlements, 
respectively (Data Insight 2018).
For a long time, the three most popular categories for online shopping have 
been electronics, clothing and household appliances (Russian Association of 
Internet Trade Companies 2017, 27). In addition to material goods, the popu-
larity of food delivery, airplane and train tickets, as well as online games’ com-
plement products have been on the rise (Data Insight 2014).
The results of a poll by BrandMonitor, published in 2018, revealed that a 
large proportion of Russians (63%) may mistake fakes for luxury brand items 
(Tishina 2018). An even larger proportion (84%) of Russians shopping online 
is actually quite eager to buy counterfeit items (usually A-brands such as Apple 
or Louis Vuitton). As a rule, these consumers have some previous experience 
of buying fake goods through traditional channels, and afterwards turn to the 
Internet as an information tool. Frequently, the webpages of original brands 
are used as points of reference for comparing how well the fakes match the 
descriptions and pictures of authentic products (Radon 2012).
Overall, some pieces of research conclude (Firsova 2013) that the growth of 
the Internet shopping has great potential in Russia, but it will primarily spread 
among people who have previous positive experience of using the web.
13.2.3  Online Cross-Border Shopping
Online retail gives a boost to cross-border shopping. In 2015, 30% of the 
Russian population made at least one online cross-border purchase in the 
course of the year (Ecommerce Foundation 2018). In 2017, 30% of Russian 
online shoppers were limiting their purchases to the domestic market, whereas 
56% were shopping both domestically and abroad, with 14% abroad only 
(PayPal Inc. 2018). These shares of cross-border online purchases are among 
the highest in Eastern Europe (ibid.)
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Clothes and accessories, smartphones/tablets (including related items), 
home appliances and electronics have been the most popular goods for order-
ing abroad (Yandex 2016). The main reasons for cross-border shopping among 
Russians have been better deals in terms of price, wider selection of goods, and 
access to brands unavailable in Russia (ibid.), which corresponds to the cross- 
border shopping drivers among US (Invesp Consulting 2016) and European 
Union (EU) shoppers (Hunter and Wilson 2015, 25), but differs from Chinese 
consumers who are primarily interested in certified and authentic goods 
(Zhang 2018).
China has been the most popular country for cross-border orders in Russia, 
accounting for up to 80% of all cross-border sales in 2016 (East-West Digital 
News 2017, 22). In 2014, AliExpress became the number one e-commerce 
platform in Russia, and since then has been offering, in addition to Chinese 
goods, products made in Russia with a same-day delivery option and purchases 
on credit (ibid.). Honoring Russian-language consumers, the platform has 
translated its web-interface into Russian. However, the automated translation 
is not always grammatically correct or smooth and the descriptions of con-
sumer goods can look like a mere collection of words without proper declen-
sion, for instance, “new fashion print design Russian crime tattoo.” AliExpress 
gave rise to social media groups educating Russian consumers on how to navi-
gate online shopping with the retailer. The company takes the Russian market 
seriously; it experimented with 3D virtual stores, and Russia is the only country 
where the retailer has tested an opportunity to enter the brick-and-mortar mar-
ket (Vedomosti 2017).
13.2.3.1  Regulation of the Online Cross-Border Shopping
As online shopping has experienced noticeable growth, so did the number of 
purchases from the foreign platforms that have to cross the Russian border. As 
a result, substantial legislative changes regarding cross-border shopping have 
been introduced recently. From 2019, individual purchases with a price over 
500 euro and weight over 25 kg are charged with a customs duty. Previously, 
customs duties were levied on individual purchases totaling over 1000 euro 
and weight over 31 kg per month. From 2020, this tax border for online cross- 
border shopping will be further decreased to 200 euro. Therefore, the direc-
tion of changes is to increase taxation by lowering the threshold amount for 
tax-free purchases. Experts and entrepreneurs working in the e-commerce sec-
tor question the necessity of this measure and predict low revenues to the 
government (Russia Business Today 2018; Skuratova 2018). As of 2018, very 
few online purchases in Russia exceed 200 euro, and 90% of receipts on the 
most popular platform AliExpress amount to less than 100 euro (Russia 
Business Today 2018).
Another legislative measure related to e-commerce offered by the Russian 
Association of Internet Trade Companies is the introduction of value added tax 
(VAT) for foreign online retailers. Arguing for this measure, the association 
maintains that the taxation of foreign e-retailers will support domestic 
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companies (Russian Association of Internet Trade Companies 2018, for more, 
see also Chap. 5). In addition, in its statement, the Russian Association of 
Internet Trade Companies stresses that customs duties will bring approximately 
300 million rubles to the Russian budget in the first three years (ibid.). The 
measure has so far been postponed due to a lack of agreement on how the 
procedure should be carried out technically. For instance, it is unclear if VAT 
should be paid by the online platform (e.g. AliExpress) or by the retailers that 
are using the platform. Experts argue that additional taxes may force interna-
tional e-commerce platforms to cease their activity in Russia: equaling just 
0.7%, Russia is a minor player for world-wide operating companies (TASS 
2017); additionally, foreign retailers are already paying operational costs, com-
mission for using the online platforms and service providers’ fees 
(Kommersant 2018d).
It is unclear how the new measures will influence cross-border shopping. In 
the meantime, new platforms are emerging to address the needs of the con-
sumers. For instance, there is a Russian platform called Tudatuda.com where 
consumers gather to find someone who could buy and pass on a needed item 
from abroad. This service has been helpful for those looking for medicines or 
brands that are unavailable in Russia or when local prices are too high (for 
example, Apple products).2 Such practices suggest that, even if affected by the 
changes in legislation, cross-border shopping will most likely adjust, for 
instance, by changing its format.
13.3  onlInE ExchangES: SharIng Economy 
and collaboratIvE conSumptIon
The sharing economy and collaborative consumption refers to the collective 
use of consumer goods (Botsman and Rogers 2010) enhanced by the develop-
ment of online platforms. Collaborative consumption is “the peer-to-peer- 
based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, 
coordinated through community-based online services” (Hamari et al. 2015, 
2047). The sharing economy is an environment in which goods and services 
are offered and consumed through community-based platforms (ibid.). The 
terms can be used interchangeably since there are common denominators, 
namely, the mediating role of new digital technologies connecting various 
actors and modes of transfer. One position even argues that collaborative con-
sumption is embedded in the sharing economy and is one of its forms (Wahlen 
and Laamanen 2017); therefore, we use sharing economy as the term embrac-
ing both categories.
The sharing economy has been triggered by the development of the Internet 
and technology, thanks to which it is easier to create trust between strangers 
(Botsman and Rogers 2010). There are other reasons for the growing popular-
ity of the sharing economy, including economic (saving money), environmen-
tal (reducing ecological footprint) and social (expanding one’s networks) 
(Schor and Thompson 2014).
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In Russia, the sharing economy has become a noticeable phenomenon for 
several reasons. On the one hand, its wider emergence has been linked to the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009, after which the use of many sharing services was 
a coping strategy of dealing with economic hardship. For example, the gift- 
giving platform DaruDar.org, launched in 2008, where participants make gifts 
of different daily objects such as books, children’s products, furniture, home-
ware and others in exchange for gratitude, illustrate this copying strategy 
(Polukhina and Strelnikova 2014, 90). The boost of the sharing economy can 
also be seen as a result of people searching for alternative income sources dur-
ing cutbacks. For instance, Youdo.com, launched in 2012, matches people 
who need minor home services (repair, cleaning) with service providers. The 
platform has been positioned as an opportunity to earn extra money in one’s 
spare time and, on the other side, solve a home problem for a lower price.
At the same time, the proliferation of the sharing economy was connected 
to deeper socio-cultural processes in Russia. The first decade of 2010s was 
associated with the relative growth of well-being of Russian citizens (“fat 
noughties”); hence, there were people whose financial conditions made them 
eligible to participate in various lending and gift-giving activities. Bocharova 
and Echevskaya (2014, 102–103) have noticed that some people join DaruDar 
due to surplus rather than need, and share the motive of contributing to the 
common good. This is evidence of the fact that the increase in well-being 
resulted in a shift towards post-materialist values, among which are contribu-
tions to the common good, self-expression and environmentalism (Polukhina 
and Strelnikova 2014, 88). In addition, participation in the sharing economy 
has become a form of “consumer solidarity.” Since the sharing economy is 
often a part of the “informal economy” (Polukhina and Strelnikova 2015), not 
directly regulated by the government (Polukhina and Strelnikova 2014, 87) 
and existing along with the “formal economy” of online stores (ibid.), it serves 
as a horizontal grassroots form of solidarity.
13.3.1  Types of Sharing Economy
Treapăt et al. (2018) distinguish between three types of sharing economy. The 
first one is paying for the benefit of using some good without purchasing it, 
such as the platform Rentmania.com launched in Moscow in 2013. The most 
popular items for borrowing (Shlyahov 2017) are children’s goods; sports 
equipment; various gadgets, including laptops, game consoles, and scooters; 
and evening and carnival garments. Goods for borrowing are provided by both 
companies and individuals. The former dominates in the sector of larger sports 
equipment, such as treadmills, that is characterized by seasonal demand. The 
latter usually prevail in children’s and gadget sectors. There are particular types 
of goods, such as photo booths, 3D printers or cotton-candy machines that are 
borrowed along with service providers. In addition, a separate and influential 
group of goods providers is comprised by winter downshifters, that is, people 
who leave Moscow for the whole winter period and are willing to offer 
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long- term lease of their items. Rentmania was initially launched as a start-up 
with venture capital for Moscow region only. Without any interest from the 
consumers, it ceased its operation in Russia. In 2018, the owners of the plat-
form decided to move from Russia to the United States due to lack of investors 
and, consequently, limited perspectives in the home market (Mihajlova 2018).
Another type of sharing economy is the redistribution of used and no longer 
needed goods to the users who need them, for money or exchange (Treapăt 
et  al. 2018). In Russia, the most popular platform of this type is Avito.ru 
founded in 2007 by Jonas Nordlander and now owned by a South-African 
company, Naspers Holding. At first, Avito was a platform for re-selling various 
everyday products such as clothes, cutlery, furniture etc., but eventually it has 
expanded into other directions, including recruiting, real-estate and short- 
term property leases. According to a Mediascope study (Ishunkina 2018), 
Avito’s audience reached 4.3 million people aged between 12 and 64 years old 
by September 2018; and over 14 million Russians used Avito monthly with 
average 8 minutes per day (as of January 2019) (Mediascope 2019).
Finally, the third type of sharing economy is sharing of lifestyles, meaning 
that in addition to tangible goods, something intangible such as space and time 
is offered (Treapăt et al. 2018). Various rental services such as AirBnb.com are 
part of this type. In Russia, AirBnb has become popular in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, showing growth of 121% between 2015 and 2016 (Egorova 2017). 
A research on AirBnb offers on Tverskaya street (Moscow) shows that Muscovites 
are renting out the rooms (40–72 euro per night) or apartments (69–120 euro 
per night) in Stalinist high rises for prices 5–15 times lower than hotels (from 
499 euro per night) on the same street (Treapăt et al. 2018). On the one hand, 
Russians have been known for a quite conservative and protective attitude 
towards their homes (“My home is my castle”); on the other, they have a long 
history of sharing homes (kommunalka, a communal apartment in the former 
Soviet Union, typically shared by several families). According to Treapăt et al. 
(2018), apart from extra income, people in Russia are opening their flats in 
order to gain new experiences, broaden horizons and practice languages.
13.3.2  Participants of Sharing Economy
The proliferation of the Internet in Russia facilitated the increasing number of 
participants of various sharing services, spread far beyond one’s close circle and 
scaling the sharing economy to a higher level. According to a survey by Data 
Insight (2018), 394 million transactions equaling 591 million rubles (7.5 mil-
lion EUR) within the Russian sharing economy were conducted in 2018. The 
most popular product category was clothing and boots with an average trans-
action price of 1950 rub (25 EUR). The second and third most popular cate-
gories were electronics and real estate. The online platform Avito was the most 
popular source for offering one’s goods (65% of users), followed by a similar 
platform Youla.ru (39%), social networking site VKontakte (33%), and 
Instagram (9%) (ibid.).
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In relation to socio-demographic characteristics of consumers, researchers 
(Rebiazina et al. 2018) have shown that people aged 18–35 and those who live 
in big cities across Russia used services based on the sharing economy several 
times per month, while older generations (35–60) and residents of smaller 
towns used the services once every few months. The majority of consumers had 
an average income. The findings showed no difference between them and 
high-income consumers. Representatives of both income groups used services 
several times per month. Therefore, the sharing economy is a mostly urban 
phenomenon and is not linked to a particular income group. It has been found 
that the most popular services are Uber, GetTaxi and Avito, which were each 
used by 4 out of 10 people (ibid., 394).
13.3.3  Drivers and Barriers of Sharing Economy
Scholars have studied drivers and barriers of the use of services based on the 
sharing economy in Russia (Rebiazina et  al. 2018). Regarding drivers, they 
found that although 60% of consumers trust the services and are ready to rent 
things, only 30% want to rent out their own things due to risks related to shar-
ing, personal safety and hygiene. They also found that the ownership of things 
is considered to be a symbol of status; therefore, some consumers prefer to own 
things rather than to rent them (ibid., 394). Among the drivers, the following 
were named: (1) interest, comfort and utility towards/of sharing services, (2) 
recommendations of reference group (family, friends), (3) ecological and envi-
ronmental benefits and (4) ease of use. Barriers included: (1) risks associated 
with participation in sharing, (2) additional efforts caused by participation 
(time, financial costs) and (3) preferences for ownership as an indicator of higher 
status. The researchers concluded that the companies willing to build their busi-
ness in the Russian market should take into consideration the meaning of own-
ership as a status symbol and the necessity of building credibility and trust; a 
major issue in an emerging market (ibid., 397).
Noticeably, the researchers mostly discussed the sharing economy as a new 
phenomenon, coming from the Western countries and sometimes appearing in 
contradiction to the Russian mentality with its inclination towards ownership 
as opposed to renting. However, it is interesting how this new sharing econ-
omy co-exists with older practices of exchange and sharing coming from social-
ist times and familiar to the older generations.
13.4  concluSIon
In this chapter, we have approached digital consumption as consumption medi-
ated by the Internet and analyzed it at the level of market transformations, 
changes in technological infrastructures and solutions, and in the activities of 
multiple actors (governments, retailers, professional associations, IT compa-
nies, consumers). To study digital consumption thus meant to focus on market 
developments (retail formats, retail culture, business models for companies), 
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regulatory aspects (laws and regulations provided by the governments), tech-
nological infrastructure (possibilities and limitations of platforms, IT solutions 
for data collection and analysis, IT solutions to address the needs of retailing 
and consumers) and consumer behavior (patterns, objects and channels of pur-
chases, online brand communities).
The key impact of digitalization of consumption in Russia by the end of the 
2010s has been the swift growth of online retail platforms, such as Wildberries.
ru, which have a potential of becoming global, as well as of sharing economy 
platforms, such as Avito.ru and Darudar.ru, aimed at arranging circulation of 
goods and services. Offline retail has evolved in the direction of omnichannel 
retailing by developing various online solutions aimed at creating, on the one 
hand, fast and convenient and, on the other hand, an immersive and customized 
experience of shopping. The interest of government in regulating this quickly 
developing sphere, in cross-border shopping, particularly with its potential tax 
revenues, has been observed. In terms of consumer practices, Russian consum-
ers have been turning to online shopping in search of lower prices and a wider 
selection of goods. Initially, the average Russian online consumer’s income and 
education were higher than the country’s average, but recently, consumers from 
lower income and education and from older age groups have been joining the 
practice of online shopping more actively. This last development might be 
attributed, on the one hand, to personal income drops, but, on the other, to 
positive developments in terms of delivery or pick-up options across the country 
as well as saturation of internet connectivity. Overall, online shopping trends in 
Russia are heterogeneous due to sharp differences across Russian regions.
We would like to suggest the following directions for future research: first, 
more ethnographic research on the shifts in the culture of consumption caused 
by digital transformations is needed. Here, such diverse topics as online brand 
and consumer communities, how they function and shape consumer identities, 
and new forms of socialities and consumer behavior in Russia are to be 
addressed. Another research direction could be based on the use of big data on 
consumption in cooperation with companies. This might help in studying the 
peculiarities of consumer behavior of various social groups depending on dif-
ferent factors, such as time and place. A third direction could be a more nuanced 
research on tastes, social characteristics and consumer practices, based on data 
collected by retailers. The researchers could also take a holistic approach by 
examining the intersection of various aspects of digital consumption, for exam-
ple overlaps between regulations, retail, technology, and consumer behavior.
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1. This is the term from the professional field of retailing.
2. According to a Deutsche Bank report on prices in 2017, Russia was the third 
most expensive country for buying an iPhone 7. The report was accessed on 
December 2018. https://www.finews.ch/images/download/Mapping.the.
worlds.prices.2017.pdf.
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CHAPTER 14
Digital Art: A Sourcebook of Ideas 




Computer-enabled, digital technologies have altered the ways in which art is 
produced, experienced and thought of. For example, in the 1990s, European, 
North American and Russian art museums and galleries developed multi-media 
products—Compact Discs (CD), Compact Disc Read-Only Memory 
(CD-ROM) and Digital Versatile Discs (DVD)—featuring images of artworks 
from their permanent collections along with critical commentary. The user was 
now able to appreciate works of art on the computer screen, and not just in the 
space of the gallery or in a book format. The user was also able to modify the 
image of an artwork, or add it to their personal web page, thus emerging as an 
“active” consumer of art. In the same period, online galleries appeared on the 
internet, competing with established institutions. In the early 2000s, online 
galleries emerged. For example, the Olga Gallery (abcgallery.com) was set up 
by teenage brothers Yury and Sergej Mataev, who published catalogued works 
by famous artists, first Russian and later world masters. Their clandestine gal-
lery became an important teaching tool for those in the field of Russian Studies 
and Arts, providing easy access to quality reproductions of artworks.
At the same time, large museums started to provide online tours of their 
galleries. The Russian State Hermitage Museum was a pioneer of innovative 
virtual tours. On the one hand, the museum allows users anywhere in the 
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world to experience its galleries online. On the other, visitors to the museum 
in St. Petersburg can watch 3D movies and become a witness of historical 
events that had taken place in the Winter Palace. These experiments with vir-
tual reality occurred at the same time as the production of Aleksander Sokurov’s 
2002 Russkij kovčeg (Russian Ark), a movie that was shot entirely in the Winter 
Palace of the Russian State Hermitage Museum on 23 December 2001 using a 
single-take single 96-minute Steadicam sequence shot. Russian Ark has become 
a digital artwork itself insofar as it had challenged existing theories of film and 
audio-visual presentation, paving the way for experiments with digital filmmak-
ing in Hollywood and elsewhere.1 With the rise of social media in the late 
2000s, museums started to use digital technologies, including providing 
immersive experiences so that the visitor can enjoy art across different plat-
forms. Garage Museum of Contemporary Art in Moscow leads the way in 
terms of using digital technologies in its various inclusivity and access programs 
such as those for deaf people and people with visual impairments.
Digital technologies have changed the ways in which museums and galleries 
operate, including the kind of objects and practices they acquire for their col-
lections. The debates about what constitutes art and how to collect, curate and 
exhibit it are ongoing. Digital art is commonly understood as a form of art 
produced, distributed and appreciated with the help of digital technologies. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I limit this definition to that kind of art which 
exists exclusively in the digital form. For example, an installation featuring 
objects, photographs and a digital component such as digital animation has 
been eliminated from my consideration. This process of elimination is not dis-
criminatory but empowering because it makes one wonder about some princi-
pal notions helping us understand the nature and purpose of art. For example, 
is the digital a new medium or a new form of expression? Is digital just another 
way to say “contemporary”? Does the digital convey new forms of subjectivity 
or does it translate existing issues into a new “language”?2
The discussion is based on the analysis of specific works of art, archival work, 
interviews with artists3 and critical assessment of exhibitions, biennales and fes-
tivals of contemporary art. The discussion is organized around two nodes: (a) 
historical and artistic contexts and (b) the scope and dynamics of Russian digital 
art. In the first instance, the chapter traces the evolution of digital technologies, 
artistic practice and cultural and aesthetic transformations. In the second 
instance, the chapter supplies a conceptualization of a diverse range of artworks 
around the notion of image transformation thanks to new digital technologies. 
All artworks and images discussed in the chapter are available in the public 
domain and so can be easily found in Wikimedia commons and other sites.
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14.2  re-structurIng the Image:4 olga tobreluts 
and the dIgItal collage (the 1980s and the 1990s)
Computer technologies and digital literacy is one of the key components to 
a successful economy. This was recognized at the state level already in the 
1980s under Soviet late socialism. Articulated as an imperative to develop 
new means of automation, the policy of digitalization was at the core of 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, which translates into English as “re-struc-
turing.” It aimed to supply new, more efficient means to carry out planning 
and management for the Soviet economy. It encompassed a development of 
a few generations of computers and computational technologies and a devel-
opment of a workforce capable of operating complex machinery and running 
computer programs. These goals were achieved thanks to professional train-
ing made available to school pupils, students and those already in employ-
ment through re-training programs. As a result, in the late 1980s there was a 
large supply of engineers and other personnel involved in the production and 
maintenance of computer technologies (for more on digital education, see 
Chap. 10).
They were involved—often anonymously—in early experiments with com-
puter art, or the application of algorithms capable of producing or copying 
artworks. These included, for instance, images rendering famous works of art 
with the help of zeros and ones, thus visualizing the computer code. Other 
experiments involved visualizations of mathematical formulas such as fractals. 
These are curves or geometrical figures, each part of which has the same statis-
tical character as the whole. Fractals are used in modeling of complex struc-
tures such as snowflakes. On one level, digitally produced images incorporating 
and imitating fractal laws had the characteristics of geometrical patterns and so 
appeared as decorative elements. On another, they were works of art insofar as 
they enquired about the laws of the physical world and their mathematical 
representations, making references to abstract art and its predecessors such as 
the Russian avant-garde. These artworks were exchanged freely among com-
munities of technical intelligentsia who experimented with computer technolo-
gies, moving beyond their utilitarianism and producing artworks. In doing so 
they embraced Gorbachev’s neoliberal reforms such as unregulated informa-
tion exchanges, the privatization of national resources and self-sufficiency.
The growing availability of computers and the emergence of new software 
such as Adobe Illustrator meant that artists started experimenting with digital 
art. In the early 1990s, in St. Petersburg, a young artist Olga Tobreluts (b. 
1970) joined the art scene after making friends with Timur Novikov, an influ-
ential art manager and curator. At that time Novikov was pre-occupied with 
hangings made of different kinds of fabric and decorated with appliqués. These 
were “textile collages” aimed at re-organizing space in novel ways. Later he 
presented his ideas in the form of a theoretical treatise in which he called his 
visual experiments “perekompoziciâ” (re-compositions), a term which desig-
nates re-modeling and re-structuring of space (Andreeva 2007). Tobreluts 
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responded to Novikov’s ideas by making digital collages. She learned computer 
graphics and 3D modeling while on a visit to Berlin. On her return to St. 
Petersburg, she produced a series of images that featured digital “re- 
compositions.” They were shown at exhibitions in Russia, the United Kingdom 
(UK), the United States of America (USA) and other countries, securing 
Tobreluts the title of “a leading Russian digital artist” (Geusa 2013).
The novelty of her work was in the realistic “effect”: instead of rejecting 
perceptive realism of classical art, Tobreluts utilized it to query the status of 
image and illusion in the digital era. For example, her project Models from the 
late 1990s consisted of re-interpretations of classical art for the digital era. 
Tobreluts followed the conventions of traditional portraiture by choosing a 
“head and shoulders,” full face or three-quarter view, and depicting her sub-
jects with a thoughtful expression of face. She enhanced the conventionality of 
her portraits by using sculptural elements available from antiquity. At the same 
time, Tobreluts challenged the viewers’ perceptions by applying bright colors 
and making use of symbols from popular culture, for example, the Lacoste 
fashion brand. Ultimately, the artist enquired about the value of art and indi-
vidual expression in the era of digital reproduction. Here originality stems from 
a “re-composition” of elements, not from new elements. Tobreluts “re- 
structures” the artistic canon and the image itself by accentuating the compos-
ite quality of culture and memory. She conceives of digital art as a new medium, 
and by employing classical imagery she re-inscribes the digital into art history.
In an interview published in 1995, Tobreluts defines digital art in the fol-
lowing way. “First, the work is composed of different pieces. Then it is trans-
ferred from the computer to a compact disc (CD). Then a negative is printed, 
and then a photograph is printed … The computer is a stupid machine. It is 
just a metal box that can do nothing unless it is instructed to do something”5 
(Sharandak 1995). Tobreluts describes different stages in the production of a 
digital artwork whereby the digital is materialized, that is, different manipula-
tions are used to present the digital as an object. Different stages in the produc-
tion of the artwork refer to the process of layering employed in image editing 
programs such as Photoshop. Another artist—Natalia Kamenetskaia from 
Moscow—described the same process in an interview in 2011. Speaking of her 
digital collage titled St. Sebastian and produced in 1993 with the help of 
Photoshop, she notes that “St. Sebastian is a multi-layered, poly-semantic fig-
ure which brings together images and characters from classical and contempo-
rary art” (Strukov 2011, 123–124).6
In her 1995 interview, Tobreluts conceived of computers and digital tech-
nologies as a new medium. She compared them to “a new kind of brush which 
is just more convenient to use”7 (Sharandak 1995). In my interview with her 
in 2017, Tobreluts spoke about “cifrovaâ èstetika” (digital visuality), or a par-
ticular way of thinking about the world, not just representing it artistically 
(interview with the author, 2017). In other words, in twenty years Tobreluts’ 
understanding of computers and digitality has evolved from one which consid-
ers the digital as a more efficient medium to one which utilizes the digital to 
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construct new worlds. The change in her thinking is manifested artistically: 
from using the digital to re-structure the image in the 1990s, in the 2010s she 
turned to using the medium of painting to reveal the nature and dynamics of 
the digital. I argue that this reversal of her artistic focus reveals the transforma-
tions propelled by the greater use of digital technologies in the present-day 
society.
In the early 1990s, Tobreluts, Kamenetskaia and other artists centered on 
the image as a key component of artistic expression. Their attempts to “re- 
structure” the image using digital technologies resulted in a new understand-
ing of artistic originality and authorship. Like their predecessors such as Marcel 
Duchamp, Andy Warhol and Ilya Kabakov, Russian digital artists queried art as 
an autonomous sphere of production. They continued to challenge the notion 
of the artistic genius by engaging with technologies that they could not fully 
control.8 Kamenetskaia acknowledges that “the computer was an unpredictable 
thing that would generate unplanned, unexpected results. Working with a 
computer was a mystical process” (Strukov 2011, 122–123). On one level, 
Kamenetskaia ascribes some degree of authorship to the machine which, in her 
view, is responsible for the outcome without discernible human intention. Like 
Dadaists, she embraces chance as a stimulus to expression in the work of art. 
Like Pollock, who practiced the technique called “Action Painting,” which 
relied on chance, she is interested in random connections generated by the 
computer software.
On another level, Kamenetskaia re-claims ownership of art as a collective 
enterprise, thus opposing the long-standing tradition of perceiving art as a 
result of individual expression, or Romantic genius. She reminisces (Strukov 
2011) that in the early 1990s she did not own her own computer and made use 
of her friends’ computers, for example, of a computer that belonged to Irina 
Sandomirskaia, now a professor of Russian Studies at Södertörn University. 
Kamenetskaia would spend hours working on her computer at night. According 
to the artist, it was more than borrowing some tools from a friend; rather it was 
a collective enterprise insofar as they wanted to achieve something new in their 
work, namely, to open to the global community. Kamenetskaia recalls 
Sandomirskaia saying that “by learning how to use the computer we can show 
to the western world that we are part of it. The computer was a language in 
which all modern people communicated but Russians not yet” (Strukov 2011, 
123).9 In this regard, Kamenetskaia and her friend, perhaps unknowingly, 
rehearsed the vision of global solidarity originally articulated by Sergei 
Eisenstein for the medium of film. For him, film would be a universal language, 
one that does not require translation, which would unite people of the world 
(2007 [1934]).
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14.3  re-wIrIng the east: olIa lIalIna and net.art 
(the 1990s)
These ideas of shared knowledge, collective authorship and international soli-
darity were at the core of an artistic movement known as net.art. The main 
members of the movement were Vuk Ćosić, Jodi.org, Heath Bunting, Aleksei 
Shulgin and Olia Lialina, based in countries that just a few years ago were sepa-
rated by the Iron Curtain. To achieve a new post-Cold War commonality, they 
formed an artistic collective, defining their art as “net.art,” or “internet art.” 
Though they wished to explore similar political and social concerns, from the 
aesthetic standpoint their works were very different. Net.art is a synonym of 
“internet art.” According to Shulgin, who allegedly coined the term, net.art 
stemmed from “conjoined phrases in an email bungled by a technical glitch (a 
morass of alphanumeric junk, its only legible term net.art)” (Greene 2004, 
12). The term has been used in the title of various exhibitions celebrating inter-
net art. It covers a wide range of artistic practices that use the internet as its 
main medium.
One of the most celebrated net.artists is Olia Lialina (b. 1971). She is widely 
recognized for developing the internet as a medium for artistic expression and 
storytelling. For example, her network-based artwork My Boyfriend Came Back 
from the War (1996) tells the story of a young woman and man who have been 
separated by war. To a Russian user, Lialina makes a reference to the first 
Chechen War, which had devastated the newly founded Russian Federation 
(RF); to other users, she speaks of a universal situation. The lovers attempt to 
engage in a conversation, but they find it difficult. It is not entirely clear 
whether they are communicating in the “real” or online world; the boundaries 
between spaces, lines of communication and identities are constantly blurred, 
creating a Chekhov-style drama of misunderstanding. Unlike other examples 
of net.art, My Boyfriend Came Back from the War is directly involved with the 
user’s emotions. In fact, the work reflects on what constitutes expression, 
meaning and emotion on the internet. In many ways, it anticipated the con-
flicts and dramas of social media which are to appear a decade later.
My Boyfriend Came Back from the War makes use of interactive hypertext 
storytelling. The work consists of nested frames with black and white web 
pages and grainy GIF images that show human faces and objects. Lialina con-
ceives of the internet as a space where the boundaries between words and 
images, and between connections and emotions, are erased. Each element is 
an arena of action, reflection and observation. When clicking hyperlinks in the 
work, the frame splits into smaller frames and the user reveals a nonlinear story 
about the couple. The story takes on a number of routes but eventually it 
leads to the point where the screen becomes a mosaic of empty black frames. 
They stand for emotional emptiness, a breakdown in communication and 
impossibility of genuine dialogue in the modern world (for more on hyper-
text, see Chap. 15).
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On one level, the squares and frames make a reference to the film strip, that 
is, a roll of frames. The grainy black-and-white images and intertitles evoke 
early silent movies. Like Eisenstein, Lialina is interested in montage as a means 
to construct meaning on the internet. On another level, the work reveals the 
potentialities of the internet as a new medium, particularly the role of the user 
in assembling data and constructing meaning. Without the user, the frames and 
images in My Boyfriend Came Back from the War would remain static. With the 
user’s involvement they become animated. Here, reading the story is a ludic 
experience insofar as the user is guided but not directed to act, thus producing 
new connections and exploring new spheres of meaning. The user begins to 
wonder about their role and about the impact of their actions: are they there to 
observe an intimate conversation between a man and a woman? Are they 
responsible for the breakup of communication?
My Boyfriend Came Back from the War was displayed in Lialina’s online gal-
lery, which was one of the first internet-based galleries in the world. Nowadays 
artists employ the internet to produce, showcase and distribute their work, 
with many artists boasting profiles on numerous platforms. What Lialina has 
been interested in is the exploration of the possibilities of the new medium, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the challenges of preserving early internet art 
and culture for future generations. With many programs now obsolete, how 
can a user experience the internet of the 1990s? Particularly, how can they feel 
the joy of connecting with someone they do not know in another country? 
This seems banal in the present-day world, but in the early 1990s with the 
world just emerging from the Cold War, being able to communicate directly 
with someone from another country was an extraordinary experience. What 
net.artists did in that period was to re-wire Europe and re-connect the world in 
new ways that would be free of government controls, ideological blocks and 
national, racial and gender stereotypes. My Boyfriend Came Back from the War 
is a record of this kind of aspiration of the post-Cold War Europe.
In her pioneering net.art, Lialina poses a number of important questions. 
The ethical ones are: what is the nature of communication? How does the 
internet change communication? What is privacy? How can we be intimate 
when there is no privacy? And the aesthetic questions are: what is duration on 
the internet? How do users define time? Does the digital have its own ontol-
ogy? What kind of visuality and visibility does the digital supply? Is it possible 
to conserve the digital? In other words, My Boyfriend Came Back from the War 
and Lialina’s other works are about knowledge and its calibrations and misno-
mers, about the scale and trajectory of communication and performance, and 
about the difference between connectivity and community. Lialina’s works are 
simultaneously contextual—they exist within a specific technological and social 
context—and universal as they speak of global issues and assert universal values.
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14.4  mInI and maxI: global VIsIons from oleg KuVaeV 
and aes+f (the 2000s and 2010s)
While Lialina’s works are significant from the standpoint of art criticism, his-
tory of communication and theory of the internet and the digital, they remain 
marginal from the standpoint of popular cultural industries and global con-
sumption. Who were the artists who made digital art popular? Conversely, how 
did artists respond to the rise of popular use of digital technologies? What 
effects did the changes in technologies have on the aesthetics, distribution and 
significance of digital art? In this section, I aim to answer these questions by 
addressing two interrelated concerns. The first is the role of individual artists in 
the development of the cultural industry with its digital segment. The second 
is the transnational realm of Russian culture in general and digital art in par-
ticular. Indeed, my analysis of the works by Tobreluts and Lialina indicates that 
Russian digital art has been international from its inception. Here I wish to 
emphasize that it has always occupied a transnational domain. For instance, 
Tobreluts’ collages signify the process of symbolic layering of culture in the era 
of globalization. She mixes tropes and forms stemming from different periods 
and contexts, and, following the imperial tradition of artistic expression such as 
the classical architecture of St. Petersburg, what makes her works Russian is the 
radical appropriation of seemingly un-Russian symbols. She reveals subjectivity 
through renouncing identities, or, to be precise, by demonstrating their con-
structed nature. With Lialina, transnational social networks define the pro-
cesses of articulation and dissemination of her art. She works with artists based 
in other countries, and she makes art which is possible thanks to the actions of 
users located anywhere in the world. Lialina’s interest in specificity and univer-
salism points to the effects of global communication networks which, on the 
one hand, allow us to connect to anyone anywhere and, on the other, keep us 
trapped in our information bubbles. In addition, I argue that individual artists, 
not government-funded or corporate initiatives, are responsible for the emer-
gence of cultural industry and digital economy in the RF.
The developments occurred at different levels and through employment of 
sundry strategies. Here I reflect on two of these, which I coded using the terms 
“mini” and “maxi.” The former stands for a particular sense of intimacy, per-
sonal space, reflexivity and a steer toward abstraction (see the discussion of 
Lialina’s works above). The latter signifies an infatuation with popular culture, 
spectacle and a steer toward figuration. To showcase the latter, I first investi-
gate the work of Oleg Kuvaev before turning to the art collective known as 
AES+F (the name is initials of the artists Tatiana Arzamasova, Lev Evzovich, 
Evgenii Sviatskii and Vladimir Fridkes). Kuvaev’s work characterizes the ten-
dencies of the early 2000s while AES+F address the concern of the late 2000s 
and early 2010s.
In 2001, Kuvaev (b. 1967  in St. Petersburg) founded a small animation 
studio called Mult.ru and started promoting Masyanya, a series of short clips 
about the adventures of a young girl called Masyanya who lives in St. Petersburg 
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with her boyfriend. Kuvaev worked with Macromedia Flash to produce films 
that were distributed over the network using viral marketing. Macromedia 
Flash uses vector technology to produced layered imagery. It appears quite 
simple—geometric lines, bright colors, lack of shading, and so on, but this 
simplicity, or rather naivety, was the key to success. In a few years, and in spite 
of Kuvaev being involved in a legal battle over his brand,10 Masyanya was the 
most popular phenomenon on the Russian language internet, linking commu-
nities in the RF, Europe, Israel, North America and elsewhere. Some describe 
the 2000s as “Putin’s Russia” due to the rise of the new form of governance 
associated with the figure of the president (see, for example, Wegren 2018). I 
argue that the 2000s were “Masyanya’s Russia” (see Strukov 2004 for full 
analysis) because Kuvaev and his Masyanya transformed the ways in which peo-
ple communicated online, and gave rise to digital economy (for more, see 
Chap. 4).11
Kuvaev employs caustic humor and depicts Masyanya’s absurd behavior 
while reflecting on the struggles of the young generation of Russians who had 
been affected by neoliberal reforms. Visually, Masyanya is an example of naïve, 
or primitive, art, that is, art that (looks as if it) was produced by non- professional 
artists. Elsewhere (Strukov 2004), I called Masyanya “a visual anecdote,” 
meaning that the series functions as a digital form of joke-telling which has 
traditionally characterized Russian culture. Indeed, Masyanya has the qualities 
of humorous GIFs and memes, making it an alternative to commercial, main-
stream culture. It is also a good example of how niche digital art may become 
popular. On the one hand, Masyanya resisted the dominance of Hollywood12 
with its specific visual language and symbolic economy. On the other, it con-
structed its own alternative form of globalization based on principles of free 
labor, pirating and sharing. These practices have become commodified and 
commercialized since the emergence of Western social media giants such as 
Facebook and Instagram. Masyanya spoke of community, intimacy and honest 
conversation before they became catch phrases in the new global digital 
economy.
AES+F are also interested in the effects of digital globalization on local com-
munities. Their award-winning multi-channel digital video installation 
Allegoria Sacra (2011–2013) shows some passengers stranded in an interna-
tional airport. The location alludes to Arthur Hailey’s eponymous novel which 
has been hugely popular in Russia. It represents a global community stuck in 
some kind of temporal warp. The title of the video is of course a reference to 
Giovanni Bellini’s painting (1490–1500) which represents the purgatory. Their 
artwork speaks of limbo and of the intemporality of the internet where every-
thing is available forever and yet changes and disappears all the time. AES+F 
present a series of biblical figures, mythological creatures, cyborgs, clones and 
so on who are transposed into the eternal realm of Bellini’s painting. Like 
Tobreluts, AES+F adopt classical forms for the digital environment when, for 
example, the Saracen-Muslim is transformed into a group of refugees and St. 
Sebastian turns into a young, shirtless traveler, hitchhiking his way through 
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tropical countries. Yet, AES+F’s artwork is more of an allegory of the contem-
porary life than a postmodern reinterpretation of Bellini’s painting.
Allegoria Sacra weaves complex global issues such as the refugee crisis, 
global warming, identity politics, and gender and sexuality into visually rich 
metaphors. The group conceives of the digital as the element that holds the 
global society together. However, it is not clear whether this hold is a genuine 
bond or, in fact, a form of captivity. Like Lialina, AES+F are concerned with 
the issues of identity, privacy, freedom and choice. Allegoria Sacra reflects on 
human condition from a Russian yet global perspective. This global vision is 
accounted for by the artwork outreach—it has been shown at art venues all 
over the world—and it is encoded aesthetically through the use of a multi- 
screen projection which creates an extraordinary spectacle of performance and 
immediacy such as the slow digitally enhanced movement of characters and 
objects against the pulsating background. The massive scale of the project—the 
digital maxi—is also a reflection on the spectacularity of the digital, its omni-
presence and panopticism. If Kuvaev ignited Russian digital economy by sup-
plying a product that speaks of intimacy, community and commonality, AES+F 
showcase the might of this digital economy as they orchestrate a global show 
of connectivity and (mis)communication. All the artists address ethical and 
aesthetic questions posed by Lialina a decade ago, which suggests that these 
questions remain unanswered. This leads me to enquire about the legacy of 
digital art experiments in the RF.
14.5  the dIgItal archIVe: cyland and cyfest (the 
2000s and the 2010s)
After early experiments since the late 1980s, in the 2010s digital art has become 
a mainstay of Russian contemporary art scene. For example, there are art gal-
leries that specialize in showing digital art, such as the Multimedia Art Museum 
headed by the diva of the Russian art scene Olga Sviblova and the Solyanka Art 
Gallery, which hires young curators to stage shows. Both are located in the 
center of Moscow and both are sponsored by the government. However, if the 
Multimedia Art Museum puts on big exhibitions showing blockbusters such as 
AES+F’s Allegoria Sacra, for which the Museum gets sponsorship from Russian 
oil and gas monopolies, the Solyanka Art Gallery is a small space, hidden away 
from the tourist crowds and specializing in edgy, intellectually challenging 
exhibitions of international artists and artists from Russian regions. In addition 
to art spaces, there are numerous mergers—art and fashion as well as art and 
technology spaces—which include digital art in their programs. For example, 
Art Play Design Centre in Moscow stages immersive digital shows that enable 
the visitors to interact with artworks and digital environments.13 This type of 
exhibition does not engage with innovative technologies and complex issues; 
however, they do attract wider audiences to museum spaces, thus promoting 
digital art generally. Another example would be the use of digital art in popular 
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culture, such as 3D projections and immersive videos during live concerts of 
the Ukrainian-born Russian singer Svetlana Loboda.
The burning issue facing Russian cultural managers is not the promotion of 
digital art but its preservation. Indeed, how does one conserve pieces produced 
using obsolete technologies like Lialina’s My Boyfriend Came Back from the 
War? And how does one ensure that the Russian public, especially in Russian 
regions, remains aware of advances in digital art nationally and internationally? 
While these issues are being acknowledged in the professional community 
(Biryukova 2018), more work is needed in this direction. At present, no 
Russian national (federal) museum of digital art exists, and principal museums 
do not list digital art as their priority area in terms of acquisition. Three major 
institutions—the Hermitage, the Tretyakov Gallery and the Russian Museum—
have departments specializing in contemporary art but acquisition of digital art 
is still very rare. This reveals a gap between artistic practices and the cultural 
economy whereby there is a perceived lack of national strategy in terms of pro-
motion and preservation of digital art. For example, digital art does not feature 
in the nationally funded government-led program of digitalization of Russian 
economy introduced by President Dmitry Medvedev, and discussions in the 
Russian government and parliament tend to focus on digital literacy, which is, 
in fact, a re-hash of Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (“greater automation 
and greater efficiency”), and on digital security, which is in actual terms a string 
of legislation limiting freedoms of communication on the internet.
As a result, the arena of preservation of digital art has been occupied by 
private initiatives. One of the most influential ones is Cyland Media Lab. 
Founded in 2007, Cyland is a non-profit organization dedicated to digital art 
and broadly the intersection of art and technology through exhibitions, a col-
lection of art, and educational programming. Overall, Cyland aims to connect 
emerging and established artists, educate how to use creative technology and 
foster innovation in new technologies (http://cyland.org/lab/about/). 
Co-founded by Marina Koldobskaia and Anna Frants, Cyland is sponsored by 
Frants, who, in addition to being a philanthropist, is an internationally 
renowned multi-media artist specializing in interactive art installations. Cyland 
collaborates with museums such as the Hermitage and the Chelsea Art Museum 
(New York, USA), but it has an ambition to build a museum of its own. For a 
decade Cyland has been building an online collection of artworks. Divided into 
a video archive and a sound archive, Cyland’s online collection is a comprehen-
sive survey of Russian and international art (over 100 individual artists and 
groups from the RF). Video and sound are understood as a means to catego-
rize works, whereas in actual terms, the collection, managed by Viktoria 
Ilushkina, features video art, experimental films, computer graphics, 3D anima-
tion and so on. The collection reveals the technological, platform and genre 
diversity of what is understood as digital art.
In addition to an online collection, Cyland is committed to promoting digi-
tal art nationally and internationally through Cyfest. Running since 2008, 
Cyfest is an annual festival celebrating digital and new media art. The main part 
14 DIGITAL ART: A SOURCEBOOK OF IDEAS FOR CONCEPTUALIZING NEW… 
252
of the festival takes place at different venues in St. Petersburg, and some parts 
of the festival at exhibitions in partner institutions in London, New  York, 
Venice and other places. As with similar festivals in other countries, Cyland 
festivals are themed; for example, in 2019 the theme was “ID,” and in the 
previous year it was “Digital Cloudness.” These themes refer to pressing social, 
political and aesthetic concerns in the contemporary world. Unlike Ars 
Electronica in Linz, Austria, Cyfest is a much more focused enterprise with a 
commitment to experimentation and community building, and not city brand-
ing and industry collaborations. Cyfest remains the principal platform for 
showcasing experimental digital art in the RF. The legacy of Cyland and similar 
initiatives is to be assessed in future research.
On the one hand, Russian digital art is frequently presented at international 
art festivals such as Cyfest. On the other, a national museum or archive of 
computer-based and digital art is to be formed. This is highly unusual for a 
country obsessed with museums and museufication. In fact, digital artworks 
are still to be included in permanent collections of existing museums such as 
the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg and the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow. 
Similarly, a history and a theory of Russian digital art and new media art are to 
be written. In this context of research possibilities and probabilities, an essen-
tial history of Russian art allows for an in-depth understanding of the develop-
ment of internet technologies in the RF (for more on types of digital archives, 
see Chaps. 20 and 21).
Nowadays the internet is a mundane thing and users are more likely to speak 
of specific platforms such as VKontakte or Twitter. In the mid-1990s the inter-
net was a novel phenomenon which relied on the user’s advanced technical 
knowledge and produced an important effect of instantaneous connectivity in 
a world where people still used landline telephone connections, faxes and tele-
grams to communicate with each other. Indeed, instantaneity of communica-
tion and production of online social networks were two focal points of net.
artists. They employed a variety of techniques some of which would be consid-
ered dubious by present-day users, such as fake websites, spam mails and unso-
licited distribution of information. Their purpose was to explore networked 
modes of communication and interplays of exchanges. They understood col-
laborative and cooperative work differently whereby they frequently delegated 
the production of the artwork to the user, not just to other members of the 
artistic community. Ultimately, they aimed at working across national borders, 
building a digital utopia for the next generation of artists. For many contem-
porary Russian artists, the digital remains an arena of utopian possibilities to be 
explored.
notes
1. For an in-depth discussion of the film, see Strukov (2009).
2. On new media as a form of language, see Manovich (2001).
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3. Some of these interviews were published in Studies in Russian, Eurasian and 
Central European New Media; see, for example, Strukov (2011).
4. In Russian, “perestroika obraza.”
5. [Vse montiruetsâ iz raznyh kusoč̌kov. Potom s komp’ûtera peregonâetsâ na lazernyj 
disk. Pec ̌ataetsâ negativ, potom s nego—fotografiâ…. Komp’ûtery—oni že glupye 
mašiny. Metalličeskaâ korobka, kotoraâ nicc ̌ego ne možet sdelat’’, esli ty ej ne 
skažeš’, čto nužno sdelat’].
6. [“Svâtoj Sebast’ân—èto rabota, v kotoroj sloi kul’tury naslaivaûtsâ. Èto mnogoslo-
jnyj, mnogoznac ̌nyj obraz, gde soedinâûtsâ personaži sovremennogo iskusstva—
sovremennogo tomu vremeni—i klassičeskie personaži].
7. [Ran’še, kogda pisali kartiny, poâvlâlas’ novaâ kist’, bolee udobnaâ, nikto že ot nee 
ne otkazyvalsâ].
8. [Komp’ûter byl dlâ menâ istoc ̌nikom raznyh neožidannyh ves ̂ej, kogda ty c ̌to-to 
delaeš’, i poluc ̌aetsâ nezaplanirovannyj rezul’tat. Kakoj-to mistic ̌eskij daže 
process].
9. [Â pomnû frazu Sandomirskoj, kogda poâvilsâ komp’ûter, čto èto očen’ važno, čto 
my osvoili komp’ûter, potomu čto my pokazali zapadnomu miru, c ̌to my čast’ ètogo 
mira. To est’ èto byl âzyk, na kotorom govorili vse sovremennye lûdi, a Rossiâ 
esê net].
10. Kuvaev lost and in the end decided to emigrate to Israel.
11. In retrospect, it is possible to interpret Masyanya’s adventures as a parody on 
Putin, who is also from St. Petersburg.
12. See Norris (2012) and Strukov (2016) on the dominance of Hollywood aes-
thetics on Russian culture in the 2000s.
13. See, for example, their recent Samskara project (https://www.samskara.pro/ 
[10.10.2019]).
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CHAPTER 15
From Samizdat to New Sincerity. Digital 
Literature on the Russian-Language Internet
Henrike Schmidt
15.1  IntroductIon. the hybrId nature 
of dIgItal lIterature
No clear-cut definition exists to describe digital literature, which is character-
ized by its hybrid nature and which borders on the fields of information tech-
nology, media art, media activism and computer games. Katherine Hayles 
speaks about “new horizons for the literary,” emphasizing that digital literature 
transgresses a restricted understanding of literature, in the sense of discrete 
texts and established literary devices (Hayles 2008, 4). Scott Rettberg alterna-
tively uses the term “electronic literature” (2016, 2019; see also Tabbi 2018; 
O’Sullivan 2019), underlining also its inherent hybridity and the difficulty, if 
not impossibility, of working with fixed genre definitions. Electronic literature 
in his view stands at the crossroads of literary practice and critique and is char-
acterized “by the approach rather than content” (2016, 166). In the following, 
digital literature is understood accordingly as an umbrella term for “literary 
practices in digital and networked environments.” Exemplary manifestations of 
digital literature are animated poetry, text generators producing poems relying 
on algorithms and hyperfiction, that is, stories told in a digressive, interactive 
way by using hyperlinks: icons, graphics or text that link to another document 
or website. For the later phase of increasingly mobile devices, since approxi-
mately the early 2010s, one might think of “locative literature” (ibid., 170), in 
which smartphone apps guide readers through story worlds at real locations, 
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thus enabling a temporal-physical immersion into the narration. Whether digi-
tized texts, that is, works previously published in print and later converted into 
digital format, can be classified as digital literature is a topic of debate 
(Bouchardon 2017, 3). What unites all appearances of literature or “the liter-
ary” in the digital sphere is the fact that they are computer-processed and thus 
rely on code. The literary texts, which the readers perceive on the surface of the 
computer screen, are secondary, products of the underlying primary text of the 
computer code. They tend to either hide their computer-generated nature, 
which we can call media in-transparency, or display it openly, exposing the 
texts’ mediated nature.
Literary practices on the Russian-language Internet (Runet), ranging from 
online libraries to Facebook life-writing, have become as of 2019 an established 
theme in Slavic Literary Studies, which analyzes how such phenomena relate to 
historical developments in Russian literature. Autobiographical blogging may, 
for example, be researched in connection to Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Dnevnik 
pisatelȃ (A Writer’s Diary, 1873–1881). These practices constitute an integral 
part of the broader sphere of Digital Russia Studies, which investigates the 
interaction between the different segments of culture, politics and economy, 
for example, the use of literary memes for political campaigning. The newly 
evolving discipline of Global Russian Studies (Platt 2019) tackles, in turn, 
questions of transnationally dispersed communities beyond traditional under-
standings of exile or diaspora, which are important for analyzing Russian- 
language writing-scapes and reading-scapes. Concurrently, digital literature on 
the Runet is being integrated into the wider context of Global Digital Studies, 
including literary aspects (Rettberg 2019; O’Sullivan 2019; Tabbi 2018). For 
some time now, this field has been opening itself up to non-English/non-Latin 
alphabet based case studies in order to overcome its Western-centricism (Russell 
and Echchaibi 2009).
Runet literary studies do not differ theoretically or methodologically from 
global approaches. But they do offer interesting insights into the specific cor-
relations between literary and socio-political evolution in a given national/
cultural context. This is particularly significant for the first phase of Runet 
development in the early 1990s, when, after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, political transformation and media “revolution” coincided. But it is 
also relevant to the politicized media environment that has established itself 
after almost two decades of Vladimir Putin’s executive rule as President and 
Prime Minister. This environment is characterized by a return to vertical power 
structures, neo-imperialist tendencies and new identity politics (for more on 
history of Runet, see Chap. 16).
The early manifestations of both Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) have 
been a global inspiration in terms of their potentially democratizing impact, 
with democratization understood here as access to publication technology, and 
not primarily in a values sense (Jenkins 2006, 241). Hypertext appeared as the 
embodiment of a new epistemological system or the realization of long dreamt 
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of literary utopias: the ultimate library—non-linear story telling. In global the-
ory on CMC, researchers coined concepts including the “wreader” (George 
Landow 2006) and “the prosumer” (Jenkins 2006). “Wreaders” co-create 
meaning in collaborative literary projects; “prosumers” in today’s participatory 
cultures consume and produce at the same time.
Due to the high technical and financial barriers to Internet access in the 
early phase of Internet development (i.e., from the late 1980s to the mid- 1990s), 
the first users were mostly scientists, programmers at research institutions or 
academics at universities. As the Internet became more widespread and com-
moditized, the technically advanced pioneers and “fathers of the Runet” were 
replaced by a mass of unsophisticated enthusiasts. With each new succeeding 
generation, the ways in which digital technologies are used are changing, 
including of course in the field of culture and literature. Editing, copying, shar-
ing and commenting are gradually replacing the creation of “genuine” con-
tent. The associated discourses range from the concept of an emancipating 
collective vernacular creativity, as a continuation of traditional folklore in mod-
ern garb, to critical interpretations in the sense of an emerging “prosumer capi-
talism” (Beck-Pristed 2020, 418). This process is taking place in Russia in 
analogy to global dynamics. As regards the Runet, such global phenomena and 
terminology are sometimes embedded into national cultural contexts. A char-
acteristic example of this is the study of amateur creativity, a global phenome-
non on the Internet, stimulated by the web’s easy-to-use publication 
technologies (Vadde 2017). In Runet contexts, however, amateur culture 
tends to be “nationalized,” that is, explained with an emphasis on historical or 
cultural traditions. Both protagonists and researchers contextualize amateur 
writing with reference to the historical phenomenon of Soviet samizdat litera-
ture (Gorny 2006, 197; Kuznecov 2004). Samizdat literally means “self-pub-
lishing” (from the Russian “sam” = “self” and izdavat” = “to publish”) and 
relates to a highly elaborated, clandestine publication system of works that 
were subject to political censorship.
The present chapter continues with a further clarification of terminology. It 
then offers a survey of the main “genres” of digital literature, ranging from 
hypertext to blogging. The conclusion outlines main research trends and future 
desiderata.
15.2  lIterary PractIces/lIterary facts on the runet: 
defInItIons and aPProaches
Roughly two decades have passed since Computer-Mediated Communication 
was broadly implemented worldwide. In this period, a complex terminology 
has been elaborated—and continually deconstructed—that distinguishes (1) 
digitized from (2) digital and from (3) Internet (networked; setevaâ) literature 
(Bouchardon 2017, 3; Gendolla et al. 2010). According to this approach, digi-
tized literature denotes previously published print texts, digitized to achieve 
15 FROM SAMIZDAT TO NEW SINCERITY. DIGITAL LITERATURE… 
258
broader or different dissemination. A reproduction of a historic poetry collec-
tion in one of the numerous online libraries would be a typical example. 
Digitized literature is differentiated from born digital materials, texts originally 
written on a computer and which do not have a paper substrate (Hayles 2008, 
3). Digital literature, in turn, designates works that rely aesthetically on dis-
tinct features of ICT, such as the inclusion of hyperlinks, multimedia or anima-
tion. The hyperfiction poem V metro (In the Subway) by Sergey Vlasov and 
Georgy Zherdev (together with Aleksey Dobkin 2001), offering multiple pos-
sibilities to navigate through a set of stories, may serve here as illustration. 
Internet or networked literature is closely related to digital literature. It also 
relies naturally on code and is embedded into hyperlinked CMC environments, 
but its conceptual core is concerned with communication practices (sharing, 
commenting, liking) and is characterized by the Internet’s volatile and often 
very large communities. An example would be the virtual personae that were 
popular on the Runet in the late 1990s to early 2000s. A virtual persona is “a 
fictitious personality, established by a person or group of people which creates 
semiotic artifacts” (Gorny 2006, 194). Virtual personae, or, respectively, their 
“authors,” use communication forums and websites as a playground for iden-
tity games including gender swapping (ibid., 208).
As Scott Rettberg underlines, in electronic or digital literature the individual 
literary work often is less important than the “exploratory engagement” (2016, 
166–167) with contemporary computer technology. Consequently, “toolmak-
ing and platform development” should be considered to be an integral part of 
it. The latter can be specially generated creative environments. But any exist-
ing, even commercial, platforms can also be subjected to poetic uses. On 
Twitter, for example, literary quotations from an author or on a specific topic 
can be posted, individually selected or automatically processed relying on algo-
rithmic procedures. Such (semi-)automated forms of poetic meaning produc-
tion sometimes play with the principle of chance, in a continuation of aleatory 
avant-garde practices. There exist numerous Twitter accounts of historical and 
contemporary Russian writers or celebrities—some real, some fictional. Since 
2012, to name but one, the Russian exiled poet and Nobel Prize winner Joseph 
Brodsky (†1996) has a Twitter account (@brodsky_joseph), which is followed 
by around 350,000 users. The “authors” standing behind such virtual personae 
often remain (semi-)anonymous, masked by their pseudonyms. This demon-
strates how specific “genres” or usage patterns can migrate from one technical 
environment like forums or blogs to another (Twitter).
At the same time, since ICT increasingly infiltrates everyday life and rou-
tines, including writing and reading, clear-cut distinctions between on and 
offline become obsolete. Consequently, the concept of a post-digital or post- 
Internet literature has evolved. Post-Internet literature refers to texts that have 
been produced online but re/turn to paper (Hayles 2008, 159). A typical 
example would be a blog that is subsequently printed in book form as a kind of 
sequel, as was the case with the popular online diary written by scriptwriter and 
novelist Yevgeni Grishkovetz (Izbrannye zapisi, Selected posts, 2014).
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The growing amalgamation of the on and offline spheres poses challenges to 
fixed definitions. More flexible approaches (re)gain significance, for example, 
the concept of “remediation.” Bolter and Grusin ([1999] 2000) introduced 
the term in order to describe the multiple processes of media transformation to 
which any content is subjected. Often labeled “revolutions,” these do not, at 
least in most cases, lead to the extinction of the previous forms but rather to 
convergence. Concerning the digital sphere, remediations run in opposite 
directions and on two tracks: from analogue to digital—from print books to 
digitized manuscripts—and from digital to analogue—from Twitter posts to 
poetry collections.
Another approach, which relies not on definition but rather on function, 
revitalizes Russian Formalist theory, particularly in its concepts of “literaturn-
ost’” (literariness) and the “literaturnyj fakt” (literary fact) as developed by 
Viktor Shklovsky and others in the early twentieth century (“Russian 
Formalism,” in Buchanan 2018). “Literariness” is understood as an aesthetic 
quality (function), which exists not only in literary texts proper but character-
izes (online) communication in a broader sense. “Literary facts” are, by con-
trast, features of non-literary communication (in the present case of digital 
culture, for example, encodings, media formats or colloquial styles), which in 
turn affect literary practices.
The chapter follows the typology sketched above, using the concepts of 
digitized, digital, networked and post-digital literature as a rough grid. In so 
doing, it avoids normative judgments such as the one arguing that digitized 
literature, as a “simple” remediation, is less culturally significant than experi-
ments with hypertext or critical explorations of code.
15.3  the russIan-language Internet (runet): 
horIzontal Versus VertIcal communIcatIon Patterns
The term “Runet” as an object of scientific inquiry is not less elusive than 
“digital literature.” On the global Internet, reading and writing audiences can-
not be clearly differentiated according to territorial, national, ethnic or lan-
guage criteria, despite recent trends toward a re-emerging national sovereignty 
in the digital sphere (for more, see Chap. 2). This is especially true for Russian 
contexts, with the existence of a large diaspora and the new “global Russians,” 
constantly moving between their native country and the second homes they 
have chosen across the world. Grigory Chkhartishvili, also known as Boris 
Akunin, an author of sophisticated historical detective fiction, is a good exam-
ple for a global Russian writer: he lives in Europe, in London and Northern 
France, and continues to influence Russian prose as well as the socio-political 
discourse via his Facebook account. In this chapter, the term Runet designates 
the Russian-language Internet accordingly. Where applicable, it will be distin-
guished from the Internet in the Russian Federation, for example, with regard 
to the discussion of legislation and regulation.
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In early conceptualizations, the structural horizontality of the Internet was 
hailed as a technological embodiment of postmodernist concepts, including 
de-hierarchization and non-linearity (ignoring the fact that the technology was 
actually developed as part of United States [US] military programs). In the 
contexts of the Runet, this had two major implications. Firstly, on a philosophi-
cal level, media change and the regime change of perestroika seemed to coin-
cide with the metaphor of the horizontal, denoting the non-hierarchical, 
whether this be realized in political democratization or in digressive narration. 
Secondly, on a pragmatic level, the abolition of censorship put an end to the 
hunger for books of the late 1980s, an appetite that was immediately satisfied 
on the Internet—at least for those who could access it.
The Runet of the early and mid-1990s was a marginal phenomenon, with 
less than one percent of the Russian population online. The early adopters were 
either members of the technological elite working at scientific institutions or 
living abroad, mostly in the US, Israel or Germany. The foremost implication 
of this was that early literary communication on the Runet took place using the 
Latin alphabet, as Cyrillic encodings did not yet exist. This new communica-
tion environment stimulated linguistic creativity, including the systematic use 
of obscenities, traditionally named mat. A later offspring of this linguistic 
inventiveness is the so-called padonki slang (padonki translates as “scumbags”), 
which relies on the principle of distorted phonetic transcription. Questions of 
coding thus turned into literary facts. The padonki movement produced, 
besides an immense corpus of texts that partly can be considered a form of 
Internet folklore, also its own platform, which was very popular in the 2000s 
(udaff.com; see Goriunova 2012).
The year 1998 put an end to the Runet’s marginal status. Paradoxically, this 
was a consequence of the severe financial crisis, which was accompanied by gal-
loping inflation. The new medium demonstrated that broader user groups 
could efficiently exploit it, by monitoring ruble exchange rates in real time. 
Consequently, money and politics entered the scene, and with them “profes-
sional” literature. The opening of the Reading Room (Žurnal’nyj zal) in the 
decisive year of 1998 symbolized and embodied the arrival of established can-
ons and authorities in the digital sphere. The Reading Room represented the 
tolstye žurnaly (thick journals) and published excerpts or whole issues of 
renowned journals such as Novyj mir (New World) free of charge. The thick 
journals have been a peculiarity of Russian reading culture since the late eigh-
teenth century. They publish both literary works and literary criticism and 
exemplify what is alleged to be Russian literature’s exceptional significance, a 
literature that fulfills not only aesthetic but also ethical and political functions 
in a public sphere curbed by censorship. As such, they contribute to the essen-
tialist and literature-centric view of Russia as a “reading country.” In the per-
estroika era, their popularity rocketed as they took part in political and social 
transformation. By the 1990s, however, these journals were ailing, due to an 
overall tendency of de-canonization and because of the economic problems in 
disseminating their content to more peripheral regions. Paradoxically, the 
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Runet provided a remedy against diminishing circulation and influence while 
simultaneously representing a diametrically opposed attitude of non- hierarchical 
literary communication.
With the overall growth of the Internet—jumping from 2 percent of the 
population in the late 1990s to 40–50 percent in the 2010s, and finally catch-
ing up in comparison to average global Internet penetration, reaching 76 per-
cent in 2019—state institutions also arrived on the Runet. A legal framework 
was elaborated for the previously largely unregulated sphere of the Internet 
within the Russian Federation. Of major significance for literary issues are 
copyright regulations, implemented in the course of Russia’s accession to the 
World Trading Organization (WTO) in 2012. But legislative measures also 
include the registration of popular literary blogs under the category of 
mass media and the blocking of individual works or whole websites for alleg-
edly propagating pornography and pedophilia or “extremism” (for more, see 
Chap. 5). The ban of the popular instant messenger Telegram in 2018, for 
example, met with resistance on the part of young users, in particular, and 
attracted a lot of attention abroad. Experts differentiate between first, second 
and third generations of Internet control, with the latter embracing repressive 
methods and so-called positive content, that is, cultural narratives, used to dis-
seminate pro-regime information and values (Deibert et  al. 2010, 7). It is 
writers like the prose author and TV journalist Sergey Minaev who contribute 
to such content creation in the first place. In his successful novel Media Sapiens. 
Povest’ o tret’em sroke (Media Sapiens. The Story of the Third Term, 2007), 
Minaev creates an influential picture of oppositional media as manipulated and 
corrupt. This needs to be contrasted with protest movements against electoral 
fraud and against vertical power structures since the 2010s. These movements 
rely massively on online mobilization, and, by so doing, they challenge official 
Internet policies (for more on digital activism, see Chap. 8). Literary practices 
on the Runet thus take place in a highly politicized environment. The trope of 
horizontality, ascribed to the new medium of communication in the post-
perestroika period, was superseded by the metaphor of the “vertikal’ vlasti” 
(power vertical, Ryazanova-Clarke 2009) as a description of the political sys-
tem of the Putin era.
15.4  lIterary PractIces on the runet:  
lIbrarIes and lIfe-WrItIng
15.4.1  Digitized Literature: Forming the Canon from Below
Online libraries figured among the first literary projects of the Runet. Born out 
of the hunger for books in the post-perestroika era, they made previously cen-
sored texts available. These first digital libraries were personal text collections, 
intended to be shared with like-minded readers. Their initiators belonged to 
the technical intelligentsia. Typical examples are EEL (Publičnaâ èlektronnaâ 
15 FROM SAMIZDAT TO NEW SINCERITY. DIGITAL LITERATURE… 
262
biblioteka Evgeniâ Peskina, Eugene’s Electronic Library, 1992–1998) and the 
Moshkov library lib.ru (1994), named after its initiator, the programmer 
Maksim Moshkov. The latter refused the title of librarian, describing himself 
instead as a mere “doorman” (Mjør 2014, 217). Readers digitized literary 
works they wanted to see on the virtual shelves and submitted them for elec-
tronic publication. The library reflected an eclectic mix of individual tastes and 
previously marginalized genres, ranging from religious and esoteric texts to 
science and cyberfiction writing.
With the arrivals of the “professionals” onto the field of play, academically 
trained literary critics and philologists, new library projects emerged. The RVB 
(Russkaâ virtual’naâ biblioteka, Russian Virtual Library, 1999) offered literary 
works in accordance with academic standards while modifying the canon by 
including samizdat poetry. The FÈB (Fundamental’naâ èlektronnaâ biblioteka 
‘Russkaâ literatura i fol’klor’, Fundamental Digital Library of Russian Literature 
and Folklore) was the first online library partly financed by state money and 
affiliated to pre-digital academic institutions, in this case the Gorky Institute of 
World Literature. The FÈB reproduced the literary canon of pre-revolutionary 
Russia in authoritative digital editions, partly relying on Soviet scholarship and 
thus implicitly its norms (Mjør 2014, 223).
All libraries provided popular communication forums and metamorphosed 
from text repositories into social networks in their own rights. For the Runet 
as a global reading-scape, embracing remote Russian regions and the global 
diaspora, the online libraries represented a much-needed source of informa-
tion. At the same time, through their functioning as social networks, they 
turned into “source[s] of identification” (Mjør 2014, 219). In addition to the 
troika of the renowned Runet libraries, there exists a multiplicity of smaller, less 
conceptual, but not less popular, online libraries, where books—especially con-
temporary prose—can be downloaded for free, in part still illegally. Peter 
Shillingsburg has called such amateur libraries the “dank cellar” of the Internet, 
worth consideration as an expression of canon formation from below 
(Shillingsburg 2006, 138).
An abrupt change in the history of these book repositories occurred in 
2004, when the Moshkov library was sued for copyright violations. As a reac-
tion to the trial, the “readers’ librarian” changed his publication policies. New 
entries in the library were restricted to texts available in the public domain. In 
addition, Moshkov initiated a platform associated to the library where authors 
can publish their texts themselves. Named Samizdat, the nomenclature refers 
to discourses about the Runet as an extension of unofficial Soviet publication 
practices, as detailed above.
A decade later, in 2014, the first large-scale state-financed digital library 
project was initiated: NÈB (Nacional’naâ èlektronnaâ biblioteka, National 
Electronic Library). The NÈB unites the digital collections of a multiplicity of 
Russian libraries. It is oriented toward the professional reader. Contemporary 
fiction protected by copyright is not publicly available but can be accessed from 
the electronically equipped reading rooms of participating institutions.
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Thus, 2004 was a watershed year, marked by the Moshkov trial and the 
gradual implementation of regulations covering authorial rights. Alongside 
this, a commercial sector for literary content evolved. This process was stimu-
lated technologically, by the availability of mobile devices—including smart-
phones, tablets and e-book readers—and specific e-book formats—epub, 
fb2—which detached reading from stationary computers. Only one year later, 
the Litres.ru e-book store, originally a network of smaller online libraries, 
started its activities on a pay-per-download basis. In the years following it 
established itself as market leader, actively opposing “pirated” resources. Other 
providers of legal literary content followed, offering different distribution sys-
tems. In 2007, Kroogi (Circles), a sharing platform for music, art and litera-
ture, went online, based on a pay-what-you-want strategy. Kroogi also offers 
crowdfunding models. A little later, in 2010, Bookmate was founded as a 
Freemium service. Users pay a monthly fee to access copyrighted content, 
which consisted of roughly 800,000 literary texts and audio books as of 2018. 
In order to structure the abounding wealth of content and to work with their 
audiences, all of the named e-book services provide multiple communication 
forums and incentive systems. They arrange editors’ and readers’ recommenda-
tions, rankings and awards, incorporating functions that were previously dis-
tributed among different institutions (online libraries, magazines, awards).
As a result, a functioning e-book market has emerged, accounting in 2018 
for five to seven percent of the book market as a whole (Federal’noe agentstvo 
2018, 57): compare with thirty percent in the US. Pay-per-download, sub-
scription and sharing models co-exist. Nevertheless, as of 2018, about half of 
all e-books were being downloaded illegally using torrents and social networks 
or being read free of charge from online libraries (Anuryev n.d., 6). Among 
electronic bestsellers, genre fiction dominates: romantic fiction, detective nov-
els and sci-fi. A significant tendency is the growing popularity of audio books. 
A more crucial trend still is the dynamically evolving segment of self- publishing, 
similar to the development in the US, where, as of the late 2010s, one-third of 
all e-books are indie productions. The company Rideró is the market leader in 
the field of self-publishing in Russia. But all of the big players in the field of 
legal e-book content offer self-publishing services. LitRes characteristically 
named it Samizdat, referring—as Moshkov had done before it—to the Soviet 
reading and publishing tradition discussed above but stripping the term of any 
political significance.
A noteworthy number of Russian authors agree to flexible publication mod-
els, which combine free access for on-screen reading with payment models for 
downloads, for example, Internet-savvy writers like Viktor Pelevin or Boris 
Akunin. Genres that have no market value are broadly accessible on the Runet. 
The main trends in contemporary poetry are represented free of charge on 
websites and journals such as Vavilon, Text Only, and Novaâ kamera 
hraneniâ (New Storage Room).
15 FROM SAMIZDAT TO NEW SINCERITY. DIGITAL LITERATURE… 
264
15.4.2  Hypertext Digressions and Media Criticism
In their nascent phases, the Internet in general—and hypertext in particular—
stirred multiple utopian visions. For literature proper, these were dreams of the 
ideal library or the emancipation of narration from the yoke of linearity, inspired 
by the short stories Library of Babel (1941) and The Garden of Forking Paths 
(1941), by Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges. The Runet’s literary pioneers 
also soon explored hypertext as a possibility for new writing modes, for exam-
ple, in the collective poetry project Sad rashodâsîhsâ hokku (The Garden of 
Forking Haiku, 1997; Roman Leibov/Dmitry Manin), paying homage to 
Borges as the global icon of pre-hypertext digressive narration. They were well 
acquainted, too, with the hypertext experiments in what was, at the time, the 
dominant player in digital literature: texts by American authors, including 
Michael Joyce’s afternoon, a story (1987).
While the utopia of the Internet as a library was realized spontaneously, 
fueled by the late Soviet hunger for books, hyperfiction remained restricted to 
a small number of experiments. These Russian explorations of hyperfiction 
often critically reflected on rampant hypertext euphoria. Thus, media artist 
Alexei Shulgin in his manifesto Art, Power and Communication (1996) dis-
mantled hyperlinking as a simulation of interactivity, while behind the screens 
the author held even more subtle powers than previously for manipulating 
readers (for more, see Chap. 14). Another such epistemological critique of 
hypertext is articulated in the cyberfiction of postmodernist writer Pelevin, the 
chronicler of digital culture in Russia, for example, in his short stories Princ 
Gosplana (Prince of Central Planning, 1992) or Akiko (2003). Skepticism 
about hypertext is partly motivated by (auto)biographical experiences of the 
advanced manipulative techniques of Soviet totalitarianism.
Iconic works of hyperfiction are Roman Leibov co-authorship of Roman, 
which would translate into English as Novel, though no English translation 
has been published to date (1995–1996; programmer Dmitrij Manin), and 
Olia Lialina’s My Boyfriend Came Back from the War (1996; for more, see 
Chap. 14). Leibov Roman is a conceptual experiment with the im/possibilities 
of turning readers into co/writers. The title has a trifold meaning, denoting 
the genre (novel), the style (romance) and the first name of its author, includ-
ing an allusion to the Roman alphabet, in which the text was written, due to 
the lack of Cyrillic web encodings at the time. Its core consists of a short text 
fragment, a juvenile love story with an open end. Readers were invited to send 
in alternative versions. A dozen author-readers produced around two hundred 
pages of text. After a year of organic growth, the text became unreadable and 
Leibov stopped the experiment, which from the beginning was intended as a 
philological critique of hypertext theory.
An immersive version of a multimedia, animated hypertext is presented by 
the creative collective consisting of Sergey Vlasov (text), Georgy Zherdev (con-
cept/animation) and Aleksey Dobkin (photography). V metro (In the Subway) 
organizes its fragmentary text as a Moscow metro map, with readers 
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“entering” and “leaving” it with the help of hyperlinks. Media theoretician 
Roberto Simanowski describes such creative cooperation among authors, art-
ists and programmers as a new “artes mechanicae” (Simanowski 2002, 148).
Runet hyperfiction is of interest today for reasons of literary history rather 
than formal innovation. The tireless innovator Akunin continues to experiment 
with digressive narration, for example, in his novel Kvest (Quest, 2009), 
designed as a game and supplemented by its own interactive website. Animation 
and code work in the sense of aesthetic explorations of computer code are less 
frequent still. An example of critical work with code is Aleksroma’s digitized 
version of the novel Idiot (The Idiot, 1868), by Fyodor Dostoevsky, rearranged 
as a news ticker (2001). “Reading” the text would take 24 hours and is inten-
tionally inconvenient. Aleksroma’s animated version of The Idiot underlines 
how disrespectful remediation can flash out the specific gains and losses that a 
text can be effected by, in its transfer from analogue to digital format. It thus 
functions as a multimedia critique of euphoria about technology.
15.4.3  Bottom-Up Creativity: Amateur Literature,  
Fan Fiction, kreatiff
While hypertext and the concept of the “wreader” were soon criticized as sim-
ulating rather than stimulating interactivity (Simanowski 2002, 66–68), ama-
teur literature and fan fiction blossomed worldwide. “Amateur” is not a clearly 
definable term in literary theory. Instead, it should be viewed as one part of the 
cultural battles between “professionals” and “dilettantes” (Vadde 2017). The 
potentially democratizing effects of easy to use digital publication technologies 
provoke a redistribution of symbolical capital between established institutions, 
which act as gatekeepers, and newcomers. Practices and discourses on the 
Runet do not differ much from similar dynamics on a global scale, although 
two areas of divergence are worthy of discussion. Firstly, the terrain of Russian 
literature has traditionally been characterized by a strong orientation around 
canon and authority, a result of the long periods of strong state interference 
into culture. On the one hand, this intensifies the quarrels between “amateurs” 
and “professionals.” On the other, amateur culture is not by default critical vis- 
à- vis the canon but rather reproduces it by (re)cycling its “masterpieces.” 
Secondly, self-publishing is terminologically and historically linked to the phe-
nomenon of Soviet samizdat, as elaborated earlier. However, literary critic 
Dmitry Kuz’min (1999) stresses instead the differences between a politically 
motivated samizdat of the Soviet type and today’s media-stimulated self- 
publishing activities: the existence of an informal but strong quality control in 
the former.
Since 2000, the largest self-publishing portals on the Runet have been the 
twin portals stihi.ru for poetry and proza.ru for prose genres. Hundreds of 
thousands of authors have published literally millions of texts on both portals. 
Publication on these privately initiated platforms is free of charge. These 
immense text repositories are structured with the help of editors’ and readers’ 
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recommendations. Stihi.ru and proza.ru regularly organize literary awards in 
order to motivate and promote their authors. Some, such as the Heritage 
Award (Nasledie), express a patriotic agenda. Texts published on stihi.ru and 
proza.ru adhere to the category of born digitals, in having no paper substrate 
and in not being primarily intended for print publication. But these platforms, 
as with most semi-professional content providers, also offer self-publishing as 
print on demand, for a small charge. This illustrates the tendency of digital 
literature to move into a post-Internet sphere. Self-publishing reveals itself to 
be a lucrative market.
Fan fiction, in comparison to amateur literature, is closely tied to the narra-
tive worlds of novels or film sagas such as The Lord of the Rings (1937–1949) 
by J.R.R.  Tolkien or the Harry Potter saga by J.K.  Rowling (1997–2007). 
Media theoreticians such as Marie-Laure Ryan and Thon (2014) attribute 
higher immersive potential to fan fiction than they do to hyperfiction. In fan 
fiction, the reader turns into a writer herself—fan fiction writers are mostly 
women—and is able to expand or change the narrative. Amateur and fan fiction 
have generated commercially very successful authors, including E.L.  James 
(Erika Leonard) with her erotic novel sequence Fifty Shades of Grey (2011–2017). 
Disregarding these economic success stories, the majority of its adepts perceive 
amateur and fan fiction as a basically non-commercial activity, the last realm of 
“pure” creativity. Fan fiction, as amateur literature, represents the born digital 
text type. While the technology to print it does of course exist, both protago-
nists and researchers often perceive it as not transferable to paper, due to its 
high embeddedness in the specific communication environments 
(Samutina 2017).
Russian fan fiction, at ficbook.net, for example, does not differ structurally 
from analogous writing worldwide. Harry Potter fiction, to name just one of 
the most popular fan fiction universes globally, also has its share of Russian 
users (ibid.). It is generally fantasy and sci-fi with their complex story worlds 
that generate the most impressive amounts of fan fiction. Thus, the narrative 
universe of the Strugatsky Brothers (Arkady and Boris), who dominated the 
genre in the late Soviet era, stimulate a lot of Russian fan fiction, as do contem-
porary sci-fi and cyberfiction writers like Dmitry Glukhovsky (Metro series, 
2002–2015) or Sergey Lukyanenko (Dozory/The Watch sequence, 1998–2018), 
both of whom started as indie or fan fiction writers.
Further phenomena relating to participatory culture are Internet memes 
and “netlore”—Internet folklore. The term “meme” developed out of Richard 
Dawkins’ contested theories of cultural evolution and describes micro- 
narratives that spread across media. Memes typically include not only linguistic 
or literary components but also visual ones. In contrast to amateur or fan fic-
tion, memes are often created anonymously, moving them closer to the pole of 
folklore production. In Russian contexts, they are sometimes associated with 
lubok, popular prints that circulated in pre-revolutionary Russia.
Moreover, the new concept of kreatiff appeared on the Runet in the 2000s, 
designating non-commercial cultural creation that is located in the intersection 
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between amateur fiction, fan fiction and netlore. The term is a linguistic distor-
tion of the English word “creative.” The most popular kreatiff has been the 
Preved-Medved meme. Its narrative core consists of an erotic scene, with a bear 
(in Russian: medved’) surprising a couple having sex in the woods by saying 
“hello” to them (in Russian: privet). The picture is taken from the US artist 
John Lurie and its English text is “translated” into padonki. At the time the 
meme was created, the bear motif referred implicitly as well to President 
Dmitry Medvedev. The meme combines allusions to traditional Russian folk-
lore (the bear motif in fairy tales), counter-cultural linguistic creativity and 
political humor. Both padonki jargon and the Preved-Medved meme function 
as literary facts in the Russian formalist sense: they both influence literary writ-
ing. Thus, postmodernist writer Pelevin titled his chat-novel Šlem užasa. 
Kreatiff o Tesee i Minotavre (The Helmet of Horror: The Myth of Theseus and 
the Minotaur, 2005), a kreatiff.
15.4.4  Blogging: Non-literariness and New Sincerity
Around the year 2000, global Internet culture witnessed the paradigm shift 
from web 1.0 to web 2.0. This shift was characterized by a move from indi-
vidual homepages to standardized blogging and social media platforms. On the 
Runet, writers’ homepages as the central location, where the author’s persona 
was constructed, became outdated. Previously, this is where Akunin had played 
his games of self-mystification, related to the hero of his series of historical 
mystery novels, Fandorin (1998–2018). Pelevin hid as much behind his fan 
community as he did behind his trademark sunglasses. The queen of crime fic-
tion, Aleksandra Marinina, invited readers to virtually and visually inspect her 
writing desk. But such self-staging always remained embedded in these authors’ 
respective narrative text-worlds. The communication format of the blog, by 
way of contrast, with the timeline as the main organizational principle, pulled 
the author back to the front of the stage, after their role had been marginalized 
by hypertext theory. Writing on the Internet became increasingly 
autobiographical.
Blogging was one of the most popular forms of online activity on the Runet 
from 2002 until 2017. The beginning is clearly marked by a typesetting blog 
entry by Leibov, who had already “invented” Russian hyperfiction. This trig-
gered a blogging boom. A significant number of Russian authors engaged in 
intensive blogging, in close interaction with their geographically dispersed 
readership: Akunin, a literary Internet explorer in all senses of the word; 
Grishkovetz, playwright and author of neo-sentimental prose; Lukyanenko, 
prominent sci-fi and cyberfiction writer; and Tatyana Tolstaya, author of 
sophisticated post-mythological prose. But blogging also offered possibilities 
to previously less known writers. These included the prolific essayist Linor 
Goralik (snorapp) or the poetry performer Vera Polozkova (vero4ka). While 
the early era of literary activities on the Runet had been predominantly male—
with the exception of renowned figures such as media artist Lialina—women 
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writers have caught up since the 2000s. Polozkova has published her blog 
poetry in book format (Nepoèmanie, an untranslatable neologism playing with 
the Russian word for “misunderstanding,” 2008) and produces carefully staged 
poetry clips. Her example illustrates the tendency toward post-Internet litera-
ture, with digital literature reverting to paper and, at the same time, a trend to 
a remediated orality.
Participant and observer Yevgeni Gorny portrays the Russian blogosphere as 
a playground for virtual identities (Gorny 2006). Literary scholar Ellen Rutten 
takes a different standpoint, highlighting the seemingly paradoxical fact that 
Russian writers are attracted by blogging specifically because it is perceived as a 
non-literary activity (Rutten 2017). From this perspective, it is precisely the 
quality of the blog as an informal communication channel, again, a literary fact 
in the Russian formalist sense, which has enabled non-polished, everyday lan-
guage to refresh literary communication. Russian literary blogging stands 
symptomatically for a broader tendency, moving from postmodernist irony 
toward “new sincerity” (ibid.)
Runet blogging is characterized by the peculiarity that it was closely linked 
to one specific blog provider: the US-based LiveJournal.com (LJ). The brand 
name was even translated into Russian as Živoj Žurnal, meaning “the lively 
journal.” Blog researcher Gorny relies on cultural psychology to explain this: 
LJ nurtured the integration of individual blogs into a wider community by 
offering specific technological features. This process chimed with the allegedly 
collectivist psychology of Russian society (Gorny 2006, 253). Others contex-
tualize this development in political terms (Howanitz 2020, 4–5): the strong 
emergence of blogging coincided with a wave of control of the Runet. The fact 
that LJ servers were based physically in the US was experienced as a protection 
from surveillance at home. The end of the LJ era was directly linked to these 
issues. In 2017, LJ moved its servers to Russian Federation territory to comply 
with Russian data location laws (for more, see Chap. 5). Parallel to this, the 
company changed its terms and conditions, prohibiting “political agitation.” 
Bloggers interpreted this as kowtow before Russian authorities. Prominent 
authors deleted their Živoj Žurnal accounts en masse.
15.4.5  Social Networks: Life-Writing, Public Expression 
and “Prosumer Capitalism”
For the social network services (SNS) in a narrower sense, the Internet in 
Russia shows peculiarities comparable to those evident in Runet blogging. 
Besides Facebook as the globally dominant actor, local social media platforms 
have grown up: Odnoklassniki (“Classmates,” founded 2006) and VKontakte, 
which is known and branded as VK (“In Contact,” also founded 2006). The 
latter has since then outmatched both its local as well as its US-based competi-
tors. A multiplicity of literary activities thrive on VKontakte, from reading 
clubs to Russian authors connecting directly with their audiences. VK is also 
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used to circulate creative content, often still illegally, and enforces authorial 
rights regulations less rigorously than its global competitors.
Although smaller in terms of user numbers in Russia, the social media giant 
Facebook is especially popular among writers and public intellectuals. It was 
the exodus from LiveJournal that led authors to Facebook in the first place: 
Tolstaya (206,000 followers) and Akunin (250,000 followers) are among the 
most prominent to date. Social media profiles of Russian authors, be they on 
VKontakte or on Facebook, intensify the trend toward autobiographical or life- 
writing. Writers stage their author personalities in direct interaction with the 
audiences (autoheterobiography; Lüdeker 2012, 147). Strategies are diverse. 
Tolstaya presents herself as a private person, mixing personal photographs with 
invitations to her readings. Akunin retains elements of self-mystifying identity 
play. His username is a combination of pseudonym and surname, Akunin 
Chkhartishvili. He uses Facebook as an efficient channel to promote his work 
in cooperation with e-book stores. Concurrently, he continues to participate in 
political debate, representing the Putin-critical wing among the Russian intel-
ligentsia. At the other end of the political spectrum stands the prominent patri-
otic writer Zakhar Prilepin (98,000 followers). Prilepin, who rose to fame 
through his novel about the Chechen War (Patologii, The Pathologies, 2005), 
comments on literary culture in contemporary Russia but also reports from the 
armed conflict between the Ukraine and Donbass secessionists, who are sup-
ported by Russia.
Hence, not only do social media profiles by Russian writers function as auto-
biographical life-writing, they are also part of the composition of the Runet as 
a deformed but effective public sphere in an otherwise tightly controlled media 
landscape. They exemplify the formation of global reading-scapes, which are 
united by language and partly shared collective experience but are also under-
mined by new ethnic, cultural, national or political affiliations.
In addition to Facebook and its Russian analogues, SNS encompass a variety 
of other platforms, each of which is characterized by distinct features, operat-
ing as literary facts and fostering specific literary usages. Twitter has been used 
for political mobilization, but the brevity of its messages also promotes the 
emergence of poetic miniatures. Despite this fact, Russian-language Twitter 
and Instagram poetry have yet to produce literary celebrities comparable to 
Indian-born Canadian poet Rupi Kaur. Instant messaging apps are also used 
for literary purposes. Despite the blocking of the aforementioned popular mes-
senger Telegram, numerous literary channels are active there. As with other 
SNS, the forms of use are wide ranging. Professional translators or publishers 
offer glimpses into their work, and addicted readers give personal book recom-
mendations. The “Chekhov writes” channel (@chekhovpishet, initiated by 
Yevgeni Pekach, about 16,000 subscribers), on the other hand, is an example 
of projects that closely integrate literature into the lives of readers. Subscribers 
regularly receive (historical) letters from the famous innovator of Russian prose 
from the beginning of the twentieth century, Anton Chekhov, via their 
Telegram account. In contrast to “locative literature,” there is not a spatial but 
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a temporal immersion. Historical and contemporary reading contexts are fused 
and contrasted. For the future, Pekach and the editorial team plan to use bots, 
software applications that execute automatic tasks, to process Chekhov’s letters 
according to search keywords. The final vision is the creation of a virtual 
“Anton Chekhov” dialogue partner relying on artificial intelligence technol-
ogy. On YouTube, and its local equivalent Rutube, spoken-word artists and 
poets circulate recordings of poetry readings or produce poetry clips, fostering 
a newly mediated orality. One especially popular example of this was occasional 
poetry by writer and journalist Dmitry Bykov in the early 2010s, who fittingly 
named his literary project Citizen Poet (an allusion to Nikolay Nekrasov’s 
famous political poem “Poèt i graždanin,” The Poet and the Citizen, 1856). In 
a serialized form, Bykov commented on daily politics in traditionally rhymed 
verses, which were performed by renowned actor Mikhail Yefremov (producer: 
Andrey Vasilyev).
SNS are not restricted to life-writing, literary experiments and political com-
munication by writers proper but have also stimulated the emergence of huge 
reading communities (Livelib.ru being the Russian equivalent to Amazon’s 
Goodreads). Brigitte Beck-Pristed presents a case study of such “social read-
ing,” understood as “sharing reading experiences through user-generated book 
comments, reviews, readers’ rankings and recommendations” (Beck-Pristed 
2020, 407). She shows how reading in digital environments is returned to its 
“haptic, bodily experience” by being staged as a sporting challenge (reading 
marathon) on the one hand and as individual quality time on the other. 
Photographs of the “good old paper books” are posted on the social reading 
platforms, which show readers relaxing lazily with a steaming teacup in their 
hands (420–422). These reading networks have market power and popularize 
authors beyond the established institutions of literary criticism (Vadde 2017). 
From a more critical point of view, readers are doubly exploited in terms of 
“prosumer capitalism,” stresses Beck-Pristed (2020): they produce unpaid 
content and are the object of targeted advertising.
15.5  fIelds of research: toWard mIxed methods
Runet literary studies rely on terminology and concepts developed in global 
Internet theory—remediation, convergence, participatory culture, transmedia 
story telling—but also incorporate approaches from Russian Formalism, 
including the notions of non-/literariness and the literary fact. Especially in the 
Runet’s early years, the mid-1990s, researchers made sense of the new medium 
by embedding it into local reading traditions (the samizdat narrative). Such 
cultural “domestications” of the new global medium were partly essentializing, 
ascribing to it seemingly inherent characteristics of Russian culture (literature- 
centrism and collectivism). There is a strong tendency to personalize the (liter-
ary) history of the Runet by focusing on pioneering protagonists (Gorny 
2006). Given the especially high percentage of male forerunners, feminist nar-
ratives of developments have only recently begun to appear (Ratilainen et al. 
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2019). The same is true for studies that focus on the significance of digital lit-
erature for the regions and ethnic minorities. More attention has been paid to 
transnational Russian-language reading-scapes (Stahl 2018). Dirk Uffelmann 
(2014) discusses aspects of Russian cyber-imperialism, with Russian being the 
lingua franca for users in ex-Soviet countries. Rutten et al. (2013) focus on 
“web wars” concerning disputed events of twentieth century and contempo-
rary history, which are fueled by and feed into literary narratives. Complementary 
to such large-scale approaches, a multiplicity of specialized studies exist, which 
focus on protagonists (Gorny 2006), institutions (Mjør 2014), genres (Coati 
2012; Schmidt 2014) and discourses (Rutten 2017).
Concerning methodology, qualitative approaches, including hermeneutic or 
formalist readings (literary devices, genres patterns), have the upper hand. 
Quantitative approaches are applied in Digital Humanities and Russian and 
East European Studies (DHREES) at Yale University (Marijeta Bozovic) and 
the Digital Humanities in the Slavic Field research association. Natalia Samutina 
(2017) in her analysis of Russian fan fiction employs long-term participant 
observation. First exemplary case studies use quantitative methods (topic mod-
eling, literary network analysis; Howanitz 2020). Challenges for future research 
lie: in combining quantitative and qualitative research (mixed methods); in 
documentation and archivation; in feminist renderings of Runet literature; in 
case studies of translocal and transnational Russian-language reading-scapes; 
and in a further integration into the discipline of Global Russian Studies, high-
lighting similarities as well as autonomous developments while avoiding essen-
tialization and exoticization.
15.6  conclusIons: content outPlays code
Literary practices on the Russian-language Internet are, as we would expect, a 
phenomenon of “glocalization.” The term is a portmanteau of globalization 
and localization, introduced in the 1990s by renowned sociologists such as 
Roland Robertson and Zygmunt Bauman, in order to describe overlapping 
global and local dynamics in an increasingly networked world. With the ever- 
growing popularity of worldwide SNS and the dominance of global Internet 
companies such as Amazon and Google, which influence the literary field with 
game-changing publication and digitization technology, the Runet integrates 
structurally and functionally more closely into global reading cultures and 
trends as “New Sincerity” (Rutten 2017). That said, and while the dynamics 
on the Russian e-book market in the late 2010s are comparable to those in the 
US (while starting from a lower total level of sales), its local market leaders like 
LitRes or Rideró outsell Amazon. The appropriation of LiveJournal for specifi-
cally Russian-language blogging needs also illustrates how global Internet 
brands can become “localized.”
Supposedly specific features of Runet literature are located on the level of 
cultural discourse—for example, self-publishing as samizdat—rather than on 
the level of the textual artifacts themselves. But Runet literary studies show that 
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genre patterns may differ as regards socio-political dynamics. Thus, content 
creation was partly more influential than coding experiments, in contrast to 
what Scott Rettberg states in his approach to electronic literature (2016, 166). 
This does not mean that content and code (form) should be seen as unrelated 
but that code is perceived as “transparent” (neutral in terms of meaning) by 
both the authors and the readers. Such content orientation on the Runet is a 
consequence of the pronounced needs to communicate that a literature in tran-
sition contained. The early Runet filled the gaps in the post-perestroika literary 
infrastructure and generated textual riches, which amaze readers until today. 
Against the background of Russian official culture’s strongly normative orien-
tation, and in light of new identity politics, the digital arena continuously rene-
gotiates norms (Lunde and Paulsen 2009). The remarkable activity of renowned 
writers on the Runet therefore is less a consequence of the persistent myth of 
Russian “literature-centrism” and rather more the result of highly politicized 
reading environments. Cultural change is often generated outside the literary 
field in the narrow sense, overlapping with net art, media activism, computer 
games or linguistic evolution, for example, padonki slang.
The outlined overview of literary practices on the Russian-language Internet 
shows that digital literature in the narrower sense, from hypertext to code 
experiments, and changes in literary communication due to alternative distri-
bution channels of digitized literature are closely intertwined. The case of the 
Runet encourages rethinking overly rigid definitions of digital or electronic 
literature (Gendolla et al. 2010; Rettberg 2016; see O’Sullivan 2019, 26–38), 
which tend to exclude digitized texts or post-Internet literature.
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CHAPTER 16
Run Runet Runaway: The Transformation 




Unlike some other national segments of the World Wide Web, the Russian 
Internet has a name of its own: it is often called Runet. One may ask why there 
is a need for a special term focused on one country and the Internet in that 
country. The question, however, is even more complicated, since we face two 
simultaneously important designations when working with the Internet and 
Russia: the first is Runet and the second is the Internet in Russia. If we explore 
the Russian Internet, are we exploring Runet or the Internet in Russia? Is this 
merely a matter of language, since the Russian language is typically considered 
one of the features designating Runet? How can we distinguish between these 
two concepts and what are the methodological consequences of this distinc-
tion? The Internet in Russia seems to be a wider concept, but a clear one. For 
instance, if we speak about the “Internet of things” in Russia, this is an element 
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of the Internet in Russia, but it is doubtful if it can be called part of Runet. The 
latter is usually seen as a socio-cultural space or a segment of the Internet. Both 
terms designate the Internet as a place, something that has borders intended 
both to include and to exclude (Markham 1998).
In our previous study, we argued that Runet is the object of continuous 
construction by a variety of actors, including technological, political, cultural, 
business and media elites, and that changes in the process of construction are 
associated with the dynamics of power relations between these actors (Asmolov 
and Kolozaridi 2017). However, following these dynamics is not sufficient to 
identify the boundaries of Runet as an object or to distinguish it from the 
Internet in Russia or from the World Wide Web. This chapter is based on his-
torical analysis and aims to offer a conceptual framework for this distinction 
and to illustrate how this framework can be applied in order to deepen our 
understanding of Runet as an object. The purpose of the chapter is to explore 
the history of Russian Internet development in the context of the tension 
between different approaches to understanding the Internet at the coun-
try level.
We focus here on two key properties of Runet: it is historically sensitive and 
it is multidimensional. The historicity of Runet highlights the fact that what 
has been developing is not only the content of the object (e.g. what happened 
with Runet) but the object itself (what Runet is). In this sense, our history has 
an ambivalent position, since it is both a history of the construction of an 
object and a historical description of various events related to this object. 
Therefore, when telling the story of Runet we should constantly question 
whether our story is still taking place within the boundaries of Runet or whether 
perhaps it is already the story of something else, for instance, of the Internet 
in Russia.
Following the dynamics of the historical process, not just as an ongoing 
chain of events but as the evolution of an object, requires a framework for fol-
lowing changes in the object. Previously, we identified five stages of Internet 
change in Russia (Asmolov and Kolozaridi 2017). Here we seek to advance this 
approach by replacing the linear structure of periodization with a framework 
that approaches Runet as a multidimensional socio-technical object with a 
number of vectors that are ongoing through continuous change.
16.2  runet as an object: theoretIcal 
and hIstorIcal approaches
The Internet in Russia is older than Runet. The history of the Russian Internet, 
at least as a concept, starts many years before the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The conceptual origins of the Internet in 
Russia have been linked to information networks and cybernetics development 
as part of the Soviet planned economy (Gerovitch 2002). Peters (2016, 4) 
explores the failure of the early development of a nationwide Soviet computer 
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network (the All-State Automated System), which was inspired by “a utopian 
vision of [a] distinctly state socialist information society.”
There are a number of other events that could be considered as the starting 
point of the Internet in Russia, including the first instance of modem-based 
communication between the Kurchatov Institute and the University of Helsinki 
in August 1990, the foundation of the first Soviet Internet service provider or 
the registration of the domain zone. The Soviet domain zone .su was estab-
lished on September 19, 1990, while the .ru zone traditionally associated with 
Runet was registered on April 7, 1994. The word Runet, however, only 
appeared later. A number of sources argue that it was first used in 1996 by Raf 
Aslanbeyli, a journalist living at that time in Israel (Lihachev 2015).
Researchers argue that the “Internet in Russia” and the “Russian Internet” 
form a “complex matrix of overlapping areas and distinct segments, producing 
constant fractions” (Schmidt et al. 2006, 130). Schmidt and Teubener (2006, 
14) highlight how the notion of Runet as a dedicated term for a specific seg-
ment of cyber space “has almost no analogue in Western languages.” They 
point out that the boundaries of Runet rely on a variety of factors, including 
“language, technology, territory, cultural norms, traditions or values and politi-
cal power” (Schmidt and Teubener 2006, 14). Deibert and Rohozinski (2010, 
19) highlight how Runet relies mostly on digital platforms that “are modelled 
on services available in the United States and the English-speaking world, but 
are completely separate, independent, and only available in Russian.” 1
That said, the significance of the distinction between Runet and the World 
Wide Web is also questioned. For instance, according to Bowles (2006, 30), 
the “differences between the RuNet and the rest of the Internet have gradually 
been dropping away” while “RuNet is simply another backwater of the Internet, 
fenced in by a language barrier and sometimes subject to mystification by loyal 
denizens, but not essentially different.” Recent literature presents an under-
standing of Runet based on its perception by the Russian state. According to 
Nocetti (2015), the Russian authorities conceive of “cyberspace as a territory 
with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see 
the remit of international laws extended to the internet space, thereby reaffirm-
ing the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.” Building on this argu-
ment, Ristolainen (2017, 8) proposes that “RuNet—the Russian segment of 
the Internet—is considered an extension of the existing territory in the Russian 
‘information space.’”
Runet is not the only national segment of cyberspace in the former USSR, 
and not the final chain in the hierarchy of segmentation of cyberspace. The idea 
of a national segment of the Internet, as discursively manifested through a 
dedicated name, can also be seen in Kazakhstan (Kaznet), Ukraine (Uanet), 
Belarus (Bynet) and other states (Shklovski and Struthers 2010). There are also 
socio-cultural online spaces in some of the Russian regions. For instance, Tonet 
was the name for a city-based network in Tomsk, Chuvashtet is the title given 
to the Internet associated with users from Chuvashia, while Tatnet is described 
as the “Internet for Tatars and in the Tatar language” (Sibgatullin 2009). So 
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Runet is not the only “net” in Russia, or in the Russian language, and it is not 
the same as the Internet in Russia in general.
The following section offers a conceptual framework that allows us to resolve 
some of the challenges for the conceptualization of Runet as an object of 
investigation.
16.3  runet as a runaway object
As argued above, Runet cannot be reduced to the experience of a shared lan-
guage (Bowles 2006). Some early approaches addressed it in terms of socio- 
political phenomena seen in the USSR. For instance, comparing the role of 
Runet to a “Soviet Kitchen” (Popkova 2014, 98) would suggest that Runet 
should be explored as a new type of public sphere “where people can get 
together and freely discuss and identify societal problems” (Habermas 1991, 
398). Another notion taken from the Soviet Union, that of samizdat, presents 
Runet as a space for the independent generation and distribution of content 
(for more, see Chap. 15). In both cases, the conceptualization of Runet builds 
on the antagonism between an authoritarian state and users seeking new, 
uncontrolled spaces of freedom. Drawing on Bakhtin, Gorny (2007) seeks to 
go beyond the political conceptualization of Runet and to address it as an alter-
native socio-cultural space that deconstructs traditional cultural hierarchies, 
offering space for the flourishing of new identities and alternative ways of liv-
ing. Runet can also be addressed as a space that allows the emergence of a 
Russian network society (Castells and Kiselyova 2003).
Previously we have argued that Runet can be explored by following the 
changes in Internet elites and in the dominant/alternative Internet imaginaries 
(Mansell 2012) promoted by different actors (Asmolov and Kolozaridi 2017). 
This approach highlights how Runet cannot be defined as a static entity or as a 
set of technological properties. It requires a conceptualization drawing on a 
historical perspective that allows us to capture the dynamics of continuous 
change. In this sense, historical description is not the purpose of our investiga-
tion but a method that allows us to deal with the complexity of its object.
Traditional concepts of the social construction of technology have a limited 
capacity to address large-scale and constantly developing socio-technical 
objects. Following Giddens (2000) and Engeström (2008), we would argue 
that these types of objects can be considered as “runaway objects”—objects 
that are constantly shaped by the forces of both technological development and 
social construction. According to Engeström (2008, 227), a “runaway object” 
is a large-scale, complex object which is “pervasive and [whose] boundaries are 
hard to draw” and “poorly under anyone’s control and have far-reaching, 
unexpected side effects”. Runaway objects are not artifacts in a traditional 
sense but are constantly addressed, shaped and changed by the activities of 
numerous actors, while every event may create a contradiction between differ-
ent actors and potentially lead to a new chain of events. Runet as an object has 
constantly created new challenges, new opportunities and “alternative ways of 
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living” (Mansell 2002, 408) for various types of actors. It has thus also trig-
gered some actors to address these changes.
Our analysis presents Runet as a “net,” opposing it to the Internet as a sin-
gle network spreading all over the world. As Kevin Driscoll and Camille 
Paloque-Berges emphasize, taking this “net” into account helps us to avoid a 
simplification of the Internet as solely a technology and to conceptualize its 
socio-technical role. “Nets” are various and highly dependent on the historical 
and cultural context, while “the Internet” remains a global phenomenon 
(Driscoll and Paloque-Berges 2017).
16.4  the Vectors of runet deVelopment: defInIng 
runet as an object In a cultural-hIstorIcal context
The description of Runet as a runaway object requires us to approach Runet as 
a multi-vector object and to follow its historical development in terms of each 
different vector. A runaway object is developed through the activity of a variety 
of actors, including not only political, cultural, media and business actors but 
also developers and everyday users. Accordingly, these sets of relationships 
between different actors can be seen in terms of each vector. The vectors are 
interrelated, however, and distinguishing between the actors allows us to con-
ceptualize the complexity of Runet as a multidimensional and complex run-
away object. Our analysis of the vectors relied on a thematic analysis of media 
sources and on the research literature on Runet.
We have chosen to distinguish the following five vectors of Runet develop-
ment: the technological vector, the cultural vector, the media vector, the user 
and everyday life vector, and the political vector. This selection does not neces-
sarily mean that these are the only vectors that could be followed or that there 
is no place for alternative descriptions. For instance, one may argue that there 
is a need to follow an “economic vector”; however, we have not addressed this 
as a distinct vector since the manifestation of economic power can be seen in all 
the vectors, as can the manifestation of political power.
The technological vector is concerned with the development of the hardware 
and software that Runet relies on, including fiber cables, domains and their 
registers, various online platforms and the infrastructure of surveillance. The 
technological question is concerned with the identification of the most popular 
online Runet platforms, including search engines, social networks and blogo-
spheres. It examines the extent to which Runet relies on local or foreign plat-
forms and follows the changes in dominant platforms. This vector is particularly 
concerned with forces of technological development and with who controls the 
technological segments of Runet.
The cultural vector allows an exploration of the role of Runet as a space of 
cultural development. On the one hand, it examines whether Runet offers a 
space for alternative and underground cultures that were not able to find a 
proper place in traditional offline space or participatory cultures (Jenkins 
16 RUN RUNET RUNAWAY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN INTERNET… 
282
2006). On the other hand, it examines different manifestations of traditional 
and mainstream culture, how these fight to establish their presence in Runet 
and the relationships between underground and mainstream.
The media vector addresses the role of Runet as a space for media develop-
ment. It explores how new types of media platforms shape the news consump-
tion and production of the Runet audience and examines the extent to which 
online media have been able to set the agenda and frame different types of 
events. It is particularly concerned with the relationship between the new 
online and traditional offline media. It also explores how power relations are 
manifested in changes in the structure of ownership, different modes of censor-
ship and various forms of state-sponsored regulation.
The role of technologies substantially changes during the transition from 
usage by a minority of early adopters to when new technologies become 
domesticated (Silverstone 2002). The user vector follows how Runet became a 
part of everyday life in almost every sphere for a wide spectrum of the popula-
tion. It explores how Runet has configured its users and the functions of Runet 
in everyday life. This includes an analysis of the changing popularity of plat-
forms, sociological data on Runet usage in different time periods and the map-
ping of new forms of social interaction and community building. It also 
addresses various forms of facilitation of user activity in order to address differ-
ent types of everyday life issues and crisis situations. A distinct sub-topic of this 
vector is the role of Runet in the lives of children and teens.
The political vector follows the role of Runet in the political life of Russia. It 
encompasses approaching Runet as a public sphere, the role of Runet in politi-
cal mobilization and the role of Runet in the empowerment of the state, includ-
ing new technologies of surveillance and crowd control. In this sense, this 
vector follows the tension between the different imaginaries of Runet as an 
alternative political space, a space of political discussion and mobilization as 
well as the securitization and sovereignization trends on Runet that seem to 
make it one more sphere of the state’s political influence and an additional set 
of technologies of political power.
16.5  the hIstory of runet through fIVe Vectors
16.5.1  The Technological Vector: From Enthusiasts to Corporations
Some of the technological origins of Runet relate to the development of infor-
mational systems for communication, scientific purposes and the advancement 
of the planned economy in the Soviet Union (Gerovitch 2002; Peters 2016). 
The experience of early Internet usage could be connected to that of earlier 
computer-based network systems like Usenet and, later, Bulletin Board Systems 
(BBS) and FidoNet2 (Driscoll 2016). However, the development of FidoNet 
and BBS differed from that of the Internet in terms of both technology and 
social organization: “Unlike the Internet, which in the United States was the 
preserve of academic and military institutions up to the early 1990s, FidoNet 
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has been more the preserve of talented computerphiles, run on a purely non- 
commercial, anyone-can-join basis” (Rohozinski 1999).
The early development of Runet can be linked to the continuous develop-
ment of the Internet in Russia, but, as mentioned, there are different approaches 
to what can be considered its starting point. For instance, Kuznetsov (2004) 
identifies two events as the starting points of the Russian Internet: the registra-
tion of the .su domain and the creation of the Relcom/Demos computer net-
work. In this sense, the development of the technology that offered an 
infrastructure for Runet was driven by scientists and programmers together 
with businessmen who identified the commercial potential of the Internet.
From a relatively early stage, the Russian security services interfered in the 
development of the new informational system. A number of scholars highlight, 
however, how KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti, Committee for 
State Security) apparently had no capacity to control the electronic flow of 
information in the first phase of Runet development, and specifically around 
the political events that triggered the final collapse of the USSR (Konradova 
2016). The systematic surveillance of Internet-based communication started 
with the implementation of SORM-2 (Sistema tehnicěskih sredstv dlâ obespecěniâ 
funkcij operativno-razysknyh meropriâtij-2, System for Operative Investigative 
Activities-2) in 1998, when all telecommunications operators were required to 
integrate this into their communication hardware.
In addition to cables and hardware, the technical aspects of Runet relied on 
the development of various types of online services. The Russian search engines 
Aport (1996), Rambler (1996) and Yandex (1997) were founded before 
Google. A social network, Odnoklassniki, was launched in March 2006 and 
followed by VKontakte in January 2007. The most popular e-mail services 
were offered by Mail.ru and Yandex. Russian blogging relied mostly on an 
American platform, LiveJournal, which was subsequently sold to a Russian 
company, Sup Media, in 2007. Since then, Yandex and Mail.ru have become 
the two major Russian Internet giants, while VKontakte dominates the social 
networks market. However, the dominance of Russian online platforms has not 
excluded Western platforms. Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram have continued to be popular destinations for the users of Runet 
(for more on social networks, see Chap. 19).
One of the ongoing developments of Runet within the technological vector 
is the change in the structure of ownership of the major online platforms. Gold 
stock in Yandex was purchased by Sberbank in 2009. Most of the platforms, 
including Mail.ru (Mail.ru Group has been controlled by Alisher Usmanov 
since 2015), Odnoklassniki (owned by Mail.ru Group), LiveJournal (since 
2013 a part of Rambler, owned by Aleksandr Mamut) and VKontakte (owned 
by the Mail.ru Group since 2014), came under the control of oligarchs alleged 
to have close ties with the Kremlin. The founder of VKontakte, Pavel Durov, 
was forced to sell his share of the company in 2014. At the same time, the 
Russian authorities increased the scale of regulation of the activity of foreign 
Internet companies including Facebook, Google and Twitter. Russian law 
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required these companies to keep the private data of Russian citizens on servers 
located in Russia. LinkedIn did not comply and was banned. Other major 
Western platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have also not complied, but 
in 2020 they remain accessible in Russia.
Efforts to increase state control can also be seen at the infrastructural level. 
The introduction of the Cyrillic .рф domain in 2010, actively supported by the 
Russian authorities, afforded new technical opportunities for the russification 
of the Internet in Russia. In 2017, the Kremlin required Russian Information 
Technologies (IT) entrepreneurs to focus locally at the expense of the global 
market in order to be independent of foreign influences (Budnitsky and Jia 
2018, 607). A number of initiatives promoted a vision of Runet as a “sovereign 
Internet” (Asmolov 2010; Kukkola and Ristolainen 2018). In 2019, this vision 
led to a law requiring the development of an independent infrastructure for the 
Russian Internet that would enable it to continue functioning while relying 
solely on Russian servers. Increasing control over technological infrastructure 
and software can also be seen at the policy level. Strategic documents from the 
late 1990s promote the idea that “our” technologies, produced and used in 
Russia, were treated by the state as a “social good” while global technologies 
were considered a threat (Shubenkova and Kolozaridi 2016).
16.5.2  The Cultural Vector: From Alternative to Mainstream
The first popular websites on Runet included an online library (lib.ru) and 
online competitions for writers and poets. Since the early 1990s, Runet has 
been rapidly occupied by artists, journalists and members of the academic com-
munity, who have not only shared their work but also actively participated in 
the construction of the new space. Roman Leibov, a semiotics scholar from 
Tartu, Estonia, is considered to have been the first Russian-language blogger 
on LiveJournal. These writers and scholars considered Runet a laboratory for 
cultural experiments such as collaborative production and hypertext. A range 
of online projects crossed national boundaries and offered a common space of 
cultural production for people in former USSR countries and for emigrants all 
over the world, including in the United States (US), Europe and Israel.
One of the first web design studios that actively contributed to designing 
the early Runet space was launched by Artemy Lebedev in October 1995. A 
special space was also offered for the production and sharing of humor, which 
had played an oppositional role in Russian culture. The list of the most popular 
websites included at that time anekdot.ru, created by Dmitry Verner. Later, the 
web project Lurkmore.to, launched by David Homak in 2007, sought to offer 
an encyclopedia of memes illustrating the underground culture of Runet.
At the beginning of the 2000s, LiveJournal became the most popular plat-
form among Russian cultural elites and, as highlighted by Alexanyan (2013), 
could be considered a unique mix of blogging and social networking. Initially, 
the option to create a blog on LiveJournal was by invitation only. This type of 
model ensured the elitist nature of the LiveJournal community. In 2002, 
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however, the invitation-only requirement was cancelled, and LiveJournal 
opened its gates to the growing community of Runet. In 2010 Harvard-based 
researchers identified this cultural cluster as still one of the biggest clusters in 
the Russian blogosphere, although it was less dominant by comparison with 
the public affairs cluster (Alexanyan et al. 2010). Later, the first Russian social 
networks, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, contributed to a shift from content- 
generation toward social networking among friends as a dominant form of 
activity of Russian Internet users.
The shift from Runet as a space of alternative culture to a mainstream 
domain could be seen in a number of aspects. Firstly, the Russian social net-
work VKontakte offered not only an option for communication but also a 
limitless and unregulated environment for sharing any type of music and video 
content. Accordingly, despite copyright laws, any type of cultural content could 
be found online. Later, VKontakte started to comply with some of the copy-
right laws; however, it remained one of the major music and video hosts on 
Runet. The increasing role of mainstream culture is associated with the increas-
ing dominance of content created for the traditional media. For instance, the 
most popular YouTube accounts among Russian audiences are KVN (Klub 
veselyh i nahodcǐvyh, a Russian humor show,), with 4 million subscribers, and a 
talk show, The Evening Urgant, with 2.7 million viewers. The most popular 
Russian account on Instagram belongs to a pop-singer, Olga Buzova, who has 
14 million followers (Lebedev 2018).
At the same time both YouTube and Instagram are key sites for new celebri-
ties competing with traditional media content, such as videobloggers, beauty 
bloggers and musicians. However, these phenomena are rarely treated as spe-
cifically characteristic of Runet, since they partly belong to a global culture of 
micro-celebrities, various youth scenes (Omelchenko 2019) or particular 
genres. They use the Russian language, but it is arguable whether they share 
that sense of commonality which was so important for the Runet culture of the 
1990s and 2000s.
16.5.3  The Media Vector: From Alternative Media to State Control
The first time Runet was able to play a substantial role as an alternative form of 
media was during the coup attempt against Gorbachev in 1991. While Soviet 
TV was broadcasting the ballet Swan Lake, Relcom allowed geeks and scien-
tists to break the information blockade through UseNet groups and inform the 
Western audience about what was happening (Konradova 2016). The first 
Russian media websites appeared a few years later, when early adopters started 
to occupy the Runet space. The first news website, Vecěrnij Internet (Evening 
Internet), launched by Anton Nosik in 1996, covered mostly news concerning 
Runet.3 As pointed out by Kuznetsov, “The Russian Internet was so small at 
that time, that the appearance of any new page was an event” (Kuznetsov 2004).
The first website of an offline newspaper was launched in spring 1995 by 
Ucǐtelskaâ gazeta (Teachers’ Newspaper). However, very soon Runet was 
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offering a space for the development of new media organizations. These 
included Vesti.ru, Gazeta.ru and Lenta.ru. While the democratization of the 
Russian media sphere was led by traditional media in the 1990s, the Internet 
took a lead as a major liberal media domain in the 2000s. Under the new presi-
dent, Vladimir Putin, who took office in 2000, the Russian state succeeded 
within a short time in taking control of the major TV channels from the oli-
garchs Berezovsky and Gusinsky, while online media remained relatively inde-
pendent. Although Vesti.ru was taken under the control of the Russian national 
TV channel, Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru were considered among the most popular 
independent online sources for about another ten years.
Social media also started to play an increasing role in shaping the Russian 
media environment. The rise of blogs, citizen journalism and groups on 
VKontakte can be seen as important factors that challenged the control of the 
traditional Russian media. Many traditional journalists also started using blogs 
to develop their personal professional brands, to share unedited content and to 
have direct communication with their audience. Other types of actors also con-
tributed to the transformation of the Russian online media system. An increas-
ing number of newsmakers, including politicians (such as President Dmitry 
Medvedev), experts and celebrities, started using blogs and social networks, 
which now could often be considered a source of first-hand information.
Social media activists and opposition politicians also contributed to the 
development of Runet as a media sphere. These activists launched online inves-
tigations that were able to set the news agenda and make an impact on tradi-
tional media. This included securing investigations of police corruption as well 
as helping to hold high-ranking businessmen and officials accountable for their 
misdeeds, as in the case of a car accident involving the vice president of the 
Lukoil oil company in February 2010. That said, Toepfl (2011) points out that 
the traditional Russian political elites learned how to manage public outrage 
and restructure it to serve their own political goals.
During parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011–2012 the Russian 
online media played a central role in exposing the scale of fraud and in covering 
the protests. Following the protests, the Russian authorities started to increase 
their control over and pressure on online media. Some, like Grani.ru, were 
blocked. The editorial teams of two leading news websites, Gazeta.ru and 
Lenta.ru, were changed and some former members of the Lenta.ru team 
moved to Latvia to found a new website, Meduza.io, in 2014. At that time 
LiveJournal also lost its political function while most of the influential media 
bloggers moved to standalone platforms or to social networks. Opposition 
sources also became less visible in the Yandex News aggregator following polit-
ical pressure from the Kremlin (Soldatov and Borogan 2015).
Alexanyan has argued that in the 2000s Runet gave rise to a different type 
of imagined community of Russian citizens, distinguishing between “Internet 
Russia and TV Russia” (Alexanyan 2013, 161). However, as a result of state 
media regulation, the Russian authorities increased their control over the 
Runet media sphere. Only a few liberal online media outlets, including 
 G. ASMOLOV AND P. KOLOZARIDI
287
NovayaGazeta.ru, Meduza.io, Ekho Moskvy (https://echo.msk.ru/) and the 
TV Rain (Doždʹ) channel (tvrain.ru), remained active. Facebook also contin-
ued to play some role, whereas a new digital platform, the messaging app 
Telegram, assumed increasing importance for the circulation of political rumors 
through anonymous channels. While on the one hand the Russian authorities 
made a failed attempt to ban Telegram in 2018 for non-compliance with anti-
terrorist legislation, on the other hand it was also being actively used by the 
Kremlin for various types of political media manipulation through popular 
anonymous political channels (Rubin and Badanin 2018). While the Runet 
media sphere lost its oppositional power as an alternative media environment, 
it still offered a diversity of media voices and genres, although since 2014 it has 
started to be dominated by state-affiliated platforms (e.g. Lenta.ru, which 
changed its ownership, Yandex News, RIA Novosti, KP.ru and Izvestia.ru) and 
the Russian authorities gained more control over agenda-setting and the fram-
ing of political events. At the same time, some opposition content moved to 
non-Russian platforms, such as in the case of the popular YouTube video chan-
nels of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and TV presenter Yury Dud, as well as 
of the independent political channels on Telegram (for more on digital journal-
ism, see Chap. 9).
16.5.4  The User Vector: From Elites to Everyday Usage
In the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s, the Internet was used actively by 
a minority of Russian citizens. The major trend, however, that changed the 
profile of the Russian user was the gradual increase in the number of Internet 
users in Russia. This could be seen in terms of both the regions covered by the 
Internet and the frequency of usage. The socio-economic groups that had had 
limited access to the Internet during the first years of Runet became active 
users. This happened as a result of the reduction in costs of Internet access and 
the broader availability of computers and mobile phones.
In 2017 Russia had more than 107 million Internet users (more than 76% 
of the Russian population) and the number of users aged between 10 and 55 
was more than the TV audience. The growth in the number of users was linked 
to the increase in instrumental usage of Runet. According to Nisbet et  al. 
(2015), the most popular usage of the Russian Internet included: “search for 
information for personal usage”; “communicating in social networks”; “read-
ing national news”; “e-mail correspondence,” and “downloading and listening 
to/viewing of music and video.” These types of usage are related to the increas-
ing popularity of a number of websites, including Avito.ru (online sales), 
weather forecasts (Gismeteo.ru) and Head Hunter [hh.ru] (recruitment). The 
ratings of most popular Russian websites are constantly changing, while the top 
placings are not only dominated by media, social networks, e-mail services and 
search engines but also determined by trends in digital consumption and online 
education. The rankings of statistically most-visited websites among Russia 
users can be seen at radar.yandex.ru and top1000-ru.hotlog.ru.
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In 2020 VKontakte remains one of the most popular websites, offering not 
only social networking but also various forms of entertainment including mov-
ies, music and pornography (Ostrovsky 2019). VKontakte also offers a plat-
form for the development of communities of different kinds, from vibrant 
youth culture to intellectual clubs, wives of prisoners and street-food testers in 
small towns. An additional sector that fulfills instrumental functions and 
addresses the needs of Russian citizens includes state-related services offered 
through the e-governance portal Gosuslugi. The increasing scope of instru-
mental functions is also manifested through rapid growth in online banking 
services and online payment systems.
We may also find evidence of how digital platforms afford Russian users an 
opportunity to address everyday life challenges. This is related to various forms 
of crowdsourcing, as a digitally mediated form of mobilization of resources to 
address different goals. One of the groups of digital platforms that allow users 
to be mobilized around everyday life issues consists of civic applications 
(Ermoshina 2014). Runet has offered a rich diversity of platforms of this type, 
from the mapping of potholes (the Rosyama.ru project, initiated by Navalny in 
2010) to RosZKH.ru and Zalivaet.SPB.ru, which map the failure of local 
authorities to fix buildings and local infrastructure. Charity platforms like 
pomogi.org and TakieDela.ru raise awareness of individuals needing various 
kinds of help and allow users’ financial resources to be mobilized to address 
these problems.
The Internet has also played a substantial role in the case of various emer-
gencies, where it has not only offered independent sources of information but 
also allowed people to take part in response. One of the most significant cases 
of digitally mediated civic mobilization was the response to wildfires in 2010 
(Asmolov 2013b). Some of these projects support continuous engagement to 
save people’s lives. For instance, the Liza Alert platform allows people to be 
mobilized for search and rescue operations when elderly people and children 
become lost in Russian forests.
The Russian authorities also seek to develop platforms to engage users and 
harness crowd resources. State-affiliated initiatives for the engagement of citi-
zens in decision-making, such as the Active Citizen project (ag.mos.ru) 
launched by the mayor of Moscow, have been criticized for offering “a sem-
blance of openness and participation, while in practice neutralizing citizens’ 
activity and exerting control over them” (Asmolov 2018).
The user vector, perhaps, is the sphere where the contrast between Runet 
and the Internet in Russia is most visible. This is where the Russian Internet 
continuously becomes an instrument of the “uses and gratifications” (Katz 
et al. 1973) of a majority of Russian citizens. Here, we also see how the change 
in the demography of Russian Internet users, specifically the increase in the 
number of users among older generations and in more remote areas of Russia, 
is associated with the change in the role of Runet. The instrumental usage of 
the Russian Internet also makes it more similar to the Internet in other 
countries.
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16.5.5  The Political Vector: From Democratic Promise 
to Digital Sovereignty
During the 1990s politicians started slowly to explore the new political tech-
nologies. In March 1996, Yabloko was the first Russian political party to open 
a website. However, Runet is sometimes considered to be a space for opposi-
tion political actors, various types of movements and individuals that have had 
no affiliation with traditional political organizations. In 1999, Putin—then 
prime minister—held his first meeting with leaders of Runet. Despite some 
pressure from a minister of communication, Mikhail Lesin, to introduce some 
form of Internet regulation, Putin opposed Lesin’s proposal. He stated: “We 
are not going to look for a balance between freedom and regulation. We will 
always choose freedom” (Soldatov and Borogan 2015).
The elections of 2000 were the first where the Internet started to play a 
significant role. A new type of political consultant with the Internet as an area 
of expertise appeared. This group included such people as Gleb Pavlovsky, a 
founder of the Fund for Effective Politics (FEP). FEP was the first organization 
to release public opinion polls online. During the first two terms of President 
Putin the authorities did not actively interfere in the online space, although a 
number of legislative initiatives for the regulation of communication were 
introduced. Meanwhile some liberal governors like Oleg Chirkunov and Nikita 
Belykh started to experiment with the online space by managing LiveJournal 
blogs. In 2008 Dmitry Medvedev became president and started a campaign of 
popularization of open data and e-government. Medvedev visited the head 
office of Twitter in California, where he opened an account and wrote his 
first Tweet.
At the same time, in the late 2000s, Runet displayed a “growing use of digi-
tal platforms in social mobilization and civic action” (Alexanyan et al. 2012). 
This political mobilization was not necessarily associated with any political 
organization but rather with “issue-based campaign[s]” initiated by Internet 
users (Alexanyan et al. 2012). At the same time, some leaders started to develop 
their political capital online, without affiliation with any political party. One 
example of the new generation of Internet-enabled leaders was Alexei Navalny, 
who gained popularity via his blog on LiveJournal, where he published his 
investigations into corruption. Later, when LiveJournal came under the con-
trol of pro-Kremlin owners, Navalny launched a standalone website, Navalny.
ru, as well as actively using YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Telegram.
That said, according to Fossato (2009), “The state remained the main 
mobilizing agent.” She argues that Runet operates “as a device to spread and 
share information, but largely among closed clusters of like-minded users who 
are seldom able or willing to cooperate.” In 2010, contradicting his previous 
positive assessments of the Internet, Putin stated that it was well known that 50 
percent of online content was pornography. Since then, one can see the domi-
nation of the state’s discourse on the role of the Internet as a dangerous tech-
nology and a threat to socio-political stability that has to be regulated. The 
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major examination of the political role of Runet, however, took place around 
the parliamentary and presidential elections in winter 2011–2012.
During the parliamentary elections of 2012, social networks, crowdsourcing 
platforms and dedicated websites were employed to monitor electoral fraud 
(Oates 2013). At the same time, the Russian authorities launched the 
WebVybory2012 (webvybory2012.ru) operation to cover 95,000 polling sta-
tions with two web cameras for each station and offer online live broadcasting 
of the vote and the counting process. The project sought to prove that the 
Russian elections were transparent and legitimate. Despite the efforts of the 
Russian authorities to protect the legitimacy of the elections, independent 
monitoring efforts and online media challenged the results. The parliamentary 
elections were followed by a wave of protests facilitated via social networks.
The electoral cycle of 2011–2012 provided a momentum for accelerated 
political innovation (Asmolov 2013a) and specifically for new forms of digitally 
enabled horizontal mobilization of protests. This included the development of 
crowdsourcing platforms for election monitoring (Kartanarusheniy.ru), using 
social networks including Facebook for large-scale mobilization, and the devel-
opment of dedicated digital tools for the organization of distributed protests 
(e.g. in the case of the White Circle protest, where a website, Feb26.ru, sup-
ported self-organization, enabling people to create a live chain around the cen-
ter of Moscow). Digital political innovation also offered new ways of collecting 
data on the scale of arrests and of offering assistance to people who were 
detained. The wave of political innovation continued after the elections. During 
the Moscow mayoral election in 2013 Navalny’s team was able to develop 
online tools to mobilize support despite the lack of coverage in the traditional 
media. Eventually Navalny received 27 percent of the vote, which was consid-
ered an unexpected success. Later Dmitry Gudkov developed so-called “politi-
cal Uber” to simplify voting for the most liberal politician at a neighborhood 
level. However, this success never went beyond local level.
Following the electoral cycle of 2011–2012, the authorities identified the 
political threat associated with Runet, through the challenge to the legitimacy 
of elections or the capacity to facilitate large-scale political action. Klyueva 
(2016) argues that “[T]he successes of the protest movement initiated a gov-
ernment crackdown on the Russian Internet and social media.” She concludes 
that “the pro-government actors were able to monopolize and control the 
public sphere with their issues and messages” (Klyueva 2016, 4674). Gunitsky 
(2015, 50) suggests that the case of Runet illustrates a “shift from contesta-
tion to co-optation” of social media (for more on social networks and politics, 
see Chap. 30).
The third Putin presidency (2012–2018) started with a series of restrictive 
laws. The Yarovaya package obliged Internet Service Providers (ISP) to store 
their information about user activity for a long time. The state also supported 
groups of cyber guards who search for prohibited content online and report it 
to the authorities. At the same time a new generation of pro-Kremlin digital- 
savvy politicians started to play an increasingly significant role online (for 
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instance, spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria 
Zaharova). Some experts started talking about building a “great Russian fire-
wall” (Kulikova 2014). The process of actually doing this, however, would be 
substantially different from that of its Chinese predecessor.
Taking control of Runet required a multidimensional operation that 
addressed content, technological infrastructure, the structure of ownership of 
major Internet platforms, shaping the perception of the Internet among 
Russian citizens and creating a legal environment to support various forms of 
repressive measures. This took the form of sovereignization—that is, the type 
and scale of control over online space became more and more like the control 
exercised over offline space (Nocetti 2015). Another notion that applied to the 
state’s approach to Runet was fragmentation (Kolozaridi 2019) or what is 
sometimes called balkanization (Kulikova 2014). Another trend seen in the 
most recent history of Runet development is the increasing securitization of 
the Russian online space. The online sphere became a major domain in the 
context of international conflict, which included not only cyberattacks and the 
use of trolls and bots as a part of state-sponsored propaganda but also the 
mobilization of users’ resources to support various aspects of warfare. These 
tendencies were visible in the conflict between Russian and Ukraine 
(2014–2016) (Asmolov 2019).
The increasing role of regulation and approval of new sovereignization 
also led to the emergence of a new wave of “digital resistance.” The first 
wave of protests in April 2018, with about 12,000 participants, addressed 
the efforts of the Russian authorities to ban Telegram, which led to the 
blocking of hundreds of other websites as “collateral damage.” The second 
wave of protests “against the isolation of Runet,” with about 15,000 partici-
pants, was triggered by the approval of the “Internet sovereignization” law 
and took place in March 2019. The new restrictions of sovereignization have 
been addressed by proliferation of Virtual Private Network (VPN) services 
and other circumvention tools. In August 2019 Telegram chats and chatbots 
became a major tool for the coordination of protests after a ban on the par-
ticipation of opposition candidates in local Moscow elections (for more on 
digital politics, see Chap. 2).
16.6  conclusIon
This vector-based historical overview of Runet allows us to identify some 
important properties of Runet as an object that has been developed as an alter-
native socio-political and cultural space. First, all the vectors seem to be inter-
related. The major trend that can be seen in all the vectors is the increasing 
conflict between understanding Runet as an alternative phenomenon with its 
own rules influencing the outer social world and treating it like other entities 
that follow the offline cultural and political order. This conflict is manifested in 
the increasing efforts of state institutions to impose various forms of regulation 
on the online networked environment. This regulation seems to be aimed at 
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restricting Runet as a construct with a distinct cultural and socio-political role 
(as seen from the first stages of Runet development), while also offering more 
space for the Internet in Russia as an instrumental construct that serves a broad 
spectrum of needs of Russian citizens, from digital consumption to 
e- government services. Most recent digital innovations offer a broad range of 
new services and contribute to the development of the Internet in Russia, but 
it is debatable whether these can be considered part of the continuous develop-
ment of Runet as a socio-political and cultural object.
The notion of a runaway object highlights the fact that objects are shaped 
by the continuous activity of a variety of actors who do not necessarily agree 
about what the object should look like. That said, their activity is still driven by 
a shared vision of the object to be constituted as a distinct entity with its own 
boundaries. All the vectors described here demonstrate that the early develop-
ment of the Russian Internet was driven by various imaginaries of Runet as a 
socio-cultural project and an alternative political space. It seems, however, that 
the increase in the number of users, the change of policy on Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) development and the increase in various 
forms of regulations and other trends not only drastically changed Runet but 
gradually decreased its salience as an object of participatory socio-political 
construction.
What continued was the development of the Internet as an advanced form 
of communication infrastructure in modern society that supports various 
aspects of people’s lives as well as being used by governments as a tool of politi-
cal influence. However, the decline of Runet is not necessarily an outcome of 
political Internet regulation but also of a range of socio-technical processes 
related to the development of the Internet, its accessibility and functions. 
Moreover, one may argue that the political regulation of the Internet in Russia 
in fact contributes to the continuation of Runet, since the act of regulation 
reinforces the boundaries of the object regulated.
We are not necessarily arguing, in imitation of Fukuyama, that Runet is at 
the end of its history. However, a historical consideration of the Russian 
Internet seems to suggest a major shift. The main outcome of the trends iden-
tified through this historical analysis of five vectors is not increasing state con-
trol of Runet but a gradual replacement of Runet by the whole Internet in 
Russia. That said, Runet and the Internet in Russia continue to co-exist. One 
may argue that the latent resources of Runet could still be mobilized and take 
center stage in Russian cyberspace.
notes
1. For example, in the cases of Yandex, which can be considered as the “Russian 
Google,” or of VKontakte, which can be considered as the “Russian Facebook.”
2. FidoNet is a worldwide computer network used for communication between bul-
letin board systems (BBSes).
3. The online archive of the project is available at: http://www.gagin.ru/vi/
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CHAPTER 17




This chapter focuses on textual data that are collected for a specific purpose, 
which are usually referred to as corpora. Scholars use corpora when they examine 
existing instances of a certain phenomenon or to conduct systematic quantitative 
analyses of occurrences, which in turn reflect habits, attitudes, opinions, or 
trends. For these contexts, it is extremely useful to combine different approaches. 
For example, a linguist might analyze the frequency of a certain buzzword, 
whereas a scholar in the political, cultural, or sociological sciences might attempt 
to explain the change in language usage from the data in question. This hand-
book is no exception: the reader will find several chapters (for additional infor-
mation, see Chaps. 26, 23, 29 and 24) that are either primarily or secondarily 
based on Russian textual data.
Russian text-based studies represent a well-established area of science, 
unknown in part to Western readers due to the language barrier. However, this 
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should not overshadow the existence of well-developed tools and promising 
results (Dobrushina 2007; Mustajoki and Pussinen 2008; Plungian 2009). 
Naturally, scholars in linguistics have made the most visible progress in corpus 
studies, offering a wide spectrum of data (described in Sect. 17.3 of this chap-
ter) and a range of corpus-based methods that are reflected in recent publica-
tions (Plungian 2009; Plungian and Shestakova 2014; Zabotkina 2015; 
Lyashevskaya 2016; Kopotev et al. 2018).
In the chapter, we describe existing textual resources in Russian, from avail-
able online sites to DIY (“do-it-yourself”) corpora, with a special focus on two 
of the most significant examples: the Russian National Corpus and the Integrum 
database. Finally, in the last section, we present two cases of corpus-based anal-
ysis: the first investigates the collective mnemonic patterns for names of decades 
in Soviet and post-Soviet history and the second concerns political trends in 
modern Russia.
T.  McEnery and A.  Wilson (1996, 24) offer the following definition of 
a corpus:
Corpus in modern linguistics, in contrast to being simply any body of text, might 
more accurately be described as a finite-sized body of machine-readable text, sam-
pled in order to be maximally representative of the language variety under consid-
eration. (Italics added)
Three features of this definition need to be highlighted as they constitute the 
quality criteria for any corpus data. The first is that it is finite-sized. This means 
that the number of tokens is known so the user can apply various statistics to the 
data, ranging from simple frequency rankings to sophisticated neuronal algo-
rithms. The second quality is that it is in a machine-readable format that allows 
users to conduct quick searches within an unlimited amount of data, from 
Tolstoy’s masterpieces to ordinary texts available on the internet. The third qual-
ity is maximal representativeness, which makes it possible to draw conclusions 
from a finite number of examples on the infinity of a language or its variety. In this 
sense, the usage of corpora in the humanities makes it similar to a hard science, 
meaning that the results are calculable and replicable, and thus able to be tested.
17.2  the Web as a corpus
The emergence of search engines such as Yahoo, and later Google, has 
made it possible to explore the World Wide Web and its expanding massive 
number of sites. This development has given rise to new verbs such as 
“googling” (meaning to search on google.com) and “yandexing” (to search 
on yandex.ru). The Russian part of the global internet is often referred to 
as the Runet (for additional information, see Chap. 16). This includes not 
only sites under the country code’s top-level domain. RU but every site 
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available in the Russian language. Runet had a six percent share of all inter-
net sites for 2018, putting it in second place after advanced English (see 
Usage 2019). However, a clear differentiation should be made between 
search engines that index websites and corpora. Search engines that index 
websites allow users to make searches, whereas corpora constitute data, the 
results of which are controlled and replicable.
Whichever commercial search engine is used, it is primarily intended to 
deliver information that includes, first and foremost, marketing material that 
targets specific consumer groups. One can, of course, use the internet for infor-
mation mining but the results may be scientifically unreliable without addi-
tional verification. Information from data mining tends to contain drivel 
attributable to varying spelling norms, scanning errors, fluctuation in internet 
communication, and so forth. As Adam Kilgarriff observes:
[L]ike Borges’s Library of Babel, [the internet] contains duplicates, near dupli-
cates, documents pointing to duplicates that may not be there, and documents 
that claim to be duplicates but are not. (Kilgarriff 2001, 342)
A simple internet search yields a priori unknown results, which are usable 
only if they are task-specific and the researcher is cognizant of all the limita-
tions. Even then, using the internet as a source is fraught with serious risks. 
Among the most serious is the fact that users do not control the data they 
search and they do not control the search engines they use (see Bozdag 2013; 
Flaxman et al. 2016).
It is difficult to conduct data-based research without texts that are reliable 
and accessible. By reliable, we mean texts that are consistently of high quality, 
and by accessible, we refer to texts that are easily obtainable. A general caveat 
with regard to the data that are available online is that the smaller the text and 
the more unique its contents, the more reliable the source should be. If the 
features of an individual text are not crucially important, then any potential 
noise in the data can be ignored, at least to some extent. A large amount of 
noisy data may nonetheless be used effectively to study general tendencies in 
the language variety under consideration. For example, a noise would be caused 
by errors related to a source, as in mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters after Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR) processing, and these are dissolved in the total 
mass of data.
Electronic texts that are available on the internet fall into one of three, 
uneven, categories: the majority are insufficiently prepared (e.g., a source is not 
reliable), error-filled (e.g., inaccurately digitized), or non-authorized (such as a 
doubtful copyright status). A smaller amount of textual data, with more atten-
tion given to their quality, can be further categorized as non-linguistic collec-
tions, or “electronic libraries,” and linguistically oriented collections, or 
“linguistic corpora.” Naturally, the distinction between non-linguistic and lin-
guistic data is somewhat vague and depends heavily on the task at hand, the 
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main difference being whether or not the data are linguistically annotated, that 
is, enriched with linguistic information.
17.3  electronIc lIbrarIes
Collections of texts are not corpora in the strict sense of the term. However, 
large text collections have a wide circulation in digital studies and are reliable 
resources for Russian studies. The largest of these collections on Runet are 
Moshkov’s Library (www.lib.ru) and Librusec (www.lib.rus.ec).1 Access to 
both sites is free and includes massive collections of fictional and non-fictional 
Russian texts. Furthermore, both could serve as good initial sources for big- 
data studies in Russian digital humanities (for more, see Chap. 29).
When the research objective is to analyze literary masterpieces, the sources 
need to be more carefully selected. In this context, Runet has three useful web-
sites that aim to provide high-quality data. The first is the Fundamental 
Electronic Library of “Russian Literature and Folklore” (www.feb-web.ru), 
which is a fast-developing collection of belles lettres that follows the strict 
guidelines of academic publications, enriched with commentaries and an 
extended reference apparatus. The website contains fiction from the eighteenth 
to the twentieth century as well as Old Russian literature and folklore. The 
second resource is the Russian Virtual Library (www.rvb.ru). The content, 
principles, and developers of this collection partly overlap with the Fundamental 
Electronic Library, although the latter focuses more on published Russian texts 
from the eighteenth century, the fin de siècle, and from Soviet underground 
poetry. The third resource, lib.pushkinskijdom.ru, is maintained by the Institute 
of Russian Literature (RAS, also known as Pushkinskij dom). This site provides 
access to thousands of texts from the ninth to the twentieth century. These 
consist mainly of fiction and poetry, but also memoirs, critical reviews, and 
critical bibliographies. A true gem of the collection is the library of Old Russian 
literature, which includes most of the surviving ancient texts and their Russian 
translations.
17.4  lInguIstIc corpora2
While the aforementioned sources are sufficient for many researchers, linguists 
require resources that are specifically designed for their analyses of language 
phenomena. These are referred to as “linguistic corpora,” which means that 
the entries are enriched with specific linguistic information. Some examples of 
this are tokenization, lemmatization, part-of-speech tagging, and syntactic 
relations. This detailed information enables scholars who are more interested in 
the linguistic content of the texts to search in sources that are more directly 
oriented to linguistic information.
The dawn of computer-assisted research in the Russian language occurred at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, which was shortly after the emergence of 
 M. KOPOTEV ET AL.
303
resources specifically designed to meet the needs of linguistics scholars, namely 
linguistic corpora. Russian corpus linguistics is currently a highly developed 
branch of linguistic studies and is well represented in national computational 
linguistic landscapes (see the “Dialogue” conferences at www.dialog-21.ru/
en) and in international collaboration (see, e.g., Erjavec et al. 2010; Nivre et al. 
2018). The following extensive “big data” resources were made available from 
the beginning, presented below in an ascending order of tokens:
• the Araneum Russicum corpora of 1.2 billion tokens (Benko 2014);
• the ruWac: the Russian portion of the project “The Web as a Corpus” of 
1.3 billion tokens (Sharoff and Nivre 2011);
• the Taiga corpus of 5 billion tokens (Shavrina and Shapovalova 2017);
• ruTenTen of 14.5 billion tokens, a member of the commercial TenTen 
corpus family (Jakubíček et al. 2013);
• General Internet Corpus of Russian of 19.8 billion tokens (GICR; see 
Belikov et al. 2013).
The above list of corpora and resources is by no means comprehensive, and 
many smaller, more specific and more deeply annotated corpora are available 
for academic use (see the catalogue at www.ruscorpora.ru/new/corpora-other.
html). There are also various historical and parallel corpora, as well as corpora 
that are not publicly available, which are beyond the scope of this chapter (see 
reviews in Mitrenina 2014; Mikhailov and Cooper 2016; Kopotev et al. 2018). 
Nonetheless, in many cases, the best available option is to create a task- 
specific corpus.
A do-it-yourself (DIY) corpus eliminates many issues caused by raw internet 
data, such as repetition, disproportion, and babelization (language mixture). 
Many special tools have been developed to create DIY corpora, typically 
referred to as a “concordancer” or “corpus manager” (see https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Corpus_manager). Researchers can use these programs to look up 
contexts, construct lists of keywords or frequencies, analyze word co-occur-
rences, and determine the distribution of words across texts or topics. A reli-
able option that is available to scholars is the commercial Sketch Engine service 
and its non-commercial version, No Sketch Engine (www.sketchengine.eu/
nosketch-engine). The service includes many specific linguistic tools that are 
available upon registration.
17.4.1  The Russian National Corpus (www.ruscorpora.ru)
A national corpus of any language, the acme of linguistic resources, is charac-
terized by two fundamental features. First, it is essential that the corpus repre-
sent the entire language in question. This means that it should contain all types 
of communication, both written and oral, in all genres, from the belletristic to 
the dialectal, and represent all historical periods, from antiquity to the present. 
Second, it should be maximally balanced insofar as the text types in the corpus 
17 CORPORA IN TEXT-BASED RUSSIAN STUDIES 
304
correspond to their proportion of usage in real-life communication to the 
extent that it is feasible, taking into consideration aspects such as data avail-
ability and legal restrictions.
A national corpus makes it possible to conduct a wide range of linguistic 
analyses into the language for which it is available. As the creators of the Russian 
National Corpus (hereafter RNC) explain:
[Electronic] libraries are not well suited to academic work on the nature of lan-
guage; they tend to focus on the content of texts rather than their language 
properties, while the creators of the Corpus recognize the importance of literary 
or scientific value of the texts, but see them as a secondary feature. Unlike an 
electronic library, the National Corpus is not a collection of texts which are 
deemed “interesting” or “useful” of themselves; the texts in the Corpus are inter-
esting and useful for the study of language. Such texts might include not only 
great works of literature, but also works of a “secondary” writer, or a transcrip-
tion of an ordinary conversation. (http://www.ruscorpora.ru/en/corpora-
intro.html)
Since the RNC became available in 2004, it has developed into a functional 
and extensively annotated resource. Today, in terms of its size and scientific 
value, it is comparable to the American, British, Czech, and Polish national 
corpora. The core collection of the RNC includes manually selected samples of 
written and spoken texts. Those samples represent various genres, such as fic-
tion, drama, memoirs, news and literary criticism, popular non-fiction and text-
books, religious and technical texts, business and jurisprudence papers, and 
texts on daily life. The samples include texts that were not initially intended for 
publication.
Any national corpus by definition is large and multifaceted. At the time of 
writing, all subcorpora and spin-off projects available on the ruscorpora.ru site 
comprise 600 million tokens. Table 17.1 lists the detailed statistics on the main 
Table 17.1 Russian National Corpus: texts by subcorpora




Number of tokens % of 
tokens
The main subcorpus 76,882 17,574,752 209,198,275 57.3
The news-media 
subcorpus
181,175 8,553,495 113,292,003 31.0
The dialectal subcorpus 197 20,273 194,283 0.1
The educational subcorpus 229 65,666 664,751 0.2
The parallel subcorpus 370 1,609,609 24,022,437 6.6
The poetry subcorpus 41,448 638,861 6,738,474 1.8
The oral subcorpus 3034 1,604,626 10,122,579 2.8
The multimodal subcorpus 31,741 148,619 648,576 0.2
In total: 335,076 30,215,901 364,881,378 100
Source: http://www.ruscorpora.ru/corpora-stat.html. The English translation is ours
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parts of the collections; Table 17.2 provides additional details on the core col-
lection. The represented time periods vary due to the availability of the digi-
tized sources of the particular period.
All the subcorpora are lemmatized, which occurs when all forms of a word 
are arranged under a headword as in dictionary form, called lemma, and anno-
tated both morphologically and syntactically. Some of the subcorpora are also 
analyzed semantically (grouped in lexical classes according to the meaning) and 
derivationally (grouped by word formation). The crowning touches of this 
monumental resource are its diverse rich metadata and sophisticated search 
options, such as multiword expressions, tag repetition in adjacent tokens, and 
stress marking.
The site also hosts several spin-off projects of which the most interesting is 
the Old Russian subcorpus (Pichhadze 2005), which includes original Old 
Russian texts (such as chronicles and Novgorodian birch-bark letters) as well as 
translations from Greek texts (e.g., The Romance of Alexander, Flavius 
Josephus’s Books of the History of the Jewish War against the Romans) and South 
Slavic texts, rewritten in Old Russian (e.g., Izbornik [Miscellany] of 1076). 
Other notable projects are the SynTagRus corpus (Boguslavsky et al. 2000), 
which is manually annotated with syntactic dependency and lexical function 
markups, and the FrameBank (Lyashevskaya and Kashkin 2015), which is 
annotated with semantic roles. To the best of our knowledge, the RNC is also 
the only resource that includes a corpus of Russian poetry, which allows 
searches by meter and rhyme of poetic texts from the eighteenth century to the 
present (Grishina et al. 2009).
17.4.1.1  Case Study: Tracking Collective Memory Through “Decade 
Constructions”3
The study of collective memory is a strong interdisciplinary field that concen-
trates on the exploration of collective mnemonic concepts. The aim is to ana-
lyze how and why people and society think about and collect the events of their 
mutual past. This research objective has drawn the attention of historians, 
Table 17.2 Russian National Corpus: texts by creation date (the main subcorpus only)
Periods Number of texts Number of sentences Number of tokens % of tokens
1701–1750 298 27,090 590,541 0.3
1751–1800 979 176,207 2,981,803 1.4
1801–1850 1098 704,678 10,380,375 4.8
1851–1900 2063 2,366,209 31,761,447 14.7
1901–1950 26,325 4,646,823 53,445,536 24.7
1951–2000 14,486 6,172,190 67,252,763 31.0
2001–2010 31,491 4,094,011 50,231,677 23.2
In total: 76,740 18,187,208 216,644,142 100
Source: http://www.ruscorpora.ru/corpora-stat.html. The English translation is ours
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scholars of cultural studies, and anthropologists. However, this has almost 
never been addressed by linguists, despite the generally acknowledged impor-
tance of language as a key translator of culture (Lotman 2009; Koselek 2004). 
Attempts to explore the Russian collective memory through corpus analysis 
have been made by Bonch-Osmolovskaya (2018) and Götzelmann et  al. 
(2019). The former analysis focuses on the constructions, which include a 
word- denoted decade preceded by an epithet, such as lihie devânostye (wild 
nineties), zolotye pâtidesâtye (golden fifties), and groznye tridcatye (terrible thir-
ties). We refer to them hereafter as decade constructions. The basic assumption 
is that these constructions reflect the mnemonic patterns of each decade in 
Soviet and post-Soviet history; hence, their linguistic analysis makes it possible 
to reconstruct patterns of collective memory.
The data obtained from the Russian National Corpus have been re- organized 
so that the final dataset had a total of 242 sentences with decade constructions, 
which refer to the period from the 1920s until the 1990s. A non-trivial seman-
tic feature of this construction is that the ordinal, such as dvadcatye (twenties), 
refers to a timespan that does not fully coincide with a corresponding decade. 
A timespan is perceived as a featured historical period, with specific connota-
tions, expressed by an adjective and shared between a speaker and an audience. 
As Zerubavel (2003, 31) observes, the corpus analysis of decade constructions 
reveals a non-even distribution of historical periods so that “hills and valleys” 
appear in the collective memory. Some decades seem to be salient and promi-
nent mnemonic concepts, whereas others remain almost forgotten.
Frequency analyses of the examples have their own methodological specific-
ity. Most corpus methods focus on the most frequent entries, and those that are 
statistically non-significant are typically not considered. In this case, however, 
even a unique entry should not be neglected and must be included in the 
analysis, as the adjective still refers to a shared collective concept that can only 
be understood if this association occurs. Figure 17.1 displays the overall fre-
quency distribution of the construction for each decade. The radar-chart values 
for each decade correspond to the mean value for all constructions. Table 17.3 
presents the number of constructions that occur in the RNC for each ordinal.
It is clear from both Fig. 17.1 and Table 17.3 that the distribution is not 
even. Naïve chronology covers almost all of the decades in the twentieth cen-
tury, but some are more important (the 1930s and 1990s). Some decades are 
rarely referred to (the 1950s and 1980s), which means that they do not form a 
mnemonic pattern and barely exist in the collective memory. The 1990s, which 
was the turbulent period of post-Soviet political and economic transition and a 
time of intensive and highly emotional social reflection, display the highest 
frequency, whereas the 1950s and the 1980s represent the lowest, which is less 
than the overall mean. These two periods coincide with the end of two histori-
cal epochs: Stalin’s reign of terror and Brezhnev’s era of stagnation. One might 
speculate that they do not form a holistic mnemonic pattern because they are 
more likely to represent a rupture between the preceding and subsequent 
decades.
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Our research continues with the analysis of 117 adjectives, which are used 
with the ordinals in question and fall into several semantic classes. The first 
three classes are united by the semantics of direct or indirect emotional assess-
ment toward an ordinal. The epithet basically defines the decade as a separate 
cultural phenomenon with specific symbolic meaning; the epithet also contains 
a built-in assessment of the epoch by the speakers. These are adjectives that 
refer to real-world attributes that are characteristic of the historical period, such 
as ateističeskie dvadcatye (atheistic twenties), stilâžnye pâtidesâtye (dandy fif-














Fig. 17.1 Frequency of adjective decade constructions for each decade
Table 17.3 Frequency 
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comprises adjectives of positive or negative assessment, which include meta-
phorical expressions, such as lihie devânostye (wild nineties). There are also 
adjectives that emphasize the prominence of the decade that cannot be classi-
fied as either positive or negative, such as nepovtorimye devânostye (unique 
nineties) and rokovye sorokovye (fatal forties). Two more adjectival classes are 
connected by spatial or geographical references, such as sovetskie semidesâtye 
(Soviet seventies) and moskovskie šestidesâtye (Moscow sixties), or by temporal 
references of which the most frequent are rannie (early) and pozdnie (late). 
One might expect the latter two to reflect a common characteristic of any 
decade, but this is not the case because their distribution across the decades is 
uneven (see Fig. 17.2): the concept “early/late” is not selected randomly but 
corresponds to micro-historical patterns. Hence, the “early thirties” is a period 
that precedes the Great Terror, which is not referred to as the “late thirties” 
because it has its own name. On the other hand, the “late fifties” and “early 
sixties” combined constitute the conceptual memory of the Khrushchev Thaw 
(Rus. ottepel’).
As Fig. 17.1 indicates, “the nineties” is the most frequently occurring nomi-
nation in the dataset and it represents a very special case of collective memory 
modeling. Approximately 70 percent of all “nineties” examples contain attri-
butes of either a positive or negative assessment. The most common is lihie 
devânostye (wild nineties), which occurs 14 times (30%). However, on 10 of 
those occasions, the adjective lihie (wild) is enclosed within quotation marks, 
which makes the whole pattern more complex. One might assume that the 
speaker uses quotation marks to refer not to the collective memory but to the 
Fig. 17.2 Distribution of rannie (early) and pozdnie (late) in decade constructions
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preceding contextual usage of the expression specifically adopted by those in 
power. This is where the process of lexicalization begins and initial conceptual 
semantics fade. This is even more obvious when examining the Newspaper 
subcorpus within the RNC (about 133 million tokens from 2001 to 2014). 
The “nineties” constructions again constitute the dominant majority, compris-
ing approximately 50 percent of all the examples, of which 30 percent is lihie 
devânostye (wild nineties). However, the marked difference in distribution 
demonstrates that the collective memory of the post-Soviet nineties was formed 
later in the noughties when it became a phrasal cliché through the perpetual 
repetition of lihie devânostye (wild nineties) in the media. Figure 17.3 presents 
the rapidly increasing frequency of the “wild” nineties compared to all other 
adjectives followed by the ordinal; “wild” becomes nearly dominant from 2008 
to present. Having become a fixed-word combination, lihie devânostye (wild 
nineties) no longer triggers collective memory but is instead a meme, a seman-
tically bleached language sign that has nothing in common with the concept of 
“wildness and chaos,” which is something that could be associated with the 
period in question.
The case study presented above demonstrates the potential usefulness of 
relatively small datasets in collecting promising historical observations on 
“memory landscapes” by using linguistic corpora. Although the dataset is too 
small to apply standard statistical measures, the qualitative analysis of symbolic 
value provides an alternative basis for interpretation, which is based on evi-
dence rather than statistics. There is no single occurrence of the construction 
nor is a single use of the adjectives random because they are all bricks in the 
construction of a controversial and multifaceted collective memory. What is of 










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
wild 90sothers
Fig. 17.3 Frequencies of lihie devânostye (wild nineties) compared to all adjectives 
attested in the construction (2001–2013, the Newspaper subcorpus)
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terms of both genre and timespan. Its morphological mark-up also allows the 
user to search not only for a word but also for a moving context that yields 
insights that are otherwise inaccessible.
17.4.2  Integrum (www.integrumworld.com)
Although it is not a corpus in the strict sense, the Integrum database of Russian 
media has features that render it extremely useful for research purposes in com-
parison with both linguistic corpora and biased raw Internet data (for a com-
parison, see Mustajoki 2006; Plungian 2006). The service is not free, but 
libraries and universities throughout the world provide access to it online.
The main benefit of Integrum is that it covers almost all newspapers and 
magazines published in Russia from the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, users 
have easy access to the full texts of metropolitan media publications, such as 
Izvestia and Komsomolskaya pravda, as well as to far more remote and thus dif-
ficult to obtain media including Vesti respubliki (Grozny, Chechnya), Večernij 
Murmansk, and Saratovskaya panorama. Dozens of Russian-language newspa-
pers published outside Russia are likewise available, including Evropa- Èkspress 
(Berlin), Karavan (Kazakhstan), and Minskij kur’er (Belarus). Complementing 
the printed media, Integrum also includes a wide variety of data from radio and 
television broadcasts, online media, news agencies, and legislation. A total of 
approximately 200 million texts are available, which means many more than 50 
billion running words.
A researcher can find some of the materials available in Integrum elsewhere 
on the Internet. Yet what makes Integrum invaluable is the thorough catego-
rization of the data. Within the categories, users can search for further sources 
of interest simply by clicking on a given list of resources. This option is espe-
cially useful for those who are interested in examining different opinions on 
political issues, such as pension reforms throughout Russia, or in comparing 
regional differences in attitudes, such as how foreign powers are perceived in 
the eastern part of Siberia versus attitudes that prevail in the capital region.
The data in Integrum are not deeply morphologically annotated, but the 
search options are diverse nonetheless. To make searches, users can utilize 
tokens (word forms), lemmas (words), or parts of words (using wildcards). It 
is possible to determine the distance between the searched words, that is, how 
far apart they are to be included in the results. For example, the query [mod-
ernizac* :3 Rossi*] returns all contexts in which all forms of the words occur 
within one to three words of each other. In addition, a brief excerpt and the full 
text are provided for the examples found. Researchers may also conduct more 
sophisticated searches to create macros that enable them to more precisely 
pinpoint the passages they find most interesting and useful. For anyone with a 
limited command of Russian, one available option is to make a quick automatic 
English translation in the search box. Thus, a look-up value, such as “digital 
Russia,” returns texts containing corresponding Russian words highlighted in 
Russian-language articles.
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17.4.2.1  Case Study: Political Buzzwords in Russian4
Integrum is intended primarily for business people, journalists, and scholars 
who are interested in Russian society and politics, and the economy, but it can 
also be used effectively in linguistic studies, such as to determine how people 
use the Russian language (see Mustajoki and Pussinen 2006, 2008). Below we 
present a case that demonstrates the use of Integrum in interdisciplinary 
research to examine attitudes toward the modernization process of the Russian 
media, with special reference to events that made modernization impossible to 
achieve.
Although “modernization,” or modernizaciâ in Russian, has a colloquial 
usage, its appropriation by Dmitry Medvedev’s administration made it a buzz-
word that is identifiable as a marker in certain types of political discourse. This 
word became a central concept in Medvedev’s political program during his 
presidential term (2008–2012). Thus, modernizaciâ has both political and 
economic connotations and has continued to be associated with Medvedev and 
his politics.
In their study of media texts on modernization, Laine and Mustajoki (2017) 
concentrated on the period from December 31, 2000, to December 31, 2012, 
because it covers the rise and fall in usage of this notion in Russian media dis-
course. Within that timeframe, 94,500 occurrences of the word modernizaciâ 
in all its forms were detected in 350 national Russian newspapers (see Fig. 17.4).
A preliminary investigation of the examples revealed that discussion related 
to the concept was frequent, but that the overall attitude was rather skeptical. 
Fig. 17.4 The relative frequency (%) of modernizaciâ (modernization) occurring in 
texts from Russian national newspapers (Source: Integrum, Dec. 31, 2000—Dec. 
31, 2012)
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Many writers welcomed the modernization process per se, but they expected it 
to fail as did all previous attempts at reform. They insisted that reform could 
only succeed if X were to take place, X being something specific that should be 
undertaken, as in the following example:
Bez ètoj mobil’nosti nevozmožna modernizaciâ strany, a značit, gosudarstvu pri-
detsâ pojti na strukturnye izmeneniâ v èlitah. (RBC, July 1, 2008)
Without this mobility, modernization of the country is impossible, which 
means that the state will have to go for structural changes in the elites. (RBC, 
July 1, 2008)
Our observation corresponds to that of Juri Prokhorov and Iosif Sternin 
(2006, 67–68), who claimed that Russians tend to typically adopt reasoning 
based on a “single-explanation” in their public representations of themselves. 
These sociolinguists examined the cliché that Russians search for a centralized 
solution for all problems and put their trust in quick and simple resolutions for 
complex problems. According to Prokhorov and Sternin, what lies behind this 
stereotype is the historically grounded, left-leaning reasoning that responsibil-
ity for everything rests with oni (in Russian, “they”; here, “the ones with 
power”). This responsibility pertains to not only the country’s prosperity but 
also the well-being of the nation. “They” may be personalized, as a czar or a 
president, or it may be an abstract concept referring to those who have power. 
The implicit belief underlying this attitude is that the solution lies outside and 
above, not with the people themselves, whereas “they”—the ones with the 
power—have the opportunity, the capability, to make life better in Russia.
Laine and Mustajoki (2017) used the multistage cascade search technique 
to explore that line of argument more deeply as it applies to the concept of 
modernization. As a first step, all contexts of all forms of the word modern-
izaciâ were extracted. Thereafter, only contexts that referred to the modern-
ization of the whole country were considered further, rather than those that 
related to a specific sector, such as transportation, education, or the army. To 
achieve this, they introduced additional search criteria: contextual conditions, 
which restrict the context to all-Russian modernization, for example, modern-
izaciâ + Rossii (modernization of Russia) or modernizaciâ strany (moderniza-
tion of the country). More detailed restrictions were applied during the next 
step—finding the “single-explanation” argument. This means that certain 
expressions had to be attested in a nearby context within the same sentence, 
such as [modernizaciâ] vozmožna, tol’ko esli ([modernization] is possible only 
if) or [dlja modernizacii] neobhodimo ([for modernization,] it is necessary to). 
The corpus was restricted to the news media, which excluded scientific articles, 
official documents, and historical texts. In total, approximately 100 contexts 
were subject to further detailed analysis.
To summarize, according to the results by Laine and Mustajoki, the factors 
that obstruct modernization fall into several categories: (a) economic (such as 
a low level of investment in industry, raw-material dependency and a lack of 
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“civilized” competition); (b) scientific and educational (the country should 
create the “necessary” environment for young scientists and “normal” condi-
tions for specialist education in order to avoid a national brain drain); and (c) 
political (controversial opinions such as “Under this rule, modernization is 
impossible” and “Only Putin would have the ability to modernize the coun-
try”; “The party in power, United Russia, can ensure the success of 
modernization”).
The Russian word importozamesênie, which is both difficult to pronounce 
and comprehend, means “import substitution” in a Russian-specific sense. A 
new phase of Russian political rhetoric began in 2012 when Putin embarked on 
his successive terms in the Kremlin. The context of both his third and fourth 
terms was that of empowered authoritarianism. After the annexation of Crimea, 
the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and some other countries 
imposed sanctions on Russia, and Russia enacted counter-sanctions on EU 
products (see Travin et al. 2020). In the changed political situation, President 
Putin introduced the new concept of importozamesênie (import substitution), 
among other buzzwords. Its meteoric rise in the media is astonishing and com-
parable with that of “Russian modernization”; Fig. 17.5 illustrates how quickly 
its frequency increased in Russian media coverage from 2014 onward.
The “single-explanation” comments were again attested in the data after the 
new buzzword appeared. This time, the explanations tempering the effect of 
importozamesênie (import substitution) included the competitiveness of 
Russian enterprises and a new attitude toward agriculture:
Fig. 17.5 The usage of modernizaciâ Rossii (modernization of Russia) in comparison 
to importozamesênie (import substitution) (Source: Integrum, Russian National Media, 
2013–2015)
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Vozmožno, ambicioznye plany èkspertov sel’hozotrasli po importozamesêniû i 
sbudutsâ, no tol’ko esli rynok tepličnyh ovosêj budet horošo udobren bankovskimi 
investiciâmi i gosudarstvennoj podderžkoj. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, September 4, 2015)
Perhaps the ambitious plans of experts in the agricultural sector for import 
substitution will come true, but only if the greenhouse vegetables market is well- 
fertilized with bank investments and government support.
[S]trane nužno importozamesênie, no ono vozmožno tol’ko pri nizkoj inflâcii. 
(Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 20, 2014)
[T]he country needs import substitution, but it is possible only with low 
inflation.
To summarize, the large-scale media data provided by Integrum revealed 
three major findings. First, a large amount of data distinctly reflect the extent 
to which awareness of the political agenda set by Russian leaders is spreading 
among people. The concepts of “modernization” and “import substitution” 
aroused interest, having been introduced by leaders and reproduced in the 
media. Second, a more detailed analysis revealed recurring attitudes toward the 
concepts: there were frequent occurrences of “single-explanation” reasoning 
concerning the possibilities of modernization and import substitution, which 
appears to be a recurrent argument in Russian media discourse. Third, a quali-
tative analysis made it possible to identify the reasons that were used in media 
discourse to prevent changes in Russia. A single reason was usually provided to 
explain the failure, be it economic, educational, or political.
17.5  conclusIon
Texts are the principle sources of analysis in various types of research. Large 
textual corpora are an excellent source for investigating diverse concepts and 
their reflection in the language and attitudes in a society. These types of studies 
need both statistical data and in-depth analysis, which the described resources 
have to offer. If a researcher is aware of how to use the available resources and 
conducts an investigation within the limits that the data impose, then the 
results are reliable and inspiring.
We have presented various textual resources that are available for Russian 
studies: the web as a corpus, electronic libraries, and linguistics corpora. Some 
of these are specifically designed for linguistic research, but the majority may be 
effectively utilized in wider text-based studies. We emphasized the two most 
significant resources in particular: the Russian National Corpus and the 
Integrum database. The case studies we presented utilized a basic corpus- 
informed analysis to illustrate the usefulness of both resources in the study of 
societal changes as they are reflected in the language.
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notes
1. The projects embrace the cause of promoting copyleft ideas, the free distribution 
of copies (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyleft). Although many of the pub-
lications on these sites are no longer under copyright, there have been many 
accusations of copyright infringement.
2. This section is adapted from  our previous review by Kopotev et  al. (2018). 
Readers who are interested in the specific linguistic details are advised to consult 
that publication.
3. This section is based on Bonch-Osmolovskaya (2018), where more details are 
provided.
4. This section is based to some extent on Laine and Mustajoki (2017), where more 
details are provided.
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CHAPTER 18




In natural language processing (NLP) and information retrieval (IR), it is often 
useful to utilize various types of knowledge, including lexical knowledge about 
relations between words, their senses, domain-specific knowledge, and com-
monsense knowledge. The conventional way to represent this knowledge 
within NLP systems are the so-called thesauri (= thesauruses). In NLP and IR 
domains, a thesaurus is a language or terminological resource describing rela-
tions between lexical or terminological units in a formalized form (in form of 
links), which makes it possible to use such descriptions in computer text 
processing.
There exist two well-known paradigms of thesauri used in computer infor-
mation systems. The first paradigm is information retrieval thesauri, designated 
for improving document search in information retrieval systems. The role of 
such thesauri in information retrieval was most significant during the 
1960–1980s of the twentieth century. Currently, global search engines do not 
use manually created thesauri. Nevertheless, the importance of such resources 
continues to be quite high, because such thesauri are used in information ser-
vices of large international organizations as a source of recommended key-
words for document indexing and search. However, these thesauri are not 
intended for automatic procedures of indexing and information search 
(ISO-25964 2011; NISO 2005).
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Another paradigm of thesaurus-like resources is implemented in Princeton 
WordNet, created for the English language (Fellbaum 1998; Miller 1998). 
Since its appearance, WordNet has attracted a lot of attention of researchers 
and other specialists in natural language processing and information retrieval. 
WordNet-like thesauri (wordnets) have been initiated for many languages in 
the world (Vossen 1998; Bond and Foster 2013; Maziarz et al. 2016). In con-
trast to information retrieval thesauri, which are created for specific domains, 
wordnets usually represent the lexical system of a specific language in the form 
of sets of synonyms and relations between them.
As a detailed formalized description of the language lexical system, WordNet 
is used in numerous applications as a tool for automatic text processing, as a 
basis for generating new computational resources (e.g., ImageNet [Mishkin 
et al. 2017] or SentiWordNet [Baccianella et al. 2010]). But WordNet’s struc-
ture is not convenient for describing the conceptual system of a broad domain 
because of WordNet’s orientation to representing the lexical system of the lan-
guage including parts of speech, lexical relations (synonyms, antonyms, deriva-
tion, etc.), and language registers (Loukachevitch and Dobrov 2014).
In this chapter, we describe the Russian thesaurus RuThes, which has been 
created as a tool for automatic document processing of contemporary news 
texts, newspaper articles, and legal texts to enable their search, categorization, 
clustering, and so on. In its structure, RuThes combines approaches for lan-
guage and knowledge representation that are accepted in information retrieval 
thesauri and WordNet-like resources. The development of RuThes began more 
than 20 years ago. The thesaurus continues to be updated with novel concepts, 
words, senses, and multiword expressions, which represent the current state of 
the Russian language used in contemporary texts. RuThes stores knowledge 
about current social and political life in Russia, which can be described using 
the thesaurus’ relations. We compare the RuThes structure with other thesau-
rus paradigms and provide several examples of recently introduced concepts.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 18.2 we describe the main 
methodologies for creating large thesauri for natural language processing and 
information retrieval. In Sect. 18.3, we discuss the approach to knowledge 
representation in the RuThes thesaurus. Section 18.4 is devoted to the descrip-
tion of current social and political concepts in RuThes.
18.2  thesaurI In nLP an Ir
18.2.1  WordNet Thesaurus and Wordnets
The structure of Princeton University’s WordNet (and other wordnets) is 
based on sets of synonyms—synsets. Most synsets are provided with a “gloss” 
explaining their meaning. If a word has several meanings, it is included into 
several synsets. Synset is considered by the authors as a representation of the 
lexicalized concept of the English language. The current WordNet (version 
3.0) covers approximately 155,000 unique words and phrases, organized into 
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117,000 synsets. Each synset has relations with other synsets, such as hypo-
nyms (more specific words), hyperonyms (more general words), meronyms 
(parts), holonyms (wholes), and others. The WordNet thesaurus includes the 
words of four parts of speech (nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs) and is 
divided into four lexical nets according to these parts of speech. The synsets of 
each part of speech in WordNet have their own sets of relationships. Also, spe-
cific words in synsets can have their own lexical relations (antonyms, deriva-
tion). Princeton WordNet (Fellbaum 1998; Miller 1998) is freely available on 
the Internet (WordNet 2019), and on its basis thousands of experiments in the 
field of information retrieval and natural language processing were carried out 
(for more on linguistic resources, see Chaps. 29, 19 and 26).
Bond et al. (2016) noted that WordNet-like resources (wordnets) created 
for different languages, while preserving the basic structure of WordNet, 
can differ significantly from each other in terms of the inclusion of words 
and expressions in synsets, the use of semantic relations between synsets, 
and the interpretation of specific semantic relations. Also, in wordnets, 
approaches to the description of polysemy can vary considerably, which 
leads to a more fine or coarse system of representing the senses of ambigu-
ous words. There may be different approaches to the inclusion of multiword 
expressions into wordnets.
Some features of the WordNet structure are not very convenient for describ-
ing the conceptual system of a specific domain. These features include sets of 
synonyms (synsets) as a basic unit of the thesaurus, the division into part-of- 
speech structures, lexical relations, and approaches to inclusion phrases. 
However, several attempts to create domain-specific wordnets (e.g., 
ArchiWordNet, Jur-WordNet) have been made (for a review, see Lüngen 
et al. 2008).
18.2.2  Information Retrieval Thesauri
Information retrieval thesauri are important instruments in information and 
library services; for years, they were used for representing the domain knowl-
edge in information retrieval systems. International and national standards 
have been published in the 1980s and continue to be updated (ISO-25964 
2011; NISO 2005; Dextre Clarke and Zeng 2012). There exist some very 
influential international thesauri such as EUROVOC—the thesaurus of the 
European Community (EUROVOC Thesaurus 1995), the UNBIS thesaurus 
of the United Nations (United Nations 1976), the Art and Architecture the-
saurus (Art & Architecture Thesaurus Online 2018) and others.
Information retrieval thesauri are less known and utilized for NLP purposes 
because they are intended to be used only in manual or automated indexing by 
human indexers, according to the thesaurus standards (ISO-25964 2011; 
NISO 2005). However, the principles of describing broad and complex 
domains are important for comparison with the WordNet structure.
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The main units of information retrieval thesauri are domain terms denoting 
domain concepts. Domain concepts can have several variants of text represen-
tation, which are considered as synonyms. Among synonyms, the most repre-
sentative variant, called a descriptor or preferred term, is chosen. Other terms 
included in the thesaurus are called nonpreferred terms and used as auxiliary 
units helping to find preferred terms.
Every descriptor should be formulated unambiguously. If a clear and unam-
biguous descriptor cannot be formulated, the term that is taken as a descriptor 
is supplied with a relator (a short label) or comment. In standards, there are 
special guidelines for introducing multiword descriptors (NISO 2005). The set 
of the thesaurus descriptors should be sufficient to describe the topics of the 
absolute majority of the documents in the domain. To explain why such the-
sauri are not suited for use in automatic document processing, we would like 
to provide several examples from the EUROVOC thesaurus (EUROVOC 
1995). EUROVOC is created for 23 languages of the European Union and 
therefore it does not include Russian, but this thesaurus is one of the most 
well-known resources and therefore its principles are important to consider.
To improve the domain representation for humans, the guidelines for the 
creation of information retrieval thesauri often recommend not to include cer-
tain kinds of terms in a thesaurus (infrequent terms, terms that are too specific, 
similar terms etc.; United Nations 2009). Relying on human indexers, tradi-
tional information retrieval thesauri try to limit the inclusion of ambiguous 
terms, which leads to problems in automatic document processing. In 
EUROVOC, for example, the single-word term bank is presented in only one 
sense; other senses are described in form of multiword terms (sperm bank, data 
bank, blood bank). Note, that in WordNet, the word bank has ten senses as a 
noun and eight senses as a verb. In the defense category, EUROVOC does not 
contain such terms as soldier or military force; only the descriptor armed force 
is presented.
The relations in information retrieval thesauri are quite different from 
WordNet-like lexical relations. Information retrieval thesauri have a small set of 
generalized relations, which are usually subdivided into two classes: hierarchi-
cal and associative. The most frequent type of hierarchical relations between 
preferred terms in information retrieval thesauri are the broader-narrow rela-
tions (BT and NT relations), comprising class-subclass, instance-class, and 
sometimes part-whole relationships. The associative relations convey various 
other types of domain-specific relations between concepts (related term (RT) 
relation). The standards and manuals on thesaurus development formulate 
principles for representing associative relations as the most significant ones 
(NISO 2005; Aitchinson and Gilchrist 1987).
The RT relations are considered to be symmetric, but looking at the existing 
thesauri, it is possible to see that this is not true in many cases. For example, in 
EUROVOC the air transport descriptor has RT relations with such descriptors 
as air law, air traffic control, and aviation fuel, which are much narrower than 
the air transport descriptor. This simple system of relations has been criticized 
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in many works (Tudhope et al. 2001) but it has an important advantage: it can 
be applied to any domain without additional efforts to develop the detailed set 
of domain-specific relations, which always is a very complex task.
In Russia, the most known information retrieval thesauri are developed in 
the Institute of Scientific Information of Russian Academy of Sciences (INION 
RAN). This institution publishes separate issues of thesauri on economics, soci-
ology, linguistics, and so on, created according to the guidelines of interna-
tional and national standards on thesaurus construction. These thesauri also 
cannot be used for automatic processing of document and news flows 
(Mdivani 2013).
18.3  ruthes structure, unIts, and reLatIons
18.3.1  RuThes General Structure
In the construction of RuThes, both popular paradigms for computer thesauri 
were used: concept-based units, a small set of relation types, and rules for 
including multiword expressions as in information retrieval thesauri; language- 
motivated units, detailed sets of synonyms, and description of ambiguous 
words as in wordnets. Also, some issues of ontology research—for example, 
concepts as main units, strictness of relation description, necessity for many- 
step inference—are accounted for (Guarino 1998, 2009).
RuThes is a hierarchical network of concepts. Each concept has a name, 
relations with other concepts, and a set of language expressions (words, phrases, 
terms) whose meanings correspond to the concept. The whole set of RuThes’ 
concepts is subdivided into general lexicon and sociopolitical thesaurus. 
General Lexicon comprises general concepts and words that can be met in vari-
ous specific domains such as sozdanie (creation), udalit’ (remove), uslovnye 
(conditional). Sociopolitical Thesaurus contains thematically oriented lexemes 
and multiword expressions as well as domain-specific terms of the broad socio-
political domain. The whole RuThes thesaurus includes more than 60,000 
concepts and more than 200,000 Russian text entries (words and expressions). 
The published version of RuThes for use in noncommercial applications 
includes 110,000 text entries (RuThes 2019).
The sociopolitical domain is the domain of problems, relationships, and situ-
ations of the contemporary society (Loukachevitch and Dobrov 2015). 
Subdomains of the sociopolitical domain are themselves large domains such as 
economics, law, or international relations, each with its own terminology. 
However, the specific feature of the sociopolitical domain (and its subdomains) 
is that most domain terms are known to nonprofessionals. Here, in the socio-
political domain, the general language and domain terminologies adjoin and 
mix with each other. At present, the RuThes sociopolitical thesaurus includes 
terminology from such domains as politics, elections, sociology, demography, 
social security, civil and criminal law, the court system, banking, security, eco-
nomics (including macroeconomics, industry, agriculture, and transport), ecol-
ogy, accidents, sports, culture, and others.
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18.3.2  RuThes Units
The RuThes thesaurus is a hierarchy of concepts viewed as units of thought. A 
concept is associated with the set of language expressions that refer to it in 
texts. This approach is similar to approaches of traditional information retrieval 
construction (NISO 2005). In most cases, concepts should have denotational 
distinctions from related concepts. Such distinctions can be expressed in a spe-
cific set of relationships or associated language expressions: text entries.
Words and phrases whose meanings refer to the same concepts represented 
in the thesaurus are called ontological synonyms. Ontological synonyms can 
comprise sense-related words belonging to different parts of speech (i.e., 
privatizaciâ [privatization] vs. privatizirovat’ [to privatize]); in contrast to tra-
ditional terminological resources and information retrieval thesauri that con-
tain mainly nouns or noun phrases. A thesaurus for automatic document 
processing should contain various types of language units. Also, language 
expressions relating to different linguistic styles, technical terms, and lexical 
units can be presented as ontological synonyms related to the same concept. 
For example, the concept Oil industry has the following text entries: neftânaâ 
promyšlennost’ (oil industry)—neutral, neftânka—slang, nefteprom—abbrevia-
tion. Compositional multiword expressions may be included into synonymic 
sets as well. Each concept should have a clear, univocal, and concise name. 
Such names often help to express and delimit the denotational scope of the 
concept. In addition, the concepts’ names can be used in the analysis of the 
results of automatic document analysis, for example in visualization of trends 
or as cluster names.
Ontological synonyms, variants of lexical units, and technical terms 
(Nazarenko and Zargayouna 2009) are collected specially. After a concept has 
been introduced, an expert searches for all possible synonyms or orthographic 
variants, single words, and phrases that can be associated with it. These syn-
onymic sets can also include multiple variants of the references to the same 
concept. For example, the concept Ohrana prirody (Nature protection) is asso-
ciated with almost 50 different text entries in Russian, for example zasîta 
prirody (defense of nature), sohranenie prirody (maintenance of nature), zasîsât’ 
prirodu (to protect nature), sohranât’ prirodu (to maintain nature), and others. 
These variants are useful to describe in the thesaurus because they directly refer 
to their concept. Besides, multiword term variants often contain ambiguous 
words within themselves. Thus, the inclusion of such term variants decreases 
the overall lexical ambiguity and facilitates disambiguation. All variants are col-
lected during the analysis of real texts, usually news articles, legislative acts, or 
domain-specific documents.
In fact, the introduction of such a concept as Nature protection corresponds 
more to information retrieval thesauri than wordnets, because one of the 
important principles of WordNet-like resources is to include single words and 
lexicalized phrases into synsets (Bentivogli and Pianta 2004; Maziarz and 
Piasecki 2018). The phrase nature protection seems compositional, but the 
 N. LOUKACHEVITCH AND B. DOBROV
325
concept Nature protection is significant for the contemporary life of the society 
and it has relations with other important concepts of the sociopolitical domain.
As can be seen, one of the difficult issues in developing application-oriented 
resources, such as wordnets or information retrieval thesauri is the inclusion of 
units (synsets or descriptors) based on the senses of multiword expressions, for 
example noun compounds (Bentivogli and Pianta 2004). Manuals and stan-
dards for information retrieval thesaurus development provide detailed princi-
ples for multiword term selection (NISO 2005; Aitchinson and Gilchrist 
1987). In RuThes, the introduction of concepts based on multiword expres-
sions is not restricted but encouraged if this concept adds some new informa-
tion to the knowledge described in the thesaurus (Loukachevitch and 
Lashevich 2016).
18.3.3  RuThes Relations
Conceptual relations in the thesaurus may be utilized for several purposes, 
including query expansion in information retrieval, clustering related concepts 
mentioned in a text as a basis for better recognition of the main theme and 
subthemes in the document, and disambiguation of ambiguous terms and lexi-
cal units. Working with such a broad scope of concepts, we utilize a set of rela-
tions that can be applied to concepts in various domains, in contrast to 
domain-dependent relations.
RuThes has a small set of conceptual relations consisting of four main rela-
tions that describe the most important links of a concept. In fact, the current 
set of relations in the thesaurus is a more ontologically motivated variant of 
classic inter-descriptor relationships in information retrieval thesauri, which 
usually include hierarchical relations, such as broader term (BT) and narrower 
term (NT), and associative relations—related term (RT).
The first relation of RuThes is the class-subclass relation as it is treated in 
ontological approaches (Guarino 1998; Gangemi et  al. 2003). To establish 
such relations, we apply tests similar to those used in ontology development. 
The tests are directed toward avoiding incorrect use of class-subclass relations 
and not mixing them up with other types of relations (such as type-role rela-
tion, class-instance relation), because errors in relation types degrade logical 
inference (Gangemi et al. 2003). The class-subclass relationship is considered 
as a transitive relation with the inheritance property.
The second relationship is part-whole relation, which is established using 
specific ontological restrictions (Gangemi et al. 2003). Our decision on part- 
whole relations is based on the following principles:
• Broad treatment of part-whole relations from the semantic point of view,
• Restriction of ontological subtypes of part-whole relations,
• Postulating the transitivity of part-whole relations.
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Part-whole relations in RuThes comprise such relationships as parts of phys-
ical objects, territorial and geographical parts, process parts, and others (see 
examples in Table 18.1). Also, some other relationships are presented as part- 
whole relations in RuThes: an attribute and its bearer, a role or a participant in 
the situation (Winston et  al. 1987, 27–28), entities and situations in the 
encompassing sphere of activity (Table 18.1).
In such a broad scope, part-whole relations described in RuThes are close to 
the so-called internal relations (parthood, constitution, quality inherence, and 
participation) as described by Guarino (2009). At the same time, part-whole 
relations in RuThes have a very important restriction (correlating with the 
information retrieval thesauri guidelines about the necessity to describe only 
inherent properties as hierarchical relations [NISO 2005]): a concept-part 
should be related to its whole during the normal existence of its instances: the 
so-called ontological dependence.
To analyze the ontological dependence between entities X and Y, it is neces-
sary to determine whether entity X can exist by itself or whether its existence 
depends on the existence of Y. We describe the following types of dependent 
parts in RuThes:
Table 18.1 Types and examples of part-whole relations in RuThes
Type of relationship Part Whole
Parts of physical objects starter dvigatelâ (motor 
starter)
kost’ (bone)






izbiratel’nyj ucǎstok (electoral 
precinct)
bankovskij sejf (bank safe)—
pustynâ (desert),
izbiratel’nyj okrug (electoral 
district),
bankovskoe hranilisê (bank vault)
Process parts izbiratel’naâ tehnologiâ 
(electoral technology)
predvybornaâ kampaniâ (pre- 
election campaign)
Text and musical parts vvedenie (text introduction) 
muzykal’nyj interval (musical 
interval)
tekst (text),
muzykal’naâ kompoziciâ (musical 
composition)
Members cľen politicěskoj partii 
(political party member)
deputat Gosudarstvennoj 
Dumy (State Duma Deputy)
politicěskaâ partiâ (political party),
Gosudarstvennaâ Duma (State 
Duma, the lower house of the 
Russian Parliament)
Substance as a part židkost’ v organizme (body 
fluids)
telo (body of living organism)
An attribute and its bearer skorost’ (speed)










Entities and situations in 
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• Inseparable part, which is a part that cannot exist without its whole, such 
as oazis (oasis)—pustynâ (desert);
• Mandatory whole, when a part requires the existence of at least one entity 
described as a whole, such as bankovskij sejf (bank safe) and bankovskoe 
hranilis ê (bank vault) (Guizzardi 2011).
Thus, we put existential constraints on the part-whole relations in RuThes. 
These constraints do not change the transitivity of part-whole relations if it was 
postulated. The inference mechanism can thereby utilize the transitivity of 
part-whole relations and rely on the chain of part-whole relations (Guizzardi 
2011; Loukachevitch and Dobrov 2015).
The final types of relationships are nonsymmetrical and symmetrical associa-
tions, which are subdivided from the symmetric related term (RT) relation of 
conventional information retrieval thesauri. The nonsymmetrical associations 
are established on the basis of the ontological dependence of concepts. 
Symmetrical associations are described in the very restricted number of cases.
Associative relationships (RT relations) are quite common in information 
retrieval thesauri; they are established to provide additional links between 
descriptors for use in the indexing or retrieval of documents (NISO 2005). 
Such relations in information retrieval thesauri are always considered as sym-
metrical; however, many associative relations found in published thesauri dem-
onstrate the evident absence of symmetry, for example illness—disease 
prevention, illness—sick leave (EUROVOC), et cetera. The first term in each 
pair is much more general than the other one.
Considering the problems involved in formalizing traditional information 
retrieval thesauri to adapt them to the contemporary level of ontological 
research, some authors propose changing the thesaurus’s traditional system of 
relations to a formalized set of predicates and to provide axioms for such a set 
(Soergel et  al. 2004). However, in creating such multidomain resources as 
RuThes, it is very difficult to find the universal set of semantic relations and 
apply them consistently. Therefore, we substituted the traditional thesaurus 
relation of symmetric association with another quite generalized relation, 
which can be applied in many various domains. We usually refer to this relation 
as a nonsymmetrical association, asc1–asc2. The definition of this relation is 
again based on a variant of ontological dependence, the so-called external 
dependence in ontological terms (Gangemi et al. 2003; Guarino 2009). This 
relation is established between two concepts c1 and c2 when two requirements 
are fulfilled:
• Neither class-subclass nor part-whole relations can be established between 
c1 and c2 in the thesaurus.
• The following assertion is true: “concept c2 exists” means “concept c1 
exists” (necessarily existent entities are excluded from consideration).
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These two conditions mean that the concept c2 (dependent concept) exter-
nally depends on c1 : asc1(c2, c1) = asc2(c1, c2). Table 18.2 presents some exam-
ples of conceptual relationships, where conceptual dependence can be seen.
Relations of ontological dependence are applicable to various domains; 
therefore, they are usually used in top-level ontologies (Gangemi et al. 2003). 
An additional advantage of using these relations in thesauri for automatic doc-
ument processing is their usefulness for describing links between a concept 
based on the sense of a compositional multiword expression and concepts cor-
responding to the components of this multiword expression. As a result, a 
multiword-based concept (e.g., Automobile racing) is described as the depen-
dent concept and its component concept (Automobile) as the main concept. 
This allows us to introduce concepts based on various types of multiword 
expressions and to establish their necessary relations.
18.4  descrIPtIon of socIaL and PoLItIcaL concePts 
In ruthes
The specific part of RuThes called Sociopolitical thesaurus provides detailed 
coverage of thematic lexical units and terms in the broad sociopolitical domain 
of contemporary written Russian (mainly news articles, laws, and official docu-
ments). The thesaurus was utilized in document-processing applications within 
information,retrieval and information analytical systems (Loukachevitch and 
Dobrov 2015). Every project gave the opportunity to improve the descriptions 
of lexical senses, reveal useful expressions, and add domain terms of new sub-
domains of the sociopolitical domain, which, in turn, improved the description 
of related lexical senses.
Let us consider several examples of recently introduced concepts related to 
popular topics discussed in the Russian and international press and their 
descriptions in RuThes. Figure  18.1 represents the description of concepts 
Table 18.2 Examples of conceptual dependence relations denoted as nonsymmetrical 
associations in RuThes
Type of relationships Main concept Dependent concept
Instrument—professional that uses this 
instrument
skripka (violin) skripac ̌ (violinist)






Entity and related entity bagaž (luggage) bagažnaâ karusel’ (luggage 
carousel)




donorstvo krovi (blood donation)
žarka (frying)
Entity and its specific problems les (forest)
serdce (heart)
lesnoj požar (forest fire)
bolezn’ serdca (heart disease)
Entity and opposing entity or action virus (virus) antivirus (antivirus)
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related to sanctions: Sankcii protiv Rossii (Sanctions against Russia), 
Sankcionnaâ vojna (War of sanctions), Sankcionnaâ produkciâ (Products under 
sanctions). The upper-left form enumerates a list of concepts in alphabeti-
cal order.
The left-lower form shows Russian text entries for the concept War of sanc-
tions such as vojna sankcij (war of sanctions) and sankcionnaâ vojna (sanctions 
war). The right-upper form presents the relations of the highlighted concept. 
Figure 18.1 shows the relation of the War of sanctions concept with such con-
cepts as Meždunarodnyj konflikt (International conflict), Antisankcii (Counter- 
sanctions), and Meždunarodnye sankcii (International sanctions). In particular, 
the War of sanctions concept is described as dependent from the concept 
International sanctions, because it could not appear without this concept. The 
Counter-sanctions concept is described as a part of War of sanctions. The lower- 
right form shows Russian text entries for the related concept Antisankcii 
(Counter-sanctions). They include: nouns (antisankcii, kontrsankcii), noun 
groups (otvetnye sankcii [sanctions as an answer]), and adjectives (antisank-
cionnyj, kontrsankcionnyj).
After the pension reform in Russia was announced in 2018, new concepts 
Predpensioner (Person before retirement age) and Predpensionnyj vozrast 
(Before retirement age) were introduced in the thesaurus. These concepts 
appeared in Russian law to provide social security to some categories of the 
population in relation to raising the retirement age. The Before retirement age 
concept is described as a part (property) of Person before retirement age accord-
ing the thesaurus guidelines. The concept Person before retirement age depends 
on the concepts Pensioner and Pension system because it requires their existence.
Fig. 18.1 Representation of the current international sanctions situation in the the-
saurus form
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An innovation of the Russian transport law introduced yellow boxes on 
roads, a specific kind of road marks (box marking). In Russian, the concept is 
called Vafel’naâ razmetka (literally, waffle marking). The concept’s set of 
Russian text entries includes word vafel’nica, which previously meant only 
“waffle iron,” a kitchen appliance for baking waffles. Therefore, the new sense 
of the word vafel’nica and new multiword expression vafel’naâ razmetka have 
been added into RuThes.
In recent years, cryptocurrencies were actively discussed. The corresponding 
concepts: kriptovalûta (cryptocurrency), èlektronnye den’gi (electronic money), 
Bitcoin, kriptomat (Cryptocurrency ATM machine) have been introduced into 
the thesaurus.
Thus, RuThes provides detailed coverage of thematic lexical units and terms 
in the broad sociopolitical domain of contemporary written Russian (mainly 
news articles, laws, and official documents). The thesaurus can be used as a 
conceptual indexing tool in information analytical systems. RuThes can also be 
a useful instrument for developing knowledge-based categorization systems in 
conditions when a training collection for machine learning methods is absent 
and cannot be easily created. It is possible because the thesaurus contains thou-
sands of words and expressions stored in a hierarchical structure, which can be 
used in the description of categories for automatic text categorization 
(Loukachevitch and Dobrov 2015).
18.5  ruthes as a source for russIan Wordnet
Despite the fact that RuThes is currently published for noncommercial use, 
people would like to have a large Russian wordnet. Therefore, a transform-
ing procedure from the published version of RuThes (RuThes-lite) to the 
largest Russian WordNet (RuWordNet 2019) has been initiated. One of the 
most distinctive features of WordNet-like resources is their division into syn-
set nets according to parts of speech. Therefore, all text entries of RuThes-
lite were subdivided into three parts of speech: nouns (single nouns, noun 
groups, and preposition groups), verbs (single verbs and verb groups), 
adjectives (single adjectives and adjective groups). We have obtained 29,297 
noun synsets, 12,865 adjective synsets, and 7636 verb synsets. The divided 
synsets were linked to each other with the relation of part-of-speech 
synonymy.
The hyponym-hypernym lexical relations (hyponymy shows the relationship 
between a generic term [hypernym] and a specific instance of it [hyponym]) 
were established between synsets of the same part of speech. These relations 
include direct hyponym-hypernym relations from RuThes-lite. In addition, the 
transitivity property of hyponym-hypernym relations was employed in cases 
when a specific synset did not contain a specific part of speech, but its parent 
and child had text entries of this part of speech. In such cases, the 
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hypernymy- hyponymy relation was established between the child and the par-
ent of this synset.
Other RuThes relations were modified. The part-whole relations from 
RuThes were semi-automatically transferred and corrected according to tradi-
tions of WordNet-like without the expanded set of part-whole relations. Some 
part-whole relations were transformed to domain relations, for example zavod 
synset (industrial plant) is related to the domain promyšlennost’ (industry) via 
the domain relation. The ontological dependence relations of RuThes were 
manually transformed to appropriate semantic relations such as antonyms, 
cause, entailment, and some others. RuWordNet is publicly available 
(RuWordNet 2019).
18.6  concLusIon
In this chapter, we described the RuThes thesaurus that was created as a lin-
guistic and terminological resource for automatic document processing in 
Russian. In the construction of RuThes, both popular paradigms for computer 
thesauri were used: concept-based units, a small set of relation types, and rules 
for including multiword expression as in information retrieval thesauri; 
language- motivated units, detailed sets of synonyms, and description of ambig-
uous words as in wordnets. A large part of RuThes is devoted to the descrip-
tion of terms and concepts related to the current sociopolitical life in Russia 
and in the world—the so-called Sociopolitical thesaurus.
We have supported the development of RuThes for many years by introduc-
ing new concepts, representing new senses, and recording multiword expres-
sions. In this chapter, we have showed some examples of representing newly 
appeared concepts related to important internal and international events. We 
demonstrated how we used the thesaurus’ relation system for describing these 
concepts. Hence, we consider RuThes as a kind of formalized encyclopedia of 
social and political life of the contemporary society.
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CHAPTER 19





Social media and, in particular, social networking sites (SNS) have become an 
important source of research data both in Russia and worldwide which, corre-
spondingly, has given rise to new research methods and approaches. Social 
media data serve as sources of two major types of data: first, the data about the 
“offline” reality, such as migration, electoral outcomes or mental disorders, and 
second, the data about human behavior within social media, which includes 
online self-presentation, networking, media consumption or purchasing behav-
ior. Russian social media, unusual both in terms of their market configuration 
and data access opportunities, create a slim, but an interesting stream of 
research.
In this chapter, we critically review the most exemplary works in Russian 
social media studies. Our goal is to discuss strengths and weaknesses of differ-
ent research designs and methods that are seldom reported in the papers 
focused on the research results. As of now, Russian social media studies can be 
classified along two major lines. The first line differentiates between studies 
using Russian SNSs as a source of data about human behavior in general, and 
those that aim at studying specifically Russian society or Russian-speaking com-
munity with the data from different social media, including the Russian SNSs.
The second line of differentiation is disciplinary, and we can single out three 
disciplines that have contributed most to Russian social media research: 
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psychology and health studies, sociology and political science. The latter has 
focused specifically on Russia, and especially on the relations between social 
media and protests. Sociology has addressed a wide range of topics, such as 
virtual demography, education and ethnic relations whose results reflect spe-
cific Russian context, but can often be extrapolated beyond the Russian society. 
Psychological research has mostly contributed to fundamental psychology by 
studying the relation of social media to such universal psychological phenom-
ena as depression or personality traits. Health studies may be situated between 
psychology and sociology.
This review chapter focuses on the three above-mentioned disciplines. We 
find that they use a wide range of data types and data-collection techniques: 
self-reported data (from surveys and experiments collected off-line or on-line) 
and SNS activity user data (incl. user texts and their metadata, such as time-
stamps and geolocation, the data from group accounts, data on links between 
accounts and various external statistics). Methods of data analysis vary from 
traditional discourse analysis and classical statistics to social network analysis 
(SNA), supervised and unsupervised machine learning, and various combina-
tions of those.
We should also note that Russian social media are actively used in computa-
tional linguistics. Though this research community works with the Russian 
language, it does not focus either on the Russian society or a broader Russian- 
speaking community, tackling such problems as optimization of information 
retrieval, text clustering and summarization, named entity recognition or auto-
matic translation. It thus forms a distinct stream of literature addressed in this 
book (for more, see Chaps. 26, 19, 29, 25, 23 and 24) that we leave out in this 
review. We also omit the large and important topic of “research ethics is social 
media studies” as it is a subject for a separate contribution.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, we briefly introduce 
the context of social media development in Russia and show how it has resulted 
in their unique position within the global SNS landscape. The next three sec-
tions are devoted to the disciplinary overviews of political science, sociology, 
health and psychology. We conclude with summarizing both research opportu-
nities and limitations created by social media.
19.2  SocIal MedIa In ruSSIa
Russian Internet landscape is unique in terms of its “home-grown” character. 
According to Forbes.ru, Russian companies compete with global players nearly 
in all spheres of Internet business, including search engines, mailing services 
and social media (Forbes.ru 2019). Unlike in China, where the closed Internet 
ecosystem owes most of its success to the policy of technical, political and eco-
nomic isolation known as the Great Chinese Firewall, Russian information 
technologies (IT) industry has until recently developed without any protec-
tionist barriers.
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As a result, social media “diets” of Russian and Russian-language users are 
substantially different from global trends (see Table 19.1). Social networking 
site VKontakte (VK), a Russian replica of Facebook, has by far higher reach and 
especially higher user activity than all other SNSs, followed by popular, but 
much less active Odnoklassniki. Facebook (FB) in Russia is a niche network 
that attracts higher-educated audiences oriented towards international integra-
tion, business and, to some extent, more oppositional political views (e.g. 
Enikolopov et al. 2018). VK, on the other hand, has become a universal tool 
for everyday communication, practical task-solving and small business. A typi-
cal VK user consumes news from a few large entertainment and/or political 
public pages run by media organizations and also belongs to a multitude of 
smaller groups that include everything from school classes and self-help com-
munities to pages of local businesses that use VK to promote their services.
Consequently, political and market pressures experienced by VK are to some 
extent different from those faced by Facebook. Unlike Facebook, VK has not 
been accused of illegitimate influence on elections, since it is widely accepted 
that electoral outcomes in Russia depend on very different things (Gel’man 
2014). Combined with relatively low importance of privacy among the Russian 
population (Kisilevich et al. 2012), this until recently has been creating incen-
tives for VK to privilege data sharing over privacy protection. As a result, the 
amount and diversity of data available through VK application programming 
interface (API) is incomparably higher than in FB, and thousands of business 
and research actors use it on a daily basis. It is this unique data availability that 
has made possible such large-scale virtual demography projects as Webcensus 
(Zamyatina and Yashunsky 2018) (see further below). Surprisingly, such 
opportunities have attracted nearly no attention from international scholars, 
which is why most VK-based research has been done by Russian researchers.
Another important trend is the fragmentation of the Russian-speaking 
online environment. For a while, VK was an integrating medium for 
Table 19.1 SNS use in Russia according to media research (October 2018, in mil)
SNS Average daily reach 
(desktop) (Mediascope 
2018)





Vkontakte 16.82 36.4 1096
Youtube 13.84 1.9 15.9
Odnoklassniki 8.22 15.8 364
Facebook 3.23 2.3 122
Instagram 2.70 23.7 304
LiveJournal 1.24 46 4.6




aActive user: user who wrote at least one public message per month
bMessage: any publicly available post—status, wall post or comment, post or comment in online group etc. The 
analysis did not include private messages
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Russian- speakers on the Post-Soviet space, but this capacity has been severely 
hindered by the ban of VK in Ukraine in 2017 and the overall deterioration of 
Russia’s relations with the rest of the world. It is plausible to expect that in the 
near future comparative studies that include Russia might be increasingly dom-
inated by research based on global SNSs which will decrease the value of VK as 
a data source.
19.3  PolItIcal ScIence
Political science research on social media is the largest among the three men-
tioned disciplines. It focuses on a number of subfields, such as the role of social 
media for political protest and civil activity (Enikolopov et al. 2018; Koltsova 
and Selivanova 2019), mapping political discourses and agendas formed both 
by lay and professional SNS users, including media professionals and politicians 
(Bodrunova et al. 2018; Goncharov and Nechay 2018; Bulovsky 2019; Kelly 
et al. 2012; Koltsova and Koltcov 2013) or topic-specific political discussions 
(Filer and Fredheim 2016), and the newly emerged topic of SNS-channeled 
propaganda (Barash and Kelly 2012; Kelly et  al. 2012; Stukal et  al. 2017; 
Badawy et al. 2018; Sanovich 2017).
Studies based on discourse, agenda and discussion mapping are by their 
nature, mostly descriptive; and when based on manual text analysis only, usually 
not scalable. However, manual approach can be enhanced with automated text 
analysis, albeit in such case often at cost of its depth. Goncharov and Nechay 
(2018) benefit from applying such a combination to a collection of about 45 
thousand tweets related to the anti-corruption protests organized by a promi-
nent Russian oppositionist Alexei Navalny in spring 2017. To evaluate the 
mobilization potential of Twitter, they apply keyword-determined time- 
constrained sampling and then use topic modeling to reveal content-based clus-
ters and social network analysis (SNA) to find link-based communities. They 
convincingly demonstrate the dominance of an oppositional and a loyalist meta-
cluster in both partitions. An important methodological note of the authors is 
that hashtags seldom occur in their data, which questions the frequently used 
hashtag-based sampling in Twitter research. At the same time, the authors do 
not specify the type of links used, neither they explain how the two partitions of 
their data are related. Most importantly, they do not find an answer for their 
main question about mobilization effect of Twitter, since cluster analysis is a 
method suitable for descriptive, not for inferential investigation.
This limitation is shared by most SNS research based on clustering tech-
niques and some research based on manual coding. Thus, Koltsova and Koltcov 
(2013) illustrate the growth of political topics at the expense of other topics in 
the Russian-language LiveJournal (LJ) top blogs on the eve of the Russian 
parliamentary elections in 2011 which, nevertheless, does not lead to any 
hypothesis testing. Bodrunova et  al. (2018) go further by formulating the 
hypotheses about prevalence of certain media roles among professional authors 
of tweets discussing politicized violent events in four different countries, 
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including Russia. Tweets are classified manually; in principle, automatically 
clustered tweets might have equally been tested for prevalence, but no statisti-
cal procedures for doing so have been introduced in this research. The authors, 
nevertheless, offer a multitude of interesting details that help understand the 
structure of the political discussion in the four countries in a comparative per-
spective, which is still quite rare in quantitative media studies. In particular, 
they echo with Goncharov and Nechay (2018) in observing that Russian media 
on Twitter, unlike those of other countries, cluster along the pro- government—
anti-government axis.
A successful attempt to do inferential research based on blog texts is pre-
sented by Bulovsky (2019). He fits a regression model to find out the differ-
ence between Twitter communication used by authoritarian and democratic 
political leaders across 144 countries, including Russia. He finds that the for-
mer have a significantly lower number of posts per day and a significantly 
smaller proportion of replies to other users.
Another difficulty with SNS research is a possible lack of context and the 
reliability of non-SNS-based data. Enikolopov et al. (Enikolopov et al. 2018) 
perform a most rigorous statistical inference to evaluate the influence of VK on 
protests in Russia using the data on the large rallies against electoral fraud and 
on voting in the electoral cycle of 2011–2012. They find out that, paradoxi-
cally, VK penetration increases pro-government voting in the respective cities, 
but simultaneously has a positive effect on both the probability of protests and 
the number of protesters. There is not enough data to test possible alternative 
explanations of this effect, such as a polarizing influence of higher SNS pene-
tration levels on the population. At the same time, the reliability of both voting 
data (given the unknown character of electoral fraud) and the protest data 
(given that they were taken from the media where the numbers reported by the 
protesters and by the police dramatically diverged) is highly questionable. 
Reuter and Szakonyi (2015), who use offline survey data only, obtain some-
what different results and find that the usage of international social networks 
Twitter and Facebook increased the awareness about electoral fraud, while the 
usage of domestic VK and Odnoklassniki did not.
Koltsova and Selivanova (2019) solve the problem of contextual enrichment 
of SNS data with the deep involvement of one of the researchers into the social 
movement they study. Similar to Goncharov and Nechay (2018), their goal is 
to evaluate the mobilization potential of VK communities. In particular, they 
study the effect of VK on the turnout of the movement activists at the poll sta-
tions in the role of independent observers on the voting day in 2014. As the 
movement created VK groups responsible for each of the 17 administrative 
districts in St. Petersburg, the researchers investigate them all and find that 
their size, activity and density are positively related to the overall turnout; how-
ever, offline observers are neither more active nor more connected members of 
online groups. The authors offer two alternative interpretations of this effect, 
based on their experience with the movement, still the problem of reliability of 
the offline turnout data is one of the unresolved issues.
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Importantly, SNS data, though more “objectified” than self-reported or 
hand-coded data, are not always reliable either. Comparing Twitter discussions 
devoted to two resonant political murders in Russia and Argentina, Filer and 
Fredheim (2016) find out that a significant proportion of the Russian tweets, 
unlike Argentinean messages, are automatically generated (2016, 13). This has 
two implications: first, the value of Twitter as the data source in Russian politi-
cal research is limited because of the network’s limited penetration. Second, 
the study of Filer and Fredheim leads us to a whole range of related research 
topics that include online state propaganda, fake news, bot-generated content, 
influence of all those factors on electoral outcomes and the problem of the use 
of personal SNS data for political purposes.
Of this stream of research, Russia-related research has a number of special 
features. First, some research on political propaganda is performed as bot 
detection (Stukal et al. 2017). However, not all bots are political (some are 
commercial), and not all propaganda is robotized (some is manual). Second, 
the phenomena that researchers try to trace—for example, trolls—are hard to 
define conceptually and even harder to find empirically. For instance, Badawy 
et al. (2018) perform an interesting descriptive research of a collection of tweet 
accounts identified as Russian “trolls.” Using one of the algorithms of auto-
matic classification known as label propagation, they identify most trolls as 
conservative-leaning, while Botometer software (botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/) 
(another classification algorithm) allows them to determine that the majority of 
those who retweeted trolls were not bots. Those valuable findings are to a cer-
tain extent limited by the data used. While trolls are defined as “malicious 
accounts created for the purpose of manipulation” (Badawy et al. 2018, 258)—
that is, intentionally deceptive—the authors use a list of Twitter accounts taken 
from the website of the US congress Committee for Intelligence via a publica-
tion at the www.recode.net website. The list contains only Twitter IDs and 
usernames, and no other information is searchable. It is thus unclear whether 
the list creators followed the authors’ definition of trolls, and if so, how they 
learnt about users’ purposes. More broadly, finding empirical referents for con-
cepts whose definitions are based on intention (e.g. deception) is a challenge, 
while taking out intention from the definition of political trolls deprives them 
from their core meaning and makes them lumped together with authors of 
unconventional, still legitimate opinions.
Third, this type of research is sometimes not entirely free from politiciza-
tion. For instance, Sanovich (Sanovich 2017) refers to Barash and Kelly (2012) 
and Kelly et al. (2012) as the research that for the first time identified a “large- 
scale deployment of pro-government bots and trolls in Russia” in favor of 
President Medvedev. However, this is not exactly what the sources suggest. 
First of all, while the word “bot” is mentioned only once, “troll” is never men-
tioned in either of the sources. Second, Barash and Kelly (2012) show unusual 
distributions of activity around tweets related to Medvedev’s innovation policy 
program, while Kelly et al. (2012), using the same data, note that the whole 
“innovation cluster” of tweets disappears when they filter out “instrumental” 
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accounts—those that are likely to use search engine optimization (SEO) and 
automation (bots). The authors do not offer any interpretations, but this sug-
gests that accounts that tweeted about innovation were likely to use commer-
cial promotion methods, in particular automation. Since Kollanyi et al. (2016) 
show that automation was spread both among pro-Trump and, to a lesser 
extent, pro-Clinton Twitter accounts during the 2016 US electoral campaign, 
such accounts might be equally termed trolls. However, there is more sense in 
distinguishing between trolls and bots than placing them in one category. This 
does not mean that the Russian government has never used trolls but suggests 
a certain lack of accuracy when it comes to the Russian computational propa-
ganda research.
To sum up, social media data may significantly enrich the repertoire of 
research in the field of political science in Russia by providing access to large 
volumes of data and thereby conducting large-scale research with the usage of 
automated methods of data analysis. In particular, the access to textual and 
network data makes it possible to grasp the substance of political discussions 
and track communication flows between different political parties. At the same 
time, the results of such research should be viewed through the lens of existing 
technical and methodological constraints. First, often accessible data allows 
producing only a limited range of conclusions, for example, descriptive ones. 
Different approaches to the conceptualization of key concepts which some-
times leads to inconsistent results are also of highly relevant issue. Finally, 
online data from social media are not free from specific limitations which may 
affect its reliability.
19.4  SocIology
19.4.1  Virtual Demography and Structure
The relative openness of VK data has enabled a number of large-scale studies 
investigating VK population structure, composition and patterns of communi-
cation. By far the largest of them is the project “Virtual population of Russia” 
(Zamyatina and Yashunsky 2018). It is based on the analysis of approximately 
200 million VK accounts and 3.5 billion friendship links, although only 88 mil-
lion accounts have been found to claim their location in Russia. The most valu-
able outcome of this project is an interactive website webcensus.ru that contains 
various subsets of the initial sample at different levels of aggregation and visual-
izes the most important distributions in the form of charts and maps. The data 
include age, gender, education, friendship patterns, migration routes and oth-
ers, along with their relations, for example, distribution of average friendship 
connectedness over the Russian regions. This data is an incredible resource for 
researchers seeking to assess the difference of their samples from the total VK 
population of Russia and thus to statistically test various hypotheses about spe-
cific features of the studied sub-populations. Russia is, to our knowledge, the 
only country for which such detailed virtual census exists. However, this data 
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has a serious limitation: it dates back to 2015 and, as such data collection is 
extremely expensive and is unlikely to be updated.
Some studies aim at restoring missing data in SNS accounts based on the 
available data from other accounts. Such data may include age, gender, geolo-
cation and others. As this research mostly lies in the sphere of computer sci-
ence, we omit it here, with an exception of two related papers based on the full 
VK data from the Russian city of Izhevsk. The first paper studies the impact of 
missing geolocation data on the features of the city friendship network (Kaveeva 
and Gurin 2018), while the second does the same in relation to fake accounts 
(Kaveeva et  al. 2018). In the first paper, the authors train a classifier that 
restores users’ city of residence based on the accounts in which this data is pres-
ent. They find out that while the city friendship network grows substantially 
when the missing users are added, most of its important metrics, do not change, 
while modularity and the number of communities in the largest connected 
component experience a very modest growth. This suggests that using incom-
plete data based on the users who choose to report publicly is a valid research 
strategy in social network analysis. In the second paper the authors train a clas-
sifier to recognize fake accounts. After deleting them, friendship network expe-
riences the reverse change, as compared to the first paper, that is modularity 
and the number of communities drop a little. One limitation of the second 
paper is the nature of its training set that is based on self-reported data from 32 
users who were asked to assess their friends. The problem of fake account iden-
tification is close to troll and bot detection and has no easy solution as all these 
types of accounts mutate quickly in their attempts to imitate real users.
Other research devoted to SNS structural features attempts inferential 
design (Kisilevich et al. 2012; Rykov et al. 2018). Kisilevich et al. (2012) exam-
ine how age and gender are related to the amount of disclosed information, 
based on 16 million accounts from a Russian SNS My World (Moj Mir, www.
my.mail.ru). This research allows not only to evaluate the completeness of self- 
reported user data but also to investigate their self-disclosure behavior. The 
authors report that self-disclosure dramatically drops with age, but find no 
substantial gender difference which, as they claim, differentiates the Russian 
SNS users from the Western users. However, the statistical procedure used to 
claim no gender difference is somewhat unclear, while the presented plots sug-
gest that females may be less frequently sharing information about their politi-
cal views but are more often sharing quite a number of other types of 
information.
19.4.2  Social Issues and Problems: Education, Ethnicity, Urbanity
While virtual demography and related studies are interested in the online pop-
ulation per se, various research tackling more specific sociological topics uses 
SNS data to obtain results about offline reality, or about the role of SNS in the 
respective problem or issue, be it education, migration, ethnic relations, or 
urbanity.
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For instance, Smirnov (2018) uses VK data on 4400 Russian students to 
predict their scores in Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
test—an international test assessing learning outcomes in reading, mathematics 
and science among 15-year old students. He obtains the data on 73 thousand 
online communities which students belong to and reaches the correlation of 
about 0.5 between the predicted and the real PISA scores. The most interest-
ing conclusion is that groups contributing most to high scores are related to 
arts and science, while those contributing to low scores are related to humor, 
sex and horoscopes. Although 0.5 is a high correlation in social science, it also 
means that VK group membership cannot be used as the only predictor of 
PISA scores. Since VK group membership cannot be used as a causal explana-
tion of PISA performance either, the significance of such type of research 
should be treated with caution. In general, the predictive power of such models 
tends to drop the more the farther in time other studied datasets are from the 
original dataset.
Alexandrov et al. (2018) use VK self-reported geolocation data to study fac-
tors influencing outgoing educational migration. They examine a larger num-
ber of student migration destinations over a sample of 85 thousand VK users 
aggregated at the city level. They find that, quite predictably, Far East and 
Southern Siberia are gravitated to China, North-West—to the Nordic coun-
tries, and Muslim regions—to the Middle East. It is interesting that among 
significant predictors they find both offline factors, such as religious and geo-
graphic proximity, and online factors, such as the number of VK groups related 
to the country of destination in the donor city. However, of course, it is 
unknown how well self-reported data on users’ secondary schools and universi-
ties reflect the overall educational migration flows. This poses a broader ques-
tion of the extent to which online data represent offline reality.
Ethnicity has been another important topic in Russia as a multi-ethnic soci-
ety, with studies asking how communication in social media either reflects eth-
nic tensions or influences ethnic relations. Bodrunova et al. (2017) study the 
posts of top LiveJournal bloggers to determine how different ethnic groups are 
treated. They first extract ethnicity-related topical clusters via topic modeling 
and then hand-code 30 most relevant texts in each of 33 ethnicity-related clus-
ters. Among other things, they find that Central Asians are treated as relatively 
positive aliens, with North Caucasians being presented both as negatively 
assessed aliens and aggressors. But while North Caucasians are also sometimes 
victimized, Americans are always both negative and aggressive, which suggests 
that global political conflicts overshadow local inter-ethnic tensions. This 
research is one of the few addressing the problem of instability of topic model-
ing by running the algorithm several times and choosing only stable topics, 
which is virtually never done in empirical social research. However, it has prob-
lems with representativity both in terms of the size of the coded sample and in 
terms of the choice of LiveJournal popular bloggers as a source.
Urban studies is a subfield that is widely believed to benefit from social 
media data. However, it often results in the simple plotting of social media data 
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on geographical city maps that, unlike the mapping of political discussions or 
virtual demography, is often less useful. Human movement in urban spaces is 
much better detected with mobile phone data than with social media data, and 
the content or sentiment of SNS messages is not always related to the places 
where they have been created. Some studies still attempt to tie geomapping to 
practical purposes of urban planning. Thus Petrova et al. (2016) examine some 
hundred thousand posts and check-ins from different SNSs in the city of 
Samara in order to generate town planning recommendations.. They find that 
messages are concentrated in the city center and are differentiated by gender, 
type of place, and topic, while locations also differ by check-in intensity, pre-
dominant sentiment of messages and the prevailing type of visitors—either 
locals or tourists. The authors suggest to create more attractive places in the 
city periphery and also to unite the most visited and the most positively assessed 
places in the center by a single pedestrian pathway. This conclusion seems to be 
based on the visual examination of maps, as the paper describes neither analytic 
procedures nor any methods of posterior evaluation of the efficiency of the 
suggested town planning strategy (for more, see Chap. 32).
An interesting result about the nature of urban civic activity is presented in 
Voskresenskiy et al. (2016). The authors analyze 41 restricted-access and 132 
open-access VK groups run by the neighbors sharing the same apartment 
blocks in St. Petersburg. Based on topic modeling, restricted-access groups are 
found to prefer such topics as mutual help, socialization and apartment repairs, 
while open access groups favor city-level initiatives, contentious initiatives, 
including court disputes with the city administration, and, paradoxically, the 
maintenance of their apartment blocks and yards. This research is a rare com-
parison of closed and open SNS groups in an urban context, although one 
should keep in mind that the majority of the former (91 of 132) had denied 
access to the researchers.
Compared to political research, sociological research of Russian SNSs is less 
numerous. While political science has one of its important objects of research, 
namely political discourse and discussion, readily available in the form of online 
content, sociological focus demands more links to offline reality, which makes 
the overall tasks more difficult. Additionally, sociological problems of Russia 
generally provoke less interest from the international research community than 
the country’s political problems.
19.5  PSychology and health StudIeS
19.5.1  Health Studies
Health studies, as a field of research lying at the intersection of sociology, pol-
icy studies, psychology and medicine, is very young in Russia, and the works in 
E-Health are few and mostly exploratory. A series of papers has been devoted 
to the VK groups of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) denialists, 
people who deny the existence of AIDS or its relation to human 
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immunodeficiency viruses (HIV), and other AIDS-related groups. The first 
work by Meylakhs et al. (2014) uses netnography (an online variant of ethnog-
raphy) to examine the largest community of AIDS-denialists in VK. The 
authors obtain a policy-relevant result that the motives of newcomers are often 
far from irrational and may result from negative experience with doctors or 
atypical medical history. In addition, persuasive strategies of the “old” com-
munity members are described which makes the authors set a new research 
task—to find a method that would discern the core of the community from its 
periphery. The significance of this task is based on the assumption that, while 
core members cannot be convinced to change their views, the periphery could 
be re-oriented. This task is addressed in Rykov et al. (2017) with the help of 
SNA and regression analysis. The authors indeed find a correlation between 
some network and activity measures, on the one hand, and the core-periphery 
status of a user as determined by hand coding of his/her messages, on the 
other. However, as in (Smirnov 2018) the set of the examined predictors is not 
sufficient to classify the users correctly, which is why hand coding seems to be 
still needed.
Meylakhs’ conclusions about the motivation of AIDS-denialism newcomers 
echo qualitative research on coping strategies of HIV-positive people (Dudina 
and Artamonova 2018). The authors exploit the anonymous character of the 
respective Russian-language forum obtaining confessions that, in the authors’ 
opinion, would have never been possible in face-to-face interviews. On the 
whole, this research describes well-known stages of coping with chronic illness 
and the related problems, such as shock, denial, acceptance, status disclosure 
and stigmatization.
An attempt to describe interests of drug users based on social network data 
is made in Yakushev and Mityagin (2014). The authors apply a keyword-based 
search while crawling Russian-language LiveJournal accounts in order to find 
users who write about drugs. They also exploit an LJ feature allowing users to 
include tags representing their interests and perform a statistical test to find out 
which interests are typical among those users who write about drugs, as com-
pared to those who do not. The main problem with this approach, as the 
authors themselves indicate, is the lack of equivalence between those who write 
about drugs and those who actually use them.
Thus, studying of various online communities in Russian social media is one 
of the research avenues in health studies, which open up great prospects for 
in-depth study of the structure, communication network, and leadership phe-
nomenon in different, including hidden and hard-to-reach, populations.
19.5.2  Psychology
As mentioned earlier, psychological research based on Russian-language social 
media is least focused on Russia, but more often attempts to establish online- 
offline connections by seeking to predict psychological traits or conditions with 
social media data. Thus, Semenov et  al. (2015) try to predict depression 
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propensity with the data from VK accounts, including different network met-
rics, and reach area under ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve (AUC) 
metric of 0.84 which is comparable to other research in the field. The main 
problem of this research, similar to Yakushev and Mityagin (2014), is that the 
training set of users with depression propensity is compiled of those who con-
tributed to discussion threads on being suicidal in depression- and suicide- 
related VK communities. This problem may be resolved in two different ways: 
by either collecting ground truth on psychological conditions outside social 
media, as in Panicheva et al. (2016) or by using social media data not as an 
indicator of “true” psychological condition but as a source of users’ self- 
representations, as in Bogolyubova et al. (2018).
In the latter work, the authors compare Instagram images used by Russian- 
speaking and anglophone users to express psychological distress. The truthful-
ness of those expressions is thus left out; this lets the authors concentrate on 
the observable data and make interesting findings about significantly more fre-
quent use of images containing text by anglophone users. The authors connect 
this finding to the lack of culture of verbal psychological self-expression in 
Russia. It should be noted that in this research the agreement between coders 
who manually assessed the images was not very high, which is a common prob-
lem for this type of studies based on human labeling.
Panicheva et  al. (2016) develop a Facebook application to collect the 
ground-truth data about users’ psychological traits—in their case, the so-called 
dark triad. They manage to obtain both the completed questionnaires and the 
text data from almost 2000 Russian-speaking users which is a huge number for 
psychological research. Using text data to predict the dark triad, the research-
ers, however, refuse from constructing a single model: as they are interested in 
evaluating the effect of each linguistic feature, not in the accuracy of predic-
tion; they acknowledge the problem of distortion of significance levels in the 
models with too many predictors and apply a special correction procedure. For 
some reason, this problem is seldom raised outside psychological community, 
although it is typical for other tasks using such high-dimensional data as texts, 
and attention to this problem is a special value of the research by Panicheva and 
colleagues. At the same time, in their work, as only a limited number of user 
messages are available, and the sample is not described, the biases that might 
be introduced by these factors may be in fact more significant than those that 
the authors are struggling against.
An interesting extension of this research is presented in Bogolyubova et al. 
(2018) where the authors relate users’ linguistic behavior, their psychological 
traits and the propensity to engage in harmful online behavior. They find out 
that one of the dark triad components—psychopathy—is the best predictor of 
such behavior. They also use a different strategy to deal with linguistic features 
by first representing words as word vectors (lists of words most closely associ-
ated with each given word) and then clustering them into 182 clusters. They 
use these clusters as harmful behavior predictors with the same procedure of 
significance correction as in their first paper. It should be said that, just like 
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topic modeling (for more, see Chaps. 23, 25 and 24), both word embeddings 
and clustering algorithm used are unstable, and when combined can produce 
an indefinite number of different solutions with the same data.
A task similar to Panicheva (2016) is addressed in Rubtsova et al. (Rubtsova 
et al. 2018): the authors seek to find associations between user account features 
in VK and the types of teenager personality accentuations as defined by Lichko 
(1983). A major limitation of this research is that while Lichko’s classification 
contains 11 types of personality, the authors manage to survey only 88 teenag-
ers. This again raises the problem of big data collapse into small data due to 
constrained access to one type of data needed. This problem is also present in 
the research by Belinskaya and Bronin (2015) which is a reduced replica of the 
famous study by Youyou et  al. (2015). Both teams use quasi-experimental 
design to measure the accuracy of perception of the most important personality 
traits—the so-called Big Five (Piedmont 2014)—by FB or VK users, respec-
tively. For this, they ask one group of subjects (the assessed) to fill in the Big 
Five questionnaire, while the other group of subjects (assessors) are asked to fill 
in the same questionnaire on behalf of the assessed subjects. The differences 
between the two studies are, however, more significant than their similarities. 
First, Kosinski’s team tests the accuracy of those who know the assessed people 
well, while Belinskaya and Bronin focus on those who have only met their 
friends online. Second, Kosinski and colleagues, by developing and promoting 
a FB application, manage to collect 86,220 observations, while the Russian 
authors collect only 30 offline assessments from 15 assessors. This turns the 
problem of big data collapse into a problem of digital divide in science: while 
collecting big data online seems cheap at the first glance, this is not the case in 
practice. On the contrary, substantial financial resources and time are needed 
to conduct large-scale research with social media data.
19.6  concluSIon
In this chapter we reviewed both the works on the Russian-language social 
media and the Russia-related topics that can be studied with social media data 
in general. We have shown that Russian SNSs give very broad opportunities for 
research—broader than most international SNSs do. However, this potential 
stays somewhat underused due to a number of factors, including the lack of 
resources for researchers within Russia and the lack of interest to the opportu-
nities given by the Russian SNSs from the international scholars. The sphere 
that generates the largest interest from the international researchers is Russian 
politics, and this is reflected in the dominant position of this topic among 
Russian SNS-based studies. Sociological research is somewhat fragmented, and 
psychology studies are least of all related to Russia, with some strong studies 
done by the Russian scholars not using Russian data at all (Buraya et al. 2018).
In our review we focused both on the opportunities and problems of social 
media research. Our goal was to go beyond the strengths and limitations of 
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concrete works and to highlight the common trends, especially the limitations 
of the field because they are seldom spoken about in research papers, since they 
tend to report success rather than failures.
The opportunities include the ability to obtain large observational data col-
lected in a non-intrusive manner and the ability to scale the research that oth-
erwise would be bound to very small laboratory experiments or qualitative field 
work. Additionally, the fact that the data of the Russian-language SNSs come 
mostly from the Post-Soviet space gives an opportunity to study various politi-
cal, social and psychological phenomena outside the Western context where 
most social research data come from. Finally, social media are an important key 
to a society where other types of data are often less available than in more trans-
parent countries.
The limitations are, however, also large. First, online digital traces, in order 
to be meaningful, often have to be combined with other types of data that are 
not so easy to collect and that become a bottleneck on the way to large sam-
ples. This is where we observe the effect of big data collapse. Second, SNS data 
have various problems of representativity in terms of their ability to represent 
both offline and online phenomena. Sampling network data and especially tex-
tual data is generally a poorly developed methodological area, while these types 
of data are the core of digital traces left by humans on social media.
Finally, methods of SNS data analysis are lagging behind the techniques 
available for data collection. The existing approaches are very complex, and 
they hide many caveats that social scientists are often unaware of. Instability of 
the majority of text-clustering techniques, absence of statistical inference meth-
ods for non-independent (networked) data, lack of approaches to work with 
power-law distributions so common for SNS data compromise the validity of 
many of the existing studies without social scientists being fully able to grasp 
the scale of the problem. Nevertheless, an open discussion of these method-
ological difficulties can enrich our understanding of the field of social media 
research and enhance its development.
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CHAPTER 20
Digitizing Archives in Russia: Epistemic 




In March 2016, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation examined a recent 
decision by the Ministry of Culture, the parent body of the Federal Archival 
Agency (Rosarhiv), to ban personal use of cameras, smartphones, and other tech-
nical devises for copying documents in Russian archives. During court hearings, 
a representative of the ministry argued that free and unlimited digitization with-
out supervision by professional archivists would likely cause increased wear and 
damage to historical documents. She also argued that the current ban did not 
violate the right of free access to archival documents and hence to historical 
knowledge. This position received support from many professional archivists; 
one of their arguments was that, if unrestricted copying of archival materials was 
allowed, archives would be unable to guarantee the authenticity of copies, which, 
in turn, would lead to manipulations of historical evidence on a large scale. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that this decision was unlawful and it had 
to be repealed (Galanichev 2016, 299–300; Druzin 2018, 4–5).
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Archive users did not have much time to enjoy free and unlimited copying. 
In April 2016, Rosarhiv was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the 
Presidential Administration of Russia, signifying that its head now reported 
directly to Vladimir Putin. Using its new legal status, in September 2017, the 
agency introduced a new regulation that allowed the use of personal cameras 
for copying, but only by permission (that could take days or even weeks) and 
for a fee. This regulation was challenged in the Supreme Court as well, but this 
time the court ruled that Rosarhiv did not violate any law and the practice of 
charging archive users for making digital copies with their own devices was 
legal (Kurilova 2019). As a result, Rosarhiv regained full control over the digi-
tization of archival materials, even when it is done by private users for a per-
sonal purpose.
This story highlights the extent to which Russian state agencies and officials 
are concerned with digital reproducibility of historical documents as a phe-
nomenon that challenges their control over the production of historical knowl-
edge. According to the code and practice of Russian law, access to historical 
documents is a civil right, and while this right is routinely violated by state 
institutions, in many cases it has been successfully enforced through legal bat-
tles. At the same time, digitization of historical documents turned out to be a 
more controversial issue. The relative ease of the digital access and reproduc-
tion implies that online archives of historical documents can be not only pro-
duced at a low cost but also be available to a much bigger audience than before 
(for an example of such archives, see Chap. 21). This offers new opportunities 
in terms of communication of knowledge, but it also means that the circulation 
and production of historical knowledge becomes less centralized as it moves 
away from the expert-controlled domains such as edited volumes published by 
academic presses into a more egalitarian information society that trespasses 
national borders and jurisdictions where digital archives can be curated by vir-
tually anyone. Given how important the maintenance of a coherent national 
narrative is for many Russian top officials (Brandenberger 2015, 200–205; 
Shteynman 2016, 107–108), it is unsurprising that Rosarhiv is very cautious 
when it comes to releasing the documents from its collections on the World 
Wide Web.
Yet the politics of history represent only one aspect of the current situation 
with digital archives in Russia. The unwillingness of Russian archives to out-
source digitization of their materials means that when they start their own digi-
tization projects, as a rule, they end up with high-cost solutions. An August 
2018 post published by the Archival Committee of St. Petersburg in its 
Facebook group claimed that it took the archives fifteen years to digitize the 
parish register books of St. Petersburg; the same post claimed that a complete 
digitization of all collections of the St. Petersburg archives would require at 
least 45 billion rubles (ca. $650 million at the current exchange rate) worth of 
funding and presumably decades of work (Archival Committee of St. Petersburg 
2018). As a result, managers of Russian archives have to choose strategically 
which documents and collections should be presented online. Since most of 
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the archives are chronically underfunded, they also actively solicit external 
funding both domestically and internationally in order to push forward their 
digitization efforts and get a better public outreach. The research and political 
agenda of funding agencies thus becomes part of the archival digitization pro-
cess in Russia.
This chapter examines the production of digital archives in a broader con-
text of the political economy of historical knowledge in Russia. The resolution 
of Rosarhiv to control which and how many documents its users copy digitally 
should be treated as a symptom signaling the epistemic anxieties of the state 
authorities. The archive, as the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, 
Ann Stoler and many others have shown, is a key institution of the state power 
over history: it defines the dominant forms of knowledge, its limits and silences, 
establishes hierarchies of voices from the past, and produces experts with 
authority to interpret its documents. In other words, the archive is a powerful 
tool that transforms the totality of the historical experience preserved by a cer-
tain community or society into a structured hegemonic form that privileges 
some parts of this experience and silences other (Foucault 1977, 155–164; 
Foucault 2002, 146–148; Derrida 1996, 3–5, 10–13, 19–20; Stoler 2006, 
44–51). However, modern information and communication technologies rep-
resent a formidable challenge to maintaining this epistemic sovereignty as they 
simplified to the extreme a precise reproduction of historical documents and 
production of digital archives, thus diluting the state’s sovereign control over 
historical knowledge. The situation is further complicated by a relatively mar-
ginal place of Russian archives in the global economy of knowledge where the 
demand for the digitization of their materials often comes from outside of the 
Russian national borders and represents political and cultural interests of non-
state agents. As a result, a study of digital archives in Russia provides a unique 
perspective on the ways in which the Russian state adapts to the digital age.
This chapter starts with a discussion of the early digitization efforts during 
the 1990s and early 2000s that were largely funded by international funding 
agencies, most prominently the Open Society Institute, whose activity is pres-
ently banned in Russia. It then examines the growing concern of the state 
authorities over the reproduction of historical documents online and their 
efforts to control the production of digital archives through specialized fund-
ing agencies (such as the Russian Foundation for Humanities that in 2016 
merged with the Russian Science Foundation) and restrictive measures. In the 
concluding section of the chapter I discuss the current state of digital archives 
in Russia, which is not limited to the activities of federal and international 
agencies, but also involves a great deal of private initiative. Yet despite the mul-
titude of actors and large-scale digitization efforts, I argue, Russian digital 
archives are curated to conform to the dominant paradigms of historical knowl-
edge and have so far failed to induce an epistemological shift in the studies of 
Russian history.
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20.2  ArchIvAl revolutIon: InternAtIonAl Actors 
And eArly dIgItIzAtIon efforts
The early effort to digitize historical documents from the former Soviet 
archives was an integral part of the archival revolution that started at the turn 
of the 1990s following the perestroika and led to an unprecedented openness 
of Russian archival collections for both the scholarly community and general 
public (Raleigh 2002). In Russia, this effort was spearheaded by international 
organizations. Between 1992 and 1996, for example, the Hoover Institution 
on War, Revolution, and Peace with the UK-based company Chadwyck-
Healey Ltd microfilmed approximately 14,500,000 pages of historical docu-
ments and inventory lists from the central Russian archives (Davies 1997, 
101–102). In the mid-1990s, the Yale University Press launched the Annals of 
Communism book series with English translations of thousands of formerly 
classified documents of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. 
Another archival collection that attracted significant international interest in 
the early 1990s was the documents of the Third (Communist) International, 
or Comintern, stored in RGASPI (Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arhiv social’no-
politic ̌eskoj istorii, Russian State Archive of Social and Political History). Since 
the Comintern as an instrument of Soviet influence coordinated activities of 
Communist parties and affiliated groups in numerous countries between 1919 
and 1943, its records amount to 20 million pages written in multiple lan-
guages. The enormous size of these archive collections and imperfect inven-
tory lists made their analysis complicated, as even a preliminary research 
required long-term trips to Moscow.
In 1992, the Council of Europe, the International Council of Archives and 
Rosarhiv initiated a discussion of a large-scale project that involved leading 
scholars on the history of the Comintern. The discussion aimed to prepare a 
large-scale project to create a database describing the entire Comintern collec-
tion at RGASPI (over 200,000 documents) and to digitize the key documents 
from the collection (ca. one million pages out of the total number of 20 mil-
lion). In June 1996, the International Council of Archives and Rosarhiv signed 
a framework agreement that established the International Committee for the 
Computerization of the Comintern Archives (INCOMKA) under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe. The funding for this large-scale digitization project 
came from numerous sponsors, including many European archives, the Library 
of Congress, and the Open Society Archives. By 2003, the project was com-
pleted including 1,059,354 digital images of archival documents (ca. 5% of the 
entire collection) and a searchable database of the entire collection with 
239,602 entries (Doorn-Moisseenko 2005; Bachman 2005; Amiantov 2011).
Since the project was initiated at the dawn of the Internet era, the digital 
archive was initially hosted at the RGASPI without remote access, and its cop-
ies were distributed on CDs to the international project participants. Users had 
to be physically present at the RGASPI (a dedicated space was equipped with 
17 workstations for this purpose) or in one of the partner institutions in order 
 A. GOLUBEV
357
to work with the archive. However, by the time of the project completion in 
2003, this principle was already outdated, and the following year a joint ven-
ture company was formed by the Dutch academic publisher, IDC Publishers 
(purchased by Brill in 2006) and Russian corporation ELAR to provide paid 
online access to the dataset. This service was hosted at www.comintern-online.
com and charged between 2000 and 7500 euro for an annual subscription 
depending on the buyer, with revenues shared between Rosarhiv, ELAR and 
IDC Publishers/Brill. The archive remained behind the paywall for the next 
ten years, until 2013, when it was published online as part of a new initiative 
The Documents of the Soviet Era of Rosarhiv that I will discuss later in this 
chapter.
The digital archive of the Comintern documents is a good example, illus-
trating the early stage of the digitization of Russian archives. The perestroika 
and the first post-Soviet decade in Russia were characterized by the state’s 
temporary disinvestment in historical knowledge, and many national and inter-
national non-government agents sought to fill this gap proposing new episte-
mological models, producing new historical narratives, and publishing formerly 
classified documents, at first as books and then, as new information and com-
munication technologies became increasingly widespread, as digital archives. 
The Open Society Institute (OSI)—a parent organization of the Open Society 
Archives which was one of the partner institutions of the INCOMKA project—
was the most visible actor in this sphere. Between 1996 and 2000, it granted a 
total of $1,500,000 United States Dollars (USD) for different projects in the 
archival sphere, including the first website of Rosarhiv (Okhotin 2001). Before 
the Russian authorities forced the OSI to quit its activities in Russia, it sup-
ported such projects as online databases of the archival collections of the 
Russian State Documentary Film and Photo Archive (Bajgarova et al. 2000), 
Gorbachev Foundation (Kolesov 2002), National Archive of the Republic of 
Kareliâ (Kadymova and Kolesova 2003), and Perm′ State Archive (Perm State 
Archive 2015). It was also one of the key sponsors of the society Memorial, a 
key non-government institution that publicizes knowledge about historical and 
contemporary state violence in Russia, that produced a database of the victims 
and later perpetrators of Soviet political repressions and several archives related 
to Soviet state violence, dissident movement, German forced labor, and oral 
history.
These projects had a clearly defined political agenda to educate audiences in 
Russia and abroad about the history of state violence, which was shared by 
many other international foundations that funded the digitization of archival 
documents in the post-Soviet countries.1 The goal to ensure a broad public 
outreach for these digital archives meant that they were produced as free prod-
ucts. A similar political agenda drove German research foundations to actively 
support the production of digital archives related to Soviet citizens’ experience 
of Nazi violence during the Second World War. One of the latest projects of 
this kind is a digital archive of oral history interviews of former Soviet prisoners- 
of- war and forced laborers Ta storona (Another Side) at tastorona.su. The 
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archive is based on a collection of interviews of the society Memorial, and was 
funded by the German Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future 
and the Henrich Böll Foundation, as well as OSI. Currently it provides access 
to 167 interviews using specially designed software that optimized the presen-
tation of interview transcripts, their commentary, audiovisual and geospatial 
data, and meta descriptions (Beilinson 2015).
20.3  russIAn ArchIves And commercIAl 
content ProvIders
The early stage of digitization of archival collections in Russia was also charac-
terized by another trend: the commercialization of scholarly content. Histories 
of state violence in Russia were a particularly attractive subject for commercial 
publishers, but the trend was much bigger and included many other fields. The 
opening of Russian archives coupled with a huge economic gap between Russia 
and the First World nations during the 1990s created a situation when Western 
publishers were able to sign lucrative digitization agreements with Russian 
archives and libraries that granted them exclusive rights to distribute the result-
ing digital collections and archives worldwide. As a rule, Western partners pro-
vided equipment and funding for digitization, and Russian partners received 
digital copies of their collections that they could provide to users within their 
computer networks (although sometimes they retained the domestic distribu-
tion rights) as well as a percentage of sales.
The Dutch company IDC Publishers mentioned above in the context of the 
international distribution of the Comintern Digital Archive was one of the 
earliest and most active players in the digitization market of Russian historical 
documents and publications. It started producing Russia-related collections of 
primary sources for commercial distribution on microfiche long before the col-
lapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) using books and peri-
odicals from the Slavonic Library of the National Library of Finland. As early 
as in 1987, it signed contracts with the Russian National Library getting a 
priority access to its collection of periodicals, rare books, and historical docu-
ments (Russian National Library 2004, 17). Over the next twenty years, the 
IDC Publishers signed similar contracts with the Library of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, K.D.  Ushinsky State Scientific Pedagogical Library, 
Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, Russian State Military Archive, 
Moscow State University Library, and Russian State Archive of Social and 
Political History. Its team used the materials from these institutions to produce 
digital archives of the Artek Pioneer Camp (1944–1967), early Soviet cinema 
(1923–1935), Russian military intelligence on Asia (1651–1917), Jewish 
Theater under Stalinism, as well as extensive digital collections of Russian and 
Soviet periodicals. The company was remarkable for its careful market analysis, 
which, prior to its merger with Brill, allowed it to become a large and successful 
commercial content provider in the field of Russian studies, including in digital 
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archives. However, following its merge with Brill in 2006, Russia- and Eastern 
Europe-related content lost its priority for the new company management. 
Access to the materials digitized earlier by the IDC Publishers is still sold 
through Brill either as an institutional subscription or as limited-term access for 
individual users (Doorn-Moisseenko 2019).
A similar model was used by the Yale University Press (YUP) in a collabora-
tion agreement with the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History 
to digitize Joseph Stalin’s personal archive (Fond 558). The project was initi-
ated in the late 2000s with the financial support of $1,300,000 from the 
Mellon Foundation (Mellon Foundation 2007), and in 2011 YUP launched 
the first version of the Stalin Digital Archive at www.stalindigitalarchive.com 
that over time grew to include 400,000 pages of over 28,000 documents 
including Stalin’s personal papers, his domestic and international correspon-
dence, and books with his marginalia. Access to the digital archive was pro-
vided through institutional subscription only. Rosarhiv as the parent 
organization of the RGASPI, however, retained the domestic distribution 
rights for the digitized copy of Stalin’s archive, and launched its free version for 
Russia-based users in 2013 as part of the portal Documents of the Soviet Era at 
sovdoc.rusarchives.ru that I will discuss in the next section of the chapter.
Another example of a successful commercialization of digital archives of 
Russian historical documents and publications is represented by the East View 
Information Services, a Minnesota-based company founded in 1989 as the 
East View Publications, Inc. to distribute Soviet military journals for interna-
tional audiences. Over the following three decades, it established itself as a 
major provider of digital content from Russia and other post-Soviet states as 
well as China, Afghanistan, Iran, and several African nations. Yet while for the 
latter regions its content is focused on exclusively contemporary affairs, its 
experience and expertise in the international distribution of Russian-language 
publications (one of its co-founders, Vladimir G. Frangulov, is a former research 
fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences) helped them diversify their business model by 
digitizing archives of Imperial-era, Soviet and post-Soviet periodicals and offer-
ing them as part of the subscription to their catalogue. The catalogue now 
includes digital archives of the key Soviet newspapers and magazines with a 
full-text search, which makes it particularly appealing for scholars (Lee and 
Frangulov 2014).
The fact that the archival revolution in Russia coincided with its transition 
to market economy and a subsequent crisis in the funding of state archives, on 
the one hand, and an astonishingly fast development of the new digitization 
technologies, on the other hand, opened a window of opportunity for Russian 
and Western non-governmental agents and for-profit companies to launch 
large-scale digital archive projects. In a way, they can be described as quasi- 
colonial projects: exploiting economic inequality between Russian and the First 
World countries, they treated the Russian historical experience represented in 
these newly built digital archives as a commodity to be sold to the First World 
20 DIGITIZING ARCHIVES IN RUSSIA: EPISTEMIC SOVEREIGNTY… 
360
audiences (East View or Brill), or as a deviant experience, a lesson of what 
future generations had to avoid at all costs (the digital archives of the Comintern 
or Joseph Stalin). Yury Afanasyev, a professional historian who became an influ-
ential politician during the late-Soviet and early post-Soviet periods, character-
ized the unequal relationship between Russian archives and Western content 
providers in precisely these terms when he interpreted the aforementioned 
1992 agreement between the Hoover Institution, Chadwyck-Healey Ltd, and 
Russian archives as a “typically colonial exercise” (Afanas’ev 1992). It is hardly 
surprising that, once the Russian state agencies were able to fund their own 
digitization projects, their political agenda became radically different.
20.4  russIAn foundAtIon for humAnItIes: PAtchIng 
the ArchIvAl fAbrIc
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, domestic funding of archival 
digitizing activities in Russia had significantly lagged behind the projects sup-
ported by Western funding. It was only in 1994 that the Russian government 
established a specialized funding agency for social sciences and humanities, the 
Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH), which had supported projects in 
digital humanities since 1995 (Semenov 1997, 118–119). However, limited 
funds and high costs of digitization activities kept them relatively small-scale: in 
2015, an average one-year grant in digital humanities was 500,000 rubles, or 
less than $10,000 USD in that year’s exchange rates (Blinov 2012, 235). 
Nevertheless, the Russian Academy of Sciences and universities have actively 
used this funding source to digitize and make available their archival collec-
tions, and a large number of small digital archives have appeared since the late 
1990s. A typical project was, for example, a digital archive of ethnographic field 
records, a personal archive of a famous cultural figure or scholar, a collection of 
folklore texts and performances, or a digital archive of historical periodical. The 
number of documents in these archives typically numbered in hundreds, some-
times thousands, although the Russian Foundation for Humanities also sup-
ported multi-year projects that resulted in bigger digital archives. A full list of 
digital archives produced, thanks to the funding of the RFH, currently num-
bers in over a hundred, so below I will only focus on a few cases to illustrate the 
goals, scope, and implementation of such projects.
One of the early digital archives produced with the funding from the RFH 
was an online collection of audio records and transcripts of folklore perfor-
mances of the Karelian Research Center (KRC) of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. With the earliest records dating back to the 1930s, the collection 
represents critical knowledge of traditional music and performances among the 
ethnic groups of Northwest Russia, including Russians, Karelians, Vepsians, 
Finns, Izhorians, and Sami. In 1999, the KRC received funding to produce an 
online catalogue and to digitize sample records from both the Open Society 
Institute and the Russian Foundation for Humanities. An early version of the 
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archive went online in early 2000 at phonogr.krc.karelia.ru; however, the num-
ber of actual records available online was just fourteen (Vdovicyn et al. 2000, 
32–34). In 2008, the KRC received another grant from the RFH to make 
available transcripts of folklore texts recorded or written down by Soviet eth-
nographers, which resulted in the publication of over 400 original texts at folk.
krc.karelia.ru. In 2012, yet another grant from the RFH allowed the center to 
add 70 audio records and their transcripts to the digital archive at phonogr.krc.
karelia.ru/folklor. This amount represents a fraction of the records stored in 
the archive of the KRC, yet it provides valuable material for those scholars of 
the region and members of the general public who are interested in its tradi-
tional cultures. Similar projects have been implemented elsewhere in Russia, 
such as a digital archive of the folklore of the peoples of Siberia developed by 
the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 2014 folk.philol-
ogy.nsc.ru, or a digital archive of ethnographic records from the Kaluga region 
of the Moscow Tchaikovsky Conservatory produced from a grant of the RFH 
in 2007 at folk.rusign.com.
The RFH also supported projects that sought to produce digital archives 
from fragmented collections, often in separate geographic locations, thus pro-
viding scholars and the general public with a single point of access to a certain 
periodical or a personal collection. The author of this chapter was a leading 
team member in one of such projects to create a digital archive of the surviving 
issues of the Russian imperial newspaper Oloneckie gubernskie vedomosti (OGV, 
or News of the Olonec Governorate). OGV was an official newspaper of the 
Olonec Governorate from 1838 to 1917; apart from official news and govern-
ment decisions, it also published materials on history, economy, ethnography, 
and culture of Northwest Russia. By the mid-2000s, several libraries and 
archives in Petrozavodsk and St. Petersburg had partial collections of the news-
paper, but in order to protect the fragile newspapers, most of them significantly 
restricted access to their collections (for example, the only categories of users 
who could work with the collection of the OGV issues from the library of the 
Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences were scholars 
with advanced degrees and graduate students). A digital archive of the newspa-
per simultaneously solved both problems by providing a consolidated collec-
tion of the surviving issues in free access. Given the complex logistics and a 
large scale of work, the RFH supported a three-year long project (2006–2008). 
It was implemented by a team from the Petrozavodsk State University, which 
digitized OGV issues from the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia, 
National Library of the Republic of Karelia, Academic Library of the Karelian 
Research Center, and Russian National Library in St. Petersburg. The result 
was a digital archive of initially 4670 issues of the newspaper (Golubev and 
Fotina 2007). After the completion of the project, it was maintained by the 
National Library of the Republic of Karelia that was able to digitize an addi-
tional 400 issues; as of now, the archive provides free access to 5064 issues at 
ogv.karelia.ru. Similar projects supported by the RFH include, among others, 
a digital archive of Ivan Bunin’s personal papers at bunin-rgali.ru that 
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consolidated the holdings of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Leeds 
Russian Archive Collections, and a digital archive of ethnographic records of 
field trips of the Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State University 
at ethnoarchive.spbu.ru. Apart from the Russian Foundation for Humanities 
and, since 2016, the Russian Science Foundation, similar small-scale digitiza-
tion projects were supported by several federal and regional programs run by 
the Russian Ministry of Education and Russian Academy of Sciences.
20.5  the return of the stAte
This system of grants run by the RFH helped to bring online many small 
archives of Russian universities and institutes of the Academy of Sciences, but 
at the same time it had a priori too limited a scope to engage in a large-scale 
digitization of archival collections of the central and regional Russian archives. 
The latter work became possible due to a particular conjunction of state and 
business interests in Russia. In 2002, the Russian government launched a fed-
eral program called Èlektronnaâ Rossiâ (Electronic Russia) with the goal to 
accelerate the use of new information and communication technologies in state 
administration. The program was designed for the period of 2002–2010, and 
while it failed to achieve the original goal to create a comprehensive online 
access to state services, one of its by-products was the appearance of a new seg-
ment in the Russian Information Technologies (IT) market, namely, a stable 
demand for commercial solutions in the sphere of e-governance. Among the 
companies that benefited from the new market conditions was Electronic 
Archive Corp. (ELAR). Established in 1992, it specialized in developing and 
providing of highly automated digitization technologies, and after 2002 it 
became the leading contractor of Russian government agencies, including 
Rosarhiv, in such areas as digitization of archives, development of digitization 
hardware and software, and digital archive management systems (Plotnikov 
2014). Unlike Western commercial publishers and content providers such as 
Brill and EastView, ELAR uses a different business model: namely, state con-
tracts to produce digital archives. In this model, Rosarhiv has a full authority 
over the selection of the content, and ELAR as the contractor does not acquire 
any distribution rights for the digitized content, which is published in open 
access. Since its profits come exclusively from the amount of completed work, 
its management is interested in lobbying more projects with the Russian gov-
ernment and its agencies, which has become an important driving force in the 
digitization of Russian archives.
The digital archives produced, at least partially, within this model include 
Rosarhiv’s Documents of the Soviet Era and The People’s Memory contracted by 
the Russian Ministry of Defense. Documents of the Soviet Era was launched in 
2013 at sovdoc.rusarchives.ru and from the very beginning comprised several 
earlier document collections, namely, the aforementioned digital archives of 
the Comintern and of Joseph Stalin. According to the agreement with the Yale 
University Press, the website restricts access to Stalin’s archive from 
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non-Russian and non-Belorussian Internet protocol (IP) addresses. At the 
same time, several document collections were digitized exclusively for this proj-
ect, including 30,000 electronic copies of documents of the Politbûro for 
1919–1932 (May 2013), 240,000 electronic copies of documents of the Soviet 
State Defense Committee (June 2015), 122,000 copies of documents about 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 (December 2017), and several smaller collec-
tions. In his interviews, the current head of Rosarhiv Andrej Artizov repeatedly 
emphasized that the purpose of the digital archive was to educate national 
audiences about the complexity of the Soviet period of Russian history (Artizov 
2018). In doing so, the management of Rosarhiv—which in these contexts 
represents the historical profession as such—asserts its authority in the produc-
tion of knowledge about Russian history, thanks to the seemingly comprehen-
sive nature of their digital archive as well as vast possibilities to enlarge it by 
digitizing additional materials when necessary. Rosarhiv has used this position-
ality in order to advance the state’s agenda in such questions as the legitimacy 
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the treat of Ukrainian nationalism, and the 
complacency of Britain and France in the rise of Nazism in Europe, with the 
publication of digital copies of historical documents serving as a technique to 
challenge the widespread accusations of illegitimacy of Russia’s claims for 
Crimea, the Ukrainian claims that the Holodomor was an intentional act of 
genocide against the Ukrainians, and of the critical role of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact in provoking the outbreak of the Second World War (Artizov 
2014, 7–10; Brandenberger 2015, 202–203).
The management of Rosarhiv places a special emphasis on its comprehensive 
approach to the digital publication of archival documents: instead of hand- 
picking sources to highlight certain aspects of the Soviet historical experience, 
Rosarhiv chose to make available entire document collections. In the logic of 
their creators, this approach should produce a more credible picture of the 
historical past than the partial digital archives of Vladimir Bukovskij (bukovsky-
archives.net), Aleksandr Yakovlev (www.alexanderyakovlev.org), and Dmitrij 
Volkogonov’s collection in the Library of Congress (National Security Archive 
2017). Their authors, who at one or another point in the late 1980s and 1990s 
acquired access to classified collections of Russian archives, understandably 
focused on more sensational and controversial documents (Bukovskij 1996, 
51–63). Yet, while providing authentic copies of important historical docu-
ments, these digital collections fail to present the totality of Soviet decision- 
making at the top level that the Documents of the Soviet Era can claim.
Needless to say, this claim of totality and objectivity disguises the epistemic 
and political foundations of the actual archival collections in the possession of 
Rosarhiv (Rosenberg 2001, 82–84). Moreover, while its management and staff 
are concerned with the questions of epistemological sovereignty, their under-
standing of how to “decolonize” Russian history is framed primarily in terms 
of data management with archives performing the function of a mediator, but 
also a censor, between historical documents and professional historians. This 
logic is based on the understanding of historical documents deposited in 
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archives as the most authentic and epistemologically reliable evidence about 
the Russian past, which is why, for example, Artizov argues that the production 
of digital archives such as the Documents of the Soviet Era is the best strategy to 
refute “false” interpretations of Russian history (Artizov 2014, 7). What is 
missing in this understanding is that the documents themselves do not provide 
new knowledge, but instead replicate the same interpretive categories that were 
laid in the foundation of original archival collections with their explicit and hid-
den hierarchies, silences, gaps, and exclusions.
The corporation ELAR played a key role in the development of another 
digital archive called The People’s Memory at pamyat-naroda.ru that combines 
archival data and copies of original documents related to Soviet servicemen 
during the Second World War. The archive is based on the collections stored in 
the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and currently includes 
digital copies of 425,000 original documents. Its structure is much more com-
plex than that of the Documents of the Soviet Era: in addition to presenting 
electronic copies of historical documents, the developers of the archive extract 
biographical data from them and combine personal information from various 
sources into coherent biographies. The archive also provides access to ca. 
100,000 digitized military maps to trace the movements of Soviet detachments 
and servicemen during the war, and a rich collection of original battle reports. 
Currently, the development team collaborates with German archives to add to 
The People’s Memory information about Soviet prisoners-of-war. The officially 
postulated goal of this archive is, like in the case of the Documents of the Soviet 
Era, to build up a critical mass of documentary evidence so that an unbiased 
and objective understanding of the Soviet Union’s participation in the Second 
World War would appear as a result of free access to these documents. At the 
same time, apart from epistemic concerns, this project also has an important 
humanitarian mission: to help the relatives of the Soviet servicemen to find 
relevant biographic information about their lives and deaths.
20.6  vernAculAr ArchIves
In recent years, thanks to the ongoing digital revolution that makes digitiza-
tion technologies increasingly cheap and easy to use, this discrepancy was 
addressed when a new phenomenon appeared that can be characterized as 
vernacular digital archives: namely, projects created, maintained, and sup-
ported by volunteers who are driven by a desire to preserve those aspects of 
the Russian historical experience that have been neglected due to a lack of 
funding or interest by the state archives. Two prominent projects include a 
digital archive of Soviet-era radiobroadcasts Audiopedia at audiopedia.su and 
a digital archive of diaries Prozhito at prozhito.org (for more, see Chap. 21). 
Audiopedia grew from an earlier project Staroe Radio (Old Radio, staroeradio.
ru), when in 2007 Yury Metelkin, a former Soviet rock-musician, launched an 
online radio station that broadcast Soviet-era programs, including audiobooks, 
audio-plays, science broadcasts, and so on. Over the following years, the 
 A. GOLUBEV
365
archive of Staroe Radio grew through the efforts of volunteers who digitized 
their old records and donated them to Metelkin; in 2018, it acquired an entire 
archive of the Irkutsk radio station that includes federal and local records from 
the 1940s on, or ca. 80,000 phonograms. Prozhito is a later project that dates 
back to 2015 when its founder, Mikhail Melnichenko, decided to produce a 
historical corpus of texts that could be used to trace the use of certain con-
cepts. The project employs a large group of volunteers to identify, scan, pro-
cess, and upload diary entries (Nordvik 2018, 43–44); as of early 2019, it 
provides access to nearly 3000 diaries, mainly from the Soviet era.
Both Audiopedia and Prozhito are non-commercial and non-government 
projects, and as such they show a large potential of public and digital history in 
terms of preserving and communicating historical evidence. Yet both ultimately 
work within the same paradigm of history as a national project that the 
Documents of the Soviet Era and The People’s Memory are part of. Metelkin expli-
cated this logic in his explanation of why he decided to preserve, digitize, and 
make available old radio broadcasts, mentioning the “preservation of the 
[national] language, education, cultural traditions, and ultimately national self- 
identity”—or everything that is traditionally identified as functions of state 
power—as the driving factors of his project. The very fact that both projects 
inadvertently prioritize the experience of the Soviet educated class, that is, the 
people who are more likely to internalize and embody the national agenda, 
means that the digital technologies do not challenge the logic of the national 
archive but rather ensure a better and more effective communication of knowl-
edge produced through it to national audiences.
20.7  conclusIon
The examples discussed above show that the Russian state has sought to use 
digital archives to firmly re-establish itself through its institutions (primarily 
Rosarhiv) as the main authority in the production of knowledge of Russian his-
tory, especially during the Soviet period, which remains extremely contested. 
Symptomatically, other post-Soviet states have used similar strategies: for 
example, Latvia whose government has persistently interpreted the period 
between 1940 and 1991 as an experience of double (Soviet and Nazi) occupa-
tion has recently made accessible documents of the Latvian office of the KGB 
(Komitet gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security) at kgb.
arhivi.lv with the names of its agents. The online publication of these docu-
ments by the State Archives of Latvia follows the same logic as the develop-
ment of digital archives in Russia. The digitization of historical documents 
remains an expensive business that the state agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) use strategically to create an online presence of docu-
ment collections that, from their perspective, benefit the common good, the 
understanding of which can vary dramatically from the national interests to 
global human rights to objective knowledge.
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The archival revolution of the early 1990s and the fact that it was used by a 
number of international actors (Library of Congress, Hoover Institution, IDC 
Publishers, etc.) to reproduce valuable collections of historical sources put 
Russian government bodies such as Rosarhiv and the Ministry of Defense in a 
situation where, despite their full control of the most important archival collec-
tions from Russian and Soviet history, they had to take proactive steps to act as 
the authoritative sources of critical evidence about Russian history. They 
responded to this challenge with ambitious digitization programs that pro-
vided an unprecedented level of access to primary sources in Russian history. At 
the same time, the political and epistemic concerns that drove the production 
of these archives forced their patrons and developers to concentrate on a very 
narrow list of topics that is limited to political and military history. Grants for 
digital projects provided by the RFH addressed a broader number of themes in 
social, cultural, and intellectual history, but in a very fragmentary manner due 
to limited funding.
The digital reproduction of historical documents and their communication 
online thus performs largely the same functions as the traditional archive, 
namely, maintaining state sovereignty over history, reinforcing silences in dom-
inant historical narratives, and endowing certain groups of experts with the 
authority to define the authenticity and validity of selected facts and sources. 
Even though such a phenomenon as the vernacular archive has become increas-
ingly prominent in recent years, it has yet to challenge this situation, since the 
developers of these digital archives have so far followed the preexisting struc-
tures and hierarchies of knowledge that prioritize the historical experience of 
privileged political and social groups.
note
1. For example, during 2006–2007, the author was an investigator of the project 
Missing in Karelia: Canadian Victims of Stalin’s Purges funded by the Canadian 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (principle investigator Prof. 
Varpu Lindström of York University). The project resulted in a database of 
Finnish-Canadian and Finnish-American immigrants to the Soviet Union that 
compiled information from several thousand of archival documents from the 
National Archive of the Republic of Karelia (http://missinginkarelia.ca/, 
accessed December 13, 2013); after the domain name expired in December 
2013, the digital archive was deposited by the National Archives of Finland and 
the National Archive of the Republic of Karelia (currently unavailable online).
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CHAPTER 21
Affordances of Digital Archives: The Case 
of the Prozhito Archive of Personal Diaries
Ekaterina Kalinina
21.1  IntroductIon
Despite being the guardians of public records Russian archives not always grant 
the right of public accessibility (TASS 2018; Rambler 2017; Komissiâ 2016; 
Slobodenyuk 2019). Not being able to get access to archival materials, profes-
sional historians and amateurs alike have to look for alternative ways of getting 
hold of historical sources, and in such a situation digital databases can become 
their salvation (Venyavkin 2017).
Today, one can get access to a wide range of historical documents online: 
project Ustnaâ istoriâ (Oral history) makes recorded talks with famous intel-
lectuals accessible through a web platform (http://oralhistory.ru); project 
Prozhito digitizes and publishes personal diaries (http://prozhito.org); data-
base Otkrytyj spisok (Open list) makes it possible to find information about 
persons who fell victim to the Soviet repression machine (http://ru.openlist.
wiki); photo databases such as Pastvu (http://pastvu.com) and Istoriâ Rossii v 
fotografiâh (History of Russia in photographs, http://russianphoto.ru) grant 
access to a wide range of photo materials.
These and other similar initiatives carry a promise of wider access to histori-
cal sources. Scholars even stress that digital archives form “public alternatives 
to official constructions of the past and ways in which that past is to be studied” 
(Lapina-Kratasyuk and Rubleva 2018, 164; Garde-Hansen et  al. 2009). 
Alexandra Herlitz and Jonathan Westin (2018, 451) believe that “[c]onflating 
E. Kalinina (*) 
Jönköping University, Jönköping, Sweden
e-mail: ekaterina.kalinina@ju.se
372
different archives digitally makes the archival substance less vulnerable to any 
agenda of an archiving individual and may therefore lead to a greater objectiv-
ity and reliability of the accumulated material.” In Russia such digital platforms 
become essential players in political, social and cultural life by allowing people 
to learn about the past from other sources rather than those that are state 
approved. This means that digital archives have the potential to not only chal-
lenge established historical discourses but also question the leading role of the 
state in the production of historical narratives.
This idea about the democratizing potential of digital archives is rooted in 
the belief that digital technologies are the solution to many problems. Recent 
studies of digital media, however, show that scholars should be more careful 
when stressing the democratic potential of the web, as internet is not necessar-
ily democracy’s magical solution (Fuchs 2017; Morozov 2011; Nisbet et al. 
2012; Rød and Weidmann 2015; Stoycheff et al. 2016). When archival collec-
tions become digital, various legal constraints and the fragmentary nature of 
archival records might lead to the reproduction of already existing biases. So, 
while some scholars (Herlitz and Westin 2018) see digital archiving as a possi-
bility to safeguard and disseminate data to wider publics, others (Aghostino 
2016; Azoulay 2012) insist on a more critical approach to digital archives by 
arguing that the non- neutral and ideological nature of digital infrastructures 
predetermines what type of content becomes visible and how much visibility it 
gets. Hence, in order to study the potential of digital archives for the democ-
ratization of history, one should look at what users can and cannot do in order 
to create new narratives that can disrupt dominant discourses of power.
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to study affordances of digital archives, 
that is, the properties that allow users to perform certain actions on the plat-
forms, in order to explore their democratic potential. To be able to do that, 
affordance analysis, which allows one to investigate the technological and orga-
nizational structures of digital platforms, the amount and quality of data avail-
able, the social underpinnings entangled in technologies and the degree of user 
participation, is applied to the Russian digital archive of diaries Prozhito.
The research questions that guide this chapter are: what kind of data is (not) 
available in the archive and why? What information about affordances is avail-
able and what does it tell us about the composition, constraints, limitations and 
affordances of the archive? How much participation does the archive allow? 
What kind of participation does the archive support? These questions are 
addressed by focusing on Prozhito as an environment that allows certain actions 
and forms of participation, rather than on specific uses of Prozhito. This means 
that this study is not a reception study but rather a research of digital archives 
as media environments.
In order to address the above-mentioned scholarly interest, the chapter 
starts with a section outlining the theoretical framework and methodological 




21.2  theoretIcal tools for unpackIng archIves
Some scholars believe that archives play an important role in the formation of 
national consciousness and in the development of democratic liberal citizen-
ship, because they preserve evidence which is paramount for the work of justice 
and crucial for keeping individuals, groups and institutions accountable (Joyce 
1999). Jacques Derrida, for example, claims the centrality of the archive to the 
existence of democratic society by stating that “[e]ffective democratization can 
always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and access to 
the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation” (Derrida 1995, 4).
Scholars also point out that archives are hardly neutral collections of records 
but rather environments where both technical and organizational structures 
produce as much as record events (Derrida 1995, 17) and organize data in a 
way that might “lead later investigators in a particular direction” (Manoff 
2004, 16). Gillian Rose (2012, 228) argues that archives “have effects on what 
is stored within them” and on “those who use them.” Jaimie Baron (2014, 
109ff) calls this process archive effect and explains it as a human response 
toward archival material, which can be triggered by the engagement of a per-
son with archival documents and even purposefully employed to activate 
the public.
As archives are environments with specific technological and organizational 
structures the users come in contact with, the concept of affordances could be 
applied in order to study archival properties and what users can and cannot do 
with them.
The term “affordance” was first coined by psychologist James J. Gibson in 
his seminal book The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979) to 
describe the properties of the environment. Gibson explains affordances as 
interconnected action possibilities offered by the environment to the subject. 
He says: “an affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an observer 
and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because of what it is” 
(Gibson 1979, 139). In other words, an affordance is the possibility of an 
action available in the environment that is independent of the subject’s ability 
to perceive this possibility. At the same time an affordance exists relative to 
action capabilities of the subject. This means that an affordance of an environ-
ment might exist, but it only can be activated if the subject has the capacity for 
an action.
At the same time what a subject perceives about affordances depends much 
on the information he/she has about them. Depending on the presence or 
absence of affordances, and the presence and absence of information about 
them, one can divide affordances into the following types (Gaver 1991): per-
ceptible affordances (both information and action exist), false affordances 
(information about the affordance might exist but the affordance itself is 
absent), hidden affordances (affordance exists but information is hidden), and 
correct rejection (absence of information and affordance) (Gaver 1991).
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Gibson (1979) also suggests two types of affordances: positive and negative, 
where positive affordances stand for properties that allow certain actions and 
negative affordances for properties that do not allow certain actions. They can 
also be called platform constraints. In this text the term “platform constraints” 
rather than “negative affordances” will be used. Constraints will be divided 
into technological, legal and ethical constraints in order to cover the whole 
spectrum of systematic issues.
One has to keep in mind that environments can be characterized by multiple 
affordances that exist in relation to each other. The notion of nesting helps to 
conceptualize these relationships between different affordances of environ-
ments by suggesting some sort of hierarchy between them. Turner (2005) 
suggests dividing affordances into simple affordances, that is, usabilities of the 
environment or objects, and complex affordances, that is, properties of the envi-
ronment that have an important cultural or historical significance when being 
used. Meanwhile, Wagman et al. (2016) suggest calling them subordinate and 
superordinate affordances, pointing to the connections between affordances of 
different levels: affordances at lower levels have means which allow higher level 
affordances to come into existence.
In order to trace the relationships between different levels of affordances, 
Gaver (1991, 82) suggests dividing affordances into sequential and nested, 
where the former emerge as a result of actions on perceptible affordances 
(Gaver 1991, 82) while the latter refer to affordances that serve as a context for 
other affordances. The best example for sequential affordances can be the func-
tions that a user learns about when logged in as an editor or a page administra-
tor. In such case, each affordance that emerges after logging in would be a 
sequential affordance. Nested affordances are actualized in temporal sequences 
as well, “yet time is not the sole basis for the nesting of affordances” as “nesting 
can also exist across levels that differ in order” (Wagman et al. 2016, 2).
Studying affordances is essential for understanding archival composition, 
which is in turn pivotal for comprehending why some documents are included 
while others are excluded or censored. Archival composition reflects biases of 
an archivist and/or donor, providing substantial information about societal, 
political and cultural contexts of the archives and in turn can shed light on 
degrees of participation in a given society.
Two key principles of archival practices—provenance and authenticity—help 
to unpack the composition of archives. In archival studies, while “provenance 
refers to the documentation of the origins and history of an archived item, 
authenticity denotes the preservation of the original object rather than the 
truth or accuracy of its content” (Kallinikos et al. 2013, 361). Both principles 
are important when it comes to the discussion of an archive’s possibility to 
evoke multi-vocal narratives. As historian Jane Stevenson (2013, 160; 170) 
puts it, archives hardly ever store enough material to fully reconstruct the 
whole life of a person; therefore, it is crucial to know the origins of the available 
documents as well as their history to be able to construct narratives that would 
give the fullest picture of the subject in question.
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The principles of provenance and authenticity are challenged in the digital 
environment because it is difficult to trace the origins of the documents 
(Marton 2010). This difficulty arises when one gets into contact with digital 
copies, which usually have neither traces of materiality nor records about their 
inquisition. In other words, this difficulty is a result of the technological and 
organizational constraints (negative affordances) of the modern digital plat-
forms that collect and make available historical documents.
21.3  MethodologIcal fraMework and steps to unpack 
Prozhito archIve
In order to learn what affordances an environment can offer, one has to engage 
with this environment. Activity theory, for example, postulates that environ-
ments can only be perceived through acting (Albrechtsen 2001). When acted 
upon, an environment reveals its hidden structures and its constraints as well as 
what are called perceived and actual affordances, where the first type stands for 
what a subject thinks he/she can do and the second for what a subject can actu-
ally do with/in the given environment (Norman 1988). Hence, in order to 
learn about affordances of digital archives, one has to try them out.
Taking off from the activity theory, Turner’s simple and complex affor-
dances (2005) and Gibson’s (1979) positive affordances and constraints, the 
project investigates what actions are allowed and not allowed on Prozhito. First, 
the user interface was browsed to collect as much information as possible about 
the perceived and simple affordances of the platform. Second, the platform was 
tested in order to create a historical narrative. Preparing for the publication of 
a special issue of the journal Baltic Worlds dedicated to the Centenary of the 
Russian Revolution, the author of the chapter has used Prozhito to tell a story 
about the Russian Revolution from the perspective of its contemporaries. In 
order to do that diaries tagged with the year 1917 were selected for the analysis 
and publication (Kalinina and Kochergan 2018). To be able to speak about 
volunteer experiences, the author joined the community of one of the labora-
tories as well as followed some of the laboratories online. The choice of the 
type of participation was defined by the author’s experiences and capabilities. 
Next, in order to learn more about the archival composition of Prozhito, the 
author interviewed the founders of the project Mikhail Melnichenko (2017) 
and Ilya Venyavkin (2017) as the information on the website was not sufficient 
despite a very encompassing description in the section “About the project” (O 
proekte—in Russian).
21.4  unpackIng Prozhito
Prozhito was founded in 2015 by a professional historian, Melnichenko, and his 
colleagues in order to collect and make available already published diaries and 
manuscripts. In 2019 Prozhito received the status of Research Institute of 
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Ego-documents at the European University in St. Petersburg, Russia, with a 
whole range of responsibilities, such as the collection and research of ego- 
documents and the organization of events and laboratories. In September 
2019, Prozhito was accepted into the European Ego-Documents Archives and 
Collections Network (http://prozhito.org) and became recognized by other 
memory institutions as a legible member (Fig. 21.1).
At the moment of writing, around 1700 diaries are uploaded into the sys-
tem, with 350 published for the first time. In total, the archive contains 
460,000 daily entries. The diaries available in the archive fall into the following 
categories: (1) transcribed manuscripts found in the archives; (2) transcribed 
manuscripts donated by the authors or their relatives; (3) digitized published 
diaries and (4) published diaries available online (Interview with 
Melnichenko 2017).
As a historical source, diaries have their specificity. A diary is usually a note-
book filled with handwritten notes arranged by date, which makes it an impor-
tant historical source that allows one to date events. Entries reporting on 
everyday occurrences, reflections, emotional experiences and impressions are 
usually written down for the author’s own use, and not with the intention of 
being published (Fig. 21.2).
Nevertheless, many authors are aware that their diaries can be read by others 
and even edit them to fit the public eye. While some intentionally write for 
profit or self-vindication with a possible reading public in mind, others develop 
secrete coding systems in order to conceal information from the eyes of 
unwanted readers (Interview with Melnichenko 2017). Compared with mem-
oirs diaries contain less “strategic lies”—intentional misrepresentations of 
events done with the aim of creating a more favorable self-representation 
(Interview with Melnichenko 2017). Still, using diaries as a historical source 
Fig. 21.1 Prozhito. User interface
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requires critical reflection on the part of the reader. One has to understand that 
the spectrum of motivations of the author, who keeps a diary, can be much 
wider than a simple desire for impartial recording of events and therefore one 
needs to consult other sources to verify the provided information.
According to the information available on the website, “absolutely all diaries 
present interest to the project” (prozhito.org), be it the diaries of famous per-
sonas or average citizens. Melnichenko says that diaries of average citizens are 
even more interesting as they rarely become available for the public eye but 
contain experiences and emotions anyone can relate to (Interview with 
Melnichenko 2017).
Organizationally Prozhito consists of a core team and a community of volun-
teers. The core team is built from people who are responsible for the overall 
concept of the project, the coordination of volunteers and laboratories, infor-
mational support, the development of specific projects, website development, 
support and editing (prozhito.org).
As the creation of an archive is a very time- and resource-consuming 
endeavor, Prozhito (being a non-commercial project) actively engages volun-
teers who collect, index, upload and tag diaries in the system. The core team 
defines tasks for the volunteers, which are communicated in authors’ directo-
ries, where next to the name of the author’s diary there is a mark signaling what 
kind of work could be performed by volunteers: text search, proof reading, 
editing or indexing (Fig. 21.3).
This means that volunteers can decide themselves which diary they want to 
work with depending on their personal interests and capabilities. The list of 
tasks for volunteers can be found on the Help page (Pomos’̂—in Russian). 
Reading this section reveals that while certain actions can be performed with-
out any supervision (preparation of the text for being uploaded), some actions 
Fig. 21.2 Prozhito. Author page
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demand additional couching (such as proofreading and final editing) and 
require special access to the corpus of the texts (such as tagging).
Apart from collecting and making digital copies of diaries available online, 
Prozhito organizes special workshops called laboratories, where volunteers 
meet to transcribe and discuss manuscripts. These sessions usually last two or 
three hours, with curators providing historical context and some background 
information about the authors of the manuscripts. The goal of such labs is to 
work collaboratively on archival sources and by doing so sustain and educate 
the vibrant volunteer community. Usually such laboratories are organized at 
the GULAG (Glavnoe upravlenie lagerej i mest zaklûčeniâ, Main Administration 
of Camps) museum in Moscow. Starting from autumn 2019 regular laborato-
ries are also organized at European University in St. Petersburg. Prozhito also 
arranges workshops in other cities in Russia, but on an irregular basis.
By 2019 the project developed new technological and organizational solu-
tions to improve the user experience. Nevertheless, certain constraints of tech-
nological and legal nature set boundaries on what becomes available in this 
archive. Therefore, in the following sections the technological and legal con-
straints are reviewed to understand what users can do on the platform.
21.5  through a glass darkly: froM sIMple 
affordance to technologIcal constraInts
Prozhito has a number of simple and perceived affordances that become evident 
when a user opens the archive’s home page. Prozhito’s interface suggests that a 
user, by clicking on action buttons, can search the data for (1) names of the 
author or individuals mentioned in the entries; (2) date of the entry; (3) key 
Fig. 21.3 Prozhito. The page Pomos’̂ (Help), where volunteers can learn how they can 
contribute to the project
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words and tags. For example, if a user is interested in what happened on January 
29, 1917, he/she can type the date into the search field to see all entries that 
exist in the database with this date tag. The system also suggests different fil-
ters, such as gender, age and geographical location. This means that all diaries 
are indexed and tagged to be searchable in the database. This feature allows 
users to work both with the diaries of specific authors and with the whole cor-
pus of texts uploaded in the system. This also means that the platform has some 
hidden affordances that could be used for scientific research, but the informa-
tion on them is not available because the developers did not want to scare 
“average users with much too many scientific tools” (Melnichenko 2017) 
(Fig. 21.4).
However, as the project is still in the making and not all texts are tagged and 
indexed, there is an uncertainty regarding the search output. This is a consider-
able constraint that might prevent users from relying on algorithmic search in 
the corpus and force them to do the search manually.
The fragmentary nature of the search output is not the only constraint of the 
archive. Altered and incomplete documents are another issue of the archive. 
Digitally stored information entails a set of specific problems: depending on 
Fig. 21.4 Prozhito. A suggested page of a diary
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the protocols and the types of data storage, not all types of documents or not 
all parts of documents can be stored or can be stored without distortion (for 
more on corpora, see Chap. 19). Hence, there is “potential for documents to 
be altered electronically in their content, provenance or through migration to 
new storage systems” (Glotzer 2013). In the case of Prozhito, the original doc-
uments when uploaded into the system lose any type of imagery, such as dia-
grams and tables, photographs and drawings, as the archive is primarily a 
textual corpus. As no images can be saved as part of the original document, the 
diaries lose a part of their identity, making it also difficult for a researcher to 
learn about the people who have written them. Meanwhile, illustrations may 
tell a lot about the time the diaries were written, as well as function as codes 
that may contain some information the authors wanted to conceal from poten-
tial readers. Even though the images can be annotated in the commentaries 
(the same goes for codes), working with the digital copy limits the actions of a 
researcher and therefore limits interpretation. Curators promise that in the 
nearest future they will add original images of the diaries for the users to be 
able to get a sense of what the manuscripts look like and therefore narrow 
down the gap between the original document, its digital copy and the reader 
(Interview with Melnichenko 2017).
There is, however, a solution to this problem, which is anchored in a sequen-
tial affordance of the platform. The curators of the project remind users that 
there is always a possibility to either ask for an original copy from the curators 
or the owners of the diary or, if the original is stored in a state archive, consult 
the original there. The information about the original manuscript is usually 
located in the annotation to the entry and contains either a bibliographical 
note (if the diary is published) or the address where the original can be found.
Another constraint users experience on Prozhito is the inability to trace how 
and by whom documents were written and revised. The information about 
authorization of some parts of the text is marked with <…>, but it does not 
allow tracing the history of the document, to see whether parts of a text were 
deleted or re-written, when exactly it happened and who did it. Such short-
comings undermine the validity of the sources and even historical narratives 
based upon them.
21.6  hIdden affordances as a result of legal 
and ethIcal constraInts
Prozhito informs users about various legal and ethical constraints that may 
restrict access to the texts and define how diaries are published. The first con-
straint is a direct consequence of intellectual property rights as written in the 
Civil Code of the Russian Federation, which protects authors’ rights and the 
rights of owners and publishers. To abide by the law and make digital versions 




If we are lucky to find publishers, we ask for permission. If we do not have such 
possibility, we upload texts into the system, but keep them in such a “closed” 
regime that does not allow our users to read the texts, but only those entries that 
contain the names or the key words the users might be after. This means that 
these texts take part in the search, but the full access is not permitted. The search 
output is not yet available in the form of snippets, but in the form of the full diary 
entry. (Interview with Melnichenko 2017)
As it reads from the quote above, intellectual property right often deter-
mines the regime of visibility of uploaded diaries. Orphan texts, that is, texts 
that have no information about owners/authors, are only available in the cita-
tion regime allowed by the intellectual property legislation.
Melnichenko says that to enable the search function across as many docu-
ments as possible the curators strike agreements with publishers who allow 
digitization and indexing of their published books if Prozhito tells their readers 
where to buy these books. When it comes to unpublished manuscripts, the 
curators of the project try to get permissions from legal owners. If they cannot 
be found, diaries are uploaded to the database and remain there unless the 
owners show up and demand to take the diaries down. Such situations could 
be seen both as affordances and as constraints: the project curators dare to 
publish orphan texts and by doing so increase the number of texts participating 
in the search (an affordance); the possibility of removal, however, signals a 
constraint—a fact of censorship of an archival record.
Curators often collaborate with authors and owners to be able to publish 
diaries. Such practice often results in the editing of manuscripts. Melnichenko 
describes the process as follows:
We work in tight collaboration with the owners of manuscripts. After a text has 
been prepared for the upload it is given for a review to the owners, who have free 
hands to delete anything they consider sensitive. In other words, it means that we 
give the owners an opportunity to shorten the text. At the same time, we restrict 
users’ access to those texts we consider too personal. These texts are still indexed 
and if a user types a key word and this word exists in this diary, the user can see 
the entry with this key word, but cannot read the whole diary. (Interview with 
Melnichenko 2017)
Melnichenko says that all diaries published after 1942 could be heavily 
edited due to the above-mentioned regulations, while all texts dated after 
December 31, 1999, are to be made invisible for the readers in order to protect 
the privacy of the individuals mentioned in the texts (Interview with 
Melnichenko 2017).
Another constraint that defines which diaries see the light has both legal and 
ethical dimensions. Diaries often contain information about third persons and 
therefore fall under personal data protection regulations. Some texts might 
even contain insults and ungrounded accusations, which means that they fall 
under the defamation law. Melnichenko says that sometimes curators 
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themselves decide not to publish such texts due to personal reasons. He tells 
about a diary written by a woman full of frustration and hatred, which he felt 
reluctant to publish in order not to “let so much negative energy out into the 
world” (Interview with Melnichenko 2017).
The legal and ethical constraints mentioned above give the right to censor 
any information in the diary that can be deemed inappropriate or going against 
the current legislation of the Russian Federation. This means that the owners 
of the diaries and the curators of the project themselves can decide what infor-
mation should be kept and what should be left out. These precautions taken by 
curators could also be seen as forced measures needed to safeguard the archive 
from the attacks of both Russian authorities and private individuals. As Prozhito 
makes information publicly available, it could be even considered a media 
source, which makes the platform vulnerable toward legislation that regulates 
mass media in Russia (The Law of the Russian Federation “On Mass Media” 
dated December 27, 1991, No. 2124-1). These regulations and laws guarding 
privacy of individuals and regulating sources of information can potentially 
hinder the construction of alternative historical narratives as information about 
perpetrators might never see the light, which might lead to the further silenc-
ing of the victims of the Soviet regime.
21.7  partIcIpatIon as a coMplex affordance
Digitization, that is, converting analogue documents into a digital format, is a 
time- and resource-consuming enterprise, which Prozhito resolves by using vol-
unteer labor. Curators design tasks by taking into consideration people’s differ-
ent skills and abilities and even allow volunteers to withdraw at any time. In the 
language of affordances it means that the platform allows for multiple levels of 
engagement and disengagement and has a number of sequential and nested 
affordances. These multiple affordances are related to each other in the follow-
ing manner: the discussions of diaries during Prozhito labs are possible because 
the Prozhito volunteers found these diaries in the archives and copied them; 
indexing and tagging of diaries is possible because the Prozhito volunteers tran-
scribed these diaries. In both cases volunteers enable multiple interconnected 
actions and are the key actors in the process of creation and functioning of the 
platform.
Some of the activities performed by volunteers are possible in the digital 
environment (indexing, tagging, transcribing), while some, such as work in the 
archives, can only be performed offline. In any case, any activities the Prozhito 
volunteers are engaged in assume direct contact with personal diaries and with 
their authors. It has its social and cultural benefits. First, by working with pri-
vate documents, one gets an opportunity to learn more about individual expe-
riences and reflections about historical events and as a result build some sort of 
solidarity with and develop compassion toward the authors of the diaries. 
Second, this revelatory power of personal documents, that is, archive power, 
has an “important social function”:
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It gives a new sense of life to many people, especially old ones. Before Prozhito, 
they thought that their lives and their diaries mattered very little. After they found 
out about Prozhito, they became very busy. Now they run around and organize 
editorial meetings with their grandchildren and children. (Interview with 
Melnichenko 2017)
This family engagement in editorial work is a form of collective remember-
ing—a representative of an older generation passes on memories to a younger 
generation. A family member’s private story becomes the subject of a collective 
experience; it allows for understanding historical events from a personal 
perspective.
At the same time narratives that emerge from personal documents can chal-
lenge historical master narratives. For the lab session it means that a diary has 
to be carefully chosen for its capacity to make a certain statement. Meanwhile, 
the curator’s work implies giving the volunteers different means both to recog-
nize master narratives that have to be challenged and to create new narratives 
based on the material in the diaries that they work with during the lab.
During one of such labs, volunteers worked with a diary of Chernevsky Oleg 
(Chinar, born 1921, the diary volume started June 21, 1938, and finished 
September 10, 1938), archived by Russian historical and human rights organi-
zation Memorial. A crucial element of this diary is the presence of several layers 
of coding. One of the layers is the actual code, a system of signs that is used to 
encode a secret text that is not supposed to be understood by others than the 
owner of the diary himself. Another layer of coding is a lingo that is used dur-
ing a specific period of time, in this case the time of the Great Terror. Decoding 
these layers reveals a matrix of visible and invisible aspects of Soviet life: what 
was allowed and what was not allowed to say out loud.
When working with diaries, volunteers get a chance to see snapshots of 
everyday life in the form of everyday descriptions in the diaries (Herlitz and 
Westin 2018, 453). By doing so they experience so-called archival voyeurism, 
the desire to see what they were not meant to see (Baron 2014). What is 
important is that during such labs people engage into what could be called a 
collective archival voyeurism, a process of collective reading of a diary that unites 
a group of volunteers together when they communicate with each other trying 
to decipher what is written in a manuscript. During such labs, volunteers 
engage in a process of meaning-making by sharing each other’s fragmentary 
historical knowledge and attempting to guess the emotional state of the author 
of a diary during the period of writing. This collective experience has a bonding 
effect: by sitting together around a table and working on different pieces of 
one diary, people start feeling a connection to each other because they all 
secretly spy on somebody’s personal life.
Hence, the role of these labs is to introduce the public into an archive 
through embodied (typing, transcribing) and sensual (empathizing or/and 
sympathizing) experiences (Chakrabarty 2013, 457). The diaries used in the 
labs are of fragmentary character (only some parts of the diaries are used for 
21 AFFORDANCES OF DIGITAL ARCHIVES: THE CASE OF THE PROZHITO… 
384
work), which by nature can generate “a sense of the ‘presence’ of history” 
(Baron 2014, 12). The volunteers do not need to get the whole picture in its 
entirety presented to them. On the contrary, partial and incomplete informa-
tion invites them to get engaged, to learn more. Being fragmentary, these dia-
ries own a performative quality as they affect the volunteers and present a 
possibility for this audience to arise as active public through the interpreta-
tive act.
21.8  conclusIon
The aim of this chapter was to study Prozhito’s potential for the production of 
historical knowledge in Russia. After having analyzed Prozhito’s affordances 
several important aspects of the project have come forward.
First, the research has shown that affordance for democratic knowledge pro-
duction is a nesting affordance, which is situated in several other simple and 
complex affordances, which in turn are sequential affordances. In practice it 
means that even though affordances exist independently of each other—for 
example, diaries are readable, indexable and searchable, they are also interde-
pendant—diaries are readable because they are searchable and indexable. These 
simple affordances also allow for participatory practices, such as group discus-
sions of Soviet history and collaborative work on the production of the Prozhito 
archive.
Second, sequences of these positive affordances emerge from a superordi-
nate negative affordance—the impossibility to create the archive without the 
help of volunteers. As Prozhito does not have enough financial and technologi-
cal resources, the work of collecting, preparing and editing texts is forced upon 
volunteers. This is a good example of how negative affordances of the environ-
ment, if handled creatively, condition positive changes and result in turn in the 
production of participatory infrastructures. Working on the creation of the 
archive gives people new meaning in life and ensures dialogue between differ-
ent generations, family members and random people, who create their own 
networks by volunteering for Prozhito.
Third, archives like Prozhito in Russia indeed play an important political, 
social and cultural role by providing more democratic access to historical 
sources. By making alternative history narratives possible, archives mobilize 
communities for action, which results in independent learning and thinking.
By providing access to previously unavailable sources of information such 
archival initiatives also challenge state archives, which have always been central 
institutions for nation building and maintenance of political dominance 
through wielding power over the shape and direction of historical scholarship 
and collective memory.
However, being alternative public platforms for historical negotiations such 
archives become sites of conflict as they potentially might provide grounds for 
demanding justice. In the case of Prozhito, the curators put in place certain 
constraints to avoid potential conflicts of interests especially when it comes to 
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publication of diaries written during the last seventy-five years. In other words, 
ethical and legal constraints condition what data has to see the light and deter-
mine the composition of archive that also might have some consequences. As 
the archive deals with documents of personal origin, which might contain data 
about third parties, crucial information has to wait for some time before it can 
be published, hence minimizing chances for justice. Meanwhile, as information 
about the removal of sensitive information is not provided, it also makes it dif-
ficult to search for evidence as no traces of such evidence remain. Therefore, 
when celebrating the evident democratic potential of such initiatives, one must 
remember that it is still an archive and it is still subjected to certain politics of 
invisibility conditioned by various constraints.
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CHAPTER 22
Open Government Data in Russia
Olga Parkhimovich and Daria Gritsenko
22.1  IntroductIon
Open data can be defined in different ways and based on different principles, 
but it generally entails that anyone can access, use, and share the data freely. For 
instance, according to the European Union, open government data describes 
“the information collected, produced or paid for by the public bodies (public 
sector information, PSI) and made freely available for re-use for any purpose” 
(European Data Portal n.d.). In the broader sense, open government data is 
not only datasets, but also open government initiatives, policies and strategies, 
data management and publication approach, and models for interaction with 
citizens, nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and business. The set of poli-
cies enabling open government data promotes transparency, accountability, 
and improved efficiency of public services. In this way, open data initiatives are 
closely aligned with the freedom of information (FOI) principle, which is con-
sidered a cornerstone of democratic governance (Ackerman and Sandoval- 
Ballesteros 2006). As a result, open data can allow citizens to develop socially 
significant services and applications, analyze government actions, and know 
how government spends their money. At the same time, open data poses 
important questions with regard to data collection, processing, maintenance, 
storage, and security.
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In Russia, the executive order to provide open government data was signed 
by the President Vladimir Putin in May 2012 (Decree No. 601 from May 7, 
2012). In 2014, the Open Government Data Portal (data.gov.ru) was launched. 
According to this portal, open government data (referred to as “open data” on 
most occasions) is
information (including documented) created within the limits of its powers by 
government bodies, or received by the specified bodies and organizations, as well 
as by information and analytical organizations participating in the publication of 
its own open data in the territory of the Russian Federation, which is to be placed 
on the Internet in a format that ensures its automatic processing for the purpose 
of re-use without prior modification by a person (machine readable format), and 
can be used freely in any lawful purposes by any persons, regardless of the form 
of its placement (a simple collection of information, a database, etc.).
The initiative has been actively developed, and by the end of 2019, more 
than 22,500 datasets were published on it. The Open Data Portal has been 
tightly connected to another initiative—the Open Government—that was 
launched by the President Dmitry Medvedev to ensure transparency of the 
legislative and executive processes in Russia (for more, see Chap. 2). In May 
2018, the Russian Federation Open Government initiative was abolished, and 
the functions of the minister of Open Government were not transferred to 
another portfolio, which significantly reduced the activity of government agen-
cies in this sphere. Nevertheless, but the obligation to publish open data has 
not been canceled. Therefore, the study of the specifics of open data in Russia 
and their use in applications and services is still relevant.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides the general legal back-
ground on the freedom of information in Russia. Next, it presents the Open 
Government Data initiative in Russia. The following sections explore the 
Russian open data strategy from the policy and implementation perspectives. 
Next, the regional dimension of open data is discussed. The following section 
provides an overview on the forms of interaction between the state and the citi-
zens based in the open data. Finally, the chapter gives examples of public, civil 
society, and business initiatives that were enabled by the Open Data initiative.
22.2  russIan Freedom oF InFormatIon act
Freedom of information (FOI) is usually considered as an extension of freedom 
of speech, one of the fundamental human rights recognized in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. FOI is the key legal concept that guarantees 
access by the general public to the government-held information. “From India 
to South Africa and Mexico to China, states of varying degrees of develop-
ment, size, and political persuasion have embraced openness and FOI” (Hazell 
and Worthy 2010, 352). For a long time, many FOI laws—especially in non-
democratic states—were criticized for lacking the implementation machinery, 
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so that the free access to information remained a right only on paper (Relly and 
Sabharwal 2009). Yet, the digital transformation has become a turning point at 
which FOI could be given a new substance through publishing government 
datasets online.
In Russia, there is a number of laws concerning the right of access to infor-
mation. Article 29 of the Russian 1993 Constitution guarantees everyone the 
right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate information by 
any lawful means. The list of information constituting a state secret is deter-
mined by a special federal law. Federal Law No. 149-FZ of July 27, 2006, “Ob 
informacii, informacionnyh tehnologiâh i o zasîte informacii” (On Information, 
Information Technologies and Information Protection) is a key legal docu-
ment in the field of freedom of information. For the first ten years of its exis-
tence, there were 25 editions of this law, demonstrating its highly sensitive and 
political nature. The mechanisms for implementing the Russian FOI law is 
regulated by a number of special laws: Federal Law of May 2, 2006, No. 59-FZ 
“O porâdke rassmotreniâ obrasênij graždan Rossijskoj Federacii” (On the 
Procedure for Consideration of Appeals of Citizens of the Russian Federation), 
Law of the Russian Federation No. 2124-1 of December 27, 1991, “O sredst-
vah massovoj informacii” (On the Mass Media), Federal Law No. 8-FZ of 
February 9, 2009, “Ob obespečenii dostupa k informacii o deâtelnosti gosudarst-
vennyh organov i organov mestnogo samoupravleniâ” (On providing access to 
information on the activities of state and local government agencies), Federal 
Law of December 22, 2008, Federal Law No. 262-FZ “Ob obespec ̌enii dostupa 
k informacii o deâtel’nosti sudov v Rossijskoj Federacii” (On providing access to 
information on the activities of courts in the Russian Federation), and Federal 
Law of October 22, 2004, No. 125-FZ “Ob arhivnom dele v Rossijskoj 
Federacii” (On the archival business in the Russian Federation).
The Russian FOI law guarantees to its subjects of the right to information 
by determining the basis for the realization of the right to information, and 
establishing the principles, forms, and freedoms for obtaining information. 
The right to seek and receive information is provided for both individual citi-
zens and organizations and can be exercised through an official request to the 
owner of the information to provide certain information. If a citizen requests 
information that affects his or her rights and freedoms, the government cannot 
refuse such a request. The law also grants a right to request, without justifica-
tion, information on (1) normative legal acts on the rights and obligations of a 
person or organization, (2) information on the state of the environment, (3) 
information on the activities of government agencies and their use of budget, 
(4) information that accumulates in the open collections of libraries, museums 
and archives, and information systems, (5) information, access to which cannot 
be limited by law. If requested, information must be provided without condi-
tions and limitations. Refusal to provide information can be appealed in a 
higher authority, the prosecutor’s office, or at the relevant court. The state can 
charge a fee for the provision of information only if this is expressly stated in 
the law. Information on the activities of the government bodies posted on the 
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Internet and information affecting the rights and duties of a person and in 
other legal cases are always supposed to be provided free of charge 
(Olenichev 2017).
A citizen, a journalist, a media outlet, an organization, or any other civil law 
entity may request information under the Russian FOI law. The request for 
information may be sent by regular or electronic mail or personally delivered to 
a government agency. Internet sites of federal executive bodies contain forms 
for filing electronic appeals of citizens. Some regional governments create a 
“single reception room” (a single form, for example, on the website of the 
regional government), and they themselves forward requests to the necessary 
regional executive bodies. In order to receive a reply, it is necessary that the 
request for information contains the name of the state body, the name and 
surname of the applicant, his or her postal or e-mail address, the date of appeal, 
and the signature (if the message was not sent by email). The appeal is consid-
ered for 30 days, and, in exceptional cases, the term can be extended for another 
30 days. Consideration of the request ends with the direction of the response. 
This procedure applies to all subjects of civil law, with the exception of the 
media. The authorities must respond to requests from the media within seven 
days of receiving the request (or notify within three days that the information 
will be provided later, indicating the date and reason for the postponement of 
the deadline).
In accordance with the Russian FOI law, authorities are required to provide 
information not only on request, but also on a regular basis. In particular, they 
are obliged to publish information about their activities in the media, on the 
Internet, in the premises of government bodies, and in other places that they 
have specifically identified, to acquaint users with information on the activities 
of state bodies through library archives and funds, and to allow interested citi-
zens to attend meetings of collegiate bodies.
Given the long-standing tradition of secrecy within most branches of gov-
ernment and state authorities in the Soviet Union that has been inherited by 
the Russian Federation, the 2010 FOI law has been a major legislative mile-
stone. Yet, the discrepancy between the law and its implementation has been 
noticed. The Global Integrity Index 2010 revealed that while Russian citizens 
have a strong constitutional right to information (scoring 90 out of 100), the 
actual ability of citizens to utilize this right was very limited (scoring only 
56/100) (Global Integrity. Global Integrity Report: Russian Federation–2010, 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Russian-Federation/2010/). As a 
result, Freedom of Information Law is often left unused by members of the 
public as there is a lack of knowledge with regard to FOI and a lack of transpar-
ency culture (Henderson and Sayadyan 2011).
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22.3  open Government data InItIatIve In russIa: 
polIcy, InstItutIons, InFrastructure
Open Government Data can be regarded as a special case of implementation of 
the freedom of information principles. From the legal point of view, the Open 
Data initiative in Russia is mainly regulated by the Decree of the President of 
the Russian Federation (No. 601 of May 7, 2012) “Ob osnovnyh napravleniâh 
soveršenstvovaniâ sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniâ” (On the main direc-
tions of improving the system of public administration) and the federal laws 
“Ob informacii, informacionnyh tehnologiâh i o zasîte informacii” (On 
Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection, No. 149- 
FZ, entered into force on July 27, 2006) and “Ob obespec ̌enii dostupa k infor-
macii o deâtel nosti gosudarstvennyh organov i organov mestnogo samoupravleniâ” 
(On providing access to information on the activities of state and local govern-
ment agencies, No. 8-FZ, entered into force on February 9, 2009), with 
respective amendments.
The first systematic approach in the field of open data in Russia was devel-
oped in 2012–2014, when the Concept of Open Data of the Russian Federation 
was adopted and implemented (Concept 2014). This Concept laid down the 
institutional, legal, and technological foundations of the open data system as it 
exists today. The Concept outlined the movement toward Open Data as a four-
fold process, consisting of the development of methodological and normative 
documentation, adoption of the main instruments of certification, registration, 
and publication of open data, adoption of the plans for the disclosure of state 
and municipal data, and, finally, the launch of the Open Data Portal of the 
Russian Federation (data.gov.ru). The main effort for the realization of the 
Open Data Concept were concentrated within the Governmental Commission 
for Coordinating the Activities of an Open Government—in short, the Open 
Government—an expert group working within the Russian government. The 
official documents about the open data activities on the national level can be 
found in the section about the project Open Data published on the Russian 
Open Government website (http://opendata.open.gov.ru). The website has 
not been updated since 2018, however, following the resignation of the Open 
Government Minister Abyzov.
By law, all the federal executive bodies, including ministries, federal services, 
and agencies, must publish open government data on their websites. Yet, in 
accordance with the Order of the Government of the Russian Federation issued 
in 2013 (No. 1187-r of July 10, 2013), not all information is a subject to man-
datory disclosure. The information that is mandatory to be disclosed in the 
form of open data includes seven categories:
 1. Names of territorial bodies and representative offices (representatives) of 
the federal executive authority abroad (if any).
 2. Names of subordinate organizations (if any).
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 3. Plan for conducting inspections of legal entities and individual entrepre-
neurs for the next year.
 4. The results of planned and unscheduled inspections conducted by the 
federal executive authority and its territorial bodies within their author-
ity, as well as the results of inspections conducted in the federal executive 
authority, its territorial bodies and subordinate organizations.
 5. Statistical information generated by the federal executive body in accor-
dance with the federal statistical work plan, as well as statistical informa-
tion on the results of planned and unscheduled inspections.
 6. Information on vacant positions of the state civil service, available in the 
federal executive body and its territorial bodies.
 7. Registers of licenses for specific types of activities licensed by federal 
executive bodies.
The publishing of other information in the form of open data is optional.
To facilitate the implementation of the Executive Order, in 2015, the 
Governmental Commission for Coordinating the Activities of an Open 
Government created the Open Data Council (https://opendata.open.gov.ru/
sovet/about/), a consultative body consisting of representatives of federal 
authorities, business, and universities, headed by the minister of the Open 
Government. The Council has four main functions. First, it develops specific 
mechanisms for opening data and to help the government to solve all organi-
zational, legal, and technical problems as efficiently as possible. Second, it was 
mandated to work with business and citizens, helping to measure the demand 
for open data, as well as to choose the priorities when disclosing government 
information. The third task of the Council is to collect and promote best prac-
tices, popularize the idea of open government data, and show specific opportu-
nities for business development. Finally, it was asked to create an independent 
feedback mechanism to assess the overall economic and social impact from the 
disclosure of government databases. Meeting every two to three months, the 
main idea behind the Open Data Council was to discuss the questions related 
to different aspects of the open data, for example data about different topics or 
data from different federal government bodies. During the meetings, represen-
tatives of state bodies were invited to the Council to make presentations, 
exchange information, and help the Council to achieve its core tasks. As the 
Council was established with consultative functions, its recommendations have 
to be submitted to the Governmental Commission for Coordinating the Activities 
of an Open Government, which is responsible for coordinating different points 
of view and interests, as well as the consideration of expert opinions. Hence, 
the Governmental Commission, not the Council itself, had the power to issue 
final recommendations by governmental orders. In May 2018, after the reelec-
tion of Vladimir Putin to the presidential post and the formation of a new 
government, the Open Data Council was suspended. A new council or working 
group has not been created, but the need for a council or center of competence 
is being discussed by experts.
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In course of its functioning, the Open Data Council developed recommen-
dations on the development of the entire open data ecosystem. The action plan 
(“Road Map”) “Open Data of the Russian Federation” for 2015–2016 
(Roadmap 2014) could be considered as the main outcome of its work. The 
Road Map presupposed a number of concrete action points. In 2015, all fed-
eral executive bodies were to create sections of open data on their Internet 
resources and disclose the so-called priority datasets, or socially significant 
datasets, grouped into 27 thematic areas, according to a certain schedule. The 
legislator was, at the same time, tasked with the development of the terms. 
Finally, the presumption of general availability of primary statistical data was 
introduced as an amendment to the Federal Law “Ob oficial nom statističeskom 
uc ̌ete i sisteme gosudarstvennoj statistiki v Rossijskoj Federacii” (On Official 
Statistical Accounting and the System of State Statistics in the Russian 
Federation, No. 282-FZ from November 29, 2007). While the roadmap has 
not been legally canceled, due to the abolition of the minister of open govern-
ment and the lack of a responsible person in the federal government, the road-
map has completely disappeared from the public and internal agendas of the 
federal government and federal executive bodies. At the time of writing this 
chapter, the roadmap can be considered to be suspended.
Reports on the implementation of the “Road Map” were submitted by all 
federal executive bodies to the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia 
quarterly to monitor the quality and timeliness of the implementation of the 
plan. The reports were used to monitor the progress of Open Data policy 
implementation. Also, the federal executive bodies annually fill out a form of 
self-examination of the level of development of mechanisms and directions of 
openness, one of the tools of which are the open data (Self-examination form 
2017), and were used to compile and the “open data rating.” According to the 
report produced by the Open Data Council, the openness self-perception 
among the federal executive organs has been growing, and new federal bodies 
are joining the Open Data movement (Expert Council Report 2016). The 
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Energy, and Ministry of Finance occupied the 
top three positions in the perceived transparency in 2015.
In order to facilitate open data management, an Action Plan Open Data of 
the Russian Federation for 2016–2017 was developed, outlining the activities 
to be undertaken, expected results, schedule, and naming the responsible exec-
utors (Action Plan 2015). The Action Plan included actions to develop meth-
odological support in the field of open data, the development of regulatory 
legal support, the development of an open data infrastructure, access to open 
data, the formation of an open data ecosystem, and the development of non-
state institutions. There have been no follow-up action plans or other strategic 
documents published since then. In general, the 2015 Action Plan has been 
followed by the Russian Open Data Council. A significant part of the actions 
in this Action Plan consisted of discussions; therefore, the implementation of 
this plan did not lead to qualitative changes in the openness of key areas of data 
publication in the Russian Federation. For example, detailed data on quality of 
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life or a register of companies have not been disclosed. On the other hand, the 
data that are now most open in Russia (for example, data on public finances) 
were disclosed in parallel with the activities of the Open Data Council as part 
of the functions of the responsible public authorities.
From the infrastructural point of view, the main gateway to the open gov-
ernment data in Russia is the Russian Open Data Portal (data.gov.ru) launched 
in 2014 and maintained by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development. 
The portal contains datasets provided by the federal, regional, and local level 
government bodies, and some federal government websites are even config-
ured to automatically upload data to the Russian Open Data Portal. The Portal 
is equipped through a search function that allows a user to do keyword searches. 
Each dataset is also assigned to a thematic category, such as “Government,” 
“Economics,” “Health,” “Transport,” “Tourism,” et cetera, and is promoted 
as the core of the open data ecosystem in Russia. Most datasets currently 
uploaded fall within the “Government” category (almost 15,000, or two- 
thirds of all uploaded datasets), while least data can be found under the catego-
ries “Cartography” (81), “Electronics” (29), and “Weather” (5) (data.gov.ru, 
December 19, 2019). While some official agencies and authorities took proac-
tive steps to disclose their information, others fulfill the requirements in a 
superficial way (Henderson and Sayadyan 2011). In a recent research, 
Repponen (2018) investigated open data availability of 75 Russian executive 
organs, including federal agencies and services, ministries and funds, revealing 
a tendency among the studied bodies to release datasets on contact informa-
tion, thereby only fulfilling the minimum requirements of the 2012 executive 
order to provide open government data on the Internet. In 2019, Begtin et al. 
issued a special report under the auspices of the Russia Audit Chamber, sug-
gesting a new instrument—an Openness rating—as a tool to monitor and pro-
vide specific recommendations to the federal authorities. The Openness rating 
measures three key dimensions—the openness of information, open data avail-
ability, and open dialogue. The first results demonstrate that the federal minis-
tries show higher results on information and open data dimensions, while only 
about a third of them scored high on the open dialogue criteria. Similarly, 
federal agencies tend to score higher on information openness, while only 24% 
scored high on the open dialogue dimension.
Over the past year and a half, the Russian Open Data Portal has not been 
developed or supported, and funding has not been allocated for it. In the fall 
of 2019, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia announced tenders 
and concluded contracts for technical support and refinement of the Portal. 
The contracts also included services such as webinars and hackathons and the 
development of recommendations. Yet, the cost, timing, and quality of work, 
the results of which could be observed at the moment of writing this chapter 
(December 2019), raise questions from the expert community.
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22.4  open data manaGement 
and publIcatIon approach
To facilitate open data management and publication, the Russian government 
developed an Open Data Standard (openstandard.ru), including the Concept 
for the Openness of the Federal Executive Bodies (Concept 2014), the 
Methodological Recommendations for the Publication of open data by state 
bodies and local self-government bodies (Methodological Recommendations 
2014), as well as technical requirements for the publication of open data. The 
Methodological Recommendations have become the main applied tool for the 
authorities, as this 100-page document contains specific guidelines for publish-
ing open data for government bodies. They were developed to provide a rele-
vant, structured, and targeted tool that helps ensure compliance with the 
legislation of the Russian Federation by explaining the law, suggesting best 
practices for compliance, providing examples of with applicable national and 
international technical standards. According to the Methodical 
Recommendations, open data is information placed on the Internet in the 
form of systematized data organized in a format that ensures its automatic 
processing without prior modification by a person for the purposes of repeated, 
free and free use. The Methodological Recommendations outline for the data 
owners (state and municipal employees) and their publishers (specialists of 
internal information technologies [IT] departments or companies involved on 
the basis of a contract) the requirements for the content of information 
resources, the technical requirements for formats for the presentation of open 
data, and the composition and principles of interaction of elements of the 
national open data infrastructure. The Recommendations are quite often criti-
cized in the expert community for three main reasons: they are not well struc-
tured, their target audience is not clearly specified, and they do not answer 
some of the important questions that arise for data publishers. As a result, the 
experts often highlight the need to revise and update this document.
The Technical Requirements for the Publication of Open Data, an annex to 
the Methodological Recommendations, contain specifications on the require-
ments for the publication of the register of open data, open datasets, the pass-
port of an open dataset (description of metadata), and the requirements for the 
structure of an open dataset in machine-readable form. Publication of the 
metadata, called a “dataset passport,” is required and is relevant for the end- 
user, as along with the identification number (id), name, description, owner, 
person in charge, link, and format, it includes important temporal information, 
such as the date of the first publication, the date and contents of the last modi-
fication, and links to previous versions of the dataset, as well as the version of 
methodical recommendations to which it adheres. When an authority creates 
an Internet page to provide access to its datasets, it should have a heading that 
clearly marks the content—“Open Data”—and the following elements: a reg-
ister of open data, information on the total number of open datasets, in case 
there are more than 20 datasets—a search tool should be provided, and a tool 
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for requesting information in the form of open data. Importantly, each pub-
lished dataset should have both a machine-readable and a human-readable rep-
resentation, with requirements differentiating the data formats (such as csv, 
xml, json, html + rdfa). Currently, majority of the data is published in a simple 
comma-separated format (CSV), which on the one hand is a format familiar to 
lay users, but, on the other hand, is the format most prone to formatting mis-
takes which makes aggregating and cleaning of large datasets into a separate, 
laborious task.
The conditions for the use of open data—terms of use and/or license—peri-
odicity of updates, and the public authority responsible for publication (pub-
lisher) should also be clearly identified. Often, in addition to the current version 
of the open dataset, user can also download archival versions. For datasets 
published on the Russian Open Data Portal (data.gov.ru), a change log is avail-
able. One important feature of open data is publishing under an open license. 
The license or terms of use of the dataset allow programmers to understand 
what actions they can do with published data: can third-party applications be 
created based on open data, can data be used for commercial services, et cetera.
The regulatory framework created in Russia provides public authorities with 
requirements and recommendations for the publication of open data. The 
open data infrastructure, which has been created mainly between 2012 and 
2014, serves the purpose of providing access to government data to a variety of 
actors. Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, the parliamentary body 
of financial control in the Russia, still considers open data as one of the priority 
areas of work. Yet, as the federal government significantly rolled back the open-
ness agenda, government data management in Russia has shifted from a prior-
ity to ensure openness to an internal inventory of data within authorities 
without additional publicity to this process.
22.5  reGIonal open data InItIatIves
In 2013, the Russian government adopted a resolution “Ob obespec ̌enii dostupa 
k obsêdostupnoj informacii o deâtel’nosti gosudarstvennyh organov i organov mes-
tnogo samoupravleniâ v informacionno-telekommunikacionnoj seti ‘Internet’ v 
forme otkrytyh dannyh” (On providing access to publicly available information 
on the activities of state bodies and local governments in the information and 
telecommunications network “Internet” in the form of open data, No. 583, 
July 10, 2013). This resolution, as already mentioned, contains rules pertain-
ing to publicly available information placed by the federal and local govern-
ment bodies on the Internet in the form of open data. Among other things, it 
introduces rules for the public authorities of the regions of the Russian 
Federation and local government bodies. The regional and local authorities are 
required to make publicly available information on the activities of the state 
authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local gov-
ernment bodies established by these bodies or receive by them in the exercise 
of authority in the regions of the Russian Federation. The rules determining 
 O. PARKHIMOVICH AND D. GRITSENKO
399
the periodicity of publishing the open data on publicly available information on 
the activities of state bodies and local government bodies on the Internet, such 
as the timing of renewal, ensuring the timeliness of the implementation and 
protection of users’ rights and legitimate interests, as well as other require-
ments for the placement of information in the form of open data, are also 
specified.
It is important to add that some local and regional data are collected on 
federal information systems. For example, each local and regional public body 
is required to add detailed data about their contracts on the official procure-
ment website (zakupki.gov.ru), while each budgetary autonomous institution 
should add data about planned and actual performance indicators, including 
balance sheets, on the official website for posting information about state and 
municipal (local) institutions (bus.gov.ru).
Currently, the Russian Open Data Portal (data.gov.ru) has more than 9500 
datasets published by the regional authorities and more than 3000 datasets 
provided by the local-level authorities, with more than 500 regional and about 
400 local public bodies being registered on this website. These numbers sug-
gest that the regional and local implementation of the Open Data strategy lags 
behind the federal implementation.
A more detailed picture on the open data publication and openness of infor-
mation of the federal, regional, and local authorities in Russia can be inferred 
from the ratings that were prepared by the Russian nongovernment project 
center “Infometer” (http://system.infometer.org). A distinctive feature of 
these ratings is the availability of links to all sites being researched and refer-
ences to each assessed parameter and to the relevant legislation.
The Infometer’s rating “Regional Open Data 2016” estimates open data of 
all Russian subnational units. This instrument measures 84 parameters, such as 
the following:
• The availability of a separate page (section) “Open Data” or a separate 
site for the placement of open data or a section on the portal of the open 
data of the Russian Federation.
• There is no requirement for registration and authorization on the site for 
the use of open data.
• Information for developers, who made applications based on open data.
• Name of the person responsible for the content of the open datasets.
• Availability of datasets “Names of registry offices,” “Names of executive 
authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation,” “Plan for conduct-
ing state ecological expertise,” “Information on the results of state eco-
logical expertise,” “State forest registry (for forests located within the 
territory of the regions of Russia),” “Register of Licenses for Educational 
Activity,” et cetera.
Seventeen out of 85 regions scored less than 30%, while 16 scored more 
than 70%, meaning that the majority of regions were rated average in the open 
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data performance. The City of Moscow, Bryansk, Tomsk, Tula, and Ulyanovsk 
regions, as well as Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area have all scored 100%. The 
City of St. Petersburg scored 91.6%.
Another Infometer’s rating “Local Open Data 2017” estimates open data in 
cities with population of more than 100,000 people using 60 parameters. The 
rating does not include Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sevastopol, as these are 
subnational units in their own right, or “cities of the federal status” whose 
governments operate at the regional level. The 166 cities were included in the 
2017 rating. Despite their obligation to provide open data, the index indicated 
that 68 cities did not publish anything, 10 cities published more than 20 data-
sets, 53 cities scored more than 50%, and only 2 cities published more than 100 
datasets. The cities that scored more than 80% are Tula, Novomoskovsk, 
Domodedovo, Taganrog, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Tagil, Obninsk, 
Nizhnevartovsk, Shakhty, and Bratsk.
22.6  cIvIl socIety, busIness, and Government 
InteractIons based on the open data
The new quality of interactions between the state and its citizens is one of the 
central promises of open data. It is difficult, however, to provide a systematic 
assessment of the level of interaction between the civil society and the federal 
government on the topic of open data in Russia. The starting point for such 
assessment would be the analysis of open data requests. As mandated by law, 
each federal executive body has a form for the electronic appeal of citizens on 
its website; some also have a feedback form or additional email for open data 
requests or comments. Each appeal must necessarily be examined and answered 
within a month. Yet, the federal authorities do not publish detailed statistics 
about the requests they received and responded to, so it is not possible to sin-
gle out requests or appeals for open data. In addition, federal executive bodies 
may underestimate the relevance of open data to citizens and programmers, as 
programmers often do not report the use of open data in their projects and do 
not send requests.
In 2014–2016, the Ministry of Finance of Russia organized meetings with 
developers on the topic of open data several times a year (Minfin 2016). It was 
a unique and effective mechanism that allowed software developers to hear 
presentations from the ministry and its contractors about the public data, as 
well as to ask their questions and get answers on the same day. Competitions, 
such as BudgetApps (www.budgetapps.ru), the All-Russian competition “Open 
data of the Russian Federation.” (www.opendatacontest.ru), and hackathons, 
for example Hackathon of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation 
“Data Audit” (http://data-audit.ru), have provided another pathway for the 
programmers and the broader community to engage with the government 
around the use of open data.
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The BudgetApps, an annual competition of projects based on open govern-
ment financial data, was held by the Russian Ministry of Finance in 2015–2018. 
The popularity of the competition grew from year to year: whereas 45 projects 
were submitted in 2015, 155 projects were submitted in 2016 and 160  in 
2017. The prize fund of the contest is about 500,000 rubles per year (around 
€7300 as of December 2019). The partners at the national level are the Federal 
Tax Service, the Federal Service for Regulation of the Alcohol Market, and the 
Federal Treasury. The NGO Infoculture acted as a contractor of the Ministry 
of Finance on the BudgetApps competition, providing the organizational 
work. In 2018, the format of the competition “BudgetApps” was changed to 
an independent search and selection of projects by an expert commission. It 
did not include hackathons, events for developers, neither activities on social 
networks, so the quality and quantity of projects decreased significantly.
One of the projects submitted for the 2015 BudgetApps competition was, 
for example, the Russian Schools project (https://goodschools.ru), a social 
service that accumulates in one place all the basic accessible information and 
knowledge about the activities of schools. The service is based on open data on 
state institutions, government contracts, exam results, and public reports of 
schools, providing an overview and rating of schools based on their funding, 
exam results, and personnel. It can be used by a variety of actors; for example, 
it can help parents to choose a school for their children, teachers—find out 
which schools are better paid, or provide public activists with information on 
how effectively taxpayer money is spent in the educational sphere. The Russian 
Schools project is still supported and developed.
The All-Russian competition “Open data of the Russian Federation” was 
planned as an annual competition of projects based on open data. Some federal 
ministers and federal agencies developed tasks for participants, including the 
Federal Treasury, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry 
of Transport, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Finance, 
Rosacreditation, Roslesinforg, Rosnedr, Rospatent, Rosstandart, Rosstat, 
Rostrud, Rosturizm, Open Data Council, and the Federal Tax Service of 
Russia. It has been held by the Russian Open Government in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and in partnership with 
the Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation in 
2015, 2016, and 2017, but not repeated in the subsequent years.
Russian Open Data Summit was first held by Russian Open Government in 
2015. It was supposed to become an annual conference and a platform for 
communication of representatives of the state among themselves and with the 
developers. At the end of 2016, it did not take place and was moved to the 
beginning of 2017. In early 2017, it was postponed to the end of 2017 and was 
not carried out. Thus, the Open Data Summit was held only once in 2015 and 
now it is impossible to say whether it will be held in the future.
Interactions between the representatives of the open data community and 
the government can also occur at various conferences and in online communi-
ties, for example the online community for open data in the Telegram 
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messenger (https://telegram.me/opendatarussiachat) and on a platform 
called Slack (https://opendatarussia.slack.com). Federal executive bodies 
often issue press releases on their websites about the publication of new open 
datasets, which is a helpful way for the interested party to receive the latest 
updates. Another tool for interaction is public pages, maintained by federal 
executive bodies in social networks (VKontakte and Facebook). For example, 
the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service and the Russian Audit Chamber not 
only maintain the pages, but also actively respond to user comments (although 
it is impossible to determine how much of this interaction revolves around 
open data).
Attention has also been paid to the capacity-building. In September 2016, 
the Russian Open Government has launched an online course “Open Data. 
Theory and Practice” (https://open.gov.ru/events/5515416/). The pro-
gram is designed for both civil servants and IT service developers, as well as a 
wide range of other professionals, who want to learn how to work with open 
data. In order to gain access to video lectures, text, and test materials of the 
course, equivalent to 72 academic hours, it is necessary to register on a specially 
created website (the registration is free). The main requirement for attendees 
is knowledge of the basics of computer literacy. Based on the results of the 
training, certification is provided for two main profiles: “civil servant” and “IT 
specialist.” When it comes to the nonprofit sector, periodically different teams 
conduct webinars and hackathons with educational content on how to work 
with open data. For example, the NGO “Infoculture” in cooperation with the 
Open Government developed the “Open Data School” in 2013–2014 with 
offline lectures, seminars, and workshops.
22.7  open data Impact In russIa
There are several cases of how open data can have an effect on increasing trans-
parency and accountability, positive impact on the economy, and creation of 
new companies.
22.7.1  Increasing Transparency and Accountability
Open data could lead to improvements in government transparency and 
accountability in a number of ways: for example, supporting journalism and 
data journalism which uncovers wasteful spending, corruption, or other wrong-
doing by government departments or officials; supporting the creation of 
applications which allow citizens to report on their experience of government 
services; supporting scrutiny of government decision-making; supporting 
greater citizen engagement in policy-making (Open Data Charter 2015).
In Russia, several examples of services based on open data related to state 
finance and public procurement are worth mentioning. “Government 
Spending” (https://clearspending.ru) is a nonstate project to increase public 
awareness of spending public funds. The automatic monitoring system allows 
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a user to study, understand, find violations, and reuse data on public spending, 
in particular, on grants and on state and municipal contracts. The aim of the 
project is to encourage the authorities to search for and implement ways to 
solve problems in the sphere of public spending and to eradicate abuses in the 
state procurement industry. The project has been featured in the news multiple 
times, and it regularly organizes webinars and open lectures for journalists to 
enhance their awareness of the service and the opportunities it provides. 
Opening of public procurement data also allowed Transparency International 
Russia to produce several influential research reports, including “How do the 
largest donors of political parties make money on government contracts?” 
(2017), “How do heads of state theaters pay themselves?” (2017), and 
“Siberian roads: how roads were repaired in six Siberian cities” (2017), all 
pointing out problematic patterns in using taxpayers’ money and the mecha-
nism of state contracts. For instance, “Siberian roads” report was based on the 
open data on 575 contracts for road repairs in six Siberian cities—Barnaul, 
Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Chita. The authors have identified 
schemes by which cartels and affiliated firms take more than 50% of all con-
tracts. Another project, Open NGO (https://openngo.ru), aims at showing 
citizens how Russian nonprofit organizations are organized and funded from 
state sources by bringing together open data on subsidies from the federal 
budget, state contracts, grants of the presidential grants fund, and the register 
of nonprofit organizations of the Ministry of Justice.
22.7.2  Economic Impact of Open Data
Open data may impact on the economy, for example, through supporting 
existing businesses to lower their costs or become more efficient or through 
supporting better economic planning. Open government data can be used by 
entrepreneurs to make commercial or nonprofit services.
There are successful examples of companies earning money using govern-
ment open financial data (Begtin 2016). According to the Open Data Impact 
Map, a project of the Center for Open Data Enterprise in partnership with the 
World Bank Group, there are 39 companies in Russia whose business is based 
on open data, while the Russian Open Data Portal enlists links to 255 applica-
tions based on open data, including both nonprofit and commercial uses. To 
name a widely known example, YandexTaxi, a taxi application run by the 
Russian tech giant Yandex, was launched after the registering of taxi licenses 
was made openly available. Another example includes technical solutions, 
which use and integrate the data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia (the reg-
ister of legal entities), financial statements, and data of the Federal State 
Statistics Service Rosstat, such as KonturFocus and Spark Interfax. These appli-
cations allow users to perform due diligence checks. For example, the revenue 
of the company KonturFocus in 2016 amounted to 8.6 billion rubles.
Open Data can also be seen as beneficial in a wider economic context. The 
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) estimated 
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the cumulative economic effect of using applications based on open data in 
public transport in Moscow (Artamonov et al. 2015). According to the study, 
the cumulative economic effect of using applications based on open public 
transport data in Moscow could amount to 58,753 billion rubles a year 
(Table 22.1).
22.8  conclusIon
The open government data has been developing in Russia since 2012. Within 
a short amount of time, the necessary regulatory framework was created, 
guidelines for the publication and management of open data were developed, 
an open data portal was launched, and an increasing number of government 
agencies, not only at the federal but also at the regional and local levels, were 
involved in the creation and publication of open data. Being a practical tool to 
the implementation of the Freedom of Information principles, open data in 
Russia has become a basis for a large number of public projects that provided 
tools for obtaining information from government agencies and interacting 
with them. Also, a community of data journalists has appeared.
Since 2018, a rollback in the area of open data has begun. Since May 2018, 
for the federal government the topic of open data has been replaced by an 
inventory of government data. The increasing internal and external economic 
challenges, domestic political changes, a decrease in Russia’s interaction with 
international organizations that focus on an open data agenda, and a loss of 
Russia’s interest in joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), all had a negative effect on the open data ecosystem 
development. And yet, open data movement in Russia continues both thanks 
to the regional and municipal authorities and especially to the community of 
developers and citizen activists. Also for some government agencies, the topic 
of open data remains not only relevant, but also a priority. The publication of 
open data by the Federal Tax Service of Russia, the launch of the project spend-
ing.gov.ru by the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, the use of open 
data for interaction between the Ministry of Culture and its subordinate 
Table 22.1 Cumulative effect of using applications based on open data in Moscow’s 
public transport system
Factor Annual saving 
(bln rub)
Higher public transport coverage and more efficient use of equipment 3,668
Reducing travel time for passengers on public transport 8,890
Reduction of travel time by private transport 41,515
Decrease in waiting time at stops 11,967
Reducing gasoline consumption and revenues from its sale (negative 
economic effect)
7,287
Source: Author based on Artamonov et al. (2015)
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organizations and cultural institutions can all serve as illustration of the conti-
nuity in open data development.
Currently, maintenance of the open data agenda is largely undertaken 
through the activities of the community and nonprofit organizations aimed at 
including open data in the federal government’s data management agenda. 
The priorities for open data experts and NGOs are training public servants to 
work with open data, lobbying for the inclusion of open data topics in the cre-
ated legal acts, and interacting with authorities to improve the quality of data 
and the convenience of its publication. Open Data Day (http://opendataday.
ru) is a prime example of a community-driven annual event that brings together 
open data experts, activists, and developers in Moscow and other large Russian 
cities. State authorities often and actively participate in the Open Data Day as 
speakers in discussions and workshops, despite the decline in interest at the 
governmental level. As a result, despite the fragmentation of open data initia-
tives and the lack of a unified federal agenda, the open data movement in 
Russia remains in existence, and the ecosystem has fair chances to be further 
developed in the future, even if the speed and scope of the development are 
somewhat limited.
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CHAPTER 23




23.1.1  Topic Modeling as a Scientific Method
Topic modeling is a method of probabilistic clustering of textual documents 
mostly used for large text collections. It finds itself on the crossroads of proba-
bilistic and predictive text classification, natural language processing method-
ologies, semantic analysis, and discourse studies. In this chapter, we look at 
how the teams involving Russian-speaking scholars have enhanced the topic 
modeling algorithms, tested their efficiency, and employed them for interpreta-
tion of real-world datasets, including those from today’s social media—either 
in Russian only or for the Russian cases in comparison with those in other 
languages.
For many scholars, topic models are about latent semantic analysis, or LSA 
(Steyvers and Griffiths 2007), but, algorithmically, LSA appears to be only one 
option of topic modeling; a large variety of algorithmic approaches and exten-
sions to them have been suggested within the last two decades (Blei and 
Lafferty 2009; Korshunov and Gomzin 2012). The main goal of using any 
topic modeling algorithm is to detect the so-called topics in a text collection. 
In communication terms, a topic is a theme around which the discussion is 
evolving; but, in topic modeling, topics express themselves via collections of 
words and/or documents that the modeling algorithm considers similar and/
or related to each other.
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The basis for the texts to be related to each other is word co-occurrence. 
The method implies that texts belonging to one topic may be described as 
those where particular words stay close to each other or, at all, can be found. 
This understanding leads to the probabilistic iterative process which sees the 
dataset as a “bag of words” where the word order and syntactic links between 
the words are ignored. It defines, by multiple iterations, which words most 
probably stand together in which documents. Computationally, a topic is a 
discrete (multinomial) probability distribution over terms in a given vocabulary 
(Mcauliffe and Blei 2008, 121). Thus, each document belongs to each topic 
with some probability (often negligibly small), but some texts belong to some 
topics with much higher probabilities, with an arbitrary threshold for where to 
cut the “long tail” of nonrelevant texts. The results of the modeling are repre-
sented in two matrices: the word-topic one (the probabilities of particular 
words to belong to a topic) and the topic-document one (the probabilities of a 
topic to be found in a particular document); but the end-users usually assess 
the top words (the words with the highest probability for the topics) and the 
most probable texts in the topics. For the end-user, a topic is a collection (clus-
ter) of texts that belong with high enough probability to one theme slot and 
are expected to be linked by topicality of their content.
The quality of modeling—that is, how well the topics are separated from 
each other, how many texts they involve above the relevance threshold, and 
how interpretable they are—may be measured by the metrics of topic interpret-
ability, coherence, robustness, et cetera. The baseline for topic quality assess-
ment is human coders’ interpretation, but a lot of automated metrics of quality 
have been developed to make the topic quality assessment quicker and easier.
Of the Bayesian bag-of-words algorithms, the one based on Dirichlet distri-
butions and called latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei et  al. 2003) is, 
undoubtedly, the most developed today. Along with it, for various types of 
data, several other algorithms have matured and also gained important exten-
sions that allow the scholars to intervene and change the parameters of the 
algorithm. In terms of allowed intervention, topic modeling may be unsuper-
vised, supervised (Mcauliffe and Blei 2008), semi-supervised (Bodrunova et al. 
2013), or weakly supervised (Lin et al. 2011). Alternative promising approaches 
to topic detection mostly try to preserve the semantics that stem from word 
order and grammatical relations between words, like the approaches based on 
Markov chains (Gruber et al. 2007) or n-grams (Wang et al. 2007).
Topic modeling has advantages quite attractive for scholars, as well as short-
comings inherent for the method. Among the latter, there are the principal 
instability of clustering results (i.e. different runs resulting in a slightly different 
shape of topics) and an impossibility of a priori definition of the optimal num-
ber of topic slots for getting the most robust and interpretable topics. Due to 
this, multiple runs are practiced, with the varying number of slots for topics—
usually, 50 to 400, depending on the nature of the dataset. Another inherent 
problem is dependence of the results upon the length of texts in the dataset: 
the longer the texts, the more material there is for an algorithm to analyze; 
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thus, the topics formed of shorter texts are more vulnerable to non- 
interpretability. Another set of complications lies in malformation of topics 
from the human viewpoint; for example, among “bad” topics, there are topics 
dominated by general words, mixed and “chained” topics, or those where one 
theme splits to several topics (Boyd-Graber et al. 2014, 235–37).
Technical issues about topic modeling are, first, its relatively low feasibility, 
as the data for topic modeling, especially the real-world datasets, demand sev-
eral steps of preprocessing (including stemming, lemmatization, and cutting 
out stop-words) and then either human interpretation or automated quality 
assessment plus reading by coders; second, it is the dependence on available 
software and hardware, as collection and processing of large datasets demands 
a lot of resources.
But, despite the aforementioned discrepancies, topic modeling remains 
attractive to the scholars, as it has several key (even if arguable) advantages. The 
first one is that, in comparison with naïve keyword search, the topics unite the 
texts that might belong to a discussion subtheme but do not contain the key-
word, thus enriching our understanding of how people discuss the theme and 
what it is linked to. The second advantage is that topic modeling may be easily 
combined with other methods and can serve as a processing tool for other 
computational goals, including dataset dimensionality reduction. Topic model-
ing has already proven to be efficient “for a wide range of research-oriented 
tasks, including multi-document summarization, word sense discrimination, 
sentiment analysis, machine translation, information retrieval, discourse analy-
sis, and image labeling” (Boyd-Graber et al. 2014, 227).
The third advantage is that the method is believed to be language- 
independent (given that the language is not hieroglyphic): it means that the 
algorithms work with words as independent units of analysis, and this approach 
is suitable for any language. However, today, this assumption is questioned. 
Topic modeling per primo was created for analytical languages such as English, 
and synthetic languages including Russian, where a role of inflexions for trans-
ferring meanings is high, experience additional complications in word prepro-
cessing. Thus, 12 possible case forms of a noun in singular/plural need to be 
distinguished from numerous forms of the same-root verb in singular/plural in 
three tenses; for modeling, both the noun and the verb need to “collapse” into 
singular-nominative (for nouns) or indefinite (for verbs) forms. Moreover, 
contextual linkages between words arranged, for example, with the help of 
diminutives, may be lost in stemming.
An overwhelming multitude of descriptions of topic modeling in general, 
with their advantages and shortcomings (Boyd-Graber et al. 2014; in Russian, 
Korshunov and Gomzin 2012), as well as particular algorithms, may be found 
elsewhere (for more detailed example of the procedures of topic modeling 
applied to a Russian language, see Chaps. 24 and 25). Here, we will focus 
on how the scholars who deal with the Russian-language datasets develop 
the topic modeling methods tackling the issues stated above, including 
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topic quality assessment, and interpret the public discussions in Russia with 
the help of topic models.
23.1.2  Topic Modeling for the Russian Language
To our best knowledge, there has so far been no extensive review of how topic 
modeling has developed for the Russian language. This gap exists despite the 
fact that Russian-oriented topic modeling studies appear to be one of the most 
developed beyond the English-language realm, outnumbering German, 
French, and Spanish in terms of methodological suggestions and cases of appli-
cation. Also, topic modeling for Russian is considered the most developed 
among the highly inflected languages like Slavonic ones. Contributions by the 
scholars working with the Russian-language datasets have become internation-
ally recognized.
To make our review more systematic, we will divide the works into groups. 
For Russian, topic modeling studies may be divided into methodological (that 
develop, compare, and extend models as well as evaluate their quality), applied 
(that apply topic modeling to extract the meanings from datasets), and rela-
tional (that relate topic modeling results to other features of the datasets or 
external factors). Of course, in the case of a rapidly developing method like 
topic modeling, nearly all the works that use it become methodological, as the 
method is used in a particular variation which needs to be chosen, grounded, 
and often reworked or extended. But still we see this distinction as fruitful to 
structure the results that have been achieved by the scholars. Also, a separate 
group of works focuses on topic quality assessment. We will also mention topic 
modeling for short texts like tweets, as, first, modeling for Twitter occupies a 
separate arena in international topic modeling studies and, second, it has also 
started to be developed in Russia (for more, see Chap. 30).
The chapter is, thus, organized as follows. In Sect. 23.2, we provide an over-
view of the methodological papers; here, we summarize the main directions of 
development of topic modeling for Russian and the main issues that the 
researchers work upon, including modeling for short texts. In Sect. 23.3, we 
review the works that deal with topic quality assessment. In Sect. 23.4, we 
focus on both Russian- and English-language papers about meaning extrac-
tion; here, we review the papers that link topic models to other text features, 
research methods, and contextual knowledge. In particular, we will look at 
how topic models are used in a wider context of aspect extraction and senti-
ment analysis. In concluding remarks, we indicate the potential research gaps 
and the prospects for future studies.
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23.2  MethodologIcal StudIeS of topIc ModelIng 
for the ruSSIan language
23.2.1  Model-oriented Works: LDA and pLSA
In the recent decades, there have been several groups within Russia who have 
been focusing on various topic modeling algorithms.
Thus, in a sequence of influential works, Koltsova and colleagues have been 
developing LDA (Koltcov et al. 2014) and a range of extensions and improve-
ments to it. What this group has tried to tackle, with the help of Russian- 
language datasets from LiveJournal and VKontakte, were the dataset-level and 
the topic-level issues.
On the level of dataset, the group has dealt with instability of the results of 
modeling, nonexhaustive LDA results, the quality of sampling and optimiza-
tion of the number of topics; we will now review the group’s achievements in 
the stated order.
Thus, the topics that appear in two runs of the model are, logically, more 
stably present in the dataset than those that appear only once and may be occa-
sional. Based on Kullback-Leibler divergence for topic models, the authors 
have introduced the normalized Kullback-Leibler topic similarity metric 
(NKLS) for multiple runs (Koltcov et al. 2014). They have used NKLS and 
also the Jaccard topic similarity metric (Bodrunova et al. 2017) to assess the 
stability of topics. They have also introduced several LDA extensions to make 
the results more stable: among others, one is granulated LDA (Koltcov et al. 
2016a) similar to the idea of using n-grams (Batura and Strekalova 2018; 
Sedova and Mitrofanova 2017a), and another is LDA with local density regu-
larization (Koltcov et al. 2016b).
Doing topic modeling in search for a particular result (say, the public opin-
ion on a particular event or issue), a researcher cannot be sure that the topics 
(s)he finds in the modeling results represent the full picture of the public dis-
course. Thus, the group has introduced interval semi-supervised LDA (ISLDA) 
that links naïve keyword search with probabilistic clustering by attaching word 
labels to topic slots, thus making the algorithm “crystallize” the topics around 
keywords (Bodrunova et al. 2013). By attaching the same keyword to several 
topic slots, a researcher can exhaust the respective theme in the dataset, at the 
same time getting the topics “thin” enough to see multiple aspects of the dis-
cussion (Koltcov et al. 2017).
As to sampling, it is the core procedure of the method that defines in which 
order the words are sampled (metaphorically, “taken out of the bag of words”) 
to be probabilistically put together. Most researchers use Gibbs sampling for 
LDA (Blei et  al. 2003), while expectation maximization (EM-algorithm; 
Mashechkin et al. 2013) and Expectation-Propagation algorithm can also be 
used (Minka and Lafferty 2002). After introducing the granulated LDA, 
Koltcov et al. (2016c) have also suggested an optimization for Gibbs sampling 
for granulated data.
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And, last but not least, selecting the optimal number of clusters was tackled. 
The number of topics is crucial for the results, and, in unsupervised models, it 
is the only parameter set by the researcher. Usually, multiple runs with varying 
number of topics are necessary to choose the number closer to optimal, and 
automation of selection of the number of topics is a separate scientific task. 
Using the maximum entropy principle, Koltcov et al. (2018) have suggested 
applying Rényi and Tsallis entropies to find the optimum number of topics. 
Other groups of scholars have suggested using text representations by dense 
vectors and sentence embeddings for the same purpose (Krasnov and Sen 
2019; Bodrunova et al. 2020).
Topic-level discrepancies of the method were less a focus of attention for 
this research group, but, in most of their works, they describe the coding expe-
rience and the problems of topic interpretability. Thus, they show that human 
interpretability is linked to the writing style of the authors of the texts in the 
dataset, as well as to the number of topics, and that the focus of the topic 
(“war” vs. “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”) matters much for qualitative studies 
(Koltsova and Koltcov 2013). For dealing with specifically Russian-related 
issues like the synthetic structure of the language, the group has successfully 
used pre-developed decisions on lemmatization and have involved contextual 
interpretations in their works described below, successfully linking the use of 
topic modeling to qualitative studies of social media and beyond (Koltcov et al. 
2017). The group has developed its own software TopicMiner and has worked 
mostly with texts from the Russian LiveJournal, VK.com, and other social 
media datasets.
Similarly, the works by Vorontsov and colleagues (e.g. Vorontsov et  al. 
2015a, 2015b; Vorontsov and Potapenko 2015) have been influential in 
exploring probabilistic LSA (pLSA) and its modifications based on non- 
Bayesian regularization. PLSA differs from LDA, as parameters of discrete dis-
tributions are estimated via likelihood maximization, with nonnegativity and 
normality constraints, while LDA uses Dirichlet distribution and additional 
parameters that help reduce overfitting (Potapenko and Vorontsov 2013, 784). 
In particular, Vorontsov and colleagues have shown that robust pLSA performs 
better than LDA for certain tasks; they have also suggested a generalized learn-
ing algorithm for probabilistic topic models (PTM), arguing that the currently 
used algorithms of topic modeling may all be viewed as specific cases of such an 
algorithm but with differing sets of algorithmic features like regularization, 
sampling, update frequency, sparsing, and robustness (Potapenko and 
Vorontsov 2013, 784).
Within this logic, and also advocating for avoidance of unnecessary probabi-
listic assumptions in natural language processing (Vorontsov and Potapenko 
2015, 304), the group has developed ARTM—a non-Bayesian additive regu-
larization of topic models. The authors have argued that, mathematically, 
“[l]earning a topic model from a document collection is an ill-posed problem 
of approximate stochastic matrix factorization” and that “[m]any requirements 
for a topic model can be more naturally formalized in terms of optimization 
criteria rather than prior distributions. Regularizers may have no probabilistic 
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interpretation at all” (Vorontsov and Potapenko 2015, 304). ARTM as a regu-
larization framework that integrates many potential regularizers for topic mod-
eling parameters, as the authors have shown. The authors’ claim of high 
efficiency of their approach, as well as of BigARTM, an open-source library for 
additive-regularized topic models (Vorontsov et al. 2015a, b), remains unchal-
lenged (Kochedykov et al. 2017). Later, the group has developed TransARTM 
based on hyper-graph multimodal modeling for “transactional data” where 
transactions are interactions between network nodes, for example, users on 
social networks (Zharikov et al. 2018) and have suggested an ARTM improve-
ment by relying on segmental structure of texts (Skachkov and Vorontsov 2018).
Also, this group of scholars has tested two algorithms for the Russian- 
language short texts, namely biterm topic modeling (BTM) and word network 
topic model (WNTM) (Kochedykov et al. 2017, 191). These algorithms were 
also tested against LDA for short texts including tweets (see below) and user 
queries (Völske et al. 2015).
Despite their varying algorithmic preferences, the research groups led by 
Koltsova and Vorontsov have collaborated on additive and regularized topic 
models (Apishev et al. 2016a, b). Also, Vorontsov and colleagues have pub-
lished important methodological and review papers in Russian, including one 
on regularization, robustness, and sparsity of probabilistic topic models 
(Vorontsov and Potapenko 2012).
The similarity between these groups of scholars lies in their focus. First, they 
both develop the methodologies on the level of dataset, and the level of word 
in a text corpus mostly remains their secondary concern. This, it seems, stems 
from the fact that, second, they both treat Russian as “language as such”—just 
as English is used in topic modeling, often without discussing inherent linguis-
tic or contextual limitations of analytical/inflective languages. This has its 
advantages, as the language is not treated as “local,” and thus the scholars 
avoid the “colonial” relations between more universal English and more local-
ized other languages. Also, the authors’ contributions can be easily applied to 
other languages. But, at the same time, they, to some extent, overlook the 
word-level of topic modeling, being, of course, well aware of the achievements 
of Russian computer linguists in developing opinion mining for Russian.
23.2.2  Computer-linguistic Approaches to Topic Modeling
The latter efforts have, for decades, been concentrating in several groups 
vaguely linked to each other via the conference on computational linguistics 
and intellectual technologies called “Dialogue” dedicated to, inter alia, senti-
ment analysis and aspect detection (for details, see dialog-21.ru). For years, in 
the conference proceedings and individual papers, the notion of topicality and 
topic detection has been developing on the level of word semantics and lexical 
relations. Semantic proximity, ambiguity of meaning, inflections and their 
impact upon word semantics, sentiment, and other features of lexical units have 
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been the focus of attention of this sparse “school” or, rather, array of 
research groups.
Here, we find an understanding of goals of topic modeling that differs from 
that in the previously described studies. Topic modeling is seen here as a tool 
for resolution of grapheme-, word-, or fragment-level tasks, such as, for exam-
ple, relevance detection for automatic text annotation (Mashechkin et  al. 
2013), automatic content filtration and genre detection (Voronov and 
Vorontsov 2015), or aspect-based (Rubtsova and Koshelnikov 2015) and non- 
aspect- based sentiment analysis (Koltsova et  al. 2016a; Tutubalina and 
Nikolenko 2015). Such an approach shifts the very notion of what a topic is: 
thus, already as early as in 2000, Loukachevitch and Dobrov (2000) noted that 
topics may be viewed as semantically linked chains of words, thus stating the 
necessity for a topic to preserve both the grammatical and semantic relations 
between lexical units. Loukachevitch, Dobrov and their colleagues who, for 
over two decades, have been dealing with both hard and fuzzy classification 
methods for the Russian language have developed the notions of “thematic 
knots” and “thematic text representation” based not on co-occurrence but on 
semantic relatedness of words in documents (Loukachevitch and Dobrov 
2009; for more, also see Chap. 18).
In accordance to this, within computational-linguistic approaches, topic 
modeling is often used for the tasks that deal with the level of a lexical unit, and 
not always with great success in comparison with other methods of computa-
tional linguistics. Thus, one recent work by Davydova (2019) unites LSA-base 
modeling with the use of contextual vectors for the task of disambiguation and 
differentiation of meaning. It successfully unites LSA with word-vector logic to 
detect thematic relevance of lexemes. In other works (see, e.g., Lopukhin and 
Lopukhina 2016; Lopukhin et al. 2017), though, it was argued that, for lexical 
disambiguation, word2vec approaches were more efficient than LDA and other 
topic modeling approaches  based on bag-of-words logic, as topic modeling 
works on the level of document/dataset.
Thus, the two approaches to developing topic models—the method- 
oriented one and the computational-linguistic one—seem to be moving for-
ward but without being interconnected, not integrating each other’s 
achievements into research practice, even despite co-publications and collabo-
ration. There is an evident lack of works that would both develop the topic 
modeling algorithms and have in mind the peculiarities of the Russian lan-
guage. Despite the evident necessity of integration of the two logics, it is rarely 
found also for other inflective languages; we see this logic explicitly employed 
by only one group working in Slovenian (see, e.g., Maučec et al. 2004, and 
later works). Beside this, several works by computer linguists have suggested 
decisions for the Russian language, including adding automated labeling to 
Russian-language topics (Mirzagitova and Mitrofanova 2016) and showing the 
possibility of domain term extraction by topic modeling (Bolshakova et  al. 
2013). Automatic topic labeling by a single word or phrase is expected to ease 
topic interpretation; working upon it continued in the recent years by 
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comparing quality of two labeling algorithms, namely the vector-based Explicit 
Semantic Analysis (ESA) and graph-based method, with the former one pre-
ferred by the authors (Kriukova et al. 2018).
23.2.3  Topic Modeling for the Russian Twitter
Unlike for longer texts, short-text modeling for Russian is also done within 
comparative international context. For instance, there are at least three meth-
odological works that explore topic modeling for the Russian Twitter (Mimno 
et al. 2009; Sridhar 2015; Gutiérrez et al. 2016; for more, see Chap. 30) while 
developing multilingual modeling tools. The first two do not discuss individual 
results for any single language, and the third only observes one difference in 
description of sports between Russian- and English-language Twitter. Similarly, 
only a small handful of works applies topic modeling to Russian Twitter to 
detect substantial meanings or discussion features. Thus, one work (Chew and 
Turnley 2017) has shown the divergence between Russian- and English-
language “master narratives” on Russian cyber-operations.
The works by Bodrunova and colleagues appear to be the only continuous 
effort (since 2013) to combine topic modeling for Twitter with various other 
instruments of automated text analysis, also in comparison with other lan-
guages (Bodrunova et al. 2019a, c). Thus, we have tested three topic model-
ing algorithms, namely unsupervised LDA, WNTM, and BTM (Blekanov 
et al. 2018), and have shown that BTM works best, as measured by normal-
ized PMI and Umass (see below). We have also applied BTM to detect the 
dynamics of topicality in conflictual discussions (Smoliarova et al. 2018) and 
have demonstrated that the saliency of topics in time may help detect pivotal 
points in mediated discussions. Experiments with datasets on Twitter in three 
languages, including Russian (Smoliarova et  al. 2018, Bodrunova et  al. 
2019a), show that sentiment of tweets is linked to topicality: thus, more 
interpretable topics are more sentiment-loaded, in particular negativity-
loaded (Bodrunova et al. 2019a). Another study (Bodrunova et al. 2019b) 
has shown that topic interpretability may be linked to topic robustness and 
topic saliency.
23.3  QualIty aSSeSSMent and InterpretabIlIty 
of the ruSSIan-language topIcS
All around the world, a vast array of works on topic modeling is dedicated to 
finding and testing the metrics of its quality. Arguably, these metrics may be 
divided into those assessing the overall quality of the modeling and those of the 
topic level. Here, we will review the contribution by the Russian scholars to 
topic modeling quality studies.
One of the first metrics that were used to assess the modeling itself was 
perplexity—a predictive metric of how well the current distribution matrices 
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predict the results for new samples. Perplexity has been assessed by Koltcov 
et al. (2014); they have shown that it is unclear how to use it for qualitative 
studies in topic modeling, due to inability to establish how dictionary- 
dependent perplexity is linked to human interpretability of topics. Instead, to 
measure the quality of modeling, the group has introduced word and docu-
ment ratios that allow drastically cutting the dictionary of the dataset for com-
putation and suggested a new metric for topic stability measurement. The idea 
of this metric is that “good” topics are both human-interpretable and stable in 
multiple runs. As we mentioned above, Koltsova and colleagues have intro-
duced normalized Kullback-Leibler divergence-based metric of topic similarity 
(NKLS) that allows for detecting similar and stable topics.
They have also improved another traditional metric such as term frequency–
inverse document frequency (tf-idf). Tf-idf calculates values for each word in a 
document through an inverse proportion: frequency of the word in a particular 
document against the percentage of documents the word appears in—which 
gives a hint on how relevant a given word is in a given document. Tf-idf values 
allow for calculating the tf-idf coherence metric, to see whether the topics are 
composed of the words highly relevant for them (Koltcov et al. 2017).
Coherence as a measure of topic quality is one of the basic metrics suggested 
in early years of topic modeling, but later, other automated metrics were intro-
duced. An extensive study of nine automated metrics juxtaposed to the human- 
coding baseline was performed by Nikolenko (2016). The author has looked 
at several classes of metrics, including coherence, pairwise pointwise mutual 
information (PMI), and metrics elaborated by the author based on distributed 
word representations where each word is represented as a vector in a semantic 
space (word2vec approach). The author shows that normalized PMI (NPMI) 
suggested in the paper outperforms PMI as well as other conventional metrics 
like tf-idf, but vector-based metrics work even better than NPMI.  But the 
question remains whether both NPMI and word2vec metrics work well for 
short texts, as there is evidence that NPMI marks the topics as good while they 
remain low-interpretable for human coders (Bodrunova et  al. 2019b). For 
automated topic assessment versus human interpretability, an important 
attempt to introduce a quality metric has recently been made. Mavrin et al. 
(2018) have introduced a new interpretability score for top words, based both 
on assessing the word probability against an external dataset of frequently used 
words and on pairing the words and assessing the pairs’ coherence. In parallel, 
Alekseev et  al. (2018) have suggested intra-text coherence as a metric to 
improve interpretability, fairly arguing that topic coherence and interpretability 
cannot stand for each other, due to a very small percentage of text volume 
covered by the topic’s top words. Another work has discussed metrics based 
both on linguistic and probabilistic similarity for hierarchical topic modeling, a 
special sort of topic modeling (Belyy et al. 2018).
But none of these works has primarily focused on the causes in human 
(non-)interpretability of the topics, mostly seeing human coding as a base-
line—perhaps because, for longer texts, when interpretability was at stake, the 
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models performed well enough. Thus, Koltsova and Koltcov (2013) have 
shown that, for long texts like LiveJournal posts, circa two-thirds of the topics 
are interpretable after LDA has been applied. They have also identified three 
types of uninterpretable topics: “language” (other than Russian), “style” (writ-
ing styles, including offensive language), and “noise” (uninterpretable texts/
combinations of texts) (Koltsova and Koltcov 2013, 218). In our pilot studies, 
though, we have seen that topics for Twitter are less interpretable, with only up 
to 40–45% identified as such in all the three languages (Bodrunova et al. 2019a, 
b); thus, it is not the nature of Russian alone that seems to be causing lower 
topic interpretability in the case of Russian Twitter. Also, we  examined the 
features of top words and found that their negative sentiment could actually 
raise topic interpretability (Bodrunova et al. 2019a).
23.4  uSe of topIc ModelIng 
for content InterpretatIon
In this part of our chapter, we provide a short overview of how the topic mod-
els have been applied to social and language studies. A detailed review, though, 
would demand a separate chapter, as many findings by scholars working with 
the Russian data are illuminating enough; here, we will only indicate the exam-
ples of content-exploring research aiming to demonstrate the variety of possi-
ble applications of topic modeling for today’s social science. Also, many works 
have already been discussed above, and, here, we will only mark the major 
findings.
The works exploring content may be divided into “purely applicational” and 
“relational.” The former apply the methods to generate findings relevant for 
social science; the latter relate such findings to other phenomena or research 
methods. Also, content-exploring research has scrutinized both social media 
and text collections beyond them.
In social media studies, topic modeling was first employed to map the 
agenda of the Russian LiveJournal (Koltsova and Koltcov 2013), finding that 
the topical structure of posts of the top 2000 Russian LiveJournal authors was 
quite stable across time and, thus, challenging the notion of dissipative social 
media agendas. Later, this structural finding was amplified by analyzing the 
structure of co-commenting communities in LiveJournal (Koltsova  et  al. 
2016b) which showed that the role of individual authors and active commenta-
tors was higher than that of topics for the stability of commenting structure.
The two major themes explored via topic modeling have been politics and 
ethnicity. Thus, Koltsova and Shcherbak (2015) have shown how the bias in 
political LiveJournal posts correlated with the ratings of the leading parties and 
presidential candidates in the 2011–2012 election campaigns in Russia. This 
chapter is an example of combining topic modeling as a dataset reduction 
instrument with manual coding and descriptive statistics performed for the 
reduced dataset. Also, Smoliarova and colleagues (2018) have shown that 
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assessment of topic saliency (i.e. which topics stick out and when) may help 
detect pivotal moments in development of conflictual political discus-
sions online.
Other important works add to media effects theory, including agenda set-
ting and media framing. They, inter alia, demonstrated how agendas on the 
Ukrainian conflict were gradually diverging on the Russian and Ukrainian TV, 
thus coming from different framing to building differing agendas (Koltsova 
and Pashakhin 2017), and that the agendas in news and user comments on 
Russian regional news portals diverge (Koltsova and Nagornyy 2019). Later, a 
full-cycle methodology was suggested for co-analysis of news topicality and 
user feedback (Koltsov et al. 2018). Another group of scholars has also applied 
LDA to analysis of newspaper coverage on climate change in 2000–2014 
(Boussalis et  al. 2016) identifying national-level and newspaper-level factors 
influencing the volume and framing of the coverage.
In a separate line of research, the scholars have explored ethnic content of 
the Russian social media (Apishev et al. 2016b; Nagornyy 2018a), including 
detection of most hated ethnicities (Bodrunova et al. 2017), as well as user 
ethnicity and gender versus attitudes toward ethnic groups (Nagornyy 2018b). 
Here, topic modeling has produced results unavailable by means of surveys or 
field research. It has been shown that Americans (outside Russia) and Caucasian 
nations (inside Russia) provoke the most negative discussion; also, a clear divi-
sion of attitudes in the Ukrainians-related topics had shown up in LiveJournal 
much before the Ukrainian conflict started.
Last but not least, beyond the social networking realm, LDA has been 
applied to Russian and English prose with the aim of facilitating translation of 
fiction (Sedova and Mitrofanova 2017b) and to a corpus of musicological texts, 
with the purpose of automated defining syntagmatic and paradigmatic rela-
tions between terms (Mitrofanova 2015). In the former work, the authors have 
added bigrams to the LDA algorithm to detect the differences in various trans-
lations of novels. The paper shows high differences in topical structure between 
English and Russian versions of novels but shows that this diversity may be 
used for lexical and topical comparison of prose translations. The latter paper is 
of descriptive nature and was conducted to show that automated text cluster-
ing provides the results that are in line with expert knowledge on musicology.
23.5  concluSIon
Among highly inflected languages, Russian is today the most researched upon 
in terms of topics models and their applications. The scholars working with 
Russian-language data have successfully employed the existing methods and 
have suggested both their universally applicable modifications and new quality 
metrics. Significant results going much beyond the modeling methodology 
have been achieved in analysis of social structures of online communication, 
agenda setting and framing, ethnic studies, and political factors of user 
discussions.
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At the same time, we have identified a gap between method-oriented works 
that develop topic modeling for Russian as “language as such” and the math- 
linguistic approach that is Russian-oriented but often sees topic modeling as a 
secondary, not very useful tool for aspect extraction. Also, there is already a 
slight “method fatigue” among the researchers who have, to a large extent, 
reached the limits of the method and are willing to combine it with other 
methods for resolving tasks in social science. Topic modeling suits well for 
mapping subthemes inside a stable corpus of documents or understanding the 
configuration of a particular subtheme beyond the naïve search; it fits a bit less 
for regular monitoring or precise classification of highly noisy data from social 
media. There is also lack of studies of human interpretability of Russian- 
language topics and the factors behind it. In future, we need more discussion 
on how the properties of Russian influence the modeling results, how text 
semantics may be used to enhance topic extraction, and whether topic model-
ing may be used to monitor the dynamics of the discussions. Also, within prac-
tically all Slavic languages, no attempts have so far been made to use topic 
detection in image studies; all these fields are open for rigorous research.
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CHAPTER 24
Topic Modeling Russian History
Mila Oiva
24.1  IntroductIon
The power of history rests on its capability to interpret and contextualize past 
phenomena to explain continuities, differences, and specificities. To a large 
extent, this process depends on the work and abilities of the historian. With the 
introduction of computational analysis methods, historians can now use auxil-
iary means to enhance this process. Topic modeling is a highly useful compu-
tational analysis method used to understand and identify the content and 
patterns of text corpora. This method also allows for additional close reading. 
Based on complex calculations of word co-occurrences, the method summa-
rizes the text by identifying the topics (i.e. the constellations of words that tend 
to come up in a discussion) (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 547) that can be used 
to analyze, categorize, and compare text corpora. It can be used to studying 
the content of a large number of texts as well as a “microscope” that extracts 
patterns that are otherwise difficult to detect in a small number of texts.
One can view topic modeling as a machine that condenses the studied text 
into topics that consist of a collection of words connected in a statistically 
coherent way. For example, if researchers wanted to extract ten topics from past 
issues of Pravda newspaper over the course of a century, they would most likely 
get one topic consisting of the terms “the Party,” “meeting,” and “resolution”; 
another topic containing terms such as “team,” “gymnastics,” and “skiing”; 
and a third topic with terms such as “plan,” “development,” and “produc-
tion.” If the researcher then extracted more detailed topics from the texts, they 
would come across terms related to topics such as “Stakhanovite,” de- 
Stalinization,” and “Perestroika.”
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The “machine” of topic modeling is based on a statistical calculation that 
reveals patterns of co-occurring words in a text. Using probability distribution, 
topic modeling categorizes individual words in the studied text and analyzes 
which words are statistically used most often in connection with each other, 
and these words then form a topic (Brett 2012; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013, 
546; Nelson n.d.). In this way, topic modeling allows for the consistent detec-
tion and examination of patterns in a large text without the need for sampling.
“Topic modeling” is the term commonly used in text mining to signify a 
large group of computational algorithms that aim to detect patterns in an 
unstructured collection of documents. Topic modeling algorithms often use 
unsupervised machine learning, which allows researchers to identify patterns in 
the text without prescribing in advance what should be looked for. However, 
this does not apply to all forms of topic modeling (Isoaho et al. 2019; Boumans 
and Trilling 2016; Goldstone and Underwood 2014). There are several statis-
tical methods used to calculate the number of topics in a text, with the most 
frequently used method being the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA). In addi-
tion, there are other types, such as structural topic modeling, dynamic topic 
modeling, and sub-corpus topic modeling, that produce more nuanced results 
(Hakkarainen and Iftikhar in press; Isoaho et al. 2019; Roberts et al. n.d.; Blei 
and Lafferty 2006; Tangherlini and Leonard 2013). This chapter highlights 
the possibilities of MALLET, a basic LDA topic modeling tool. MALLET is a 
Java-based, open source, and free text analysis program developed by Andrew 
McCallum (2002).
Topic modeling provides exciting ways in which to analyze the content of 
larger corpora that encapsulate the content and “see” the text computationally. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that it has become one of the most popular meth-
ods of text analysis in the humanities and social sciences. It has been success-
fully used to reveal the themes studied texts consist of, the temporal variations 
of said themes, and the differences between texts (see Gritsenko 2016; 
Goldstone and Underwood 2014; Tangherlini and Leonard 2013). Numerous 
scholars in the humanities and social sciences now consider topic modeling a 
ubiquitous “digital humanities method that solves all the problems” without 
problematizing or examining which research purposes it can be used for.
The aim of this chapter is to show how topic modeling can be applied to 
research in Russian and East European studies, with an emphasis on historical 
research and the choices a researcher will face when using topic modeling. 
First, the chapter charts the steps that need to be taken when preparing a data 
set for topic modeling and describes how different choices can affect the results 
of the analysis. Second, the chapter discusses how the results of topic modeling 
can be interpreted. Third, the chapter explores the uses of topic modeling in 




24.2  PreParIng a text for toPIc ModelIng
The results of topic modeling respond to the following questions: What kinds 
of topics are present in the text? How prevalent are they? Where do these topics 
appear? The algorithm produces two types of outputs—namely, word–topic 
and topic–document proportions of the text. It thus creates groups of words 
that form a topic and identifies how frequently each topic appears in the text. 
Unlike a human reader, however, the topic modeling program does not under-
stand the text: It only calculates the statistical co-occurrence of words and 
produces results based on this calculation that offer a statistical perspective of 
the text. Topic modeling often provides predictable results that are in accor-
dance with the impressions of human readers, but it can also produce nonsensi-
cal results or reveal unexpected aspects of the text. It is thus up to the human 
to decide, based on their knowledge of the data and method, which results 
should be relied on and which should be discarded.
When beginning topic modeling, and similar to most natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) analyses, the researcher needs to arrange the data to correspond 
with the research question, name the documents systematically, preprocess the 
text, prepare an adequate stop-word list, and determine the specificity of the 
results by selecting the number of topics. This chapter explains the steps that 
need to be taken when using Mallet, but it is important to note that different 
topic modeling algorithms require different approaches regarding the arrange-
ment or naming of data. The choices made at this stage affect the results of the 
analysis and comprise a crucial element of the process. This stage is also the 
most time-consuming.
24.2.1  Arranging the Data
Arranging the data to correspond with the research question is the first step in 
preparing the text for topic modeling. The arrangement of the data, whether 
in one large document or in several smaller documents, and according to cer-
tain categories, determines what the topic modeling analysis will reveal. 
Combining all the studied texts into one large document provides a general 
view of the data set, whereas separating the text according to preset categories 
allows for the detection of their differences and similarities. For example, if a 
researcher is simply interested in what kinds of topics exist in studied texts, the 
texts can be merged into a large text document. If, in contrast, the researcher 
wishes to study how the topics of a newspaper have evolved over the years, it is 
useful to arrange the texts so that all the issues of one year or one month are in 
one document, another year or month in the second document, and so on. 
This arrangement would then provide data on topic changes on an annual or 
monthly basis. In a project that studied the reception in Soviet media of French 
singer and actor Yves Montand when on a tour of the Soviet Union in December 
1956, we arranged the data so that each individual article was downloaded as a 
separate document and saved under a name that indicated the publication date 
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and newspaper it was published in (Johnson et al. 2019). This then allowed us 
to detect how the depiction of Montand varied between publications and 
over time.
24.2.2  Systematic Naming
The second step, naming the documents in a systematic, expressive, and con-
cise manner, assists the later stages of interpretation of the output. For exam-
ple, using a document name such as “1953_F_Pravda.txt” for an article written 
by a female journalist and “1953_M_Pravda.txt” for an article written by a 
male journalist condenses the essential information of the document in a com-
prehensive way and does not confuse the computer program. Document names 
that are too long or that have spaces between words often cause problems 
when running the program.
24.2.3  Preprocessing the Text
Once the data have been arranged and named accordingly, the third step is to 
preprocess the text. Preprocessing is not mandatory, but it does make the final 
results clearer due to the simplistic assumptions inherent to the topic modeling 
algorithm. This step simplifies and standardizes the text for the computational 
analysis so that certain elements of the text can be revealed. Preprocessing 
involves various stages, including lemmatization, stemming, the removal of 
punctuation, and the conversion of uppercase letters into lowercase letters. 
Lemmatization refers to the process that converts the words in the text into 
their basic form (e.g. “studying” becomes “to study”). Stemming changes 
words into their root forms (e.g. “studying” becomes “stud”) (Arnold and 
Tilton 2015). In the context of Russian-language texts, these processes are 
highly useful, as Russian is a highly inflected language, and the same words can 
appear in different forms in a text. Although a human reader recognizes differ-
ent forms of the same word, the computer program sees them as different 
words. Because the program does not recognize that the words “studying” and 
“studied” are different forms of the verb “to study,” the results of the analysis 
do not attribute the correct weight to the words, thus meaning that the results 
are distorted. Lemmatization produces more nuanced results than stemming, 
as the text is simplified to a greater extent (Sharoff et al. 2012; Jabeen 2018). 
In topic modeling, which explores the statistical relations between words, iden-
tifying the correct dictionary-based basic form of the word using lemmatiza-
tion is often useful. However, simplifying the text does improve the final results 
if the research looks to explore how different word cases or tenses appear in the 
text. In these cases, the scholar should not stem or lemmatize the text, as it will 
result in the decreased quality of the final results.
The Mallet program removes punctuation and converts all the letters into 
lowercase but does not lemmatize or stem the text. Thus, researchers who wish 
to lemmatize their Russian-language texts can use programs such as MyStem, 
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TreeTagger, Language Analysis Service LAS, Python, or R programming lan-
guage packages for natural language processing (see for example MyStem n.d.; 
TreeTagger n.d. or Language Analysis Service LAS n.d.).
24.2.4  Composing the Stop-Word List
The fourth stage of preparing for topic modeling comprises the composition of 
a stop-word list. In this stage, researchers often remove the most frequent 
nonmeaning-making words from the text, including “the,” “and,” “or,” and 
“but.” These are referred to as stop words. While they appear in the texts fre-
quently, they are irrelevant when analyzing the content of texts using statistical 
means. The Mallet program does not contain a ready stop-word list in Russian, 
meaning that users need to download their own stop-word lists. Luckily, there 
are stop-word-lists available online that can be easily applied to Mallet. When 
downloading a stop-word list in Russian, it should be saved in an eight-bit 
Unicode Transformation Format (UTF-8) to ensure that the Cyrillic appears 
correctly.
Although ready-made stop-word lists are available, for serious analysis, it is 
important to customize the stop-word list for the purposes of the study. Ready- 
made stop-word lists can contain words that are important in the text, but the 
specifics of the study might also require the removal of words that appear too 
frequently in the text. For example, a digitized collection of newspaper articles 
can contain repeated names of the days of the week (indicating the day of pub-
lication of the issue) or the authors of the articles. The researcher might want 
to add the names of the week and the journalists’ names to the stop-word list 
to avoid these words being overemphasized and distorting the analysis of the 
articles. However, having these words in the stop-word list removes them com-
pletely from the texts, and this affects the topic modeling results.
24.2.5  Selecting the Number of Topics
The fifth stage in the topic modeling process comprises the selection of the 
number of topics, the k-value. The difficulty in determining the “correct” 
k-value is considered one the greatest weaknesses of the method. There is no 
one way to determine the correct number of topics, and although there are 
computational means to determine the optimal number (Isoaho et al. 2019; 
Oiva et al. 2019), the researcher ultimately chooses which k-value to use. The 
researcher determines the k-value depending on how detailed an outcome the 
study requires. The optimal number of topics depends on the size of the data, 
the nature of the research question, and the content of the text.
For example, in studies exploring large long-term data sets, scholars have 
worked with one hundred topics (see Underwood 2012), while in the Yves 
Montand project, we found ten topics to be meaningful due to the small vol-
ume of the data set (Johnson et al. 2019). The data analyzed in the Montand 
project was preselected and contained only texts that discussed Montand’s tour 
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during a short period of time. This meant that the expected variation of the 
topics was small. If the content of the data is not a preselected sample but cov-
ers a wide variety of different texts, the number of expected topics will obvi-
ously be higher. Similarly, if the researcher’s aim is to understand the general 
variation of the topics in the text, a smaller k-value may be useful; if the aim of 
the research is to extract nuances from the text, the k-value should be higher.
When determining the number of topics, the usability of the results guides 
the selection of reasonable k-value, as a large number of topics does not sum-
marize the text in a way that is understandable for humans. For example, many 
scholars find three hundred topics too large a number to be analyzed. 
Tangherlini and Leonard argue that the risk of using too many topics is lower 
than the risk of using too few (2013, 732). Often, if the k-value is set to be 
larger than the “actual” number of topics in the text, the researcher can easily 
understand which topics belong to the same family of topics. For example, in a 
project that studied the contexts in which Finland was discussed in the Russian 
news and Russia discussed in the Finnish news, the vast coverage of sports news 
was divided into different types of sports news segments that were easy for 
researchers to identify (Gritsenko et  al. 2018). As Tangherlini and Leonard 
state, perhaps the best—and most informal—advice is that given by Doyle and 
Elkan, according to whom a useful way in which to determine the number of 
topics is to look at whether the proposed topics are plausible (Tangherlini and 
Leonard 2013, 731).
While there is no singular and clear-cut way to determine the correct k-value, 
running the topic modeling algorithm with different numbers of topics is not 
difficult. This allows the researcher to determine the best k-value through 
exploration. Thus, a good way to explore the optimal number of topics is to 
run topic modeling with different k-values and decide, based on the results, 
which one to focus on. When analyzing the results, it is useful to consider the 
results of other k-values and discuss the reasons for selecting the studied num-
ber of topics for the study.
For example, when analyzing the articles for our Montand project, we even-
tually extracted ten topics after testing different k-values. We ran the algorithm 
with five, ten, and twenty topics. The analysis with five topics produced overly 
general topics that did not appear to provide any additional insights. Twenty 
topics provided more detailed results, but these were so detailed that the topics 
did not accurately summarize the texts. Ten topics provided sufficiently detailed 
results that also successfully summarized the studied articles. It is important to 
note that the topics we received in the smaller number of topics seemed to 
contain the topics that we received with the larger number of topics. This find-
ing confirmed that the results were not random—rather, they followed certain 
logic—and that we just needed to select the resolution we wanted to oper-
ate with.
Although the launching of a topic modeling project has been depicted as a 
straightforward process, in reality the process often develops by repeated test-
ing and alterations, as shown in the previous paragraphs. This comprises a 
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normal way of developing a research project, and to ensure that the process 
does not become confusing, it is advisable to keep track of the steps taken as 
well as the reasons behind them. Checking the steps made throughout the 
process at the end will help to explain and justify the choices made in the 
research.
After arranging and naming the data, preprocessing the text, customizing 
the stop words, and selecting the number of topics to be studied, the researcher 
can then run the data through the topic modeling algorithm. The Programming 
Historian journal offers lessons on how to conduct topic modeling with the 
Mallet program (Graham et al. 2012).
24.3  InterPretIng the results of toPIc ModelIng
After the topic modeling algorithm has been run, the program produces lists of 
words that together form a topic. The percentage coverage of each topic in the 
analyzed documents is also produced. Although the researcher has been work-
ing with the text for a while at this stage, the results of the topic modeling only 
launch the actual analytical process.
Since the results of topic modeling can easily be misleading, it is important 
to validate the choices made and assess the output. At this stage, the researcher 
should evaluate how the preprocessing choices and modeling parameters affect 
the results, how well the topics model the phenomenon under investigation, 
and how interpretable and plausible the outcomes are (Isoaho et al. 2019). The 
overall assessment of the quality and robustness of the topic model results is 
crucial, as it forms the basis for the whole analysis. Several scholars have sug-
gested metrics and solutions for computational quality assessment, both con-
cerning the overall and topic-level quality (see Chap. 23; Chuang et al. 2015; 
Mimno et al. 2011).
After assessing the results, the analysis of the results can begin by naming the 
topics, as the algorithm only produces groups of words and does not evidence 
what kind of meaning the words that appear together make. However, it is not 
always necessary to name the topics. For example, if the researcher is interested 
in studying the appearance of certain keywords or in creating a relevant sample 
out of a vast corpus for close reading, it is reasonable to keep the “names” as 
Topic 1, Topic 2, et cetera. When naming the topics, at first glance, the lists of 
words may seem nonsensical. However, after some close reading, the common 
themes become clear. Word lists can be large and probabilistic, and the same 
word can belong to several topics to a varying extent. Luckily, the sequence of 
words is meaningful, as it shows the proportion of the words in the topic. The 
words that are more central to the topic come first in the list, thus helping the 
researcher to identify what is crucial to the topic. Researchers sometimes name 
the topics according to the first word of the word list, especially when they are 
operating with large numbers of topics. When operating with a smaller number 
of topics, it is useful to ascribe them more precise titles.
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To concretize the naming of topics, below are two example topics from the 
Montand project. Using TreeTagger, the words have been lemmatized into 
their basic form so that different declinations of one word appear as the 
same word.
Topic 1: montan iv moskva sin'ore simona sssr franciâ pariž pevec vestibûl' 
dekabr' svâzi vec ̌er press gazeta zal dežurstvo šurupova
Topic 2: montan iv pet' lûdej iskusstvo slov pariž pesnâ lûbov' pevec lûbit' 
čajkovskogo serdce vystuplenie koncert
Topic 1 contains Montand’s name and his spouse, Simone Signoret, and 
words including “the USSR,” “France,” “singer,” “lobby,” “December,” 
“evening,” “press,” “newspaper,” “hall,” “shift,” and the surname “Šurupova.” 
This combination of words comprises a topic that discusses Yves Montand’s 
arrival in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from France in 
December, Soviet newspapers writing about him, and Soviet people eagerly 
waiting to buy tickets to his concerts. The words “lobby,” “hall,” “shift,” and 
“Šurupova” refer to a specific article that discussed the queues of Soviet people 
waiting to buy tickets to Montand’s concerts. Topic 1 could be titled the 
“Reception of Montand.”
Topic 2 contains, in addition to Montand’s name, words including “to 
sing,” “people,” “art,” “word,” “Paris,” “singer,” “love,” “heart,” “perfor-
mance,” “Tchaikovsky” (a famous concert hall in Moscow), and “a concert.” 
This topic describes the songs Montand sang in his concerts, their lyrics, and 
the positive emotions the articles reported them evoking in the Soviet audi-
ences. This topic could be titled “Montand’s emotional songs.” As these exam-
ples demonstrate, the naming of the topics depends, in addition to the words 
emerging in the group of words that represent the topic, on the researcher’s 
interpretation and knowledge of the context.
In addition to the word lists, the output shows the percentage coverage of 
the topics in the studied texts. In terms of the interpretation of topic modeling 
output, this part is important. A good method of grasping the variation of the 
topics is to visualize them to allow for an understanding of the proportions of 
the topics that the program suggests.
The ability of topic modeling to provide new insights into the text becomes 
especially visible when analyzing the scope and content of the topics. In the 
Montand project, this was exemplified in an interesting way: We had already 
read the articles before conducting the topic modeling, meaning that we had a 
suitable understanding of the topics that we expected to emerge. However, 
despite our established knowledge, based on a close reading of the articles, the 
results of the topic modeling provided a new kind of angle. The results high-
lighted that the topic we had labeled “French-Soviet art connection” consis-
tently prevailed in the articles (see Fig. 24.1). While this result made sense, it is 
likely that with simple human reading we would not have identified the topic 
as being so prevalent. It was clear that all the articles discussed the 
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French–Soviet artistic exchange, exemplified by Yves Montand’s tour of the 
Soviet Union. However, the more abstract level of understanding, whereby the 
transnational interaction addressed the cultural, diplomatic, and political 
spheres more generally, only became evident when the program had displayed 
the results.
Topic modeling is considered a particularly useful method for analyzing 
large data sets. The shortcut it provides in understanding large amounts of 
texts is so efficient that it is impossible for a human reader to analyze it within 
a reasonable amount of time. However, the Montand project demonstrates 
that it is also possible to use topic modeling as a type of “microscope” that 
provides a statistical overview of the studied text. When topic modeling a 
smaller data set, however, one needs to remember that the statistical reliability 
of the results decreases with a smaller amount of data. Nevertheless, the algo-
rithmic reading of texts provided by this quantitative approach complements 
qualitative research by adding another analysis layer to human reading.
In another example, it is demonstrated how topic modeling can allow for 
the detection of patterns that are not self-evident to a human reader. This 
example comprises a project in which I analyzed the annual reports of the 
Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade between 1950 and 1980. Again, in this proj-
ect, I had read through the documents before beginning the topic modeling 
analysis. Based on my reading, I assumed that one topic would dominate all the 
studied texts throughout the years. However, the result of the topic modeling 
showed that said topic was dominant in just one document (it was also present 
in the other documents to a lesser extent). It appears that when reading through 
the documents, I had read the text in which the topic was dominant at an early 
stage in my close reading, and when I continued to read, I paid special atten-
tion to it. In this way, the topic became important in my mind. This exemplifies 
how a human reader reads in different ways: While they pay attention to one 
element, they may omit other issues that seem irrelevant but are not in 
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Fig. 24.1 The ten topics covered in newspaper articles that discussed Yves Montand’s 
1956 tour of the Soviet Union
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actuality. A human reads texts by immediately interpreting the meaning and 
paying attention to issues of interest. Thus, although one cannot say that com-
puter reading leads to truer results (because the results of computer-assisted 
analyses can sometimes be nonsensical), this example shows how topic model-
ing provides other useful and statistically based interpretations of the text.
Topic modeling provides new insights into the studied text because its 
results are based on the systematic categorization of text without understand-
ing its meaning. In contrast, a human reader interprets the text immediately 
and pays attention to the significant similarities or differences regarding their 
understanding of the topic. However, the results of a computational analysis 
are also dependent on human interpretations in terms of preprocessing, arrang-
ing, customizing the stop words, and selecting the number of topics. As well as 
this, the algorithms behind the program are all based on human construction 
and selection, and this affects the outcomes of the analysis. The strength of 
computer reading lies in its inability to understand and its extraordinary capac-
ity to calculate the text in a systematic way. The combination of the algorithms’ 
analysis and human’s interpretative skills leads to new findings. Thus, the use 
of the interpretative power of a human reader and the systematic reading of a 
computer renders topic modeling a powerful tool.
Alongside small data sets, topic modeling is highly useful for determining 
general patterns in larger text corpora. The results of topic modeling of large 
text corpora can help identify interesting sub-corpora, guide further analysis, 
and even give rise to new research questions (Nelson n.d.). For example, con-
ducting a topic model of all the issues of Życie Gospodarcze, a Polish economics 
newspaper, between 1950 and 1980, led to the creation of new research ques-
tions, as it revealed radical temporal alterations of the most frequent topics (see 
Fig. 24.2).
Upon closer inspection, the results showed that the topics of production 
planning and the need to increase production prevailed in the newspaper dur-
ing the entire period. But from 1953 to 1963, the tone of the discussion was 
different from the tone used in 1964 onward. The change in tone was so 
Cold War Competition
Production Plan II
Companies, Prices and Trade
Production Plan
Increase of Production II
Prices














Fig. 24.2 The top eight topics in the Polish Życie Gospodarcze newspaper, 1950–1980
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prevailing that the topic modeling program identified the production planning 
discussion before and after 1964 as separate topics.
Sometimes the program classifies a topic—that appears to a human reader as 
one topic—as two separate topics. This occurs if the researcher sets the number 
of topics relatively high. These results are often important indicators of radical 
shifts in the way in which issues are discussed. Conducting topic modeling with 
more topics can thus lead to the identification of more sensitive topic altera-
tions. This topic modeling result is significant and calls for further exploration. 
The result also evidences the power of topic modeling in leading to new find-
ings, as these results are extremely difficult to arrive at without the help of 
statistical computing. A human reader, reading through thirty years of newspa-
per articles, would most likely have sensed the change of tone but would have 
been unable to show it in a systematic way.
According to Guldi (2018), 90 per cent of topic modeling results reveals 
information that we already know. In a sense, this makes researchers confident 
that the method works and that the countless hours of work done by the pre-
ceding generations of scholars have not been done in vain. The remaining 10 
per cent reveals insights that have not been identified by preceding research. In 
order to identify which results belong to the 90 per cent category and which to 
the 10 per cent category, one needs to understand the context and preceding 
research. The shift of topics in Życie Gospodarcze is unsurprising for a scholar 
researching Polish economic history, but the comprehensive nature of the 
change in tone is something that nobody has been able to demonstrate in this 
way before.
When analyzing the results, one should remember that topic modeling is a 
probabilistic method, therefore meaning that it provides probabilities rather 
than fixed end-results. The program calculates the probability of the topics 
several times when processing the text, and the results it provides comprise the 
average of these calculations. This is visible in practice, as the results are not 
always absolutely fixed, and topic modeling the same data set several times 
provides results that are not exactly the same. Thus, the results of topic model-
ing can give an approximate sense of the topics but not the exact truth. It is 
useful to view topic models as lenses that allow researchers to view a textual 
corpus in a different light and scale, where well-informed hermeneutic work is 
also needed in order to interpret the meaning of the results (Mohr and 
Bogdanov 2013, 560). For a historian, this variation is usually not problematic 
because we are accustomed to using interpretative data. When reading an eye- 
witness description of an event, for example, we don’t expect the document to 
reveal on a word-by-word basis what was said. Rather, we expect an interpreta-
tion of the tone of the discussions in the event. Similarly, topic modeling pro-
vides the approximate form of the studied text.
In addition to paying attention to the most prevailing topics, it is also worth 
considering the topics that do not appear in the results to get an overall under-
standing of the phenomenon. If a topic is prevailing, it means that it has been 
discussed extensively, but if a topic does not appear in the results, it does not 
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mean that the topic is not important. Often issues that are taken for granted are 
not discussed, but the issues that arouse controversies are discussed. When 
interpreting the results of topic modeling, one should reflect on the limitations 
embedded within the chosen data set. For example, in the annual reports of the 
Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade, the issue of press advertising was discussed 
extensively in the mid-1950s when the chamber promoted the increased use of 
advertising in the Polish foreign trade. The use of print advertisements 
increased, but as it then became a normal aspect of foreign trade activities, it 
did not need to be discussed anymore. In addition, as the reports were written 
for the Polish Ministry for Foreign Trade, among others, the topics tackled in 
the reports were issues that the chamber wanted the ministry to be aware of, 
while the topics it did not want the ministry to be aware of were most likely not 
discussed.
Thus, one cannot emphasize enough the importance of understanding the 
context in topic modeling outcomes. To avoid being blindly guided by the 
topic modeling outcomes, one needs to understand the nature of the source, 
how the topic modeling processes influence the results, and the relationship 
between the emerging topics and the issues studied. As Mohr and Bogdanov 
incisively state, one might think that running any text through a topic model-
ing program like MALLET would produce brilliant research. However, it is 
still the quality of knowledge about the case and the clarity of thinking about 
the phenomena that determine the utility and richness of the analysis (2013, 
559). When using topic modeling in Russian and East European studies, one 
needs to understand the context of the research.
24.4  toPIc ModelIng: russIan and east 
euroPean studIes
Although the method of topic modeling itself is universal, its application to 
studies of Russian and East European history comes with certain requirements 
and challenges. The languages of the region and their “special” characters 
(from the perspective of English) are obvious specificities that need to be con-
sidered. The program used in the examples above recognizes numerous scripts, 
including Cyrillic and the Polish alphabet, once the text is in UTF-8.
The greatest vulnerability that prevents the use of topic modeling in studies 
of Russian history is the dispersed nature of digitized sources and the lack of 
systematic computer-readable text collections that contain adequate metadata. 
Russian state archives, museums, libraries, scholarly projects, private compa-
nies, and initiatives of nongovernmental organizations, together with private 
individuals, are digitizing historical sources in increasing amounts. However, 
the problem lies in the fact that text collections seldom form systematic series 
that cover long periods that would be needed for systematic computational 
analysis. Furthermore, too often, “digitization” means uploading a scanned 
image of a text to the internet, with no computer-readable text or possibility to 
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download the text to one’s own computer for further research. Fortunately, 
Russian digital history scholars have taken the initiative to collect the available 
sources into link collections that facilitate finding the available sources (see 
Perm University Digital Humanities Center’s project n.d.; Perm Province 
Newspapers 1914–1922; Historical Materials and Oral History n.d.) (for 
more, see Chap. 20; Kizhner et al. 2019).
Currently, the digitized text collections that can be used for the research of 
Russian history form a kaleidoscopic landscape. For example, the Russian 
National Library has not produced systematic digital collections with computer- 
readable text or metadata, comparable to the digital newspaper collections in 
many other countries. As a general rule, the memory organizations’ digitiza-
tion efforts produce openly accessible samples of scanned images on nationally 
interesting topics (see, for example Artistic Legacies of Anna Akhmatova). 
Digitization initiatives are important openings for the popularization of his-
tory, but they do not serve the purposes of the big data approach to digital text 
analysis due to their focus on random samples and general lack of access to 
computer-readable texts. Furthermore, private companies have systematically 
digitized Soviet-era newspapers, and their collections form long-time series. 
However, access to their sources lies behind a paywall, and it is currently impos-
sible to have complete data sets downloaded onto your own computer, which 
makes the use of big data approaches impossible. Lastly, private initiators and 
nongovernmental organizations also produce digital collections (e.g. Prozhito 
n.d.). These collections comprise an important addition to the digitization 
efforts made by other parties, but they are often only small data sets and are not 
easily downloadable.
The lack of voluminous collections of digitized historical texts with ade-
quate metadata means that the Big Data approach to Russian historical studies 
has to be reconsidered. If one wants to apply this approach to studies of Russian 
history, it is necessary to shift the focus from volume to the other two Vs of Big 
Data—namely, variety and velocity (Schöch 2013). Instead of seeking a uni-
form analysis of one vast collection, it is necessary to develop intelligent ways 
of exploring vast collections of heterogeneous data and linking the results of 
smaller data sets together to form a meaningful whole. In this way, digital text 
analyses of Russian historical studies could contribute to the overall develop-
ment of Big Data studies.
24.5  conclusIon
As this chapter has demonstrated, using topic modeling in studies of Russian 
and East European history is useful and can provide new ways to understand 
the past. For this, understanding the context, the specifics of the data, how the 
algorithm works, and the stage that the research literature is currently at is 
extremely important. Without these basic components, the researcher is unable 
to explain in an adequate manner the results of topic modeling and its wider 
meaning. The low number of usable digitized collections restrains 
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opportunities to topic model large text corpora in studies of Russian history. 
Luckily, as this chapter has demonstrated, topic modeling can also be useful in 
analyzing smaller data sets. However, if we are willing to understand current 
complex problems that are studied with the help of big data, we should make 
an effort to understand the historical roots of these developments. For that, we 
should develop ways to combine the kaleidoscopic multitude of digitized his-
torical sources into long time series of data that would correlate with the big 
data produced today.
references
Arnold, Taylor, and Lauren Tilton. 2015. Humanities Data in R: Exploring Networks, 
Geospatial Data, Images, and Text. New York: Springer.
Blei, David M., and John D. Lafferty. 2006. Dynamic Topic Models. Proceedings of the 
23rd International Conference on Machine Learning. Pittsburg, PA. https://
mimno.infosci.cornell.edu/info6150/readings/dynamic_topic_models.pdf.
Boumans, Jelle W., and Damian Trilling. 2016. Taking Stock of the Toolkit. Digital 
Journalism 4 (1): 8–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2015.1096598.
Brett, Megan R. 2012. Topic Modeling: A Basic Introduction. Journal of Digital 
Humanities 2, 1. http://journalofdigitalhumanities.org/2-1/topic-modeling-a- 
basic-introduction-by-megan-r-brett/.
Chuang, Jason, Margaret E.  Roberts, Brandon M.  Steward, Rebecca Weiss, Dustin 
Tingley, Justin Grimmer, and Jeffrey Heer. 2015. TopicCheck: Interactive Alignment 
for Assessing Topic Model Stability. In Human Language Technologies, 175–184. 
Colorado, USA: Denver.
Goldstone, Andrew, and Ted Underwood. 2014. The Quiet Transformations of 
Literary Studies: What Thirteen Thousand Scholars Could Tell Us. New Literary 
History 45 (3): 359–384. https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2014.0025.
Golubev, Alexey. in press. Digitizing Archives: Epistemic Sovereignty and its Challenges 
in the Digital Age. In Handbook of Digital Russia Studies, Daria Gritsenko and 
Marielle Wijermars, eds.
Graham, Shawn, Scott Weingart, and Ian Milligan. 2012. Getting Started with Topic 
Modeling and MALLET. https://programminghistorian.org/en/lessons/topic-
modeling-and-mallet. Accessed 25 Nov 2019.
Gritsenko, Daria. 2016. Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the 
Arctic. Energy Research & Social Science 16: 2–12.
Gritsenko, Daria, Andrey Indukaev, Viktorija Tkachenko, Ilona Repponen, Alexey 
Igonen, Mila Oiva, Miika Lampi, and Arturs Polis. 2018. Russia–Finland. Reflection 
on Neighbours Next Door. Digital Humanities Hackathon, May 25–June 1, 
2018. Helsinki.
Guldi, Jo. 2018. Topic Modeling. Lecture in Digital History Research Methods, 
University of Oulu, Jyväskylä, Finland, January 29–February 9, 2018. https://digi-
histfinlandroadmapblog.wordpress.com/topic-modeling/.
Hakkarainen, Heidi, and Zuhair Iftikhar. in press. The Many Themes of Humanism: 
Topic Modelling Humanism Discourse in Early Nineteenth-Century 
 German- Language Press. In Digital Readings of History: History Research in the 




Historical Materials. n.d. Accessed November 25, 2019. http://istmat.info/.
Isoaho, Karoliina, Daria Gritsenko, and Eetu Mäkelä. 2019. Topic Modeling and Text 
Analysis for Qualitative Policy Research. Policy Studies Journal 25 (June): 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12343.
Jabeen, Hafsa. 2018, October 23. Stemming and Lemmatization in Python. Data 
Camp tutorial. https://www.datacamp.com/community/tutorials/stemming- 
lemmatization-python.
Johnson, Bruce, Mila Oiva, and Hannu Salmi. 2019. Yves Montand in the USSR. Mixed 
Messages of Post-Stalinist/Western Cultural Encounters. In Entangled East and 
West: Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War, ed. Simo 
Mikkonen, Jari Parkkinen, and Giles Scott-Smith, 241–261. Berlin: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg.
Language Analysis Service LAS. n.d.. https://github.com/jiemakel/las/. Accessed 
25 Nov 2019.
McCallum, Andrew Kachites. 2002. MALLET: A Machine Learning for Language 
Toolkit. http://mallet.cs.umass.edu.
Mimno, David, Hanna M.  Wallach, Edmund Talley, Miriam Leenders, and Andrew 
McCallum. 2011. Optimizing Semantic Coherence in Topic Models. In Proceedings 
of the Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 262–272. 
Scotland, UK: Edinburgh. https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/ 
2145432.2145462.
Mohr, John W., and Petko Bogdanov. 2013. Introduction—Topic Models: What They 
Are and Why They Matter. Poetics: Topic Models and the Cultural Sciences 41 (6): 
545–569. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2013.10.001.
MyStem. n.d.. https://tech.yandex.ru/mystem/. Accessed 25 Nov 2019.
Nelson, Robert K. n.d. Mining the Dispatch. http://dsl.richmond.edu/dispatch/. 
Accessed 24 Oct 2018.
Oiva, Mila, Asko Nivala, Hannu Salmi, Otto Latva, Marja Jalava, Jana Keck, Laura 
Martínez Domínguez, and James Parker. 2019. Spreading News in 1904. The Media 
Coverage of Nikolay Bobrikov’s Shooting. Media History 25 (3): 1–17. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13688804.2019.1652090.
Perm Province Newspapers. 1914–1922. http://permnewspapers.ru/. Accessed 
25 Nov 2019.
Perm University Digital Humanities Center’s project. n.d. Istoriko-orientirovannye 
informacionnye sistemy. http://digitalhistory.ru/. Accessed 25 Nov 2019.
Prozhito. n.d.. http://prozhito.org/. Accessed 31 Oct 2018.
Roberts, Molly, Brandon Steward, and Dusting Tingley. n.d. STM: An R package for 
Structural Topic Model. https://www.structuraltopicmodel.com/. Accessed 
31 Oct 2018.
Schöch, Christof. 2013. Big? Smart? Clean? Messy? Data in the Humanities. Journal of 
Digital Humanities (November). http://journalofdigitalhumanities.org/2-3/
big-smart-clean-messy-data-in-the-humanities/.
Sharoff, Serge, Tomaz Erjavec, Anna Feldman, Mikhail Kopotev, Dagmar Divjak, 
Joakim Nivre, and Marilena di Bari. 2012. Russian Statistical Taggers and Parsers. 
http://corpus.leeds.ac.uk/mocky/.
Tangherlini, Timothy R., and Peter Leonard. 2013. Trawling in the Sea of the Great 
Unread: Sub-Corpus Topic Modeling and Humanities Research. Poetics 41 
(2013): 725–749.
24 TOPIC MODELING RUSSIAN HISTORY 
442
TreeTagger. n.d.. http://www.cis.uni-muenchen.de/~schmid/tools/TreeTagger/. 
Accessed 25 Nov 2019.
Underwood, Ted. 2012. What Can Topic Models of PMLA Teach Us About the 
History of Literary Scholarship? The Stone and the Shell: Using Large Digital 
Libraries to Advance Literary History (blog). https://tedunderwood.com/ 
category/methodology/topic-modeling/bayesian-topic-modeling/. Accessed 14 
Dec 2012.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any 
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes 
were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
 M. OIVA
443© The Author(s) 2021
D. Gritsenko et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia 
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6_25
CHAPTER 25
Studying Ideational Change in Russian Politics 
with Topic Models and Word Embeddings
Andrey Indukaev
25.1  IntroductIon
Ideas are both a promising and challenging object for political and social sci-
ence, especially in the case of Russian studies. The challenges and promises are 
of methodological and theoretical order. At the theoretical level, the study of 
the Russian political system quite often discards ideas because of the prevalent 
rent-seeking behavior of political and economic actors that make interests, not 
ideas, reign (Gel’man 2016b). However, ideas are of importance for politics 
and policy processes in any context (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Indeed, 
recent research shows that many aspects of Russian politics cannot be under-
stood without taking into account the ideational dimension, making it a prom-
ising direction in the field of Russian studies (Wengle 2015; Dabrowska and 
Zweynert 2015). Pursuing this direction is challenging. First, ideas are hard to 
grasp and cannot be studied without a thorough and context-aware examina-
tion of meaning expression. Quite often, that implies using methods relying on 
a “close reading” of texts and requires that the texts where ideas are expressed 
are available. Within the context of Russian electoral authoritarianism, public 
expression of ideas in political arenas, through media and other channels, faces 
constraints that should be taken into consideration. Since the parliament is not 
a place of political debate, one does not have the data that could serve as a 
reference for capturing the legislature’s ideological landscape, thus making it 
difficult to study the ideas in the Russian politics (Lowe et al. 2011; Slapin and 
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Proksch 2008). The political context and historical factors are also a source of 
the “public aphasia”—the lack of the register for the public discussion of the 
issues of common interest where ideas and ideological positions are expressed 
(Vakhtin and Firsov 2016).
The proliferation of digital communication, leaving a multitude of textual 
traces, implies that the study of ideas can significantly widen its scope. It is 
particularly relevant for Russia, where the Internet became a primary medium 
for oppositional politics and emerged as an arena for public debate, reducing 
the “public aphasia” and making the public expression less constrained (for 
more, see Chap. 2). In addition, a greater volume of textual data and new com-
putational methods of textual analysis are becoming available. They promise a 
possibility to study the ideational dimension of politics without relying on big 
corpora of texts frequently and explicitly invoking political ideas, such as parlia-
mentary debates or party manifestos. Indeed, ideational content can be cap-
tured even when it is sparsely distributed across a large volume of texts. Digital 
data and computational methods of text analysis give the opportunity to com-
plete or scale up insights of qualitative analysis based on scarce sources of ide-
ationally dense political texts.
Word embeddings (WE) and topic models (TM) refer to two groups of 
techniques of text processing and mining that are often used by researchers in 
social science and humanities (SSH) to study the ideational dimension of poli-
tics. This volume provides a discussion of both of them in detail (for more, see 
Chaps. 26, 23, and 24). An important feature of TM and WE, when used in 
SSH, is that there are no guidelines on how to apply them to research prob-
lems. Instead of treating them as “ready-to-use” methods, a sensible use of TM 
and WE in SSH implies nowadays developing a research design that takes into 
account the specificities of the research question and the data at hand. Thus, I 
find it important to complement contributions to this volume focusing on the 
overview of the methods with an illustration of their application. To do that, I 
will use WE and TM to study how ideas, influential in Russian politics, change 
over time. Particular attention will be accorded to explaining why and how 
each method was used given the peculiarities of the research question, of the 
Russian context, and of the data available. To allow the larger audience to apply 
the chapter’s ideas in their own research, I will give preference to solutions that 
can be easily implemented in the R programming language (www.r-project.
org) and indicate specific R packages used in each case.
The empirical focus of the chapter is on the ideas of innovation, technology, 
and economic development that played a key role in the modernization agenda 
of Dmitry Medvedev, on their evolution when the agenda was abandoned, and 
when some elements of it resurfaced in Russian politics thanks to Putin’s fourth 
term’s emphasis on digitalization as a key priority. More specifically, I explore 
the evolving relationship that the innovation, technology, and economic devel-
opment maintain, in public discourse, with the political liberalization idea. 
Through its focus on digitalization, this chapter is connected to the first section 
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of the handbook, which studies digitalization as a sociopolitical phenomenon, 
and to the chapter of Anna Lowry on the digital economy.
The chapter will be organized as follows. In Sect. 25.2, I present the key 
ideational dimensions of Medvedev’s modernization agenda and their evolu-
tion on the basis of a qualitative study. Then I formulate the research questions: 
(1) Did the ideas associated with modernization and its demise manifest them-
selves in the Russian media? and (2) How did the concept of digitalization 
embed itself in the existing set of ideas on technology and politics? Section 
25.3 focuses on the overview of the methodology. In Sect. 25.3.2, I discuss 
topic modeling, and in Sect. 25.3.3, I discuss word embeddings and how it can 
be used to detect complex semantic relationships between words, revealing 
social and political representations. Finally, in Sect. 25.4, I apply TM and WE 
to the Russian media data by using specific approaches given the type of data at 
hand. I show that the modernization agenda influenced public discourse in 
Russia by promoting the idea that innovation, technology, and economic 
development are associated with political and social change, that this idea dis-
appeared from the public discourse, and that the rise of the digitalization 
agenda did not bring it back.
25.2  Ideas of ModernIzatIon
As suggested above, qualitative analysis is essential for studying the ideational 
dimension of politics. Thus, any study of ideas using quantitative techniques 
should be accompanied by qualitative analysis or should build on such analysis 
done previously. In this chapter, I will apply TM and WE to study a case that I 
extensively studied in my doctoral dissertation, using a variety of qualitative 
techniques (Indukaev 2018). My focus will be on the ideas on the political role 
of innovation, technology, and economic development. These ideas have 
played an important role in Russia recently because of the political agenda of 
modernization that Dmitry Medvedev embraced during his presidency in 
2008–2012. They were subject to a major transformation after the moderniza-
tion program was abandoned. The transformation was a nontrivial one, making 
it an interesting object for the study. In the following section, I will describe 
the political context of the case study, outline the key features of the ideational 
change I am focusing on, and state the research questions and hypothesis.
25.2.1  Politics of Innovation, Technology, and Economic 
Development During Medvedev’s Presidency and After
Medvedev’s political platform positioned him as a more liberal and reform- 
minded president, without directly opposing him to Putin. Medvedev’s politi-
cal manifesto “Go, Russia!” presented economic and technological 
modernization of the country as a top priority, but also promised political lib-
eralization. The latter promise relied, in part, on the planned change of the 
country’s political system—including giving more power to the parliament and 
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making elections more inclusive. However, at the discursive level, the political 
change was subordinated to the imperative of economic modernization since, 
in Medvedev’s reading of history, “democracy occurred on a mass scale, not 
earlier … than when the level of the technological development of the Western 
civilization made it possible to gain universal access to basic amenities: educa-
tion, healthcare and information” (Medvedev 2009, n.p.). Technological and 
economic modernization is presented as a precondition to political moderniza-
tion: “the technological development is a societal and political task of top pri-
ority because the scientific and technological progress is inextricably linked 
with the progress of political systems” (Ibid, n.p.). In Medvedev’s political 
program, the idea of technological and economic development connoted the 
idea of political liberalization and social change, while the concept of modern-
ization englobed both ideas.
The key projects associated with Medvedev’s modernization agenda aiming 
at technological and economic development were associated with the ambition 
of political liberlaization. For example, the organizational design of the 
Skolkovo Innovation Center was influenced by the idea that the state should 
leave more space for the bottom-up initiative, making its mission focused less 
on concrete projects but more on the development of an “ecosystem” provid-
ing opportunities for unfettered innovative activities (Indukaev 2018). 
Rusnano, an institution aiming at nanotechnology development in Russia and 
created under Putin’s patronage before Medvedev’s election, associated itself 
with the political ambition of the modernization even more explicitly. Anatoly 
Chubais, the head of Rusnano, published on the organization’s official website 
a short polemic text intended to defend the idea that modernizing the econ-
omy within the nondemocratic context is worth doing. One of his main argu-
ments was that developing an innovative economy will bring to life a class of 
“scientific and technological intelligentsia,” and that “true democracy will 
appear in the country only when there is a social class that really needs it” 
(Chubais 2009). Thus, Rusnano’s investment in high-tech companies was 
framed as serving the cause of democratic transition.
Medvedev did not run for a second term and was not able to advance his 
political program. The ambitions of the political liberalization and social trans-
formation that Medvedev’s project included were discarded and have never 
completely regained their political standing. The situation is different with the 
ambitions of technological and economic modernization. They lost their prior-
ity status after Medvedev’s departure. During Putin’s third term, the projects 
inherited from the modernization era were not at the forefront of the political 
leadership’s agenda, sidelined by the conflicts in the international arena and the 
conservative turn in the country-level politics. Many experts believed that the 
policy projects associated with modernization would be stopped, in particular 
Skolkovo (see, for example, Gel’man 2015). However, the project survived, 
and its budget was not significantly cut. Rusnano and other projects that 
aligned with the modernization agenda also remained active. Moreover, these 
organizations managed to align themselves with the import substitutions 
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agenda, importozames ̂enie (for more, see Chap. 17), which was central to the 
field of the technological and economic development (Indukaev 2018). More 
importantly still, the Medvedev-era economic and technological development 
policy instruments regained political importance when Putin presented his 
fourth mandate as being centered around the ambitions of radical “digital 
transformation” (Rus. cifrovizaciâ) and of the “breakthrough” (Rus. proryv), 
the accelerated economic and technological development. Skolkovo, for exam-
ple, immediately associated itself with Putin’s agenda. Promoting technological 
and economic development, even though framed more in the digitalization 
than in the modernization terms, revived some elements of Medvedev’s project.
25.2.2  Research Questions
The story I outlined above implies that in 2008–2012 innovation and techno-
logical and economic development were associated in Russian politics with the 
promise of political liberalization. This association was coined in the concept of 
modernization, which also served as a keyword (for more, see Chap. 17) of 
Medvedev’s political program. When Putin replaced Medvedev as the head of 
state, the ideational configuration of modernization was discarded; innovation, 
technology, and economic development were not associated with the promise 
of liberalization any more.
In my previous research (Indukaev 2018), I detected the described change 
by qualitative analysis of political speeches and manifestos, policy documents, 
and institutional arrangements. Thus, the observed change concerns ideas 
expressed by top-level politicians and reflected in policy decisions. The first 
question I want to address in this chapter is whether the described ideational 
configuration and its change was reflected in the way innovation, technology, 
and economic development were discussed in the media.
The second research objective of this chapter is to extend the scope of my 
analysis to a new element, which started playing an important role in the politi-
cal discourse on technology, innovation, and economic development, namely 
the idea of digitalization. At the top-level of the official discourse, I have not 
found any indices that Putin’s promise of digitally enabled development was 
associated with the promise of political liberalization. Instead, digitalization is 
framed as prioritizing merely the quality of the citizens’ life, and, not less 
important, the country’s standing in the international arena. In contrast, digi-
tal technology was associated with liberalization during Medvedev’s time, who 
suggested, “The growth of modern information technologies, something we 
will do our best to facilitate, gives us unprecedented opportunities for the real-
ization of fundamental political freedoms, such as freedom of speech and 
assembly” (Medvedev 2009, n. p.). Moreover, the development of digital tools 
promising political empowerment and democratization was actively supported 
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by the state after 2012 and at the level of local politics (Chap. 3). One may 
suggest that digitalization is associated with political liberalization in public 
discourse, despite this association not being explicitly expressed by the political 
leadership. The second question of this chapter is whether this suggestion 
is valid.
25.3  data and Methods
To extend the analysis based on writings and speeches by political leaders and 
policy documents to the ideas expressed by a wider audience, one needs appro-
priate data, such as Russian media data used in this chapter. Despite the limited 
freedom of speech, Russian media are not mere translators of the political lead-
ership’s perspective and can be used to assess how ideas spread within the 
Russian public. To analyze these data, I will use two families of computational 
textual analysis methods, topic modeling (TM) and word embeddings (WE). 
Apart from methodological reasons, described below, the choice is determined 
by the fact that topic modeling is among the most widely used among these 
techniques (Isoaho et al. 2019), and word embeddings could be expected to 
take the lead in the coming years.
25.3.1  Data
Integrum is the largest database of Russian media. It is a commercial product 
primarily aimed at business clients but is also used by researchers in their stud-
ies of Russian language and society (Chap. 17). In this chapter, I use this data-
base. The research strategy is to assemble the corpus focused on technological 
and economic issues to detect how the political issues appear there. Thus, the 
query did not include the word modernization, since it has explicit political 
connotations. Instead, the query was made of terms related primarily to tech-
nological and economic development, innovation, and digitalization, but not 
to political change. The query looked as follows:
“иннов*	OR	роснан*	OR	сколков*	OR венчур	*	OR нано*	OR цифровиз*	OR	Электронная
Россия)/W2	OR (Цифровое	Развитие)/W2”,
where the symbols in Cyrillic represent stemmas of Russian words, “OR” is an 
operator, and “W2” is a context that is considered in the query.
When forming the query, I used wildcards to include all possible morpho-
logical forms of a word corresponding to a concept of interest (for the descrip-
tion of the search options, see Chap. 17). The promotion of innovative activities 
 A. INDUKAEV
449
was an important part of the modernization program, so any form and cognate 
word for innovaciâ (innovation) could be used in relation to this program. I 
use the stem with a wildcard “иннов*” (innov*) to capture all these forms. The 
stem “венчур*” (venčur*) refers to venture capital, a specific form of invest-
ments in early-stage innovative firms, which was an important reference for the 
state’s effort to promote innovation. Skolkovo was a flagship project of mod-
ernization, so I used “сколков*” (skolkov*) to get it mentioned. This part of 
the query returned a limited number of irrelevant documents because of the 
Russian word skolok (plural skolki) meaning, “pricked pattern,” which should 
not influence the analysis because of the word’s rarity. However, when building 
a query, a user should be aware that Russian words may have more frequent 
homonyms, which makes searching tricky.
Nanotechnology promotion and the designated organization Rusnano were 
major projects of technological development and were also associated with 
modernization. Again, the “нано*” (nano*) part of the query returned a lot of 
irrelevant documents because of many words beginning with “нанос” 
(“nanos”), in particular the verb nanosit’, the meaning of which is “to inflict.” 
That included, for example, a significant amount of crime news. The corre-
sponding documents were removed during the corpus preparation. The query 
“цифровиз*” (“cifroviz*”) aims at various forms of the word cifrovizaciâ (digi-
talization), a distinctive term that Putin introduced into political language as a 
Russian equivalent of digitalization. The query also included the names of two 
major policy instruments in the field of digitalization, Èlektronnaâ Rossiâ 
(Electronic Russia) and Cifrovoe razvitie (Digital Development) programs.
The list of media included 12 sources from the category “Central press,” 2 
from “Central news agencies,” 39 from “Central internet media,” 13 from 
“Central TV and radio,” and 20 regional newspapers, news agencies, and inter-
net media as well as the websites of the Russian government and the presi-
dency. The list composition aimed at a coverage of a variety of sources, including 
pro-government and more oppositional ones, and also media specialized in 
technology or economics, regional media, in particular from the regions 
actively engaged in development projects, such as Tomsk, Novosibirsk 
(Indukaev 2019), and Tatarstan. The time period covered spans from October 
1, 2007, until January 1, 2019, starting about half a year before Medvedev’s 
inauguration. The query produced 320,000 documents, among which a ran-
dom selection of 160,000 was used to work with, because of computational 
limitations of the used setup. The corpus was preprocessed: all characters were 
transformed to lowercase, and punctuation and number were stripped. Using 
the collocation functionality of text2vec R package (CRAN.R-project.org/
package=text2vec), the most common multi-word expressions, such as 
tehnologičeskoe razvitie (technological development) were transformed into 
tokens, such as tehnologičeskoe_razvitie. The stopwords were removed using 
“stopwords-iso” list from R stopwords package (CRAN.R-project.org/
package=stopwords). The resulting corpus had 45,295,399 tokens.
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25.3.2  Topic Modeling
The fact that modernization became a slogan for President Medvedev’s term 
sparked active research in the field of Russian studies focused on a vast range 
of subjects connected to the topic of modernization (Gel’man 2016a; 
Mustajoki and Lehtisaari 2017). The only use of methods of quantitative tex-
tual analysis that I am aware of is the study of “the attitudes of the people 
towards modernization” in Russia. It was done through exploring the media 
publication available in the Integrum database (Chap. 17; Laine and Mustajoki 
2017). The authors showed how economic, educational, and political precon-
ditions of modernization were debated. To do so, the authors focused on the 
uses of the word modernizaciâ (modernization) that explicitly refer to country 
modernization. Applying an iterative search procedure to a dataset containing 
about 10,000 occurrences of the word, the authors extracted 100 passages 
where the necessary preconditions to the modernization of the country were 
discussed.
In this chapter, I analyze the political concept of modernization in the con-
text of a larger set of ideas on the political role of innovation, technology, and 
economic development. This leads me to use the corpus that covers quite a 
large spectrum of discussions of innovation, technology, and the correspond-
ing government’s activities and to look there for evidence regarding the 
research questions focused on political ideas. To do that, I will approach the 
corpus in a way that gives the opportunity to explore the totality of its ide-
ational content but also to focus on particular ideas and concepts. Topic mod-
eling is a great method to start this exploration.
To put it simply, topic modeling is based on the assumption that the docu-
ments in a given corpus are generated as a mixture of a determined number of 
topics—technically, bags of words grouped together based on their tendency 
to co-occur in the corpus (for more, see Chap. 24). Many variations and exten-
sions of the method are available (for more, see Chap. 23); however, the basic 
intuition stays the same. Initially, topic modeling was developed as a tool for 
the retrieval of information that can summarize the thematic content of a large 
collection of documents. Yet, the key issue that researchers in social sciences 
and humanities encounter when using topic modeling is that the there is no 
universal rule for interpreting the output of the topic model—the “topic” that 
emerges as output—as well as no universal way to integrate TM into the 
research design and to adapt it to a specific research question (Isoaho et al. 
2019). In what follows, I discuss how to use the method to answer research 
questions related to the study of ideas.
In many studies using topic modeling, the thematic content of a corpus is 
predetermined, and the method is used instead to detect various ideological 
perspectives on a given topic. In these approaches, a topic or a set of topics, 
detected by the model, are interpreted as being associated with a specific per-
spective on the thematic content. Typically, scholars analyze these perspectives 
using the concept of “issue dimension” (Nowlin 2016) or, more commonly, 
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that of a frame (see e.g. DiMaggio et al. 2013; Fligstein et al. 2017; Ylä-Anttila 
et  al. 2018). However, quite often, using an issue-specific corpus does not 
guarantee that the topic model will output topics corresponding to the frames. 
In the known examples of the use of topic modeling in frame analysis by 
Fligstein et al. (2017) and DiMaggio et al. (2013), both interpret some sets of 
topics among the output of the model as corresponding to the frames, while 
not attributing other topics to any frame. Indeed, the topic model outputs, 
even within an issue-specific corpus, cannot be automatically seen as frames in 
most cases (see Isoaho et al. 2019). The association between a topic produced 
by a topic model and a frame, an “issue dimension,” or any other comparable 
analytical category is a matter of interpretation which does not rely exclusively 
on the topic model output but invokes other quantitative or qualitative meth-
ods and a theoretical perspective on the issue.
Another use of TMs for studying ideas is to treat TM output more as topics 
in the literal sense—basically, a coherent theme appearing in the corpus—and 
not to interpret them as ideational perspectives. When other methods are used 
to reveal these perspectives, topic modeling can be used to offset the influence 
of thematic content of analyzed texts on the ideational perspective (Jelveh et al. 
2018; Lauderdale and Clark 2014). Other approaches suggest modification of 
the Topic Modeling algorithm in a way that assumes that word choice in texts 
is determined both by the ideological perspective and by the topic in the main-
stream understanding of a term—the theme of a text (Magnusson et al. 2018; 
Ahmed and Xing 2010).
In the next section, I apply TM to summarize the thematic content of the 
corpus. Then, I focus on the topics that are of interest for the study of ideas on 
innovation, technology, and economic development. I will not use the family 
of approaches described in the previous paragraph. However, the insight that 
there are a variety of possible relationships between a topic detected by TM and 
an ideological perspective—from equivalence to independence—will be key to 
understanding the limitations of TM-based analysis of ideas. To overcome 
these limitations, I will use another family of techniques based on word 
embeddings.
25.3.3  Word Embeddings: Semantic Change 
and Interpretable Dimensions
Word embeddings is a family of techniques that represent words as numerical 
vectors in a way that the relative positions of vectors in the embedding space 
reflect the relations of semantic proximity of corresponding words (for more, 
see Chap. 26). To put it simply, the semantic proximity of two words corre-
sponds to the geometric proximity of two vectors that represent the words. 
The term “word embeddings” is often used to refer both to the vectors repre-
senting the words and to the techniques used to obtain the vectors.
The capacity to represent semantic proximity as a geometric one opens ave-
nues for many advanced approaches for studying the ideational dimension in 
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large corpora. One of these approaches comes from the studies of how the 
meanings of words change in time: diachronic lexical semantics change. 
Distributional semantics is one of the advanced computational approaches to 
semantic change in linguistics. Since the introduction of neural word embed-
dings, the methods of distributional semantics have manifested significant 
progress (for a comprehensive review, see Tahmasebi et  al. 2018; Kutuzov 
et al. 2018; and also Tang 2018).
Distributional semantics using WE analyzes semantic shifts following the 
logic that a relative position of words vectors in multidimensional embedding 
space is a reflection of the meaning shift. The techniques used may vary. In 
most cases, researchers use diachronic corpora: for example, a bigger corpus 
sliced into a set of subcorpora corresponding to consecutive time periods. 
Then, word embeddings are created for each subcorpus. The vectors represent-
ing a word of interest and corresponding to different time periods in the sub-
corpora may have a different position relative to other words’ vectors. That 
could imply a change of semantics of the word of interest. One of the most 
used techniques is to focus on the change of semantic “neighbors” of a word—
the words whose vectors are the closest to the vector representing the word of 
interest. For example, a word is expected to have changed its meaning if there 
was a significant change of the list of top ten words most semantically similar to 
it. For example, in the word embedding space based on the corpus of English 
texts dating to the 1850s, the world “broadcast” had words like “seed,” “sow,” 
and “scatter” as its nearest neighbors, but in the embeddings based on a 1990s 
corpus, it neighbored “bbc,” “radio,” and “television.” That suggests that the 
old meaning “throwing seeds” was replaced by the new one, “disseminating 
information” (Hamilton et al. 2018, 2).
The methods of distributional semantics can be used to analyze ideational 
change, even though they were not designed for this purpose. Within the study 
of semantics, the change of word meaning can be explained by “sociocultural” 
causes (Kutuzov et al. 2018, sec. 2), which opens an avenue for research that 
interprets semantic change not as a language’s internal affair, but as an indica-
tor of an ideological transformation in the society. Also, the methods of distri-
butional semantics can be used to analyze synchronic variation instead of 
diachronic change. For example, Azarbonyad et  al. (2017) used word 
embeddings- based metrics of semantic similarity to contrast the viewpoints of 
Labor and Conservative parties on democracy.
The malleability of words and concepts, the fact that their meaning can vary 
in time and across different social and political contexts of use, is an essential 
feature of political language. In the case of the studies of Russian politics, this 
malleability is of great importance. The change of political language is not pri-
marily associated with public debates on political arenas but is related to opaque 
political processes that are not always intelligible. Moreover, compared to dem-
ocratic systems, abrupt political change, and, correspondingly, changes in 
political discourse are not a feature of Russian politics. At the surface, the polit-
ical system manifests continuity, and its political discourse is subject to a 
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gradual change. That makes this change less obvious. Using the methods of 
distributional semantics, I will show how the concept of modernization, central 
to Medvedev’s political program, gradually changed its meaning while staying 
an important element of the political discourse on technology, innovation, and 
economic development.
When analyzing the ideational change through looking at how concepts 
central to the political discourse change their meaning, a question arises of how 
to include new concepts in the analysis. Indeed, the ideational configuration 
can evolve not only through semantic drifts of its key elements. One of the pos-
sible paths to ideational change is the rise of new ideas and new concepts. In 
my inquiry on political ideas on innovation, technology, and economic devel-
opment, one can easily detect such a new element—the concept of digitaliza-
tion. In this case, analyzing how new politically important concepts are different 
compared to old ones becomes an important problem, and word embeddings 
provide an opportunity to do it.
An important feature of word embedding is that any two words can be char-
acterized not only by the distance between them—that means the length of the 
difference vector obtained by subtracting the vector representing word A from 
the vector representing word B. In addition to it, the direction of the difference 
is informative, as it can reveal fine-grained aspects of the semantic relationship 
between two words. For example, the vectors for the words “queen” and 
“king” can have a relatively small distance and be neighbors in the embedding 
space built on a sufficient volume of data—a trivial result, since both words 
designate a monarch. However, if one looks at the direction of the difference 
between two-word vectors in an embedding space, one can make an interesting 
observation. The difference between the vector “king” and the vector “queen” 
will be almost the same as the difference between the vector “man” and the 
vector “woman” (Mikolov et al. 2013). Thus, one can conclude that it is pos-
sible to determine in the embedding space a vector whose direction summa-
rizes the semantic difference between male and female, or in other words, a 
“gender” dimension. This logic can be extended to other forms of semantic 
relationship, for example those opposing “rich” and “poor,” or the “affluence” 
dimension. This approach is thoroughly presented by Kozlowski et al. (2019) 
in a recent article. The authors calculated word embeddings on Google 
Ngram’s corpus with the help of standard techniques but used the resulting 
vectors in a way that made it possible for them to extract what they call “cul-
tural dimensions.” The technique assembles antonym pairs for a dimension, 
such as “poor”-“rich” for the “affluence” dimension, and then calculates the 
difference vector for each pair and the average difference vector. Thus, any 
word in the corpus can be located as being more or less related to the affluence. 
Authors show, for example, how certain activities are located on an “affluence” 
dimension, tennis, for example, being more related to affluence than boxing. 
The method was proved to capture cultural representations existing in society 
and revealed through other means, such as surveys or experimental studies. 
Comparable approaches are being actively developed, such as one proposed by 
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Bodell et al. (2019), who modified a word embeddings algorithm in a way that 
the resulting embedding space dimensions are interpretable.
The approaches like the one developed by Kozlowski et al. (2019) convinc-
ingly show that one can construct, in an embedding space, the vectors that 
capture the semantic relationships corresponding to cultural representations 
within a society. Such approaches do not have to focus exclusively on culture 
but can be applied to the study of political ideas and representations. For exam-
ple, Rheault and Cochrane (2019) use a modified version of the word2vec 
model, which, based on a parliamentary debate corpus, creates an embedding 
space that, after applying the dimensionality reduction, produces a vector that 
represents the opposition between the right and the left ideological 
perspectives.
One of the questions of this chapter is how a new conceptual element—
namely, digitalization—fits into the existing ideational landscape. To answer it, 
I will rely on the approaches described above by constructing vectors that cor-
respond to key dimensions of this ideational landscape.
25.4  results
In this chapter, I analyze the Russian media to see how its language reflected 
the events in which the association between political liberalization and innova-
tion, technology, and economic development was brought into political dis-
course by Medvedev, but vanished after his departure. Also, I am going to look 
in the media, for evidence that the digitalization agenda revived in the public 
discourse the political liberalization promise of the modernization agenda.
First, it is important to get an idea of the corpus thematic composition, to 
understand whether it can be used to answer the research questions. The key-
words used in the query, in particular “innov*,” match with words that have a 
multiplicity of meanings. For example, the word “innovacija” (an innovation) 
is often used to refer to new features of products. As a consequence, the corpus 
is composed of many documents unrelated to the research question. In gen-
eral, one does not know precisely what is being discussed in the corpus. In this 
situation, topic modeling is an appropriate method to start with, as it can reveal 
the composition of the corpus.
The corpus was analyzed using the text2vec library for R (Selivanov and 
Wang 2018). This library has an advantage of being developed with computa-
tional efficiency in mind. Topic modeling is implemented there using WarpLDA 
algorithm, which is significantly more efficient than other algorithms for Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (Chen et al. 2016). The disadvantage of this implementa-
tion is that it does not take into account topic correlation and does not allow 
the inclusion of covariates, such as date, in the topic modeling process, which 
is possible to do with the much slower Structural Topic Models (STM) version 
of TM (Roberts et al. 2019). However, as this chapter uses a large corpus nec-




Given the size of the corpus, the number of topics to be calculated had to 
be set high. I first ran a model with 50 topics, a part of which were interpreted 
as relevant to the chapter’s research questions. Then, to check the stability of 
these relevant topics, I ran models with 45 and 55 topics, respectively, and saw 
the same topics reappear. This technique was used to validate the model, show-
ing that the results are robust enough to resist minor changes in the model 
parameter—number of topics.
Analyzing TM output showed that the corpus includes many documents 
that discuss themes irrelevant to the research questions. For example, many 
topics focus on specific products and services, such as mobile phones or cloud 
services; others correspond to themes dominating the Russian media space, 
such as Ukrainian politics or war in Syria. As mentioned, many topics were 
interpreted as being relevant, such as the one focused on nanotechnology. 
However, one topic stands up as being central to my analysis.
The topic that is the most prevalent in the corpus is the one that is clearly 
associated with the modernization agenda. I analyzed the 50 most representa-
tive words for this topic (using the tex2vec function get_top_words, setting 
lambda to 0.3). The list includes various forms of the words and expressions 
gosudarstvo (state), èkonomika (economy), modernizaciâ (modernization), 
čelovečeskij_kapital (human capital), srednij_klass (middle class), strana (coun-
try), reforma (reform), otstavanie (retardation), proizvoditel’nost’_truda (labor 
productivity), konkurencii (genitive for competition), preobrazovanij (genitive 
for trasformations), peremeny (changes), strukturnyh_reform (genitive for 
structural reforms), obsêstva (genitive for society), and razvityh_stran (genitive 
for developed countries). These words are characteristic for the topic and sug-
gest that it is associated with Medvedev’s idea of modernization. First, it 
appeared in a corpus that was built without using modernizaciâ (moderniza-
tion) in the query but focusing on documents mentioning innovation and 
policy tools in the fields of innovation, technology and economic development. 
It suggests that the debate of modernization is associated with the debate on 
innovation and technological and economic development, as it was in 
Medvedev’s program. Second, the topic combines words referring to economic 
development with words referring to social and political change and reforms. 
Third, terms like “developed countries” and “retardation” suggest the impor-
tance of the rhetoric where the country’s modernization is seen as “catching 
up” with the most developed countries. Last, the words referring to the state 
are frequent in the topic, suggesting that the modernization is considered at 
the state level. All these dimensions of modernization are present in Medvedev’s 
manifesto “Go, Russia” (Medvedev 2009). A close reading of the top ten doc-
uments where the topic is the most prevalent confirms my interpretation. All 
the documents debate the ideas that are present in Medvedev’s program.
As I described in Sect. 25.3.2., TM is often used to analyze political ideas by 
associating a topic with a certain ideational perspective. The “Modernization” 
topic that I described can be associated with a specific perspective on the rela-
tionship between political and social change and economic development, 
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technology, and innovation. If one accepts the idea that this topic is an indica-
tor of a certain ideological position, one can attempt to assess the ideational 
change looking at topic dynamics. The topic prevalence in time corresponds, in 
part, with what could be expected based on the case description in Sect. 25.2. 
The topic peaked in 2008 and declined gradually after that (Fig.  25.1). 
However, after reaching a minimum in 2015, the topic started rising again, 
with a second peak in 2017, the year Putin started promoting his agenda of 
digitalization. That could suggest that the revival of technological develop-
ment as a central element of the political leadership agenda revived the con-
notation between technological and sociopolitical change. However, using the 
methods of distributional semantics described in Sect. 25.3.3, I will show that 
this interpretation does not hold.
Modernization, despite its clear association with Medvedev’s political pro-
gram, is a concept that has a rich and a malleable meaning, and actors can use 
it in ways that can highlight various dimensions of the meaning and even 
attempt to redefine it. I will show that there was a change of meaning which 
erased the Medvedev era’s ideological association between modernization and 
political reform, as suggested by the qualitative analysis in Sect. 25.2.
To analyze meaning change, I used a technique based on word embeddings. 
To calculate word embeddings, I used an implementation of the GloVe algo-
rithm (Pennington et al. 2014) provided by text2vec package in R.
The data used is the same as described in the corresponding section, but 
with one major adjustment, which is due to my choice of research design 
appropriate for detecting the change in word meaning and use. Dubossarsky 
et al. (2019) recently demonstrated that the Temporal Referencing technique 
Fig. 25.1 “Modernization” topic prevalence dynamic
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has significant advantages over other approaches of detecting genuine semantic 
change. The idea of the method is, first, to focus on a limited set of words 
whose change is going to be studied. Then, the corpus is not sliced into sub-
corpora corresponding to different time intervals; instead, the word embed-
dings are calculated for the entire corpus. However, the corpus is modified: the 
words of interest are replaced by “time-specific tokens.” It simply means that, 
for example, if one wants to study how the meaning of the word “moderniza-
tion” changes from year to year, one replaces the word “modernization” in the 
documents dated by 2007 by “modernization_2007” and does the same for 
every other year. The rest of the words, whose semantic change is not analyzed, 
stay intact. In this chapter, I use the described method to trace the semantic 
change of two words: modernizaciâ (modernization in singular) and innovacii 
(innovations in plural). To keep the research design simple, I worked with two 
periods January 1, 2007–January 1, 2012 (label “_before”), and January 2, 
2012–January 1, 2019 (label “_after”). This change was made because by the 
end of 2011, it was clear that Medvedev would not keep the presidency, and 
the promise of political reform was not to be fulfilled.
To detect the change in the meaning of modernizaciâ “modernization,” I 
compare the list of semantic neighbors of modernizaciâ before January 1, 
2012, to semantic neighbors of modernizaciâ after 2012. In addition, I analyze 
how the list of neighbors changed: which words became less semantically close 
to the word of interest and which words got closer. When one looks at the 
“neighbors” of modernizaciâ, one sees quite a radical change. In Table 25.1 
are provided the top 30 words closest to modernizaciâ before and after January 
1, 2012.1 Modernization after 2012 does not have a semantic proximity to 
democracy (demokratiâ), fight with corruption (bor’ba_s_korrupciej), reforms 
(reformy), and politics (politika), being associated mostly with terms related to 
technological advances, efficiency (povyšenie èffektivnosti), and retooling 
(tehničeskoe perevooruženie). The meaning of the concept changed, and the 
specific association between the modernization and the promise of political 
liberalization evaporated after Medvedev’s departure. This result refutes the 
idea based on the topic modeling analysis of the “modernization” topic, which 
suggested that Medvedev’s modernization discourse resurrected around 2017: 
instead, the very concept of modernization changed its meaning.
The fact that the concept of modernization lost its association with political 
change does not completely rule out that the other key concepts referring to 
technological and economic development do not manifest it. Digitalization 
became the most important concept in the technological and economic devel-
opment projects by the government after 2016. Revealing the association of 
this concept with the idea of political liberalization in public discourse is a good 
way to assess the scope of the ideational change that happened after 2012. 
Would it be possible that the digitalization project took the role of a technol-
ogy development project bearing also a promise of a political change? To 
explore it, I used the approach following the insight that vectors in the embed-
ding space can capture “dimensions of cultural meaning” and ideological 
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dimensions (Kozlowski et al. 2019, 905). To operationalize this insight, I fol-
lowed the approach by van Lange and Futselaar (2019), which is less robust 
than the one proposed by Kozlowski et al. (2019), but requires less data and 
less preparation. The authors suggest that to create a vector that captures the 
distance of any word to a given perspective, it is enough to detect the words 
that indicate the perspective, then to create an aggregate vector that is an aver-
age of vectors of each of these words. The proximity of any word to a given 
perspective is then measured as a cosine distance between the words’ vector 
and the aggregated vector representing the perspective. Van Lange and 
Futselaar’s strategy to construct the aggregated vector is to focus on a concept 
that epitomizes an ideological perspective and then to find all the words that 
refer to a concept and do not have multiple meanings.
My analysis was limited by constructing two vectors, corresponding to two 
ideational perspectives on technology: innovation and economic development. 
The first perspective—“Political liberalization”—frames these phenomena as 
associated with social and political change. The second one, however, is focused 
on development, efficiency, competitiveness—the issues that economy and 
Table 25.1 Top-30 
semantic neighbors of the 
word modernizaciâ 
(modernization) before 
and after January 1, 2012. 
Neighbors appearing only 
in one list are highlighted































technology face and that are seen as apolitical. I labeled this perspective 
“Economy and technology.” To construct the vectors for each perspective, I 
first compiled, based on qualitative knowledge of the case, the list of words that 
are markers of a position. Next, among these words, I selected those that are 
frequent in the corpus (more than 150 occurrences) because the embedding 
vector’s quality is sensitive to word frequency. Next, I looked at the top neigh-
bors of each word and selected, based on a qualitative analysis, those that are 
good markers of the ideational perspective, again selecting only frequent words. 
Finally, I excluded words with multiple meanings. As a result, the “Political 
liberalization’ vector consists of reformy, demokratiâ, demokratii, liberal’noj, 
liberalizaciâ, liberalizacii, svobody, prav_svobod,2 strukturnye_reformy. The 
“Economy and technology” vector consists of diversifikaciâ, diversifikacii, 
diversificirovat’, importozamesênie, konkurentosposobnost’, povyšenie_konkuren-
tosposobnosti, èkonomičeskoe_razvitie.
I calculated the distance to the two aggregated vectors for the vectors rep-
resenting words that are central to the research question, including the two 
vectors for modernizaciâ before and after January 1, 2012, and the same for 
innovacii. Fig.  25.2 shows that modernizaciâ before January 1, 2012, was 
closer to the “Political liberalization,” but during the period after January 1, 
Fig. 25.2 Projection of keywords on a two-dimensional space
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2012, it joined other terms, such as innovacii, becoming less associated with 
the idea of political change. The graph also gives an answer to our second 
research question. The position of cifrovizaciâ (digitalization) vis-à-vis the 
“Economy and technology” and “Political liberalization” vectors is almost 
identical to that of modernizaciâ after January 1, 2012, and that of innovacii. 
That suggests that the digitalization program, in contrast to Medvedev’s mod-
ernization, is not associated with the question of political liberalization at the 
level of public discourse.
25.5  conclusIon
In this chapter, I used computational methods of textual analysis to study a 
recent case of ideational change in Russian politics. Based on my prior qualita-
tive analysis of policy documents and political communication of political lead-
ership, I outlined the main contours of this change. When Dmitry Medvedev 
was president, innovation and technological and economic development were 
associated with the promise of political liberalisation and played key role in the 
modernization agenda endorsed by the new president. The modernization 
agenda was abandoned after the end of Medvedev’s mandate, but technology 
and innovation regained political importance when Putin chose digitalization 
as a priority project. However, the political liberalization was not associated 
with this new promise of technological and economic development.
I showed that the described story of ideational change could be observed at 
the level of Russian media discussing innovation, high technology, and policy 
projects of technological development. A good illustration of this case is the 
semantic change of the concept of modernization. This key concept of 
Medvedev’s agenda had a close connotation to political and social change but 
became an apolitical term referring to mere economic and technological devel-
opment. Moreover, the analysis corroborated the hypothesis that the digitali-
zation, as a new political concept, does not have connotations to political and 
social change.
From the methodological point of view, this chapter serves as an example of 
the application of two popular methods of text mining—word embeddings and 
topic models—to the study of ideational change. An interesting result is that 
the analysis revealed how topic modeling can provide misleading results and 
how the methods of distributional semantics and multidimensional ideological 
mapping can help to avoid an erroneous interpretation. More precisely, believ-
ing that a topic can indicate the presence of a certain ideological position across 
time may lead to errors. As I showed, the topic centered on modernization, 
while being coherent and well present in the corpus, cannot be seen as a proxy 
for Medvedev era’s ideational perspective on the political role of technology 
and economic development. This insight seems to be of great relevance for 
Russian politics, where ideational change takes place with not much public 
debate and can be overlooked by a researcher.
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This chapter also provides a successful exploration of the possibilities that 
word embeddings provide for the study of the ideational dimension of politics. 
The capacity of WE to capture complex semantic relationships gives an oppor-
tunity to construct multidimensional “ideational spaces” in which words can 
be located according to their proximity to two or more ideational perspectives. 
I believe that this promising and actively developing branch of text analysis will 
be of great use for Russian studies, given the lack of simple ways to identify 
ideational oppositions that structure Russian public life.
notes
1. The authentic context is bor’ba s korrupciej, but the stopword “s” (“with”) is 
deleted.
2. The authentic context is prav i svobod, but the stopword “i” (“and”) is deleted.
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CHAPTER 26
Deep Learning for the Russian Language
Ekaterina Artemova
26.1  IntroductIon
Deep learning has conquered the natural language processing (NLP) research 
area in the mid-2010s. Most research publications were focused on English 
and showed a significant improvement of results on major datasets. However, 
languages other than English were out of the scope of early deep learning 
research. Russian-oriented research first appeared on Russian local venues, such 
as Dialogue, Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language (AINL) and Analysis 
of Images, Social networks, and Texts (AIST). Early papers addressed such 
tasks as text classification and part of speech tagging. As of the late 2010s, a 
new trend for multilingual model development was established, which resulted 
in quite a few models for Russian, released by non-Russian universities and 
technology companies, such as Google or Facebook.
The deep learning breakthrough is grounded on the efficient use of large 
amounts of data, without any handcrafted features. While traditional statistical- 
based machine learning algorithms require a lot of manual annotation of tex-
tual data, the deep learning methods discover hidden patterns in the data 
without human help. Before the deep learning era, an NLP practitioner had to 
manually set hundreds of features: starting from such surface features as “is a 
word capitalized,” or “is there a comma before the word,” up to complex fea-
tures that try to encode semantics. This resulted, among other things, in creat-
ing linguistic corpora, such as Russian National Corpus (http://www.
ruscorpora.ru/) and OpenCorpora (http://opencorpora.org) (for more, see 
Chap. 17).
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The advantages of the deep learning approach to text processing are two-
fold: first, it produces efficient word and sentence representations, sometimes 
addressed as word and sentence embeddings, which are capable of modeling 
lexical and grammatical meaning; second, due to multiple nonlinear transfor-
mations applied to word and sentence representations inside the deep model, 
language patterns are learned from actual observations, rather than from 
human annotations.
Although deep learning treats data differently from traditional machine 
learning, training a model is core to both approaches. The “black box” is a 
common metaphor to describe what a model is. We can treat any traditional 
machine learning or deep learning as a black box, which inputs some observa-
tions and outputs target labels. For example, for the task of sentiment analysis, 
the inputs are the users review and the outputs are either “positive” or “nega-
tive” labels (for more on sentiment analysis, see Chap. 28). Inside the black 
box are mathematical functions and objects that have many settings. The model 
is developed in two stages. During the first stage, which is addressed as the 
training stage, the model is trained to make correct predictions. The model is 
presented both with the inputs and correct labels and the settings of the model 
are adjusted so that the model is capable to produce correct answers. The cor-
rect labels help to rule the behavior of the model: if the predictions of the 
model are correct, it is encouraged to behave the same way, otherwise it is 
punished for incorrect predictions. It is common to say that the model is 
supervised while receiving feedback from correct labels. During the second 
stage, prediction or inference stage, the model is only used for prediction and 
the settings of the model are unchanged.
The procedure of training a model can be compared to the learning-by- 
doing, educational approach. The model is not presented with any theoretical 
statements, but rather is trained to perform in an expected way. While tradi-
tional machine learning exploits a variety of different models, deep learning 
apparatus is based on a single notion of artificial neural network, which is 
loosely inspired by the human brain. The usage of neural networks allows to 
develop more versatile models, as different types of neural networks are used as 
building blocks for specific tasks. This makes the models more reusable and 
easier to adjust to new tasks. Together, the ability to generalize well along with 
versatility turns deep learning into a powerful framework that is appealing for 
use in NLP, as it allows to attain a very high performance across many different 
NLP tasks.
This chapter provides an overview of deep learning applied to Russian 
NLP. The remainder is organized as follows: Sect. 26.2 introduces the main 
deep learning architectures, that is, neural network building blocks. Section 
26.3 presents a few NLP tasks and Russian-language examples along with the 
lists of available datasets and models. Section 26.4 concludes.
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26.2  deep LearnIng archItecture overvIew
The process of designing a neural network is similar to cooking a layered cake. 
An NLP practitioner first thinks of a preliminary sketch of the model and 
understands what the input to the model is, and what the model should out-
put. Next, the layers are added one by one to the model. The lowest layer is 
responsible for reading the textual input and creating an efficient representa-
tion of the input. The upper layers are aimed at solving the task under consid-
eration and preparing the desired output. The middle, or the hidden, layers do 
most of the work: hidden language patterns are discovered here by applying 
numerous nonlinear transformations.
Neural network architectures are constructed from various types of building 
blocks or layers. A crucial component of neural networks is the embedding 
layer. It maps words to vectors in a low dimensional space. These vectors, 
referred to as word embeddings, can be manipulated as any mathematical 
object: not only is it possible to calculate a similarity between them, but also to 
sum them up or to subtract them. The closer the words are by lexical meaning, 
the closer the corresponding word embeddings should be. The construction of 
word vectors can be treated either as a standalone task (see Sect. 26.3.1 of this 
chapter) or as a part of the whole neural network training. Word embeddings 
can be seen as a broad understanding of the grammar and semantics. When 
pretrained on a large general corpus, such as Wikipedia, word embeddings 
reveal the understanding of general language that can be adopted for a more 
specific domain. Word embeddings are shallow representations that only incor-
porate previous training in the input layer of the network. The upper layer of 
the network still needs to be trained from scratch.
Two major neural network architectures are Feed Forward Networks (FFNs) 
and recurrent neural networks (RNNs). The main difference between these 
architectures is in the way these architectures input the textual data.
FFNs treat the input text as a so-called “bag of words,” disregarding gram-
mar and word order and taking only word frequency into account. For exam-
ple, the sentence “the cat sat on the mat” would be turned into the following 
tuple: ([the, cat, sat, mat, on], [2, 1, 1, 1, 1]). Although FFNs are capable of 
combining the words in a meaningful way, it is still a significant disadvantage 
for languages with free word order, where the word order heavily affects the 
meaning of the sentence.
The design of RNNs overcomes the disadvantages of FFNs by introducing 
a built-in memory mechanism that summarizes the input text. RNNs can be 
seen as a tool which reads the input text sequentially in a word-by-word fash-
ion. As the memory is updated after reading a new word, RNNs are endowed 
with memorizing the word order and the understanding of the current word 
context. RNNs are usually treated as the analytical module of the whole net-
work and are rarely used as a standalone component. The power of RNNs is in 
their ability to produce context-aware word representations, which help, for 
example, to disambiguate word senses. RNNs often work in tandem with 
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FFNs, so that the output of the RNN is fed into a FFN, intended for final 
prediction.
The duality of feedforward and recurrent neural networks is caused by the 
difference of two widely used models for text representation. In contrast to the 
bag-of-words model exploited by FFNs, the recurrency targets at language 
modeling, which is central to the majority of NLP tasks. A language model has 
a double purpose: first, it assigns a probability to a sequence of words. Second, 
it predicts the next word based on a number of previously used words. The 
probability of a sentence, estimated by a language model, is closely related to 
the quality and correctness of the sentence. Language models help to evaluate 
the quality of machine translation or any other natural language generation 
task. By predicting the next word, the language model creates context- 
dependent word and sentence representations.
Although one of the early works by Bengio et al. (2003) shows that FFN 
can be treated as a language model, RNN outperforms by far FFNs for the task 
of language modeling. Finally, technical limitations of vanilla RNNs are resolved 
by gated architectures, such as long short-term memory (LSTM) and gated 
recurrent unit (GRU) networks. Both LSTM and GRU are very efficient as 
language models and are de-facto baseline NLP architectures.
The building blocks of neural network architectures are not limited to feed-
forward and recurrent layers. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are an 
extension of the FFN architecture. CNNs excel in discovering local patterns. 
They can be seen as a magnifier, which moves over a word sequence and identi-
fies important features. CNNs are often utilized on the lowest network layers 
to process not words, but rather characters, to discover long orthographic and 
derivational patterns. Many applications in Russian, a morphologically rich lan-
guage, benefit from the ability of CNNs to capture derivational word suffixes 
and endings. It helps to handle rare words, such as family names, terminology, 
toponyms, and slang, as well as to take surface features into account (Fig. 26.1).
When compared to feedforward and convolutional neural networks, recur-
rent neural networks are much slower to train, since they pose long-term 
dependencies and it is hard to parallelize recurrent computations. The recently 
introduced transformer layer combines the best of two approaches. It consists 
of multiple feedforward layers and a powerful attention mechanism that is anal-
ogous to human attention in the same way the artificial neural networks model 
biological neural networks. The attention mechanism directs focus to a certain 
part of the task while maintaining a background understanding of the whole 
task. It models word-by-word interactions on each feedforward layer, so that 
different types of dependencies are considered. The self-attention mechanism 
is used both to produce context-aware word embeddings, and also measures 
how strong the dependencies are between the words.
At the core of the recent paradigm shift in NLP, are pretrained language 
models that are built with rare exceptions with transformer blocks. Not only 
word embeddings, but the whole neural network is now pretrained as a lan-
guage model. It becomes possible, since the language modeling objective, next 
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word prediction, does not require any human annotation. The training data 
comes for free and the amount of training data available in almost every lan-
guage are potentially unlimited. Transformer-derived language models seem to 
capture many facets of language relevant for other NLP tasks. When pretrained 
on large and diverse corpora, they can be fine-tuned for downstream tasks and 
surpass previous results in almost every application (for more on corpus lin-
guistics, see Chap. 17).
Despite having excellent results for NLP tasks, neural networks have some 
disadvantages. First of all, they are frequently treated as black boxes as they 
lack interpretability. There have been several attempts to find a plausible expla-
nation of how exactly neural networks operate. One of the hypotheses states 
that the neural network follows the common linguistic pipeline of staged pro-
cessing of the language. It has been shown that if the neural network is deep 
enough, lower layers may become morphology aware, middle layers model 
syntactic dependencies, while the upper layers discover complex semantic pat-
terns. Secondly, deep learning technologies require a lot of data and computa-
tional sources. Modern computations, which may take about a month of 
training, are worth thousands of dollars. Thirdly, ethical concerns arise when 
training a model on textual data collected from the Web. A model can become 
unfair when trained on all misconceptions, offensive and biased judgments, 
fake news and false facts, published on the Web (for more on Runet, see 
Chap. 16). Finally, the fluency of text generation models may lead to poten-
tially harmful usage. New breed of text generation models impresses with their 
ability to generate coherent text from minimal prompts. When provided with 
a headline, such a model will compose a news story; when provided with a 
movie title, it will compose a movie plot. Text generation models can often 
Fig. 26.1 Neural network layers. (a) feed forward layer, (b) convolutional building 
layer, (c) recurrent layer, (d) transformer layer
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give the appearance of common sense and intelligence, so that it may become 
quite challenging to recognize, whether a text was composed by a human or 
by a machine. This frustrates research progress in language generation devel-
opment, as, it sees, text generators may be misused to generate fake news or 
propaganda or to increase the amount of spam on the Web. It is of crucial 
importance, the release of a powerful text generator is accompanied with a 
tool, which is capable of recognizing machine generated text and can be used 
to tackle online disinformation.
26.3  nLp tasks
26.3.1  Word Embeddings: How Do Computers Understand 
Lexical Meaning
Word embedding stands for a group of methods which are used to map words 
from a large vocabulary, to vectors. These vectors should consist of real num-
bers, have few zeros and be of relatively small dimensionality: it is common to 
construct 300-dimensional word embeddings. These vectors are treated as 
mathematical objects: not only similarity (or distance) between them can be 
computed, but also they can be added together or subtracted. At the core of 
numerous methods for word embedding construction is the distributional 
hypothesis: words that occur in the same contexts tend to have similar mean-
ings (Harris 1954). Word embedding models are trained on large text corpora. 
They aim at finding words that share contexts and represent them with such 
vectors that would be close, according to a mathematical similarity measure. 
For example, the embeddings of such words as kofe (“coffee”) and čaj (“tee”) 
should have a high similarity degree, since they are used in a similar way, along 
with the words pit′ (“to drink”), čaška (“cup”), nalit′ (“to pour”), et cetera. 
What is more, advanced word embedding models allow to conduct arithmeti-
cal operations: kofe (“coffee”) to utro (“morning”)  =  “čaj (“tee”) to vec ̌er 
(“evening”); Moskva (“Moscow”) to Rossiâ (“Russia”) = Berlin (“Berlin”) to 
Germaniâ (“Germany”). Of course, these associations are corpus-specific and 
may not be present in other models. The examples are provided by RusVectores 
(https://rusvectores.org), a free online service which provides, and which 
computes semantic relations between words in Russian and provides pretrained 
distributional semantic models (word embeddings), including contextual-
ized ones.
Word embeddings may serve as input to a neural network model, which 
further will be trained for any downstream task, and may be used as a stand-
alone model for studies of language usage. Word embeddings help to detect 
semantic shift, caused by either diachronic (Kutuzov et  al. 2018) or social 
changes (Solovyev et al. 2015). Bilingual word embeddings help to develop 




The most popular word embedding model is word2vec (Mikolov et  al. 
2013) and its extension fasttext (Joulin et al. 2017). Word2vec exploits neural 
networks to compute word embeddings. It has two configurations: in a con-
tinuous bag of words, CBOW, it predicts a word based on surrounding words 
(two to the left and two to the right). In skip-gram, SGNS, it predicts sur-
rounding words based on the given central word (Fig. 26.2).
SGNS is a de-facto state of the art model for word embeddings and is almost 
a default choice for many NLP applications for the English language. However, 
for the Russian language SGNS might not be the best choice. When trained on 
raw texts, SGNS does not take into account the derivational forms of the 
words. As a result, for the word kot (a cat) there might be up to ten possible 
vectors for each possible derivational form. This would make a similarity mea-
sure almost invalid, since the closest words to the vector kot (a cat) would be 
the vectors of the derivational forms kotu (to the cat), kote (about the cat), et 
cetera. To overcome this issue, a preliminary normalization is required to 
replace each word with its base form. Normalization methods, however, may 
either have limited vocabulary and introduce some mistakes while processing 
out of vocabulary words or require word embeddings. This vicious circle is 
broken by the fasttext model that does not modify word2vec mathematics but 
treats the words differently. Instead of computing a single vector for a given 
word, it computes multiple vectors for all character n-grams (sequences of two 
to five characters) and then combines them to get the final vector.
Fasttext allows to capture such properties of rich morphology in Russian as 
derivational patterns in suffixes and endings. It is strongly recommended to use 
fasttext for the Russian language as the word embedding model. See Table 26.1 
for available pretrained word embedding models and Table  26.2 for word 
embedding training tools.
Word embedding models often fail when faced with such complex language 
phenomena as antonyms or homonyms. Although word embeddings are 
exceptionally powerful for finding words that share a similar meaning, they 
often mistake for words that have opposite meanings, such as proigrat′ (“to 
lose”) or vyigrat′ (“to win”), as they occur in similar contexts. Word embed-
ding models suffer from polysemy and homonymy. Such words as luk (“onion” 
or “bow” or “a look”) and zamok (“castle” or “lock”) get a single vector, 
despite having multiple sense. A few models, such as AdaGram (Bartunov et al. 
2016) and SenseGram (Pelevina et  al. 2016), try to overcome this issue by 
Fig. 26.2 Word2vec configurations. (a) continuous bag of words, (b) skip-gram
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simultaneous word sense disambiguation, and word embedding training. 
However, current pretrained language models are a much more efficient solu-
tion to this issue, as they search for context-dependent word embeddings.
As of the mid 2010s, using pretrained word embeddings as an input to any 
machine learning or deep learning has become a must. The word embeddings 
can be fine-tuned while training the model for a downstream task or remain 
constant. Fine-tuning of word embeddings may help to resolve some issues 
related to antonyms or homonyms. When fine-tuned for sentiment classifica-
tion (for more on Sentiment analysis, see Chap. 28), embeddings for words 
horošij (“good”) and plohoj (“bad”), which may be initially close, will be pushed 
apart from each other.
Last but not least, an alternative approach to word tokenization, called byte 
pair encoding (BPE; Heinzerling and Strube 2018), suggests not to use whole 
words as text units, but rather split the words into subwords, based on frequent 
n-grams. BPE tokens resemble to a certain degree, morphemes, and seem quite 
promising for Russian.
To conclude this section, we will list a few pretrained word embedding 
models for Russian in Table 26.1.
All these models are available for downloads as single files. The models are 
trained on large freely available corpora, such as Wikipedia, Taiga,1 and 
Table 26.1 Word embeddings for Russian
http://rusvectores.org Multiple Russian-only word and sentence embeddings 




Multiple Russian-only word and sentence embeddings
https://fasttext.cc/docs/en/
crawl-vectors.html
Google fasttext embeddings trained with limited 
preprocessing for 157 languages
http://vectors.nlpl.eu/
repository/
Thirteen Russian word embedding models trained with 




BPE embeddings for 275 languages










Araneum.2 The vocabulary of the models ranges from 100K to 700K unique 
tokens and the model size ranges from 200MB to 3GB.
RusVectores additionally provides web interface for exploration of word 
embedding models, along with visualization and semantic calculator.
Table 26.2 lists tools freely available to train embedding models from 
scratch. Gensim is one of the most popular Python libraries for building word 
embedding models and topic models, though Gensim does not provide deep 
learning functionality. In contrast to Gensim, AllenNLP and flair provide refer-
ence implementations for deep learning models for NLP, including word2vec 
and fasttext. These libraries provide tools for processing textual data and share 
similar functionality, though target different audience. AllenNLP is more 
advanced and flair is designed as a very simple framework. Both AllenNLP and 
flair have Python interfaces. Fasttext is available as a console application of the 
same name. Deeplearning4j is a general deep learning framework that provides 
scripts for training deep learning models.
26.3.2  Text Classification
The task of text classification is to assign categories to texts. This is a common 
supervised task: given labeled data (i.e. texts, annotated with class labels), a 
model should be first trained, and then applied to unlabeled test data.
Text classification is one of the most demanded industrial NLP tasks. 
Sentiment analysis and information filtering are the most common applications 
of text classification algorithms. Sentiment analysis is widely used for marketing 
research. Companies use sentiment classification for product analytics, brand 
monitoring, customer support, and market research. One of the main informa-
tion filtering techniques is spam filtering, which exploit classification algorithms 
to distinguish between spam and ham incoming emails. In general, email cat-
egorization is a powerful idea which facilitates the work of an office employee. 
Other information filtering applications may include identification of trolls, 
obscene content detection, ad blocking and privacy protection. What is more, 
hotlines use text classification for language identification.
Virtual personal assistants, such as Apple Siri or Amazon Alexa, are becom-
ing an internal part of our daily lives. They use the whole range of NLP meth-
ods, including text classification. Each user utterance is classified according to 
its intent, according to the desired action of the user (i.e. whether the user 
meant to launch an application, make a call, write a note, etc.).
The classification of Russian texts is almost no different from English text 
classification and follows a standard pipeline:
 1. Word embeddings are used as an input to the model
 2. Multiple hidden CNN- or RNN-derived layers are used for input 
processing
 3. A feed forward layer is used for final prediction.
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The labels in the training set, that is, the correct answers, are used for super-
vision. When presented with correct answers, the model is able to adjust its 
own parameters so that its predictions become correct.
The quality of the classification task is evaluated according to the ratio of 
correct predictions and the ratio of erroneous predictions.
There are a few recent Russian-language datasets for text classification:
• A large-scale dataset for sentiment analysis, which consists of texts from 
social media (Rogers et al. 2018).
• A dataset for sentiment analysis of product reviews on e-commerce sites 
(Smetanin and Komarov 2019).
• A collected dataset for humor recognition in short stories (Baranova- 
Bolotova et al. 2019).
• RusIdiolect3 is a dataset for experimental studies of the idiolect of a native 
Russian speaker, such as deception detection (Litvinova et al. 2017).
• RusProfiling is a popular dataset for author profiling, including gender 
identification. Current state of the art results are achieved by Sboev 
et al. (2018).
These datasets are available to download from the Web. In contrast to major 
English datasets gathered in Natural Language Toolkit4 (NLTK), there is no 
unified application programming interface (API) to access Russian datasets.
Finally, the major component of fasttext (Joulin et al. 2017) functionality is 
a simple yet strong classification algorithm. It is very fast and easy to use and is 
strongly recommended as a strong baseline.
Finally, there are a few applications of word embeddings outside linguistic 
field. For example, (Panicheva and Litvinova 2019) report on using word 
embeddings to measure speech coherence of patients, affected by schizophre-
nia. “Semantic coherence” is defined as mean pairwise similarity between words 
in a sample text, written by a patient. Word embeddings allow to measure 
semantic coherence, as they provide a simple approach to measure word simi-
larity. The schizophrenia status of a patient along with text samples is provided 
in RusIdiolect corpus. The findings of Panicheva and Litvinova show that 
semantic coherence features allow to distinguish between healthy patients and 
patients, who suffer from schizophrenia. This is comparable to results reported 
for similar task in English. This research project aims at studying various phe-
nomena present in the schizophrenia and by no means calls to replace tradi-
tional medical diagnostics.
26.3.3  Sequence Labeling
The task of sequence labeling is to assign categories to single words. Common 
examples of a sequence labeling tasks are part-of-speech (POS) tagging or 
named entity recognition (NER). POS tagging is the task of labeling a word 
with a corresponding POS tag. NER seeks to identify such named entities as 
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persons, locations, organizations, et cetera, and assign them with a correspond-
ing tag. See Table 26.3 for examples of POS tagging and NER.
Sequence labeling applications range from linguistics tasks, such as POS tag-
ging, which can be treated is a preliminary step for further analysis, up to more 
complex tasks, such as coreference and gapping resolution. NER, as a sequence 
labeling task, can be treated as a preliminary step for machine translation. 
Named entities should be identified and treated differently from regular words 
for proper translation. When used in Legal Tech or medical applications, NER 
helps to discover important features, such as legal condition or diseases, used 
further for decision-making. In Russian realities, Legal Tech applications are 
very much in demand. This motivates several research groups to develop NER 
methods for specific domains.
Sequence labeling helps virtual assistants to understand user needs better. 
While text classification helps to detect user intent, sequence labeling methods 
are able to fill in slots, that is, to discover specific details, such as what exactly 
application should be launched or which contact should be addressed. Gapping 
and coreference are crucial for handling messaging history. Gapping resolu-
tions helps to find omitted predicates in consequent turns, while coreference 
resolutions helps to connect nouns and names with corresponding pronouns.
RNN and its variations are widely used for sequence labeling tasks due to its 
ability to process a sequence word by word. We can think of RNN as an atten-
tive reader that reads each word carefully, thinks over the context of the word, 
and then makes a decision as to what tag to assign. It is worth noting that 
bidirectional variations of RNN, capable of both left-to-right and right-to-left 
reading, are suited to model languages with free word order as they maintain 
both left and right contexts.
The pipeline of the sequence labeling task does not differ significantly from 
the text classification pipeline:
 1. Word embeddings are used as an input to the model. Word embeddings 
may be extended with convolved character representations, which would 
take care of derivational patterns.
 2. Multiple hidden RNN-derived layers are used for processing input and 
for producing context-aware word representations.
 3. Each word representation is fed into a feed forward layer for final predic-
tion and each word is assigned with a label. Alternatively, another model, 
Table 26.3 Two examples of sequence labeling tasks
Boris (Boris) Pasternak (Pasternak) rodilsâ (was born) v (in) Moskve (Moscow)
POS tags PROPN PROP VERB PREP PROPN
NE tags Person Person O O Location
POS tagging (first line), named entity recognition (second line). Each word is assigned with two tags: a POS tag 
and a named entity tag. If the word is not a named entity, the tag “O” is used
26 DEEP LEARNING FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE 
476
 conditional random field (CRF), may be used on top of the recurrent 
layer to reweight its prediction.
The main difference between text classification and sequence label affects 
the final layer. When used for text classification, the final layer is applied only 
once to get one class label. However, for sequence labeling it is applied to each 
individual word representation from previous layer.
In contrast to text classification task, sequence labeling seems to be more 
complicated from a linguistic point of view. Tasks, modeled as sequence label-
ing, are more advanced and range from POS tagging to coreference and gap-
ping resolution.
There are several Russian datasets for the sequence labeling task:
• Universal dependencies5 project presents four Russian corpora annotated 
with POS tags
• Persons-1000 (Gareev et al. 2013) and FactRuEval (Starostin et al. 2016) 
are large-scale datasets for named entity recognition
• AGGR-2019 (Smurov et al. 2019) is a corpus for gapping resolution
• RuCor and AnCor (Toldova et al. 2014) are corpora used for coreference 
and anaphora resolution
• SberQUAD, a dataset for question answering, treats answer generation as 
a retrieval of a relevant fragment of text.
26.3.4  Transfer Learning in NLP
Since 2017, NLP field has witnessed the emergence of transfer learning meth-
ods and algorithms. Transfer learning stands for the process of training a model 
on a large-scale dataset to conduct a simple task, such as language modeling. 
Next, this pretrained model is trained for the second time for more compli-
cated tasks. The transfer learning process is comparable to the way a child is 
educated. Children acquire the language from their environment, and only in 
the school they are taught to complete grammar tasks. The same way models 
gain language understanding while being pretrained and then are supervised 
for specific tasks.
Transfer learning led to a paradigm shift in NLP. Instead of using every time 
pretrained word embeddings and training the whole model from scratch, now 
a pretrained model is fine-tuned for downstream tasks. This requires much less 
annotated data and leads to superior results simultaneously. Word embeddings 
were an imperfect way to store language representation, which suffered from 
language ambiguity. Pretrained models are less prone to polysemy and anton-
ymy and are able to handle multilinguality at the same time.
Despite the fact that transfer learning paradigms leads to superior results in 




Inside transfer learning models are transformer layers (see Fig. 26.1d) that 
are more advanced from a technical point of view when compared to other lay-
ers. The architecture of transfer learning models is sophisticated, enumerates 
millions of parameters, and take weeks to be pretrained.
Not only transfer learning models established new state of the art for several 
existing NLP tasks, they also appear to be efficient in new generations of tasks. 
For example, there is evidence that the tasks that require commonsense under-
standing can be conducted using transfer learning techniques. This is sup-
ported by the idea that excessive pretraining results in a subtle understanding 
of language patterns.
When pretrained on the corpus of multiple languages or on parallel corpus, 
transfer learning models become aware of several languages at the same time 
and can be shared across several languages for the same downstream task. For 
example, Piskorski et al. (2019) show how NER in four Slavic languages can be 
approached by a multilingual model.
Even though pretraining of a large model is expensive and time-consuming, 
new models appear almost every month as of late 2019. Among others, ELMo 
(Peters et al. 2018) and BERT by Google (Devlin et al. 2019) are the most 
popular models. BERT’s successors, ALBERT, RoBERTa, XLNet, and T5, 
released by Facebook, Microsoft, and other technology companies, are larger 
and outperform BERT by far. At the same time, they are heavily criticized for 
being unaffordable for smaller institutions. Indeed, few universities in Russia 
have enough resources to train transfer learning models. Table 26.4 lists trans-
fer learning models available for the Russian language. RusVectores poses both 
word and sentence embeddings model. RusVectores provides not only word 
embeddings, but also a pretrained ELMo model, which can be treated as sen-
tence embedding models.
Transfer learning models can be exploited as a standalone sentence embed-
ding tool. Sentence embeddings are massively used in those applications, which 
require modeling of sentence similarity. Consider, for example, the task of find-
ing an answer to a frequently asked question (FAQ). Imagine that the answers 
to some FAQs are already known, and a user asks a new question. The most 
similar question to the new one can be found by using an embedding-based 
similarity measure. With a high chance, the answer to the retrieved question 
should fit the new question, too.
Table 26.4 Transfer learning models for Russian
http://docs.deeppavlov.ai/en/master/
features/models/bert.html
BERT in DeepPavlov (Kuratov and Arkhipov 
2019)
http://rusvectores.org Multiple Russian-only word and sentence 
embeddings (Kutuzov and Kuzmenko 2017)
https://github.com/vlarine/ruberta Russian RoBERTa, RuBERTa
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Transfer learning models are excellent not only in solving complex down-
stream tasks, but also in text generation. Some researchers are afraid of the 
fluency of these models and raise ethical questions of the harmless strategy of 
releasing the models. When misused, the transfer learning models can generate 
fake news and offensive utterances and be disturbing. However, these concerns 
are vivid for English-spoken communities and do not reach Russia so far.
26.4  concLusIon
This chapter discusses the applications of deep learning methods to Natural 
Language Processing tasks and is particularly oriented at the Russian language. 
We traced the development of deep learning methods for NLP from early 
stages of using feed forward networks to recent developments in transfer learn-
ing. Two basic text representation models, namely bag-of-words and language 
models, were presented and related to the duality between convolutional and 
recurrent neural networks. We have recognized a recent paradigm shift, caused 
by new advances in architecture design and development of transformer layers. 
Several analogies between human intelligence and neural networks were drawn. 
Neural networks aim at resembling human by using artificial neurons and 
attention mechanisms, and acquiring language from textual data.
With no doubt, deep learning is a leading paradigm in modern language 
technology. Unfortunately, the Russian language resources do not provide 
enough resources to exploit deep learning scope fully. The Russian research 
community is facing a need for both keeping track of worldwide challenges 
and, if necessary, reapply the methods initially developed for the English lan-
guage to the Russian language.
The latter requires an increase not only of computational powers, which is 
rather a financial matter but also of the amounts of annotated data. Recent 
government decisions and AI-centered strategies seem to provide financial sup-
port to the research community that may help to narrow the gap between 
English and Russian language resources.
Not only is Russian different from English from a linguistic point of view, 
but also different language technology applications are demanded in Russia 
and English-spoken countries. The major NLP applications in Russia are 
related to marketing, e-Government transformation, and call center automa-
tion. Whole domains such as Legal Tech, medical NLP, educational NLP still 
stay out of business focus and are subject to further development. Minority 
languages currently are not supported by major language technology applica-
tions with Yandex.Search (the web search engine and the core product of 
Yandex) being the only exception.
At the same time, while language technologies become more and more 
sophisticated, the entry threshold to the NLP field is lowered. Recent advances 
in programming tools and programming languages made it possible to develop 
high-level languages, which can be easily comprehended by users with little or 
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no previous programming experience. Successful implementations of many 
deep learning architectures have substantially facilitated the development of 
practical applications. The complexity of deep learning models comes along 
with the flexibility of fine-tuning and reuse across practical applications. The 
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CHAPTER 27




Plagiarism currently tends to be viewed as a problem connected primarily with 
students, albeit more prominent authors such as William Shakespeare and 
George Friedrich Handel were accused of it long ago. Plagiarism continues to 
be widespread in educational institutions, predominantly due to single-click 
technology, but another contributing factor that helps make it common prac-
tice is the tolerance of plagiarism on the part of educators and academia in 
general. In 2004, for instance, it was estimated that 10 percent of student 
projects in the United States and Australia involved plagiarism (Oakes 2014, 
60). By contrast, in Russia, 36 percent of respondents admitted to having regu-
larly copied the texts of others (Kicherova et  al. 2013, 2); as many as 36.7 
percent of undergraduate students in 8 Russian universities took personal 
credit for material they had, in fact, downloaded from the Internet 
(Maloshonok 2016).
The problem of plagiarism is certainly not limited to undergraduate stu-
dents. For example, two cases of plagiarism were documented in PhD 
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dissertations published in Germany in 2011. These cases, which were analyzed 
in detail by the GuttenPlag community, led to the monograph titled False 
Feathers: A Perspective on Academic Plagiarism (Weber-Wulff 2014). However, 
plagiarism is arguably exceedingly prevalent and more deeply rooted in Russia 
than in Europe (see Golunov 2014; Denisova-Schmidt 2016). One reason for 
this may be that the symbolic value of scholarly achievements in Russia has 
been widely appropriated by politicians, civil servants, businesspersons, and 
administrators from educational and medical fields. These professionals have 
been awarded degrees by lenient defense panels for dissertations that have been 
entirely copy-pasted from other sources. This would be even more prevalent 
among those in power if strong opposition had not been voiced by the aca-
demic community. This led to the establishment of “Dissernet,” a network that 
purports to expose large-scale plagiarism in Russian scientific publications. Our 
focus in this chapter is on Russian doctoral and post-doctoral dissertations,1 
which constitute merely the tip of an academic iceberg that includes articles, 
monographs, coursebooks, and other scholarly works. In fact, the post-Soviet 
publishing market is flooded with texts of questionable originality.
The current availability of material and ease of use raises more general ques-
tions. For example, what is the textual authenticity and what are the norms of 
textual authenticity for scholars at a time when everything is “a copy of a copy 
of a copy” (Palahniuk 1996)? Western academic culture presupposes that the 
origin of the words and ideas in a scholarly text, from the first word to the last, 
are from the author or authors accredited in connection with the title, with the 
exception, of course, of properly attributed quotations from other scholarly 
works, or paraphrases of them. Even within these norms, however, exactly what 
is meant by “original from the first word to the last” is somewhat ambiguous 
(Korbut 2013).
One of the principal subjects in sociology since the time of Durkheim is 
social norms; in other words, the rules of conduct that are considered proper, 
right, and socially desirable. In recent decades, digitalization has made it pos-
sible to analyze compliance with various norms using digital traces of naturally 
occurring behaviors rather than self-reporting, official statistics, or other less 
reliable resources. Areas of conduct analyzed in this manner vary—from using 
dirty words (McEnery 2004) to observing meritocratic principles in the selec-
tion of professors (Clauset et al. 2015). Due to the increasing digitalization of 
Russian society together with emergent methods of analysis, it is now possible 
to study the level of support for a particular norm, specifically one that requires 
authenticity in academic writing, and to analyze conditions under which this 
norm is likely to be transgressed.
The norm of textual authenticity requires that any academic text be fully 
original in compliance with the highest academic standards, which permit quo-
tation and paraphrasing with correct and appropriate attribution to the source. 
This could be deconstructed into two different norms requiring (1) that the 
text be written in full by its presumed author and (2) that the text is written for 
one and only one purpose or publication outlet. The latter, which forbids any 
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recycling of an academic text, is more restrictive than the former in that it bans 
all forms of reuse including that of one’s own texts. The focus of this chapter is 
on the first, less restrictive norm of texts that are written entirely by an author. 
The assumption is that dissertation authors can reproduce sections of their dis-
sertation in articles and that this is universally regarded as a permissible and 
even a desirable practice.
The norm of textual authenticity requires identification of what constitutes 
a form of expression, such as widely used terms or stock phrases, and what is 
the true content of the academic text. Some forms of expressions or presenta-
tion style may or may not qualify as unauthorized borrowing. These include 
the use of certain truisms and clichés such as “to the best of our knowledge,” 
design layouts, and fonts. To apply the norm of textual authenticity thus 
requires constant discrimination between what is the “mere form” of an aca-
demic message and what is “the message itself,” with the form being consid-
ered part of academic convention and without authorship. The digitalization of 
scholarly production together with software development facilitate the study of 
particular variations in the norms of textual authenticity.
We begin the analysis for this chapter by describing the challenge that aca-
demic plagiarism poses for digital humanities in an era when sophisticated tools 
make it possible to detect inappropriate academic activity, and we focus specifi-
cally on Russian dissertations. Second, we examine the changing norms of aca-
demic integrity in terms of the sociology of science. Thus, in Sect. 27.2, we 
describe the various types of plagiarism and the computational tools that have 
been created to detect fraudulent texts. Section 27.3 comprises a review of 
available digitized resources, including dissertations, articles, and abstracts 
published by the Russian academic press. In Sect. 27.4, we provide an overall 
picture of the Dissernet findings when these tools were applied to large-scale 
(greater than 50%) plagiarism in dissertations that have been defended in 
Russia. Section 27.5 presents a case study of small-scale plagiarism based on the 
same academic genre. This study analyzes and traces the shifting authenticity 
norms in Russia since post-Soviet times. Finally, Sect. 27.6 concludes the 
chapter.
27.2  types of plagIarIsm and tools enablIng 
Its detectIon2
The Modern Language Association (MLA) Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly 
Publishing defines plagiarism as follows:
Forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate acknowledgment 
when repeating another’s wording or particularly apt phrase, paraphrasing anoth-
er’s argument, and presenting another’s line of thinking. (Modern Language 
Association 2008, 166)
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Two types of plagiarism are commonly distinguished in the scholarly litera-
ture, which Bela Gipp refers to as copy&paste versus shake&past (Gipp 2014, 
12; see also Potthast et al. 2010). The former refers to copying someone’s text 
unchanged without proper acknowledgment, whereas the latter implies minor 
modifications, such as varying the word order or using synonyms—again with-
out acknowledging the source. Several services are currently available that can 
detect plagiarism in Russian-language texts (see Nikitov et al. 2012). Below we 
describe several of the most advanced technologies applicable to textual plagia-
rism. We do not address evidence of fraudulent publication such as image and 
diagram falsification, carbon-copied lists of references, or data manipulation 
(for example, wild data or loose correlation).3
Copy-and-paste, or cut-and-paste refers to “involving or relating to the cut-
ting and pasting of printed material, or (Computing) the ‘cut’ and ‘paste’ func-
tions on a computer” (OED, c.v. cut-and-paste). Technically, the basic 
commands available on any computer can create the simplest form of plagia-
rism, and hence the most alluring, is when a source is used but not cited prop-
erly. This is easy to identify, even when the text under suspicion has 
been—intentionally or otherwise—modified or corrupted. Detection is based 
on identifying similar chains of symbols and their possible modifications. Some 
of these modifications reflect deliberate distortions by the borrower-creator, 
such as Cyrillic letters replaced with identical Latin ones, whereas others derive 
from optical character recognition (OCR) (see Table 27.1).
The plagiarism in each of these cases can be detected by conducting a basic 
similarity test or by using a more sophisticated technique such as the Levenshtein 
distance, which is the number of required symbol substitutions for one word to 
be changed into another (Levenshtein 1966). This approach is exemplified by 
a tool called Disserorubka (literally “the Thesis-grinder”) and was developed by 
the Dissernet community. Another service that is available online, albeit a com-
mercial one, is antiplagiat.ru, which is specifically designed to detect plagiarism 
in Russian texts. The available techniques and services allow copy-and-paste 
plagiarism to be effectively detected by taking into account specific issues 
related to the Cyrillic alphabet, such as the Cyrillic “P” replaced with Latin 
“P,” and the confused recognition of “Ф” as “%.”
Table 27.1 A source text (left) and the copy-pasted text after OCR (right)a
Специфика воинской деятельности в 
сочетании с высочайшим напряжением всех 
духовных и физических сил, с возможностью 
и необходимостью самопожертвования во 
имя Родины, определяют значимость 
духовного фактора для армии.
С п е ц и ф и к а в о и н с к о и д е я т е л ь 
н о с т и в с о ч е т а н и и с высочаишим 
напряжением всеx духовных и физических 
сиn, с возможностью и не обходимостью 
само пожертвованnя bо имя Qoдины, 
определяют значимость дуxовного %актора 
для армии.
The distortions are in bold.
aThe examples are fictional and were constructed by the authors: any correspondence to actual texts is accidental.
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In the case of paraphrasing, different linguistic techniques are used to 
rework the source texts, including word removal, word replacement, synonym 
substitution, word-order modification, grammatical changes, and patchwriting 
(for example, by combining fragments from several texts) (Oakes 2014, 60). 
The nature of these changes depends on whether the paraphrase had been 
generated by means of manual text editing or automatically (Gupta et al. 2011, 
1), as shown in Table 27.2.
Dictionary-based methods are used to detect this type of plagiarism, requir-
ing a lexicon that contains all possible changes, substitutions, and transforma-
tions. All modifications are weighted, with the slighter ones prioritized, and 
those that are more substantial being downgraded. For instance, word-order 
modification and word replacement are both automatically detectable, but the 
former is weighted more heavily than the latter because it preserves more of the 
original source. An application of this approach to the Russian, Ukrainian, and 
English languages, developed by K. Kuznetsov and M. Kopotev, can be found 
online at http://dissercomp.ru. Thus far, the service is able to detect para-
phrased plagiarism in Russian, Ukrainian, and English texts.
Another case of paraphrasing is interlingual plagiarism, when a text is 
“paraphrased” in a sense from one source language to another. This process 
may involve manual or automatic translation. When automatic translation is 
involved, the output of the machine translator usually undergoes post-editing, 
along with obfuscation, which makes a comparison of the sources with the 
plagiarized text substantially more difficult while at the same time displaying 
evidence of translation (Table 27.3).
Detecting this type of plagiarism poses a challenge and tests the very limits 
of the methods available to scholars in digital humanities. Those engaged in 
this endeavor have turned to distributional neural net modeling, and specifi-
cally to distributional semantics.
The initial idea behind this approach reflects the understanding of meaning 
through context, as proposed by J. R. Firth: “You shall know a word by the 
company it keeps” (Firth, J. R. 1957, 11). The main objective in distributional 
semantics is to analyze the co-occurrence of linguistic entities (usually words) 
Table 27.2 A source text (left) and the paraphrased text (right)
Некоторая часть начальников и 
преподавательского состава, обладая 
неплохими теоретическими знаниями, сами 
имеют слабые практические навыки, поэтому они 
не могут правильно учить курсантов.
Некоторая часть командиров и 
учителей, обладая хорошими 
теоретическими знаниями, сами имеют 
плохие практические навыки, поэтому 
они не могут хорошо учить студентов.
English translation
Some of the heads and faculty, possessing 
goodish theoretical knowledge, have themselves 
weak practical skills, so they can not properly 
teach the cadets.
Some of the commanders and teachers, 
possessing good theoretical knowledge, 
have themselves poor practical skills, so 
they cannot teach students well.
The paraphrasing is indicated in bold.
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and to summarize this distribution statistically on multidimensional “semantic 
spaces.” For example, the English noun plagiarism regularly collocates with 
the same words as the nouns falsification, obscenity, and misbehavior:
…accused of plagiarism/falsification/obscenity/misbehavior in…
Among the many applications for this paradigm, one that is based on the 
word2vec modeling was specifically developed to expose translated plagiarism. 
The authors call their method “semantic fingerprinting” (see Kutuzov et al. 
2016); the service is also available online: www.dissernet.org/dissemsearch.
27.3  avaIlable electronIc resources
A well-functioning computational tool does recognize plagiarism effectively. If 
they are to achieve results, experts also need access to the relevant textual data. 
Numerous (preferably all) academic texts are required in order to compare the 
plagiarized text with potential sources by applying an algorithm that can make 
searches. The full range of texts, both online and offline, would be available in 
a perfect world, but real life poses additional challenges. An accepted presup-
position here is that both the copycat who scans for a suitable source to rewrite, 
and the unmasker who is intent on revealing the copycatting are most likely to 
be relying on the same resources, in other words (publicly), available digi-
tized texts.
How many scientific text documents in Russian have been digitized and 
made available to the public? In answer to this question, we consider different 
categories of academic texts. The first category includes doctoral and post- 
doctoral dissertations which are referred to as autoreferats, a formal abstract of 
the dissertation. An autoreferat is a summary of the main results reported in a 
work that the author compiles and it usually consists of 20–30 pages abstracted 
from the full text. These abstracts also contain basic information on the formal 
public defense such as the date and place of the event, the name of the aca-
demic supervisor, the official opponents, and so on. The degree candidate in 
Russia is required to deposit both the dissertation and the abstract in the main 
libraries of the Russian Federation. The RSL (Rossijskaâ gosudarstvennaâ bib-
lioteka, Russian State Library) in Moscow has been a major repository for these 
texts from 1944 onwards. In 2003, the RSL management decided to ensure 
broad public availability and preservation of dissertations electronically. Thus 
far, this has led to the creation of the most comprehensive electronic collection 
of abstracts (autoreferats) of domestic doctoral and post-doctoral dissertations 
Table 27.3 A source text (left) and the translated text (right)
In a crisis, the whole educational system 
was reformed: the structure of educational 
institutions changed; the throughput of 
schools increased.
В условиях кризиса была проведена реформа 
всей системы образования: изменилась структура 
учебных заведений, увеличилась пропускная 
способность училищ.
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in the world. To date, the collection incorporates more than 919,000 full texts. 
The dissertations defended in 1994 and thereafter were digitized rather sys-
tematically, whereas the collection of abstracts (autoreferats) covers the time 
period from 2007 up to the present. Most, but not all, dissertations and 
abstracts from previous years have also been digitized.
All of the aforementioned documents are available in the Digital Dissertation 
Library at http://diss.rsl.ru upon registration. Registered visitors receive free 
and unrestricted, open access to the abstract collection. Access to the copyright- 
protected part of the Digital Dissertation Library is provided at the RSL in 
Moscow or in its virtual reading rooms, of which there are more than 600 in 
Russia and worldwide. Most of the reading rooms located abroad are accessible 
through local university libraries. Readers who are registered individually are 
also offered the opportunity to access the full texts remotely. However, they are 
limited to viewing at most five dissertations per day, and no more than fifteen 
per month. Beginning in 2014, prior to their public defenses, all post-graduate 
students have been required to publish their dissertations and their abstracts 
online and in open-access forums. As a result, the number of available disserta-
tions is increasing annually by approximately 30,000 texts. The RSL with its 
Digital Dissertation Library nevertheless remains the only central collection of 
these documents in Russia.
All types of scientific publications apart from dissertations are accessible in 
many electronic libraries, both in Russia and beyond. Russia’s most compre-
hensive and ambitious repository is the Russian Scientific Electronic Library, 
available at elibrary.ru, which also offers many other categories of scientific 
publications. Another category comprises books and book chapters, of which 
more than 122,000 full texts are available in the Electronic Library, and more 
than 55,000 of them are open access. Collected papers constitute a further 
category of digitized documents available at the same website. There are also 
more than 127,000 volumes and papers available, and approximately 87,000 of 
them are open access. Conference and similar short papers are assigned a sepa-
rate category among the digitized documents: there are more than 982,000 of 
them with 779,000 being open access. The last of these groups consists of 
academic articles or publications in scholarly periodicals, and this group natu-
rally represents the largest category of digitized scientific documents with 
approximately 4.5 million papers written in Russian available at elibrary.ru, and 
of these, about 3.3 million are open access.
The impressive collections of academic texts described above have become 
available, thanks to public funding. They are key sources of successful scientific 
work in Russia and/or of data in Russian for projects ranging from conducting 
basic bibliographic searches to discovering trends in Russian science. These 
data provide the groundwork for the detection of plagiarism in academic texts. 
Plagiarism detection rests on two crucial conditions: effective algorithms and 
the availability of source texts to which a suspicious text is compared in order 
to find similarities. The available data in Russian meets both conditions that 
allow the effective detection of plagiarism and deal with this social 
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phenomenon in depth. In the next two sections, we explore two case studies 
that utilize available resources. The first case concerns large-scale plagiarism 
that involves the copying of more than half of the source text, which provokes 
general observations of fake academic activity in Russia. By contrast, the sec-
ond case focuses on small-scale plagiarism and discusses cross-cultural variation 
in interpretations of authenticity norms.
27.4  the best practIces of dIssernet In the detectIon 
of large-scale plagIarIsm
The volunteer network known as Dissernet was established in 2013 to counter 
fraud and dishonesty in academia, specifically in fabricated dissertations and in 
the conferring of false university degrees. According to its manifesto, Dissernet 
is “a networking community of experts, researchers and reporters seeking to 
unmask swindlers, forgers and liars,” whose members “oppose abusive prac-
tices, machinations and falsifications in the fields of scientific research and edu-
cation, in particular in the process of defending theses and awarding academic 
degrees in Russia” (English translation from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Dissernet).
It is now possible to detect plagiarism in thousands of dissertations, primar-
ily through the application of in-house tools, introduced in Sect. 27.2, to the 
data described in Sect. 27.3 of this chapter. The abstract, or autoreferat, serves 
as a prerequisite for identifying suspected cases of plagiarism in that it is avail-
able online and is thus indexed by search engines such as Google and Yandex. 
This works even when the dissertation itself is not indexed, based on the 
assumption that when a dissertation contains a large amount of plagiarized 
text, its autoreferat will retain fragments of the plagiarized sources. Dissernet 
software is able to pick up the abstracts one by one by utilizing search-engine 
indices to search for textual coincidences within the entire, publicly available 
mass of Russian digitized texts, including articles, monographs, and disserta-
tions as well as their abstracts. This is essentially how the technological part of 
the process works, and hundreds of thousands of texts are automatically 
checked in this manner. Dissernet is principally aimed at detecting large-scale 
plagiarism, which is determined to be the illegal use of equal to or greater than 
50 percent of a text. In an extreme but real-life example, a source text was uti-
lized in full, with the automatic replacement of “dark chocolate” with “local 
beef,” and “confectionery” with “meat and dairy.” As at beginning of 2020, 
Dissernet had identified almost 9,000 plagiarized dissertations, both doctoral 
and post-doctoral, that had been defended in the previous two decades.
At the next level of its investigation, Dissernet exposes established practices 
that are corrupt, such as when an omertà-like community repeatedly produces 
fraudulent dissertations. Dissernet findings clearly indicate that as soon as ram-
pant plagiarism is detected in one dissertation, plagiarism is likely to be discov-
ered in other dissertations defended before the same defense panel or under 
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the same supervision. Many of those who produce these dissertations work in 
a “conveyor-belt” mode by using exceedingly limited sets of scientific texts as 
sources. The graph below (Fig. 27.1) demonstrates the density of such practice 
that one dissertation-defense panel established at MGPU (Moskovskij 
pedagogičeskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, Moscow Pedagogical State 
University). This panel approved more than 90 “doctored” dissertations from 
2001 to 2012, with the same actors playing interchangeable roles first as kan-
didat nauk (doctoral degree candidate) or doctor nauk (post-doctoral degree 
candidate) and later as naučnyj konsul’tant (supervisors) or official opponents 
(see Fig. 27.1).
First and foremost, Dissernet activity targets plagiarism among top-ranked 
Russian politicians and administrators, both in academia and beyond. Thus, the 
results cannot be interpreted as representing the whole landscape across all 
disciplines over the entire country. However, the number of dissertations tested 
(more than 20,000) allows us to draw a number of preliminary conclusions. 
First, the number of heavily plagiarized dissertations varies significantly depend-
ing on the academic field. Most of the identified fake dissertations (44%) were 
in the field of economics. Other academic fields deeply infected by fraud include 
pedagogy (16%) and law (12%), followed by the medical sciences, political sci-
ence, engineering, and the social sciences. However, this type of fraud is less 
common in the natural sciences. It is important to mention that this 
Fig. 27.1 A network in the MGPU producing large-scale plagiarism (A. Abalkina, 
Dissernet.org). The full interactive graph is available at: https://www.dissernet.org/
publications/mpgu_graf.htm
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distribution is symptomatic because it represents the main bottlenecks in mod-
ern Russia: economics, law, and education.
Second, universities have been predominantly responsible for faking aca-
demic production, whereas the research institutions of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, the RAS, have produced relatively small numbers of detected plagia-
rism cases. The two most prominent universities in terms of producing faked 
material during the last fifteen years are Moscow State Pedagogical University 
and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public 
Administration. Yet other “leading contenders” include the Russian State 
University for Humanities and the Russian State Social University, as well as 
the country’s leading seat of learning, Moscow State University. By way of 
contrast, the RAS, which comprises hundreds of research institutions across the 
country, was ranked 23rd on the plagiarism list—the frauds being exclusively 
represented by its Caucasus-based branch.
Finally, the majority (approx. 50%) of those holding questionable academic 
degrees are working as administrative staff in universities. Not coincidentally, 
large-scale plagiarism was detected in 66 dissertations (21.22%) defended by 
rectors (311 of those awarded during the last fifteen years in Russia were 
checked). Politicians and businessmen fell behind in this regard with only 
about fifteen percent of their numbers engaging in plagiarism.
Large-scale plagiarism in Russia is, by its very nature, a special case when the 
numbers are compared to those recently disclosed in Western Europe (for 
example, see Weber-Wulff 2014). Whereas a Western plagiarist endeavors to 
present a text that has been copied from others as original research, the high- 
profile swindler in Russia may well not have even seen the plagiarized text prior 
to the public defense, having received it ready for publication from ghost- 
writers. When this occurs, wholesale plagiarism is not disguised; instead, the 
“dissertation” is composed with a crazy quilt of texts with fully automated 
replacements.
This pervasive academic corruption inevitably raises various questions. For 
example, does the widespread occurrence of badly adapted texts indicate a local 
trend that exclusively features pseudo-academics who attempt to enhance their 
value among their own kind? Or does it foretell greater changes in acceptable 
norms that academic communities have faced thus far? We address these ques-
tions in our second case study, presented in Sect. 27.5 below.
27.5  small-scale plagIarIsm and shIftIng norms 
of textual authentIcIty
While the detection of small-scale plagiarism also involves the same tools and 
collections as those described above, it is more dependent on manual process-
ing in that a small piece of text may be a legitimate quotation or a paraphrase 
with a valid reference. This challenge calls for deeper conceptual reasoning on 
the shifting norms of textual authenticity.
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As is the case with many other norms, justifications for the norm of textual 
authenticity are subject to deeper disagreement than the norm itself. Those 
who attempt to provide grounds for accepting this norm tend to present one 
of two arguments. The first is that either copy-pasting from the texts of other 
persons is defined as an infringement of these authors’ intellectual property and 
thus as a type of theft, or they regard copy-pasting as a fraudulent way of 
obtaining intellectual distinction that is not actually deserved, and thus akin to 
cheating on an exam. The latter interpretation is based on the assumption that 
an individual with a university-level degree is able, single-handedly, to produce 
a text that meets certain stringent requirements. Nonetheless, both justifica-
tions can be disputed in specific cases. In contrast to more obvious cases of 
theft, dissertation plagiarism does not necessarily damage the rightful owner of 
the property, who probably loses little in terms of professional recognition 
given that dissertations are rarely read. Moreover, as a reason for condemning 
plagiarism, it becomes irrelevant if an author of the borrowed source raises no 
objections. The Dissernet studies nevertheless revealed that a person’s supervi-
sor and/or opponents are the most likely sources of unauthorized large-scale 
borrowing (see Sect. 27.4 for details). In all probability, in such cases, the text 
is borrowed with the author’s full consent, thus in the true sense of the word, 
no theft occurs of intellectual property. As for the second justification, although 
the copy-pasting of an entire text by another person is obviously incompatible 
with originality, borrowing some parts of it (such as the literary review or 
descriptions of procedures) is apparently possible without compromising the 
originality of the research results. One could therefore argue that the authentic 
reproduction of the whole text is much less serious than producing substantive 
original results, particularly in light of the aforementioned disagreements 
regarding the meaning of originality and authenticity. Despite a certain shaki-
ness concerning the grounds on which it rests, the norm requiring full textual 
authenticity evolved in Western publishing, and it was officially supported by 
the VAK (Vysšaâ attestacionnaâ komissiâ, All-Russian Attestation Committee)—a 
state agency based in Moscow that verifies both doctoral and post-doctoral 
degrees.4
Researchers who use the software and data described above could determine 
how closely the norm of textual authenticity was adhered to by large numbers 
of academics and identify the deviants who did not follow it. Two hypotheses 
could be posited here. The first is the “weakness hypothesis” that deviation 
from the norm of textual authenticity is associated with academic weakness. In 
other words, this concerns those authors who are unable to produce texts of an 
acceptable quality and therefore accept the risk associated with plagiarizing. In 
a slightly different form, this hypothesis predicts that when academics decide 
whether or not to plagiarize, they self-sort themselves into two groups. There 
are those for whom the costs of writing an authentic text are greater than the 
costs of being revealed as a plagiarizer, multiplied by the estimated probability 
of such a revelation. The second group consists of those for whom the opposite 
is true (Spence 1973, 2002). The “convention hypothesis,” on the other hand, 
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holds that some academics disregard the norm because they disagree with its 
justifications, and may not be fully aware that others support it.
Several predictions follow from the “weakness hypothesis” as to where pla-
giarism is to be found. In the case of Russia, one would expect plagiarism to 
occur primarily in disciplines that were the least developed during the Soviet 
period, but which expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is, the 
social sciences. Second, one might expect less borrowing in institutions in 
which the prime research forces are concentrated, namely, the Academy of 
Sciences and the top universities. Third, individuals who conduct highly 
esteemed research are presumably less likely to borrow than those whose results 
are less prominent.
The “convention hypothesis” does not generate predictions, but it does 
explain why expectations based on the “weakness hypothesis” may be falsified. 
If no correlation occurs between borrowing and intellectual weakness, then the 
social sciences may not differ from the natural sciences, and the best institu-
tions and scholars may not differ from their weaker counterparts. In this case, 
the principal variable deciding who plagiarizes and who does not is the degree 
of contact with Western academia and its standardized norms. Indeed, institu-
tions which conduct the highest quality research are also likely to be more 
globalized. However, this correlation is probably weak, given that there are a 
few intervening variables.
To determine which hypothesis has more support, we analyzed 2,468 post- 
doctoral dissertations (Doktor nauk, see note 1 above), which were randomly 
selected from the pool of all dissertations defended in Russia in the years 
2006–2015.5 We utilized the antiplagiat.ru online service, which allowed us to 
assess the selected texts against many sources, including the Digital Dissertation 
Library of the RSL.
Figure 27.2 presents the overall distribution of plagiarism that occurred 
across disciplines. The figure in the graph is a boxplot. It divides the amount of 
borrowed materials found in each discipline into four quartiles, from the high-
est to the lowest, and indicates where the boundaries of each of them are situ-
ated. The band inside the box corresponds to the median, crosses (X) stand for 
averages, and points outside of the upper “whisker” are outliers with an 
extraordinarily high amount of borrowing for a given discipline. Three aspects 
of plagiarism immediately become apparent. First, inappropriate borrowing is 
almost universally present.6 Second, the disciplines differ dramatically in what 
an “extraordinary” amount of borrowing means to them, such that the excep-
tional case of borrowing around 30 percent of a text in philology would be 
close to the average in agriculture. Third, cases of large-scale plagiarism similar 
to those discovered by Dissernet are rather rare. Thus, from the sample of 
2,468 post-doctoral dissertations, we determined that 44 contained borrowing 
that exceeded 60 percent (1.7%). We checked these 44 manually, and three 
cases were false positives. Overall, large-scale plagiarism exceeding 50 percent 
was found in 149 of the 2,468 dissertations (6%). Thus, we further focus on 
relatively small-scale plagiarism.
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In contrast to what is posited in the weakness hypothesis, no straightforward 
connections were discovered between the character of a discipline (humanities, 
social sciences, or natural sciences; predominantly theoretical or predominantly 
applied), the degree of its expansion in post-Soviet times, and the degree of 
plagiarism. Thus, of the three disciplines with the highest levels of unauthor-
ized borrowing, agriculture (natural sciences, predominantly applied) has wit-
nessed moderate expansion, chemistry (natural sciences, including both 
theoretical and applied subfields) is shrinking, and law (social sciences, both 
theoretical and applied) is expanding enormously. In the case of specific disci-
plines, apparently traditions play a key role, which sometimes differ in other-
wise closely related subjects such as chemistry and biology, or economics and 
sociology. In general, it seems that neither the lower-level development of 
scholarship in a given field in Russia nor its recent expansion played a promi-
nent role in tolerating unauthorized borrowings. The weakness argument does 
not appear to be valid for the moderate infringement of the norm for textual 
authenticity. It is interesting, however, that the logic does seem to be applicable 
in another sense: among the relatively sizable disciplines, philology (in Russia, 
this includes both literary studies and linguistics) displayed the least amount of 
borrowing.
We discovered some limited support for the hypothesis positing that aver-
sion to plagiarism will be strongest among institutions of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences and universities that participate in Project 5-100, as their objective 
is to have at least five Russian universities among the top one hundred in the 
world university rankings. However, Russia’s leading institutions are the most 
highly internationalized. For example, the top Russian universities are 
Fig. 27.2 The overall distribution of small-scale plagiarism across disciplines
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evaluated according to the number of foreign students and faculty they employ. 
The leading institutions also serve as the gateways through which international 
norms find their way into Russia. In this sense, the “convention hypothesis” 
that resulted from the adoption of international norms may explain the aver-
sion of these institutions to plagiarism (Table 27.4).
Finally, we examined individual publication profiles in the Russian Index for 
Scientific Citing. We selected 10 percent of the representatives of each disci-
pline with the highest and the lowest number of borrowing and compared their 
publication profiles. The formulation of the sample thus eliminated the influ-
ence of differences in profile. Table 27.5 presents the results. Although some 
statistically significant differences emerged in the amount of plagiarism among 
researchers who publish widely in international publications compared to those 
who publish exclusively in second-rate domestic editions, such differences are 
relatively minor in absolute terms. Again, one could infer that according to the 
“convention hypothesis,” scholars with the most impressive international pub-
lication records are also those with the highest exposure to the norms of inter-
national publication.
Overall, our findings cast considerable doubt on the validity of the “weak-
ness hypothesis.” It appears that the norm of textual authenticity is not widely 
accepted in Russia. Although borrowing larger amounts of a text (as in exceed-
ing 50%) is rather rare, recycling the minor parts of other people’s texts is 
almost a universal practice (probably 75% of dissertations include at least a few 
slightly re-written paragraphs from the works of others, without attribution).
Some Russian scholars justified borrowing by describing a dissertation and 
its public defense as a “mere formality” and decrying “senseless conventions.” 
Others questioned the possibility of dividing collaborative work into personal-
ized scientific contributions. There are no reasons to believe that the tendency 
to provide such explanations in any way correlates with the authors’ intellectual 
competency. Regretfully, widespread tolerance toward borrowing in Russia 
greatly impedes the addressing of more notorious types of plagiarism because 
it renders the difference between borrowing some technical paragraphs and 
borrowing the whole text a matter of degree rather than a matter of principle.
Table 27.4 Percentage 
of borrowing in disserta-
tions defended at various 
Russian institutions
Organization Median percent 
plagiarized (%)
Top universitiesa 10.1
Russian Academy of Sciences 10.1
Other 15.9
ALL 14.4
aThis includes 21 participants in Project 5-100, as well as 
Moscow and Saint-Petersburg state universities, in effect, 23 
institutions in all.
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27.6  conclusIon
The aim of this chapter was to describe the tools and resources that are avail-
able to detect plagiarism, as well as to establish how academic plagiarism in 
Russia, detected by automatic means, can be interpreted from different per-
spectives. The most visible manifestation of this, and the one that is most hotly 
debated in the media, is the spread of large-scale plagiarism in dissertations by 
those in power, who believe that possessing an academic degree will advance 
their careers. Less commonly discussed, but no less interesting, is the range of 
interpretations of the authenticity norm that underlies the notion of plagia-
rism. Tolerance toward utilizing someone else’s text, which is evident in Russia, 
may be the sign of an impending global shift in academia, because it perfectly 
matches the Zeitgeist of digital post-modernity, or as Roland Barthes once 
observed: La mort de l’auteur, “the death of the author” (Barthes 1968).
notes
1. Russia has two higher academic degrees: kandidat nauk (Candidate of Science, 
roughly equal to a Ph.D.) and doktor nauk (Doctor of Science, roughly equal to 
doctor habilitatus in some European countries). Henceforth in this chapter, we 
distinguish doctoral (=PhD) and post-doctoral (=habilitation) dissertations 
respectively.
2. This section is adapted from  an  article by M.  Kopotev et  al.; see (Smirnov 
et al. 2017).
3. There is currently no software that detects mathematical formulas. The possibili-
ties for detecting “borrowed” graphs and figures are also rather limited, although 
the situation is rapidly changing (see, for example, Acuna et al. 2018; see also the 
survey by Eisa et al. 2015).
Table 27.5 Differences in publication and citation performance among authors dem-
onstrating the highest and the lowest amount of borrowing






Publications RISCa core, % 19.96 24.99 −5.03*
Citing from RISC core, % 17.79 24.29 −6.50**
Impact factor, published 0.37 0.45 −0.07*
Impact factor, cited 0.42 0.52 −0.10*
Articles in foreign 
publications, %
3.74 6.84 −3.10***
Citing from foreign 
publications, %
6.94 10.4 −3.45**
*Statistically significant values; their numbers reflect the degree of confidence from less (*) to most (***) 
significant
aThe Russian Index for Scientific Citing, RISC, includes a “core” of editions receiving the highest evaluations in 
a survey of Russian academics. It is also partially integrated with the Scopus and Web of Science databases, which 
enable the tracing of publications and citations from non-Russian-language editions.
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4. It is important to note that the verification does not extend to research papers.
5. The study reported in this section was conducted between March and November 
of 2018, at the Centre for Institutional Analysis of Science and Education in col-
laboration with the Centre for the Sociology of Education of the Russian 
Presidential academy. The authors would like to thank Katerina Guba, Alexandra 
Makeeva, Nadezhda Sokolova, and Anzhelika Tsivinskaya for their help in this 
project.
6. Antiplagiat produces some false positives. For example, it sometimes counts lists 
of referenced literature as borrowing, or it may not recognize alternative spellings 
of an author’s name. We checked more than 800 dissertations manually and for 
most disciplines found medians that were approximately five percent lower than 
in the case of automatic search. However, the manual check was rather conserva-
tive and probably underestimated the scale of the borrowing. The actual statistics 
are therefore somewhere in between these estimates. There were no significant 
differences between the relative propensity of disciplines to borrow as estimated 
by automatic and manual procedures, with one notable exception: automatic 
checks probably overestimate the borrowing in dissertations on law, most likely 
due to the highly formulaic forms of speech in this genre.
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CHAPTER 28




Automatic sentiment analysis of texts, that is, the identification of the author’s 
opinion about the subject discussed in the text, has been one of the most sig-
nificant tasks in natural language processing in the past two decades. The inter-
est in sentiment analysis is connected to the large volume of electronic texts 
available on social networks and online recommendation services that contain 
an abundance of individuals’ opinions on various issues: from products and 
services to the current political and economic situation (for more on corpora, 
see Chap. 17).
A large number of scholarly works is devoted to sentiment analysis of user 
reviews stored in recommendation services (Pang et al. 2002; Pang and Lee 
2008; Liu 2012). Another important area of sentiment analysis is the so-called 
reputation monitoring that tracks positive and negative feedback about a com-
pany and its products (Amigo et  al. 2012). Sentiment analysis of financial 
reports and financial news is used to determine trends in the stock and currency 
markets (Nassirtoussi et al. 2015). The sentiment of mentioning terms in sci-
entific articles is used to predict the most important concepts and scientific 
trends (McKeown et al. 2016). Sentiment information extracted from texts can 
be used to determine the personal characteristics of the author (Volkova 
et al. 2015).
The role of automatic sentiment analysis of social network messages for 
political and social research is growing. Such studies include the identification 
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of political preferences (Volkova et al. 2014), the prediction of election results 
(Vepsäläinen et al. 2017; Vilares et al. 2015), and the identification of attitudes 
toward various political decisions. Also, automatic sentiment analysis can be 
used to recognize hate speech and calls for violence or fake news (Volkova and 
Bell 2016).
The first approaches to sentiment analysis aimed to determine the overall 
sentiment of the document or its fragment (Pang et al. 2002). This level of 
analysis assumes that a document expresses a unanimous opinion about a single 
entity, such as in a review of a product. Since the document can express mul-
tiple attitudes in relation to the different entities it contains, at the next stage 
scholars studied the tasks of sentiment analysis aimed toward specified entities 
mentioned in the text (Amigo et al. 2012; Jiang et al. 2011; Loukachevitch 
et al. 2015; Loukachevitch and Rubtsova 2016). Finally, an even more detailed 
level of sentiment analysis is the analysis of opinions on specific properties or 
parts (the so-called aspects) of the entity (Liu and Zhang 2012; Pontiki et al. 
2016; Popescu and Etzioni 2007).
Liu and Zhang (2012, 4) define opinion as a five tuple (ei, aij, sijkl, hk, tl), 
where ei is the name of an entity to which the opinion relates, aij is an aspect 
(part or characteristic) of ei, sijkl is the sentiment regarding the entity and its 
aspect, hk is the author of the opinion (opinion holder), and tl is the time when 
the opinion is expressed by hk. The sentiment sijkl may be positive, negative, or 
neutral, or may be expressed with varying degrees of intensity that is measured, 
for example on a scale of 1–5.
In this chapter, we first describe the problems that can be encountered in 
automatic sentiment analysis. Then, we briefly consider the main methods to 
conduct sentiment analysis and approaches to creating sentiment vocabularies. 
Finally, Russian-specific components of automatic sentiment analysis are 
described, including publicly available vocabularies and sentiment-related 
shared tasks.
28.2  Problems In sentIment AnAlysIs
If we ask native speakers what the most significant problems in sentiment analy-
sis would be, the respondents often name irony and sarcasm. Certainly, the 
difficulties with these language phenomena really exist but problems of auto-
matic sentiment analysis are much more diverse. In what follows, six additional 
challenges of sentiment analysis are presented.
28.2.1  Multiple Opinions in a Single Text
Approaches to extracting the main components of opinion largely depend on 
the genre of the analyzed text. One of the most studied genres of text in the 
task of sentiment analysis are user reviews on products or services. Such texts 
usually consider a single entity (but, perhaps in its different aspects), and the 
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opinion is expressed by one author, namely the reviewer (Pang et  al. 2002; 
Pang and Lee 2008; Liu 2012).
Another popular type of texts for sentiment extraction is Twitter messages 
(Pak and Paroubek 2010; Rosenthal et al. 2017; Loukachevitch and Rubtsova 
2016). Tweets (Twitter posts) were limited to 140 symbols before 2017, when 
they were extended to 280 characters. Such short texts often require precise 
sentiment analysis but most of them mention the only opinion target and opin-
ion holder (for more on Twitter analysis, see Chap. 30). The following tweet 
shows an example of a negative attitude toward Russian phone company 
Megaphone, presented in sarcastic form, which requires the use of sophisti-
cated methods to reveal the correct attitude:
Megafon, spasibo tebe za zablokirovannye uvedomleniâ ot Rajffajzena [Megaphone, 
hank you for the blocked notifications from Raiffeisen]
It can seem that in longer texts the author’s opinion can be repeated several 
times in different ways, which would facilitate the analysis. However, long texts 
may include various entities and related sentiments (Choi et  al. 2016; 
Loukachevitch and Rusnachenko 2018) and they may mention opinions of dif-
ferent persons. If the task is to find an attitude toward the entities mentioned, 
then the problem of determining the scope of the sentiments arises. For exam-
ple, sentiment extraction is often carried out in relation to an entity mentioned 
in the same sentence. However, the author can refer to an entity using the 
means of reference, for example, pronouns. In addition, if the entire text is 
devoted to the discussion of one entity, then it can be explicitly mentioned far 
from the sentiment location (Ben-Ami et al. 2014).
In such document genres as news texts, or especially analytical texts, many 
opinions from different sources can be simultaneously mentioned. These texts 
contain opinions conveyed by different subjects, including the author(s)’ atti-
tudes, the positions of cited sources, and the relations of the mentioned entities 
to each other. Analytical texts usually contain a lot of named entities, and only 
a few of them are subjects or objects of a sentiment attitude (Loukachevitch 
and Rusnachenko 2018). It is clear that in texts with multiple subjects and/or 
objects of opinion, the complexity of high-quality automatic analysis of senti-
ment increases manifold.
28.2.2  Implicit vs. Explicit Sentiment
It is usually assumed that sentiment is expressed using specialized sentiment 
words (such as good, bad, awful), which is an explicit way of conveying atti-
tudes. However, sentiment can be expressed also implicitly with the so-called 
sentiment facts (Liu 2012; Loukachevitch and Levchik 2016; Tutubalina 2015) 
or words with connotations (Feng et al. 2013).
According to the definition provided by Liu (2012, 26), an implicit opinion 
is an objective statement, from which the sentiment follows, that is, an implicit 
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opinion that conveys a desirable or undesirable fact. In preparation of datasets 
for testing sentiment analysis systems, such sentiment facts can be specifically 
annotated (Loukachevitch et  al. 2015; Nozza et  al. 2017). For example, 
Russian restaurant reviews may include such sentences as: “Dolgo ždali” 
(Waited for a long time) or “Našli muhu v supe” (Found a fly in the soup), 
which, on the one hand, describe what happened (report real facts), but on the 
other hand convey sentiment.
Connotation is a feeling or idea that is suggested by a particular word, 
although it need not be a part of the word’s meaning. Connotations often 
convey positive or negative sentiment (Feng et al. 2013). The appearance of 
words with positive or negative connotations in a text correlates with the cor-
responding sentiment expressed in the text. For example, in movie reviews, 
names of famous actors usually have positive connotations. In restaurant 
reviews, the noun muha (fly) is associated with a negative sentiment in different 
contexts, for example:
No sil’no dulo ot okna, pri ètom letala nazojlivaâ muha i ne hvatalo oficiantov [But 
there was a strong draft from the window, while an annoying fly was flying around 
and there were not enough waiters].
Prišli v kafe na Ozernoj, oficiantku ele doždalis’ ležala muha mertvaâ na stole 
[Went to the cafe on Lake street, barely waited for the waitress, there was a dead 
fly on the table].
An interesting example of a word with specific connotations in Russian res-
taurant reviews is the word majonez (mayonnaise). Many sources indicate 
majonez as a key component of Soviet and Russian cuisine (Shearlaw 2014; 
Whalley 2018). However, when mentioned in contemporary Russian restau-
rant reviews, this word usually conveys negative sentiment, for example:
Absolûtno vse salaty soderžat majonez, pričem ego vezde mnogo [Absolutely all sal-
ads contain mayonnaise, and lots of it in everything].
Edinstvennye teplye rolly byli tâželovaty vvidu naličiâ v nih majoneza [The only 
hot rolls were heavy due to the presence of mayonnaise].
In news and analytical texts, we can find a lot of words with international 
negative connotations such as war, unemployment, segregation, or traffic jam. 
Positive connotations are often associated with achievements of a nation. For 
example, in Russia positive connotations are associated with cosmos-related 
concepts such as sputnik, Yuri Gagarin, or MKS (International Space Station).
Gradual adjectives (such as long − short, large − small, etc.) can often convey 
sentiment facts but their sentiment orientation is very dependent of the context 
(Cambria et al. 2010). For example, the word long can be both negative and 
positive in the digital camera domain: if it has a long battery life, it means the 
battery is good; if you need to adjust the focus for a long time, then the opin-
ion about the camera is negative.
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Because of the existence of implicit sentiments and connotations, it is impos-
sible to create general sentiment lexicons, which can be equally useful across 
many domains. It is, therefore, necessary to develop specialized sentiment lexi-
cons using domain-specific text collections or update existing general lexicons 
to adapt them to a specific domain. (Hamilton et  al. 2016; Severyn and 
Moschitti 2015; Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch 2012).
28.2.3  Ambiguity of Sentiment Words
Difficulties with the interpretation of explicit sentiment vocabulary may also 
arise. Sentiment words can be ambiguous: in one sense, they can be neutral, 
while in other senses they are negative or positive (Akkaya et  al. 2009; 
Baccianella et al. 2010). For example, the Russian word presnyj (fresh) bears a 
positive connotation in the phrase presnaâ voda (freshwater), while in other 
senses of the word presnyj (tasteless for food and uninteresting as in movie 
reviews) this word is negative.
A word can change or lose its polarity depending on the subject area or the 
current context. For example, the Russian sentiment words verolomstvo (treach-
ery) and predatel’stvo (betrayal) cannot be considered as conveying an opinion 
in movie reviews, because they are usually mentioned in a movie synopsis to 
retell the plot of a movie. The word smešnoj (funny), most likely, is negative in 
the sphere of politics, yet indicates a positive orientation when it is used in 
reviews of comedies. When characterizing other movie genres, this word can 
be both positive and negative.
28.2.4  Sentiment Modifiers
The appearance of sentiment words in the text may be accompanied by senti-
ment modifiers that enhance (for example, much, more), reduce (too, less) or 
inverse prior word sentiment (negation: no, not). Thus, when analyzing the 
sentiment, such modifiers should be taken into account, and it is necessary to 
have some numerical model that modifies the original polarities of the word 
(Taboada et al. 2011; Wilson et al. 2005; Wiegand et al. 2010). One of the 
common models of accounting for polarity modifiers ascribes some coefficients 
to them, which are considered as factors modifying the initial polarity of the 
words to which these modifiers relate.
Another important issue is determining the scope of the polarity modifier in 
a particular sentence (Taboada et  al. 2011). Most approaches suppose that 
polarity modifiers, such as negation, modify sentiment of neighbor words, but 
long-distance influence is also possible. For example, in the sentence “Â ne 
dumaû, cťo èto zasluživaet upominaniâ” (I do not think it is worth mention-
ing), the negation changes the sentiment orientation of the word zasluživaet 
(worth) from positive to negative.
If negation stands before several sentiment-bearing words, it is important to 
calculate the overall sentiment of the whole group and then to apply negation 
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to it. In the following sentence, we see the phrase “ne boitsâ raskola” (is not 
afraid of a split), where negation stands before two words with negative senti-
ment. To obtain the positive mood of the sentence, it is necessary to determine 
the sentiment of the phrase as negative and then to apply negation to it:
Sekretar’ prezidiuma gensoveta “Edinoj Rossii,” zampredsedatelâ Gosdumy Sergej 
Neverov v subbotu zaâvil, c ̌to partiâ ne boitsâ raskola v svâzi s poâvleniem v nej 
raznyh ideologic ̌eskih platform [Secretary of the Presidium of the General Council 
of “United Russia,” Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Sergei Neverov, on 
Saturday stated that the party is not afraid of a split in connection to the appear-
ance of various ideological platforms within it].
Polarity modifiers can also form groups such as double negation. We can see 
such double negation ne bez in well-known Russian proverb “V sem’ye ne bez 
uroda,” which translates into English without any negations: “Every family has 
its black sheep.” In this example, we see negative sentiment as if negation coef-
ficients were multiplied.
28.2.5  Factors of Irreal Context
When analyzing the sentiment, it is important to consider how a proposition 
conveying sentiment corresponds to reality (Saurí and Pustejovsky 2012; 
Taboada et al. 2011; Wilson et al. 2005). For example, in the sentence “My 
nadeâlis’, čto nam ponravitsâ kino” (We hoped that we would like the movie), 
one can see the positive word ponravitsâ (like), but it says nothing about 
whether the author really liked the movie.
In linguistics, this is covered by the concept of irreals or irreal mood, which 
is a group of grammatical means that is used to denote that what is said in a 
sentence does not refers to what really happens (Taboada et al. 2011). In every 
language, there are some factors showing that the proposition is not factual 
(the so-called irrealis markers). In Russian modal verbs, private-state verbs, 
such as nadeât’sâ (to hope), ožidat’ (to expect), dumat’ (to think), can be used 
as such markers.
According to Kuznetsova et al. (2013, 72), for the Russian language, such 
function words as esli, by, li, esli by also often mark the irrealis mood. When 
selecting parameters on the training set, Kuznetsova et al. (2013, 72) indicated 
that the prior sentiment scores of sentiment words found in the sentences with 
irrealis markers should be decreased (but not nullified).
28.2.6  Comparisons
Comparisons complicate the process of determining sentiment, because addi-
tional entities are mentioned in the text, and some sentiments can refer to 
them. It is often supposed that comparisons are conveyed with the so-called 
comparative constructions such as lučše čem (better than) or dorože čem (more 
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expensive than). In most cases, comparisons may be introduced without any 
specialized constructions. Additional entities mentioned for comparison are 
sometimes very difficult to detect, and it can also be a complex task to single 
out the attitudes related to them. For example, in the following extract from a 
restaurant review, the comparison is marked with word drugoy (another), and 
positive words naslaždalis’ (enjoyed) and volšebnym (wonderful) characterize a 
restaurant distinct from the restaurant under review (example from 
Loukachevitch et al. 2015, 8):
My rešili ne brat’ zdes’ desert i kofe, a pošli v drugoj restoran, gde naslaždalis’ 
volšebnym zaveršeniem našego vec ̌era (We decided not to have dessert and coffee 
there, but instead went to another restaurant where we enjoyed a wonderful end 
to our evening).
28.2.7  Irony and Sarcasm
The processing of irony and sarcasm is a serious problem for sentiment analysis 
systems, since the sentiment of an ironic (sarcastic) utterance differs from its 
literal sentiment (Wilson and Sperber 2007). In Benamara et al. (2017, 37), a 
generalized understanding of irony is proposed as “an incongruity between the 
literal meaning of an utterance and its intended meaning.” Most often, a 
positive- looking statement (containing more positive sentiment words or an 
equal number of positive and negative words) hides a negative opinion, for 
example, “Sberbank—naibolee krupnaâ set’ nerabotaûsîh bankomatov v Rossii” 
(Sberbank is the largest network of nonoperating ATMs in Russia). Sarcasm is 
regarded as a sharper, more aggressive, possibly degrading form of irony 
(Benamara et al. 2017).
The annotation of textual data for the study of irony and sarcasm is a com-
plex task. Interesting data for analyzing these phenomena are Twitter messages 
that the user can mark with special hashtags: #irony, #sarcasm and some others 
(Reyes et  al. 2013; Sulis et  al. 2016). However, recent studies of irony in 
Twitter show that ironic tweets marked with hashtags and annotated by experts 
have different characteristics (Kunneman et  al. 2015). In addition, in the 
Russian segment of Twitter, users do not use similar Russian hashtags in the 
same way as American or European audience (Zefirova and Loukachevitch 
2019, 48). The “ironiâ” (irony) hashtag is mostly used as a description for 
images or jokes alongside with such hashtags as “#šutka” (joke), “#smeh” 
(laugh) and does not seems to express the desired content.
28.3  methods And resources used 
In sentIment AnAlysIs
Automatic analysis of sentiment can utilize two main types of approaches (Liu 
2012; Pang and Lee 2008): knowledge-based methods using sentiment lexi-
cons and rules (Taboada et al. 2011; Kuznetsova et al. 2013) and approaches 
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based on machine learning (Liu 2012; Pang and Lee 2008). Knowledge-based 
methods require the creation of a specialized sentiment lexicon for a specific 
domain. Linguistic rules are necessary to sum up sentiment scores of several 
sentiment words and for accounting for the word context (sentiment modifi-
ers, irreal context, etc.).
Supervised machine learning requires preliminary annotation of a training 
collection. Depending on the task, different classification algorithms, features 
of the text representation, and feature weights can be chosen (Pang et al. 2002; 
Pang and Lee 2008; Liu 2012). Currently, the best results in machine-learning 
sentiment analysis are achieved by deep learning with neural networks 
(Rosenthal et al. 2017; Cliché 2017; Arkhipenko et al. 2016), which substi-
tuted a previous leader: Support vector machine (SVM) classifier (Pang et al. 
2002; Pang and Lee 2008; Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch 2013).
At present, there exist also approaches that integrate available sentiment 
vocabularies (both manually created and automatically generated) into machine 
learning methods, transforming them into specialized features (Rosenthal et al. 
2017; Mohammad et al. 2013; Loukachevitch and Levchik 2016). The use of 
preliminary created lexicons helps to overcome data sparsity of training collec-
tions (Loukachevitch and Rubtsova 2016). Below, we consider some approaches 
to creating sentiment lexicons and publicly available Russian lexicons.
Most sentiment vocabularies look like lists of words and expressions with 
scores of their sentiment (Wilson et al. 2005). Some vocabularies also provide 
additional characteristics of the word sentiment called “strength.” Sentiment 
scores can also be assigned to specific senses of ambiguous words (Baccianella 
et al. 2010; Loukachevitch and Levchik 2016).
For many languages, general sentiment vocabularies have been published. 
Despite the fact that in each particular domain, specialized vocabularies are 
needed, general lexicons are also useful since they can serve as source material, 
which can then be adapted to a domain. Domain-specific sentiment vocabular-
ies are usually generated with automatic or semiautomatic methods using 
domain-specific text collections (Hamilton et al. 2016; Severyn and Moschitti 
2015; Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch 2012).
For Russian, Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch (2012) have described an 
automatically generated Russian sentiment lexicon in the domain of products 
and services called ProductSentiRus (ProductSentiRus 2012). The 
ProductSentiRus lexicon is obtained by applying a supervised machine- learning 
model to several domain review collections. It is presented as a list of 5000 
words ordered by the decreased probability of their sentiment orientation 
without any positive or negative labels. For example, the most probable senti-
ment words in ProductSentiRus are as follows: bespodobnyj (peerless), nevnât-
nyj (slurred), obaldennyj (awesome), otvratnyj (disgusting), et cetera.
The general Russian lexicon of sentiment words and expressions, RuSentiLex 
(RuSentiLex 2017), was created in a semiautomatic way (Loukachevitch and 
Levchik 2016). The entries of the RuSentiLex lexicon are classified according 
to four sentiment categories (positive, negative, neutral, or positive/negative) 
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and three sources of sentiment (opinion, emotion, or fact). The words in the 
lexicon that have different sentiment scores in different senses are linked to the 
appropriate concepts of the thesaurus of the Russian-language RuThes 
(Loukachevitch and Dobrov 2014; RuThes 2016), which can help disambigu-
ate sentiment ambiguity in specific domains or contexts. The lexicon was gath-
ered from several sources: opinionated words from general Russian thesaurus 
RuThes, slang and curse words extracted from Twitter, and objective words 
with positive or negative connotations from a news collection (Loukachevitch 
and Levchik 2016; for more on RuThes, see Chap. 18). For example, the 
description of word presnyj in RuSentiLex is as follows (labels in quotes corre-
spond to the names of RuThes concepts):
• presnyj, Adj, presnyj, negative, emotion, “NEVKUSNYJ” [tasteless];
• presnyj, Adj, presnyj, negative, opinion, “NEINTERESNYJ” [insipid];
• presnyj, Adj, presnyj, positive, fact, “PRESNAÂ VODA” [fresh water]
The Russian sentiment lexicon LINIS Crowd was created via crowdsourcing 
(Koltsova et  al. 2016; LINIS Crowd SENT 2016). The lexicon is aimed at 
detecting sentiment in user-generated content (blogs, social media) related to 
social and political issues. Each word was assessed by at least three volunteers 
in the context of different texts. The words were scored from −2 (negative) to 
+2 (positive). For example, the word anarhizm (anarchism) obtained three 0 
(neutral) scores and three −1 (weakly negative) scores in the considered 
contexts.
Several international lexicons were automatically constructed for Russian. 
The Chen-Skiena’s lexicon (2876 words) (Chen and Skiena 2014; Chen- 
Skiena’s Lexicon 2014) was generated for 136 languages via graph propaga-
tion from seed words. However, from the human point of view, the words 
included in this automatically generated lexicon seem extremely strange. For 
example, positive words in the Chen-Skiena’s Lexicon include such words as 
tipa (type of), post (post), sootvetstvenno (correspondingly), sovsem (at all), 
et cetera.
Mohammad and Turney (2013) generated the Russian variant of the 
EmoLex lexicon (EmoLex 2017) with automatic translation from the English 
lexicon obtained by crowdsourcing (4412 Russian words).
Kotelnikov et al. (2018) studied available Russian sentiment lexicons and 
found that all the lexicons have relatively small intersection with each other. 
Besides, the translated lexicons (EmoLex and Chen-Skiena’s lexicon) have a 
smaller intersection with other lexicons than on average (10.0%), and at the 
same time are relatively similar to each other (18.2%). Kotelnikov et al. (2018) 
also compared available Russian lexicons as features in machine-learning text 
categorization. Users’ reviews from five domains (books, movies, banks, hotels, 
and kitchens) were used as text collections for the experiments. The study 
found that the best results of classification using a single lexicon in all domains 
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were obtained with ProductSentiRus (Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch 2012). 
The union of all lexicons gives slightly better results.
As was mentioned, useful sentiment lexicons should be fine-tuned or con-
structed specially for the domain under analysis. Therefore, to apply sentiment 
lexicons in a specific domain, it is recommended to gather all available lexicons 
and to collect a domain-specific text collection as large as possible. Having such 
data, it is possible to filter out sentiment words and constructions relevant in 
the domain.
28.4  russIAn sentIment-relAted shAred tAsks
For the evaluation of Russian sentiment analysis systems, several shared tasks 
have been organized. In 2011–2013, two evaluations of document-level senti-
ment approaches were carried out. Two types of text collections were used for 
the evaluation: users’ reviews in three domains (movies, books, and digital 
cameras) and news quotations (Chetviorkin and Loukachevitch 2013).
For training in the review track, users’ reviews were collected from recom-
mendation services (Imhonet and Yandex.market). The reviews had users’ 
scores on a ten-point scale for the Imhonet reviews (movies and books) and on 
a five-point scale for the Yandex reviews (digital cameras). The participants 
could choose any of tracks classifying reviews into two, three, or five classes. 
The reviews for the test collections were extracted from social network mes-
sages. The sentiment annotation was created manually by human experts. The 
participants utilized various machine-learning and knowledge-based 
approaches, but the best methods in all review-related tasks were SVM-based 
classifiers.
In the quotation track, direct or indirect speech fragments extracted from 
news reports had to be classified into three classes (positive, negative, or neu-
tral). About 5000 fragments each were prepared for the training and test col-
lection. Both collections were annotated manually; therefore, the size of the 
training collection was much smaller than for the review task. In this quotation 
task, the knowledge-based approaches showed the best results (Chetviorkin 
and Loukachevitch 2013).
The second series of Russian sentiment analysis evaluations (SentiRuEval 
2014–2016) was devoted to the entity-oriented and aspect-based tasks of sen-
timent analysis. Namely, the tasks included aspect-based analysis of reviews in 
two domains (car and restaurant reviews). Using the prepared collections, 
Russian training and test datasets were further utilized in the international 
SemEval aspect-based sentiment evaluation in 2016 (Pontiki et al. 2016; ABSA 
SemEval-2006 2016).
The entity-oriented task was based on Twitter messages. The participants 
were asked to classify messages into three classes from the point of view of 
reputation monitoring (positive, negative, or neutral) in two separate domains: 
banks and mobile operators. For example, positive tweets could contain a 
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positive opinion or positive fact about the company. The training and test col-
lections were prepared via crowdsourcing (SentiRuEval-2016 data 2016).
The approaches of the participants for the Twitter sentiment analysis dif-
fered significantly in 2015 and 2016 (Loukachevitch and Rubtsova 2016). In 
2015, the basic approach was the SVM classifier trained on only the training 
collection without any additional data (unlabeled text collections or sentiment 
lexicons). Due to this, the participating systems could make mistakes in the 
classification of the test tweets if a tweet contained sentiment words absent in 
the training dataset (Loukachevitch and Rubtsova 2016).
In 2016, the best approach was based on neural networks, which used word 
embeddings (vector representations of words) calculated on a large collection 
of user comments (Arkhipenko et al. 2016). Such representations allowed the 
winner to overcome the differences in the training and test collections because 
words that have semantic similarity also have similar vector representations. 
The next most successful approaches in terms of the quality of results com-
bined machine learning and the existing Russian lexicons (Loukachevitch and 
Rubtsova 2016).
28.5  conclusIon
Automatic sentiment analysis of texts is among the popular applications in nat-
ural language processing of texts. In this chapter, we described the problems 
that can be encountered in automatic sentiment analysis. Then, we briefly con-
sidered the main methods for sentiment analysis and approaches to creating 
sentiment vocabularies. Finally, Russian-specific components of automatic sen-
timent analysis—publicly available vocabularies and sentiment-related shared 
tasks—were presented.
The current state of affairs in sentiment analysis (including in its application 
to the Russian language) can be characterized as follows: approaches to senti-
ment analysis of some text genres, such as user reviews or short posts on social 
networking sites, are well studied, but there are a lot of complicated phenom-
ena in sentiment analysis that require further research, especially in the process-
ing of full-text news and analytical articles.
From the practical point of view, there are at least four Russian sentiment 
vocabularies currently available on the Internet. To apply sentiment lexicons in 
a specific domain, it is recommended to gather all available lexicons and to col-
lect a domain-specific text collection as large as possible. Having such data, it is 
possible to filter out sentiment words and constructions that are relevant in 
the domain.
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CHAPTER 29




Network analysis has come to be an essential method in the Digital Humanities. 
A network can be described, in brief, as “a collection of points joined together 
in pairs by lines.” Terminologically, “a point is referred to as a node or vertex 
and a line is referred to as an edge” (Newman 2018, 1). If you can meaning-
fully describe a dataset with such nodes and edges, it is network data you deal 
with. Nodes can be entities like airports, cities, or devices connected to the 
Internet, linked to each other (or not) via edges. In the case of social networks, 
nodes represent people or, more generally, social entities, which easily extends 
to fictional characters. The edges between them describe their relations. While 
these relations can be of many types, literary network analysis at this stage is 
usually looking into communicative relations: Who is talking to whom and to 
what extent? This formal approach usually neglects the content of these inter-
actions but can reveal larger structural patterns that would otherwise stay invis-
ible as we will see in the use cases presented below. Network analysis is meant 
to complement other quantitative and qualitative approaches when it comes to 
interpreting literary texts.
Once we established a set of network data, the broad range of algorithms 
and methods developed within network theory becomes available to make the 
material “speak” in different ways. The visualization of network data often 
comes first but is usually only the starting point of a more precise analysis, 
because the underlying data can be interpreted more meaningfully by help of 
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literally hundreds of different algorithms. The nature of questions around net-
work data can roughly be divided into graph- and node-related questions. The 
former allow for an analysis of the structural evolution of texts, while the latter 
allow for new ways of categorizing character types.
This chapter is structured as follows. A short look into the origins of (social) 
network analysis in general and literary network analysis in particular will be 
followed by a methodology section which will explain how to extract and for-
malize network data before introducing basic graph- and node-related mea-
sures. We then present exemplary use cases for literary network analysis, for 
both drama and novels.
The data for the subsection on drama originates from the Russian Drama 
Corpus (RusDraCor, see https://dracor.org/rus), a Text Encoding Initiative 
(TEI)-encoded collection of Russian drama from 1747 to the 1940s (Skorinkin 
et al. 2018). In the words of the Text Encoding Initiative, TEI is “a standard 
for the representation of texts in digital form” (http://tei-c.org). It is usually 
“expressed using a very widely-used formal encoding language called XML” 
(Burnard 2014). The data for the subsection on the novel consists in an anno-
tated version of Tolstoy’s War and Peace (for more on other corpora, see 
Chap. 17).
29.2  the orIgIns of socIal network analysIs
When talking about methods and tools, it is always insightful to look at their 
historicity, that is, the circumstances which led to their invention. In the case of 
graph theory, we have to go back to the year 1736 and Swiss mathematician 
Leonhard Euler. He was confronted with the seven bridges of the back then 
Prussian city of Königsberg and a question: Is it possible to cross all seven 
bridges reaching across river Pregel one after another without crossing a bridge 
twice? By finding an abstraction of the problem, Euler was able to proof that 
this, in fact, is impossible. He understood the four involved landmasses as 
nodes and the bridges as edges (see Fig. 29.1). The number of bridges and 
their endpoints were key for the solution of the problem: all four landmasses 
Fig. 29.1 The seven 
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are reached by an odd number of bridges, but for it to work there should be a 
maximum of two landmasses (nodes) with an odd number of bridges (edges); 
these two landmasses could then serve as starting and end point, whereas the 
other two would have to feature an even number of bridges leading to them.
From this historical anecdote, we only take with us the idea of abstracting 
interconnected entities as graphs and jump two centuries ahead on the time-
line, to April 3, 1933. On that very day, an article appeared in The New York 
Times reporting about a new method called “psychological geography” (later 
renamed to “sociometry”), which was developed by psychosociologist Jacob 
Levy Moreno. This method promised to visualize attraction and repulsion 
between individuals within communities showing “the strange human currents 
that flow in all directions from each individual in the group toward other indi-
viduals” (McCulloh et al. 2013). Moreno was one of the first to use network 
visualizations to describe social phenomena.
Another jump on the timeline and we are in the 1960s at Harvard, where 
scholars such as Harrison White achieved the so-called “Harvard Breakthrough,” 
which through methodological innovations “firmly established social network 
analysis as a method of structural analysis” (Scott 2000, 33). Looking at these 
developments, Linton Freeman lists “four defining properties” of social net-
work analysis:
 1. It involves the intuition that links among social actors are important.
 2. It is based on the collection and analysis of data that record social rela-
tions that link actors.
 3. It draws heavily on graphic imagery to reveal and display the patterning 
of those links.
 4. It develops mathematical and computational models to describe and 
explain those patterns (Freeman 2011, 26).
We will find all these properties in literary network analysis, too. So, when 
did the literary studies start to become interested in network analysis? At first, 
this was not driven by inherent research questions, but by the mere fact that 
literature is an entertaining use case for social network analysis. Computer sci-
entist Donald Knuth, author of The Art of Computer Programming and creator 
of the TeX typesetting system, needed example data for the Stanford GraphBase, 
a program and dataset collection for the generation and manipulation of graphs 
and networks (Knuth 1993). The list of datasets featured character interactions 
in the chapters of Anna Karenina, David Copperfield, and Les Misérables 
(https://people.sc.fsu.edu/~jburkardt/datasets/sgb/sgb.html)
The files for these three novels contain data on the co-occurrence of literary 
characters per chapter, which makes for genuine network data. Interestingly, 
anyone who has ever opened an example file in the number-one network analy-
sis tool in the Humanities, Gephi, will have seen the very network graph of Les 
Misérables, because it is very prominently provided as a Gephi example file 
(Bastian et al. 2009).
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After some more individual approaches to the network analysis of novels 
(Schweizer and Schnegg 1998 on the post-1989 novel Simple Stories by East- 
German author Ingo Schulze), the network analysis of dramatic texts started 
out with Shakespeare (Stiller et al. 2003; Stiller and Hudson 2005). Yet these 
first incentives did not come from literary scholars, and it took some more years 
until that eventually happened with the studies of Franco Moretti in 2011 and 
Peer Trilcke in 2013.
These two papers were the starting signal for a broad application of the net-
work paradigm in digital literary studies, leading to several dozen papers in this 
field within the following five years. The main focus was on dramatic texts, as 
under normal circumstances they are easier to segment than novels, given their 
clear division into acts, scenes, and speech acts. While earlier works revolved 
around the network analysis of just a few individual texts, now hundreds or 
thousands of texts were examined, following the “Distant Reading” paradigm, 
which sets out to complement the close reading of texts. In the practice of 
Distant Reading, digital methods are used to analyze a number of texts that can 
be orders of magnitude larger than what an individual can read.
One result of this development was the “Distant-Reading Showcase” 
(Fischer et  al. 2016), which put 465 German-language plays on a poster in 
chronological order, visually illustrating the structural transformation of 
German drama between 1730 and 1930. Using the same method, we can plot 
the extracted social networks of the 144 plays contained in the Russian Drama 
Corpus to date (Fig. 29.2). This unusual view from the digital stratosphere can 
reveal macrostructures: what is visible from such a distance are general shifts 
from simple network structures to more complex ones throughout the two 
centuries between Sumarokov’s tragedy “Horev” (1747) and Mayakovsky’s 
and Bulgakov’s plays of the 1920s and 1930s.
29.3  Methodology
29.3.1  Formalizing Literary Network Data: The “Digital Spectator”
In order to extract network data from fictional texts, we have to define a con-
sistent way to formalize character interaction. A relation between two charac-
ters as we define it is established if both characters are performing a speech act 
in a given segment of a play, usually a scene. Following this definition, if char-
acter A and character B are speaking in the same scene, they are linked to 
each other.
This formalization is inspired by Romanian mathematician Solomon Marcus 
who in his book Mathematical Poetics (1973) suggested a formalization of a 
theater play undertaken by an “unusual spectator,” one who is only capable to 
observe the entrances and exits of the actors and monitor their co-occurrences 
on stage without listening to what they say. In the digital age, it is very simple 
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to operationalize such formalization on a large scale, which is why we could 
rename the concept and call this method “the digital spectator.” Put in action, 
the digital spectator extracts the co-occurrences of speaking characters. Let us 
take Ostrovsky’s play “Groza” (“The Storm,” 1859) as an example, one of the 
pivotal Russian plays of the nineteenth century, which caused a scandal with its 
clear implication of adultery. The number of co-occurrences between charac-
ters looks as shown in Table 29.1.
This (abbreviated) table simply collects the number of co-occurrences 
between all characters of the play (in the “Weight” column). The table headers 
Fig. 29.2 Extracted social networks of 20 Russian plays. Excerpt (left-upper corner) 
from a larger poster displaying 144 plays in chronological order (1747–1940s). Version 
in full resolution: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12058179
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“Source” and “Target” are interchangeable in our example since we are not 
collecting the direction of information flows.
This is already everything we need for a network analysis of “Groza.” A 
visualization of this simple formalization is shown in Fig. 29.3. It comprises all 
characters of the play (including side characters of acts 4 and 5 lacking proper 
names), and we can clearly see the core of the network, the Kabanov family 
with mother (Kabanova) and daughter (Varvara), son (Kabanov) plus wife 
(Katerina). Without involving one line of the actual text, we arguably found 
the protagonists of the play just by looking at their position in the network. It 
is important to note that the “epistemic thing” of our analysis is different than 
that of traditional textual analyses of literary texts (Trilcke and Fischer 2018). 
We are not analyzing the actual text of the play, but a strict formalization of it. 
There, it cannot hurt to stress once more that a formal approach like network 
analysis does not set out to replace more traditional approaches, but to comple-
ment them.
Fig. 29.3 Network graph for Ostrovsky’s Groza
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Since the formalization step is so crucial, we developed an easy-entry tool to 
acquaint literary scholars with the problem and enable them to extract literary 
network data by hand. The tool Easy Linavis (ezlinavis)—an abbreviation for 
“Easy Literary Network Visualisation”—is available at https://ezlinavis.dra-

















As its output, ezlinavis generates a CSV file which can be downloaded and 
opened in a network analysis tool like the aforementioned Gephi.
Our take on formalizing character interaction has some advantages (it can 
be easily automatized and, thus, scaled up), but also some shortcomings. It is 
important to not forget the rationale behind a formalization and to be consis-
tent after a formalization method has been established. Following our opera-
tionalization, characters that do not speak are invisible to our “digital spectator.” 
For example, the blind old man playing the violin in the first scene of Pushkin’s 
“Mozart and Salieri” (1831) does not raise his voice, so he doesn’t appear in 
our formalization (in an admittedly not very interesting network with only two 
characters, i.e., Mozart and Salieri). While we might lose some information and 
dimensions of the literary piece, we accept this limitation in order to gain 
something, namely scale. By being able to automatize the extraction of charac-
ter relations, we can look at a larger number of texts and distill patterns that 
would otherwise remain invisible.
Since we already introduced Gephi as one of the most popular tools for 
analysis, we should take the opportunity to mention alternative software. Other 
Graphical User Interface (GUI)-driven programs like Pajek, Cytoscape, and 
NodeXL are complemented by the two programming libraries NetworkX and 
igraph, which are usually used from within higher programming languages 
such as Python or R. These libraries have in common that most of the estab-
lished network algorithms are already implemented and well documented so 
that they can directly be put to use.
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29.3.2  Graph-Related Measures
From the abundance of graph-related measures that can be used to describe 
the properties of a network, we want to introduce six basic ones:
• Network size: The number of nodes of a network; in our case, the number 
of (speaking) characters in a play.
• Network diameter: The highest value among all shortest distances between 
two nodes. For example, the shortest distance between two directly con-
nected nodes is 1. If node A is connected to nodes B and C, but B and C 
are not directly connected, then the shortest distance between them 
(through node A) is 2, and so forth.
• Network density: A value between 0 and 1 indicating the ratio between all 
realized to all possible connections. In average, comedies are denser than 
tragedies (one reason for this is that, at the end of comedies, the majority 
of the cast often appears on stage to witness the resolution of the comic 
conflict, thereby establishing relationships between characters that are 
reflected in a higher network density).
• Clustering coefficient: Another value between 0 and 1, measuring the 
number of transitive relations: if node A is related to node B and B is 
related to node C, then A is also related to C. The value is determined by 
the number of such closed triplets over the total number of triplets.
• Average path length: For each pair of nodes in a connected network, there 
is a shortest path length. The average path length is thus the average of all 
shortest path lengths.
• Maximum degree: The degree is the number of relations of a node to 
other nodes. The maximum degree shows the character with the most 
relations (i.e., the plurality of interactions), thus playing a central role in 
the play.
29.3.3  Node-Related Measures
Graph-related measures are complemented by node-related ones, which allow 
us to zoom in on single networks and talk about individual nodes. There are 
literally hundreds of node-related measures, among which are these three 
basic ones:
• Degree: Like stated above, the degree is the number of relations of a node 
to other nodes.
• PageRank: A recursive algorithm, different from degree insofar that it 
counts not only the number of relations to other nodes, but also depends 
on the PageRank of these other nodes. According to PageRank, the 
importance of a node depends on the importance of other nodes link-
ing to it.
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• Betweenness centrality: A measure of centrality in a graph based on short-
est paths. The betweenness centrality of a node does not value the mere 
number of direct connections to other nodes, but the number of shortest 
paths between other nodes leading through that node.
Now that we have introduced some basic terminology and measures, let us 
look at the network properties of some literary works.
29.4  use cases
29.4.1  Drama
Graph-related values for five selected plays from our Russian Drama Corpus 
look as shown in Table 29.2.
Just by looking at the network metrics, it becomes apparent how much the 
two plays by Sumarokov and Pushkin differ structurally, although they are basi-
cally revolving around the same storyline (the story of False Dimitrij during the 
Time of Troubles around 1600). A diameter of 6 and a network size of 79 
shows how Pushkin stretches the plot in a very Shakespearean manner. This 
strong influence is confirmed by a letter that Pushkin wrote (in French) to his 
friend Raevsky, dating from July, 1825, around the time he finished “Boris 
Godunov” (spelling follows the original):
mais quel homme que ce Schakespeare! je n’en reviens pas. … Voyez Schakespeare. 
Lisez Schakespeare (now what a man is this Shakespeare! I can’t believe it … 
Look at Shakespeare. Read Shakespeare). Pushkin (1962, 178)


















6 2 0.73 0.77 1.27 5 (Dimitrij)
Pushkin: Boris 
Godunov (1825)
79 6 0.11 0.89 3.03 29 (Boris)
Griboedov: Gore ot 
uma (Woe from Wit, 
1825)




31 3 0.49 0.82 1.52 26 (Gorodnichij)
Ostrovsky: Groza 
(The Storm, 1859)
29 4 0.28 0.83 1.93 23 (Kabanova)
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The revolutionary change that Pushkin brought to Russian drama can be 
shown when put into context. Figure 29.4 shows the network sizes of 144 
Russian plays in chronological order. Until 1825, the network size of plays 
stays well below 25, but with Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov,” the network size 
suddenly explodes: 79 speaking entities are counted, and the diagram also 
shows that after Pushkin there is a broader variety of different network sizes, a 
changed landscape of how character networks are crafted in Russian drama 
after Pushkin’s initial ignition.
Without trying to overinterpret these very basic metrics, it is interesting to 
note that Pushkin’s play exhibits the lowest density of all plays present in the 
table above, but at the same time shows the highest clustering coefficient. A 
comparatively high clustering coefficient in a larger network with several distin-
guishable communities means that the individual nodes of these communities 
are tightly connected among each other, a property known from real-world 
networks, which also applies to “Boris Godunov” (cf. Fig. 29.5 below). Such 
real-life social networks have been called “small worlds,” building on the idea 
that every citizen of the world knows every other citizen over only six edges.
After looking at entire networks, let us throw a glance at node-related values 
and how we can use them to study literary characters. Distance and centrality 
measures can be used to describe and interpret the position of a node in the 
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Fig. 29.4 Network sizes of 144 Russian plays in chronological order, x-axis: (normal-
ized) year of publication, y-axis: number of speaking entities per play. Arrow indicates 
Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov.” Russian Drama Corpus (https://dracor.org/rus)
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detecting the protagonist of a play. The character minimizing the distance to all 
other characters should be a candidate, Moretti argues in his above-mentioned 
paper. In his formalization of “Hamlet,” Hamlet has an average distance (from 
all other characters) of 1.45, while the average distance of Claudius is 1.62 and 
that of Horatio 1.69. Recent research has shown that it is not very fruitful to 
suggest such simple measures for very complex concepts such as “protagonist.” 
Instead, multidimensional approaches to describe character types have been 
proposed since (Algee-Hewitt 2017; Fischer et al. 2018).
Truth be told, literary networks are usually small compared to real-life social 
networks. Analyzing a single network of two nodes (like in the “Mozart and 
Salieri” example mentioned above), or even five or ten nodes, is close to being 
pointless. However, analyzing bigger plays can be insightful, which we demon-
strate once more with Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov.” This example also serves as 
demonstration as to how to combine a visual and a numeric analysis. To address 
the former, let us look at a Gephi visualization of Pushkin’s play (Fig. 29.5).
We easily recognize two larger clusters on the left and right side: the forces 
assembled by False Dimitrij to the left, and the broader Muscovite community 
around the tsar, Boris Godunov, to the right. Visualizations like this make use 
of the so-called spring-embedding algorithms which try to assemble nodes and 
edges in a way that makes it easy to identify larger structures (in our case, we 
used “Force Atlas 2,” which comes built-in with Gephi). Next to the two major 
opposing parties, our attention is drawn to the one and only character that 
Fig. 29.5 Network visualization of A.  Pushkin’s Boris Godunov. Russian Drama 
Corpus (https://dracor.org/rus)
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connects the two larger clusters, Gavrila Puškin. While his degree is quite low, 
he occupies a strategically important position. He, in fact, acts as a messenger 
and mediator. He is sent from Poland to Moscow to convey to Boris the terms 
of False Dimitrij and later convinces Boris’s military chief Basmanov to change 
sides, which eventually helps Dimitrij win the throne. Gavrila Puškin, as a fol-
lower of Dimitrij, also announces the decrees of the new tsar to the People 
(“Narod”), thus becoming the only character connecting all larger clusters of 
the network.
A visual interpretation of this play may be fruitful already, but pinning inter-
pretations on actual numbers adds more precision, so let us come back to the 
node-related metrics. We chose five characters of the play and listed some 
network- analytical values in the table below, contrasted by the number of 
words uttered by these characters (Table 29.3).
A network-based interpretation would first ascertain that Boris has connec-
tions to more characters than his opponent Grigorij. At second glance, his 
position is weaker, since Grigorij is connected to more nodes completely 
dependent on him, strengthening his position for the eventual usurpation. And 
last but not least, Gavrila Puškin. Like seen above, he does not excel in the 
mere number of connections, but he is the bottleneck through which the 
important information has to pass, yielding in a very high value for between-
ness centrality. We can assume that the crucial role of a side character like 
Gavrila Puškin is not accidental. The idea that Pushkin’s noble ancestors played 
an active part in Russian history can be pursued up to poems like “Moâ rodo-
slovnaâ” (1830).
The fact that some of the above metrics contradict each other again strength-
ens the importance of a multidimensional approach when it comes to the quan-
titative analysis of characters and character types in literary texts.
29.4.2  Novels
The social network analysis of novels has developed a tad slower. Unlike in the 
case of drama, there are usually no speaker names in front of a speech act, 
which is why the automated extraction of communication networks is far more 
Table 29.3 Selected network metrics for five characters in A. Pushkin’s Boris Godunov
Character Number of spoken words (without stage 
directions)
Degree PageRank Betweenness 
centrality
Boris 1660 29 0.038 405
Grigorij 1967 26 0.044 1501
Basmanov 303 15 0.020 629
Šujskij 770 13 0.021 197
Gavrila 
Puškin
424 12 0.018 1482
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complicated here. The simpler approaches rely on named-entity recognition to 
extract character names before choosing a text window to relate characters to 
each other. This can happen on sentence, paragraph or chapter level and yields 
very different results, depending on the method chosen. Since characters are 
often mentioned indirectly via pronouns or other referring expressions, a lot of 
work has to go into coreference resolution. But despite the more difficult task, 
the network analysis of novels has yielded first promising results (Grayson et al. 
2016; Jannidis 2017).
We made our own little foray into the network analysis of novels—with Leo 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace. With help of named-entity recognition tools and a 
pinch of manual markup, we identified character mentions throughout the 
novel. Though by no means comprehensive, our markup contains 25,600 
unambiguously identified appearances of individual characters across the text 
of War and Peace. We used the markup to automatically extract the social net-
work of the novel. Each time two characters were mentioned within one sen-
tence, they were assumed to be interacting in some way. Figure 29.6 contains 
the visualization of the resulting network of 119 nodes.
Let us turn to numbers and compare character centralities using the multi-
dimensional approach described above. The table below ranks the most central 
characters according to three different centrality measures (Table 29.4).
Overall, Pierre seems to be the most central character—hardly a surprise to 
anyone familiar with the novel. Differences between centrality measures are 
also telling. Betweenness centrality obviously assigns more importance to the 
historical/military characters. If we examine the military subnetwork of 
Tolstoy’s novel, we can see that it is less dense—and more hierarchical. Political 
and military figures in the novel do not have as much interaction as the main 
nonhistorical characters of War and Peace, who are constantly thrown into all 
sorts of social groups and circumstances. But when Kutuzov or Napoleon or 
Aleksandr I do get involved, they mostly interact with their inferiors (marshals, 
generals), who in turn convey the message down the command chain. Some 
actual examples from the novel include the scene in which Kutuzov, Russian 
commander-in-chief, talks to a regimental commander (interaction), who in 
turn talks extensively to his subordinate battalion commander (interaction). 
Yet, there is no direct conversation between Kutuzov and the battalion com-
mander. The reader hardly ever notices this fact, but the structure of the net-
work seems to highlight this setting-dependent difference in communication 
patterns.
Whether Tolstoy, himself a retired artillery officer with war experience, pur-
posefully attempted to create an opposition of “War interaction” versus “Peace 
interaction” in his novel, remains an open question. But the difference in the 
social network structure in War and Peace clearly correlates with the settings. 
To show this, we produced separate networks for each of the 15 books (parts 
of volumes in the canonical Russian four-volume edition) and the epilogue of 
War and Peace. Figures 29.7, 29.8, and 29.9 present three sample networks for 
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Fig. 29.6 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace
Table 29.4 Central characters in L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace ranked according to 
three different centrality measures
Degree (weighted) PageRank Betweenness centrality
P’er Bezuhov P’er Bezuhov Kutuzov
Nataša Rostova Nataša Rostova P’er Bezuhov
Nikolaj Rostov Nikolaj Rostov Aleksandr I
Andrej Bolkonskij Andrej Bolkonskij Napoleon
Mar’ja Bolkonskaâ Mar’ja Bolkonskaâ Andrej Bolkonskij
Sonâ Rostova Aleksandr I Nikolaj Rostov
Aleksandr I Kutuzov graf Rostov
Kutuzov Sonâ Rostova staryj knâz’ Bolkonskij
Denisov Napoleon Nataša Rostova
Boris Drubeckoj Denisov Vasilij Kuragin
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Fig. 29.7 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, book 1 (first part of 
the first volume)
Fig. 29.8 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, book 10 (second part 
of the third volume)
29 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN RUSSIAN LITERARY STUDIES 
532
separate books: book 1, starting the novel; book 10, in which the Borodino 
battle occurs; and the epilogue that wraps up the novel.
The network in Fig. 29.8 represents Book 10 (second part of the third vol-
ume). This is one of the most battle-torn parts of War and Peace, as it describes 
the preparation and events of the Borodino battle. This network exhibits the 
lowest density in the whole novel—one could speculate that war and military 
settings disrupt human interaction.
Fig. 29.9 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, epilogue
Fig. 29.10 Network densities of separate books (parts) of War and Peace
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Figure 29.10 shows the density dynamics throughout the whole novel, 
which can be interpreted in terms of war/peace cycles of War and Peace. The 
novel begins in book 1 with peaceful events and higher-than-average density of 
the character network. This is interrupted by the war of the third coalition, 
ending with the disastrous Austerlitz battle (books 2 and 3)—and lower-than- 
average density. Book 4 brings us back to the peaceful life by describing the life 
of the Rostov family with Nikolai Rostov on vacation from his regiment. In 
book 5, Nikolai, having lost a small fortune in a card game, goes back to ser-
vice, the war gains momentum, Pierre breaks up with his wife completely and 
goes on his spiritual search—peaceful life is disrupted everywhere, and network 
density drops along with it. However, this time the war ends quickly in book 6 
with the Treaties of Tilsit, Prince Andrej falls in love with Nataša—and the 
reader enters the high-density zone of peaceful life again. Book 7, the densest 
of all in the novel, describes the idyllic life of the Rostov family in their Otradnoe 
estate. The events of book 8 take place in Moscow, and this is where peace ends 
with Anatol’s attempt to steal Nataša away. Next comes book 9—Napoleon 
invades Russia, not only disrupting peace, but also the social network of the 
novel. Then comes the Borodino battle—the watermark moment of the whole 
novel, and the lowest density point. The war and sorrows continue, and the 
density remains below the average until the very end. Only in the epilogue, 
which wraps up the events of the novel proper, the network density reaches the 
same above-average value that it had at the beginning of War and Peace.
29.5  conclusIon
The network analysis of literary texts has developed into a prolific subdiscipline 
of the Digital Humanities, a formal approach revealing hitherto invisible struc-
tures and structural changes in literary history.
The extraction and formalization of network-analytical data is the first step 
to gaining workable network data. It can be done manually or automatically, 
depending on the scale of the research question and the data available. 
Following data formalization, the visualization step oftentimes is a first indica-
tor for the quality of the extracted network data. A visualization can be used for 
interpretation, too, but the real power of network analysis resides in the under-
lying numbers and available algorithms as we have demonstrated with a few 
examples in this chapter.
Further development will depend on whether it will be possible to establish 
versatile and stable infrastructures for the general digital analysis of literary 
texts, based on reliable text corpora and technical interfaces, like Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) or other endpoints that make it easier to access 
structural data. The DraCor platform (https://dracor.org/) is one such 
attempt addressing the digital research on drama (Fischer et  al. 2019). By 
offering an interface for TEI-encoded drama corpora, it can open a compara-
tive angle to the digital literary studies, and also help to position Russian drama 
within the context of other national literatures. A glance at the richness of 
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existing TEI-encoded drama corpora will help to understand these 
opportunities:
• Théâtre Classique: 1290 French plays from seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries
• Shakespeare His Contemporaries: 853 English plays written between 
1550 and 1700
• German Drama Corpus: 474 German-language plays from between 1730 
and 1930
• Russian Drama Corpus: 144 Russian plays published between 1747 and 
the 1940s
• Letteratura teatrale nella Biblioteca italiana: 139 Italian plays
• Dramawebben: 68 Swedish plays
• Shakespeare Folger Library: all (37) Shakespeare plays
• Ludvig Holbergs skrifter: 36 comedies
• Biblioteca Electrónica Textual del Teatro en Español de 1868–1936 
(BETTE): 25 Spanish plays
• Emothe: The Classics of Early Modern European Theatre: 113 plays 
including translations (Italian, English, French, Spanish)
Since all these corpora are encoded in TEI, they are comparable, although 
being written in different languages and stemming from different epochs. The 
comparative aspect is well within reach and complements similar efforts in the 
field of the analysis of the European novel (Schöch et al. 2018).
Beyond the added methodology for the study of literary texts, the knowl-
edge of network metrics also sharpens the senses for the functions of other 
kinds of networks we are surrounded by in everyday life, be they online com-
munities, metro lines, or highways. They are all based on the same assumptions 
and can be examined and understood using the same methods. The successful 
import of network analysis into the humanities thus leads to a broader under-
standing of realities beyond one’s own discipline and to new opportunities for 
interdisciplinary cooperation.
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CHAPTER 30




The popularity of social media studies in the context of Russian politics started 
to take off during the 2011–2012 civil protests against what are widely seen as 
fraudulent results of the 2011 parliamentary elections. In the absence of impar-
tial and objective coverage of elections in the traditional media (Golos 2011) 
various Social Network Sites (SNS) appeared to be instrumental in circulating 
information among citizens, effectively serving as an alternative source of trust-
worthy information on the election process. The key feature of social media 
functionality during the 2011–2012 protest was its multi-channel and multi- 
hierarchical structure. Spontaneously emerging information posted online 
about fraud and other infringements over the course of the elections was picked 
up and popularized by famous bloggers and popular public channels. It helped 
build awareness of the magnitude of committed acts and reaffirm large public 
discontent regarding the validity of the election process and the pronounced 
winner—the pro-Kremlin Edinaâ Rossiâ (United Russia) party. Furthermore, 
social media were instrumental in organizing and coordinating the protest as a 
key means of information circulation (for more on digital activism, see 
Chap. 8). Earlier academic accounts were positive on the crucial role of SNS in 
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“mobilizing the discontent of citizens under the conditions of a semi-authori-
tarian political regime” (Lonkila 2012, 9).
This type of research received impetus from a chain of protests, ranging 
from the Occupy movement in mostly developed countries to the Arab Spring 
in the Middle East and North Africa region. In these cases, the internet in gen-
eral and social media in particular were the key factors in the scope and magni-
tude of the protests. The events spurred a vigorous research into the 
phenomenon of social media in the context of social capital and civic engage-
ment (Agarwal et al. 2014; Fuchs 2014), mobilization of protests (Earl et al. 
2013; Greene 2013; Breuer et al. 2015), as well as methodological boundaries 
of political science, associated with new and growing computational methods 
(Tremayne 2014; Sinclair 2016; Tucker et al. 2016).
The events of the Arab Spring further reinvigorated the discourse of democ-
ratization of authoritarian states, claiming social media to be the key underly-
ing technology promoting political change (Tufekci and Wilson 2012). These 
studies have fallen on the fertile soil of the Russian protest realities, determin-
ing the key theme of research. Therefore, in the context of politics, social media 
and digital social networks, Russian studies explored the main democratization 
hypothesis (Greene 2013), looking for answers as to why the Russian case did 
not result in a tumultuous upheaval akin to the Arab Spring (White and 
McAllister 2014; Reuter and Szakonyi 2013; Pallin 2017). In their answers, 
authors outlined several key features of social media in Russia. First of all, they 
agreed that up until the 2011–2012 protests the Russian digital public sphere 
had been developing relatively freely, without the tight oversight of the gov-
ernment. Secondly, recognizing the importance of Internet technologies, the 
authorities preferred a rather flexible model of domination over the rigid regu-
latory framework, which are popular in other authoritarian countries (with 
China being the exemplary case). On the one hand, an active and popular pro- 
government audience was cultivated and exhibited to the entire political spec-
trum, on the other, any anti-government sentiment was disrupted by various 
means, including the use of bots and trolls. Finally, the government undertook 
measures to domesticate the ownership over key social network sites and to 
ensure compliance of the large international ones through excessive regulation.
Following the emergence and controversy around the cyber activities of 
Russian government-affiliated organizations outside Russia’s territorial border, 
the research agenda and discourse then shifted towards a deeper study of trolls 
and bots (Jensen 2018; Stukal et al. 2017). Therefore, given the public interest 
in these specific topics, Russian social media studies have been dominated by a 
rather narrow research agenda, mainly referring to abnormal and critical situa-
tions. Obviously, patterns of users’ behavior would differ during these events, 
from their behavior under normal circumstances.
There have been earlier attempts to depict the topology of Russian digital 
social networks (Barash and Kelly 2012; Kelly et al. 2012) as well as the con-
tents of key discussions (Nagornyy and Koltsova 2017; Maslinsky et al. 2013), 
using advanced computational methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and 
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topic modeling. Yet, apart from specific and quite narrow-focused contribu-
tions from other fields and especially computational linguistics, such studies 
remain on the periphery of contemporary policy research.
30.2  Goals and data
This chapter aims to fill this gap by analyzing the intra- and intergroup struc-
ture of politically engaged users of Russian social media and presenting the 
dynamics of ongoing political discussions. It builds on already conducted 
research and applies key SNA methods and approaches to the corpora of social 
media data from the Russian segment of Twitter. Therefore, the goals of the 
chapter are twofold: (1) to demonstrate the potential of SNA to analyze politi-
cal discussions in Russian social media, and (2) to establish online political 
communities, determine their internal structure as well as measure their inter-
connectedness and detect key influencers. The chapter explores a number of 
hypotheses regarding the role of social media in contemporary Russian politics, 
which were partially inspired by the previous research in the field.
We propose and test a three-tier analytical strategy, outlining the macro-, 
meso-, and micro-levels of network analysis. We check whether Russian virtual 
society is generally divided across the same ideological lines as the public 
sphere, representing two scattered, yet distinct groups representing the pro- 
government sphere on the one hand, and, mainly, “non-systemic” opposition 
forces on the other (Gel’man 2015). Applying automated community- 
detection methods, we determine and visualize existing online communities. 
We further analyze their characteristics and, comparing their user structure 
with the contents of selected discussions, determine their ideological basis. 
Finally, we investigate relationships between and within communities, estab-
lish key leaders and influencers, as well as test the possibility of a dialogue 
between existing online political communities (for another case of network 
analysis, see Chap. 29).
While other social media platforms are more utilized by the wider public in 
Russia, such as VK (formerly VKontakte) or OK (formerly Odnoklassniki), we 
focus on Twitter due to three factors. Firstly, as a micro-blogging platform, it 
is determined by its inherently public nature, allowing the sharing and viewing 
of content without a restrictive permission structure, even permitting the view-
ing and following of all public content without a Twitter account. In part due 
to this, for public figures the platform has become a sort of modus operandi, 
both amongst the pro-government and “non-systemic” opposition. In this 
regard, Twitter, to a certain extent, has complemented LiveJournal—another 
very popular blogging platform as a means of reaching to a wider audience, yet 
with shorter announcements and “punchier” messages. Twitter remains the 
sixth most important social network platform in Russia with 9.9 million of 
unique monthly users.1 In absolute numbers, Russian Twitter segment is the 
fifth largest in the world in terms of active user accounts.2 Moreover, the 
Russian segment appears to be the most politicized, as a high proportion of the 
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top 100 most followed accounts are political figures and media accounts, com-
pared to other countries.3 Secondly, Twitter has been a platform highly utilized 
for political information dissemination and event coordination, including for 
protests, both internationally, such as during the Arab spring, and in Russia, 
particularly during the 2011–2012 protests (Lotan et al. 2011; Wolfsfeld et al. 
2013; Spaiser et  al. 2017). Thirdly, it has been argued that foreign-owned 
social media (Facebook and Twitter) have a greater impact on the patterns of 
circulation of anti-government and pro-protest information than domestically 
owned platforms (VK, OK), due to greater state control over the latter ones 
(Reuter and Szakonyi 2015). Taken together, these factors demonstrate that 
Twitter in Russia is an important and contested space for the politically engaged 
segment of the Russian population and is a relevant and valuable platform for 
the political analysis of the country. Therefore, given its inherently open and 
public nature and high nominal politicization, Twitter in Russia is regarded as 
a valuable object for analysis of politically active social networks and political 
communication in the country.
To perform the empirical assessment, we collected six samples of Twitter 
data on topics of international or national political importance. Given their 
extensive coverage in traditional media altogether with higher than average 
Twitter activity, each event demonstrated resonance in Russian political society 
(see Table 30.1 for list). Each sample was collected individually using Twitter’s 
Search feature of the REST API, which allows the retroactive extraction of 
recent popular tweets containing specific keywords and returning a sample of 
tweets made in the preceding 7 to 9 days. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows the collection of content preceding, during and following each 
specific informational event. To construct and evaluate user communities for 
each event, which are commonly understood to be based on who each user 
chooses to follow (Colleoni et al. 2014; Barberá et al. 2015; Halberstam and 
Knight 2015), we collected data on all friends/followers of users who partici-
pated in the sampled political discussions. This approach results in the collec-
tion of event data, participant users, and relationships between them. The total 
corpora of all six samples included 175K users and 978K tweets and retweets.
30.3  assessment of sna methods
30.3.1  Macroscopic Methods: Visualizing Russian Online 
Political Communities
The common starting point of network analysis is the detection of network 
structure and visualization of the resultant communities. Visualization allows 
at-a-glance assessment of the patterns present in between captured entities and 
the identification of which subsequent methods are relevant to investigate spe-
cific details of relationships of interest. Among various graph-visualization 
methods, force-directed layouts have become highly popular for practitioners 
in part due to the fact that they are aesthetically pleasant and intuitive (Koren 
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2003). Force-directed layouts, such as the commonly utilized ForceAtlas2, 
simulate a natural physical system of forces acting upon each other, with nodes 
repulsing each other like charged particles and edges attracting nodes like 
springs (Bastian et al. 2009; Jacomy et al. 2014). Applied to social networks 
such as the Twitter follower network, the method visually clusters 
Table 30.1 Six events and size of captured networks









Two-year anniversary (2016) of 
the accession of Crimea 
(collecting pro- and anti-Russian 
sentiment towards the event)












Eurovision Song Contest 2016; 
the victory of Ukrainian singer 
Džamala










Dmitrij Medvedev’s public 
comment to pensioners “there is 
no money, but you hang in 
there”










Release of Ukraine’s prisoner of 
war Nadežda Savc ̌enko in a 
prisoner swap










Liberal governor Nikita Belyh’s 
arrest for corruption









Turkey’s 2016 failed military 
coup against president Erdogan 
(responses of Russian audience, 
following Russian-Turkish 
discord resulting from the 
shooting down Russian fighter 
jet in 2015)













aKeywords and hashtags were used to collect a focused discussion sample and to minimize unrelated discussions. 
For keywords specified with a *, all possible keyword inflections were utilized in the search
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well-connected users and segregates loosely affiliated groups. It furthermore 
maps the network, practically visualizing the distance between users and 
user groups.
Modularity and community-detection methods quantify key network 
parameters, complementing visualization layouts. The modularity statistic 
measures how divided a network is into segregated groups, ranging from −0.5 
to 1, with the upper range indicating stronger module segregation (Brandes 
et al. 2007). Community-detection algorithms analyze the network structure 
and assign nodes to communities, providing a statistical analysis that comple-
ments the visual representation of force-directed graphs. The established net-
work parameters support the evaluation of sociological theories and research 
hypotheses, such as the presence of “echo chambers” in social networks. Based 
on the hypothesis that most engagement happens amongst likeminded and 
connected individuals (Bakshy et al. 2015; Colleoni et al. 2014), this phenom-
enon has been widely investigated in international cases (Colleoni et al. 2014; 
Barberá et al. 2015); however it is hitherto under researched for the Russian case.
Choosing an appropriate community-detection method depends on the 
network type as well as computational resources, with particularly large-sized 
networks presenting a challenge. For directed networks, as in this case, with 
edges representing follower relationships or communication patterns like 
retweets or mentions, the Infomap method is appropriate (Lancichinetti and 
Fortunato 2009).4 The Infomap method (Rosvall and Bergstrom 2008) simu-
lates a random walk along the edges of the network and categorizes communi-
ties where information can flow quickly amongst well-connected users and is 
unlikely to leave to another group (Rosvall et al. 2009). We apply the Infomap 
method to categorize user communities on the six captured political samples, 
calculate modularity, and visualize each using the ForceAtlas 2 (Jacomy et al. 
2014) force-directed layout (see Fig. 30.1).
We observe that the political Russian Twitter space contains a highly stable 
community structure that parallels the real political landscape in the country, 
with two major political communities and a multitude of smaller ones, reacting 
to all political events in the country. The collected data allows us to assess vari-
ous characteristics of established communities. Particularly, the basic follower 
method is complemented with an evaluation of network structures based on 
typical Twitter activities such as retweets and mentions. Both are useful as a 
retweet can be a symbolic representation of the consonance of opinions or 
importance of specific information, whereas mentions provide a wider spec-
trum of reactions and relationships between users. As hypothesized, there is 
division into two major competing political forces (Gel’man 2015), with the 
two major communities being (1) the pro-Kremlin (pro-government) support-
ers and Russian nationalists (community 0 or purple), and (2) the liberal and 
non-systemic opposition (community 2 or teal).
We also found that the “echo chamber” theory applies well to the Russian 
Twitter network, as the follower-based communities were highly polarized. 
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Modularity varied between the events, from a relatively low statistic of 0.2101 
on the Crimea sample to a moderately strong statistic of 0.4732 for the 
Eurovision sample (see Fig.  30.1).5 Furthermore, users in each community 
showed a strong preference to retweet, mention, and communicate with users 
in their own community and low preference to do the same for users in other 
communities. As Tables 30.8, 30.9, and 30.10 (Annex A) show, on average 
75% of all mentions, retweets, and replies happened within, and only 25% hap-
pened between users of different groups. Specifically looking at the pro- 
government and Opposition communities, we see that they are very highly 
polarized, as they retweet on average only 5% of the content created in the rival 
group. Interestingly, the Opposition group is less polarized of the two, possibly 
due to being on average three and half times smaller than the pro- 
government group.
Fig. 30.1 The structure of political communities on Twitter by event
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30.3.2  Mesoscopic Methods and Russian Political Communities: 
Similar or Different?
Upon detecting and visualizing a macro structure of the whole network, it is 
useful to detail each of the detected communities through the two methods of 
density and transitivity. Both demonstrate the compactness of each community 
network, showing whether a group’s users are only loosely connected or highly 
interrelated and hence likely to be ideologically contiguous. Whereas density 
approaches the network holistically, measuring the proportion of connections 
that are present in the network against the total number of possible connec-
tions, transitivity measures the proportion of triangles (or three users con-
nected to each other) against all possible triangles, a stronger indicator of 
interrelationships. Therefore, networks that have high density but low transi-
tivity will be relatively interlinked, but not all users will know each other.6 In 
practical terms, naturally built tight communities signify the presence of numer-
ous multi-user interactions and the sharing of social trust and social capital 
within the group (Coleman 1990).
A further method is to detect cliques in a network, or a subset of nodes that 
are all connected to all other nodes in the clique. In social networks, cliques are 
sometimes referred to as clique communities, where groups of users are com-
pletely interconnected, with larger communities often containing many cliques. 
A benefit of clique analysis is that the prevalence and average size of cliques in 
a community network provides insight into the structure of the political group. 
A community with a large group of tri-node cliques (triads) demonstrates a 
relatively dispersed community, whereas the presence of several cliques with a 
large number of nodes in each hint at relevant sub-community structure for 
further analysis. Furthermore, as information is disseminated on Twitter 
through follower relationships, cliques represent a method of evaluating infor-
mation propagation through a community, as well as a detailed analysis of the 
behavior of users in one versus another clique, as individuals tend to be highly 
influenced by the clique they belong to (Borgatti et al. 2009).
We find that the identified main political communities in Russian Twitter 
have vastly different characteristics and vary by event. The opposition commu-
nity is a relatively dense and closely knit group, generally having stronger ties 
between individuals and likely sharing more meaningful interpersonal relation-
ships. The pro-government community on the other hand is a more loosely 
related group of independent mini-communities, possessing more sporadic 
links between the sub-groups. In all six samples, the density of the opposition 
community exceeded that of the pro-government group (Table 30.2). Looking 
at transitivity, the pattern is repeated, although not as strongly and not for 
every sample. Clique distribution further underlies the social structure of both, 
as cliques in the opposition tend to be much smaller (Figs. 30.2 and 30.3). The 
looser amalgam of large cliques in the pro-government group also underlies 
the importance of public opinion leaders to reach each of these larger 
mini-communities.
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Pro-Government Opposition
Fig. 30.3 Clique size frequency distribution by community—Medvedev sample
An important remark concerning the utilization of meso methods that is 
applicable to both Russian and international contexts, has to be made, how-
ever. Both, density and transitivity could be sensitive to the quality of sample 
data. For instance, keyword or hashtag searches could miss statements and, 
Table 30.2 Density and transitivity of the network in its entirety and within its main 
communities
Density Transitivity








Belyh 0.41 0.92 2.64 9.85 10.73 18.12
Crimea 0.88 1.96 2.62 11.82 12.69 18.29
Eurovision 0.10 0.53 1.13 11.49 8.24 10.72
Medvedev 0.42 1.20 1.83 13.61 16.74 13.52
Savčenko 0.30 0.82 1.22 9.28 10.45 10.95
Turkey 0.23 0.70 1.48 9.20 9.49 11.80
Note: Displayed as percentage due to small scale
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hence users, that indirectly reference the political event. This would inevitably 
affect the subnetwork structure. Furthermore, the rate limits and index algo-
rithms, used by Social Media Platform APIs, could also seriously impact meso 
methodologies (Pfeffer et al. 2018). One way to alleviate sample issues is to use 
multi-sample approaches to demonstrate cross-event consistency, as done in 
this study. Another is sampling using only general limitations, such as language 
or location. While Twitter’s free API does not offer location filtering, language 
filtering has a potential for Russian political analysis, as fewer (compared to 
international languages) users outside the country would engage in online 
political discussion.7
30.3.3  Microscopic Methods: Opinion Leaders in Russian Online 
Political Networks
Following the evaluation of network structure and community sub-structure, 
scholars often turn to the identification and measurement of the impact of 
network’s “influencers,” as well as the comparison of these influencers to offline 
opinion “leaders.” Traditional elites, who have always had the ability to shape 
the political narrative, have seen their power greatly expanded with Twitter and 
other social media spaces (Jungherr 2014). Previous research, both interna-
tionally (Bakshy et al. 2011) and on Russia (Roesen and Zvereva 2014) has 
found that traditional “leaders” can be cumulatively overshadowed on social 
media by “ordinary influencers” (Bakshy et al. 2011, 8), or median public fig-
ures with an average “offline” influence.
30.3.3.1  Identifying and Evaluating “Influencers”
The analysis is based on a sample of 469 accounts, which comprises public 
personalities and organizations as well as traditional media. These users were 
selected if they: (1) actively post on politically relevant events; (2) have at least 
ten thousand followers; and (3) either occupy positions in a government/non- 
government organization, or are well-known media personalities. The sam-
pling technique adapted the “snowballing” approach but required several 
stages in order to improve the validity of the outcome. First, a top tier of politi-
cally relevant users was manually selected from the list of top 100 most popular 
accounts in the Russian segment. Secondly, from all samples collected, the 
1000 most followed accounts were selected and manually sorted in order to 
identify politically relevant ones. These two steps together resulted in a list of 
240 accounts. Among these accounts, only those that followed no more than 
500 others, were selected. Subsequently, the list of friends of each was obtained, 
but only those who themselves had at least 10,000 followers were selected. 
Qualitative filtering of this list resulted in the creation of the master sample of 
469 active Twitter public personalities.
The selection process inherent with this type of sampling technique can be 
considered as establishing a representative collection of user accounts. Given 
the “echo chamber” effect, it can be assumed that those who use Twitter as an 
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interactive platform, and not only spread but also receive information, will 
strategically connect with (or themselves follow) a limited amount of personali-
ties, many themselves public figures and involved in analogous activities (poli-
tics in the case of this study). Although the 10,000-follower threshold is rather 
arbitrary, it allows the selection of only those accounts that have the potential 
to efficiently create and/or disseminate political information. Similarly, the 
500-friend threshold excludes those personalities who apply a tactic of follow-
ing any account that interacts with them, and whose inclusion would not 
improve the sample.8 To support the assessment of the endurance and impact 
of content created by opinion leaders, the last 3200 tweets of each were down-
loaded using the REST API and ranked in terms of their impact on political 
discussions. Four types of politically relevant leader accounts can be identified 
in the Russian Twitter segment. The first type are personal accounts of top 
politicians, media, and public personalities. Many of these accounts can be 
regarded as official, as they are verified “de-jure,” while others produce content 
that corresponds with ideological views of their nominal owners and therefore 
can be regarded as “de-facto” genuine. The second cluster comprises of 
accounts of traditional media sources, which utilize the platform predomi-
nantly to reach a wider user audience. In most instances, tweets produced by 
these types of accounts contain links to materials issued on these media’s web-
sites, sometimes with opinionated comments that reflect the editors’ ideologi-
cal preferences. These accounts appear to be the most interconnected within as 
well as outside the ideologically bounded communities they belong to. The 
third type includes official accounts of government agencies, which were 
selected for analysis on the basis of multiple premises. Twitter has been actively 
used by private sector companies and entrepreneurs for marketing purposes. 
Indeed, there is a growing body of research on the subject matter, which 
explores and analyses strategies of efficient public relations and marketing for 
businesses. If used efficiently, Twitter could boost a company’s performance. 
The same logic is applied to political organizations (Waters and Williams 2011; 
Towner and Dulio 2012), who adopt advanced technologies of governance 
within the Government 2.0 paradigm. This approach was officially adopted in 
Russia in the context of the Federal Program “Information Society 2011–2020” 
(Zherebtsov 2019). Accounts that produce and circulate political satire and 
politically relevant entertainment content comprise the fourth type of accounts, 
which we conventionally refer to as the parody group. While they themselves 
are not sources of official information or representatives of certain political 
groups, such accounts appear at the epicenter of selected discussions and dis-
seminate certain sentiments. Moreover, they are quite popular not only among 
regular users but also among top political influencers.
The analysis of content produced by the leaders reveals several remarkable 
trends. There is a certain consistency between the groups in terms of retweet-
ing and liking messages. The parody group outperforms all others in the com-
bined popularity of its messages. Needless to say, all accounts in our sample 
that belong to this group produce and share oppositional sentiment. Personal 
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accounts of political leaders comprise the second most popular group on 
Twitter. Interestingly, the content produced by these types of accounts is as 
often retweeted (or shared and thus actively endorsed) as it is liked (or passively 
endorsed). The Twitter activity of traditional media appears to be much lower 
than the first two types of accounts. To some extent, this demonstrates a quite 
remarkable pattern of social engagement in the Russian Twitter segment. While 
entertainment purposes are prevalent even in the context of political discourse 
(as demonstrated by the overwhelming popularity of parody accounts), users 
tend to get involved in political discussions and favor opinionated statements 
of political pundits and media personalities over factual information circula-
tion. This being said, it was to be expected that official accounts appeared to be 
the least publicized in our sample; a trend best explained by the nature of con-
tent produced and shared by the accounts of this group. As official accounts 
tended to share links to digests and press releases, produced by the press- 
services of their respective agencies, this information is regarded as the least 
entertaining (or “infotaining”) to users.
Table 30.3 illustrates the ranking of leaders’ accounts by popularity in terms 
of both active (retweets) and passive (likes) endorsements, both on average for 
all accounts over the entire sample collected, and using a subsample of the top 
10,000 most popular tweets authored by the leaders. With the former, the 
picture is quite consistent. The latter, however, demonstrates that for retweets, 
the group of official accounts ranks higher—second rather than fourth—as 
compared to likes, while parody accounts rank lower—fourth. A cursory evalu-
ation of this shift, based on content analysis, revealed an unusually high activity 
of automated Twitter accounts (i.e. bots), indicating an evidence of selective 
strategy of boosting certain topics.
The types of leaders also differ from one another in terms of their capacity 
to influence the content and sentiment of online conversations. To perform 
this task, the most critical metrics of individual tweets—likes and retweets—
were queried from a sample of 3200 most recent tweets, authored by the lead-
ers. These metrics were aggregated and the average number of “likes” and 
retweets per leader was calculated. Used independently, it provides a good 
estimate of the “average power of a tweet” of the given user, although it does 
not consider the issue of outliers—accounts with relatively short lifespan and 
Table 30.3 Leaders’ impact metrics using all data collected or focused on the top 10k 
popular tweets
All tweets Sample of top 10K popular tweets
Account type Av. Num. retweets Av. Num. likes Av. Num. retweets Av. Num. likes
Personal (302) (2) 26.80 (2) 27.67 (3) 691.88 (2) 959.91
Media (86) (3) 15.31 (3) 12.10 (1) 848.53 (3) 855.88
Official/Gov-t (49) (4) 12.37 (4) 10.60 (2) 697.61 (4) 691.25
Parody (32) (1) 98.35 (1) 150.74 (4) 664.49 (1) 1303.07
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yet, quite high performance metrics. To address this, the maturity of accounts 
was estimated by multiplying the “tweet power” metric by the average number 
of tweets per day (1). Given the fact that all accounts in the leaders sample are 
real and used actively, the issue of automated content generation did not affect 
the overall calculations. Assuming that bots are less likely to be followed by 
leaders, the sample showed no evidence of the presence of unusually and/or 
suspiciously active accounts. Therefore, the average leader account generates 
approximately 16.03 (+/−2.3) tweets per day and the most active account, 
quite expectedly belonging to the media group, generates on average 170 
tweets per day.
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The overall list of candidate impact obtained by (1) was sorted from most to 
least impactful, and the overall list of 469 was broken down into quantiles. 
Figure 30.4 represents the breakdown of account types per quantile. Obviously, 
the parody group accounts generate content ordinary citizens are eager to react 
to: 53.1% of such accounts in the sample appeared in the first quantile. 
Approximately a quarter of personal accounts demonstrate the tendency to 
generate highly resonant content (23.5% in the first quantile). Interestingly, 
this most populous group is almost evenly distributed. Official accounts follow 
a somewhat normal distribution, peaking in the third quantile, hence generat-
ing relatively impactful content. The discrepancy between this distribution and 
the high performance of these account types in the top 10,000 sub-sample 
(Table 30.2) raises the importance of future in-depth content analysis of mes-
sages produced by this group. On the one hand, this content could be artifi-
cially “boosted”; on the other, top “tweets” could actually discuss politically 
crucial issues and be genuinely shared alongside the network, which to some 








































Parody Personal Media Official
Fig. 30.4 Influence of leaders’ content, distribution across quantiles
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extent, supports the thesis of the bursty nature of Twitter networks (Myers and 
Leskovec 2014). Finally, and rather surprisingly, the most prolific group of 
media accounts tends to be distributed towards the lower part of the scale.
30.3.3.2  Developing an Index of “Influence”
The average tweet power metric for Twitter data, while indicative of certain 
patterns in ongoing and historical discussions, does not take into consideration 
network “influence” and the leaders’ ability to disseminate content throughout 
the network and in their particular communities. While the topic has gained 
significant attention in the research community, no established and widely 
accepted method of identifying Twitter influencers exists. Time-invariant 
approaches tend to compute influence on the basis of either centrality (network- 
dominated approach), or content impact (retweet-dominated approach). At 
the same time a combination of both methods could be quite productive. We 
propose a method utilizing network centrality and demonstrated ability to dis-
seminate content.
Influence can be defined as the ability to seed discussions and spread content 
throughout the network. It can be seen as a derivative of two major parameters: 
the importance of content and its ability to meet the aspirations of ordinary 
users and the capacity of this content to spread through the network and be 
visible to a wide audience. The former is marked by users’ reaction to content, 
similar to the approaches taken in evaluating “influencers” above. The latter, 
on the other hand, evaluates the placement of the leader within a network or 
community, as a central placement creates a better opportunity to disseminate 
content amongst a wider audience. As such, we determine PageRank centrality 
on the “follow” relationship of Twitter, which is seen as both as an indicator of 
information-gathering, as well as social connection between two users, espe-
cially if it is reciprocated (Myers et al. 2014; Frederick et al. 2012).
Centrality is the most commonly used approach to determine the impor-
tance of nodes in a network (Livne et al. 2011; Romero et al. 2011). PageRank 
Centrality (Page et al. 1999), most famously used in Google search, assigns a 
probability distribution to the network, representing the chance of randomly 
picking a specific node. When applied to social networks, it allows the ranking 
of users by importance relative to each other. Centrality was combined with the 
aggregated average number of “likes” and “retweets” obtained from the 3200 
tweets authored by each individual “leader.” Combining both parameters 
yields an index of identified leaders’ influence, which represents the potential 
to have an impact, rather than a bona fide substantiation of influence. Adopting 
the average tweet power metric (1), we multiply it by PageRank centrality of 
each candidate to generate “influence” index (2).
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Introducing centrality and combining the data with leaders’ assigned 
InfoMap communities alters the observed distribution considerably. Firstly, the 
first two quantiles of the most influential Twitter users are comprised 
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predominantly of opposition accounts (Fig. 30.7, Annex B). In the first quan-
tile, two- thirds (or 60%) of accounts belong to the opposition and only one-
third to the pro-government community. A similar situation is observed in the 
second quantile, where 71% of accounts can be referred to as belonging to the 
opposition, and only 29% to a pro-government group. The first quantile 
included such popular opposition leaders as Aleksei Navalny, Leonid Volkov, 
Oleg Kashin, media outlets TV Rain (Dožd’), Èho, Moskvy, and Meduza, as well 
as highly influential parody accounts. The pro-government group, although 
outnumbered by its opponents, is represented by its most outspoken pundits 
(Vladimir Solovyev and Alexei Pushkov) and notable media sources (RIA 
Novosti, Vesti News). Interestingly, the most followed political accounts of 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, although appearing in the top quantile, 
are located in the middle and in the end of it respectively. Secondly, the distri-
bution of account types across quantiles is more flat, with a decline in propor-
tion of parody and personal accounts in the first quantile and an increase in 
media and official accounts, and a gain in parody and media accounts at the 
expense of personal and official accounts, in the second quantile (Fig. 30.8, 
Annex B). This can be understood as indication that media and official accounts, 
while not impactful in terms of content, are central to the network and hence 
have a higher ability to distribute their content. The shift of a certain propor-
tion of parody accounts from the first to the second quantile, as well as the rela-
tive decline of personal accounts, is a further validation of the presence of the 
“echo chamber.” As parody and personal content is usually popular in specific 
audiences, these accounts are not highly followed by opposing communities 
and hence do not share central position in the whole network.
Furthermore, such dominance of opposition accounts in the top half of the 
influence index speaks of the higher importance of this form of communication 
for the opposition and also supports evidence of the greater structuration and 
network sophistication from the network analysis. The opposition not only 
focuses on social media as its main form of reaching the audience but also 
emphasizes the role of opinion leaders. In this regard, Alexei Navalny is the 
major actor and the greatest influencer not only within his own political com-
munity, but also in the entire network. Pro-government pundits, like Vladimir 
Solovyev and Alexei Pushkov outperform their own formal leaders in terms of 
influence in the virtual community, and accounts of traditional federal mass 
media are instrumental in the dissemination of the pro-government content. 
This establishes a new framework of evaluating Russian political Twitter, which 
is quite different from Kelly et al. (2012) in terms of network structure and 
from Greene (2018) in terms of content.
30.3.3.3  Cross-Validation of the Proposed “Influence” Index
The proposed index (2) requires further testing and validation. Given the 
nature of the research topic, where outcomes are easily predictable on the basis 
of traditional theories and concepts of Russian politics, the best way to test reli-
ability of a new instrument would be the utilization of another approach. Given 
the fact that this new method is a derivative of major other influence indicators, 
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reusing them would result in unfavorable procedural overlap and, thus, similar-
ity of outcomes. To overcome this issue, and avoid complex dynamic methods, 
this research adapts the principle that utilized the Hirsch index (h-index) of 
academic impact (3).
Hirsch is rather unexpectedly suitable and productive for measuring leaders’ 
performance on Twitter, and even overcomes deficiencies visible in the context 
of scholarly work. Firstly, leaders on Twitter are akin to scholars in academia, 
producing content aimed at specific audiences and seek endorsement for their 
work in terms of citations or “likes” and “retweets.” Secondly, both academic 
papers and blog messages increase their value through references, with the 
growth being well documented and easily accessible. Thirdly, academics and 
leading bloggers both tend to increase their visibility by producing the maxi-
mum possible high-quality content. Moreover, the ample quantity of blog 
posts overcomes the limitations of academic work, where the number of con-
tributions is usually lower.
 




Therefore, the use of the h-index seems justified, as it addresses the issue of 
outliers (i.e. highly popular tweets) as well as the lifespan of accounts (imma-
ture, yet highly popular accounts) and provides a weighted rank of significant 
contributions. To put it simply, the h-index algorithm finds an “ideal point” 
between the number of contributions and their relative popularity, which for 
Twitter can be considered as the sum of “likes” and “retweets” for each users’ 
post (hirsch method(Favorites + Retweets)). All leaders were ranked according to 
the obtained indices and the resultant list was compared with the ranked list of 
leaders, obtained through the index method proposed by this research. 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) was utilized to establish whether 
both methods were concordant. It demonstrated a high correlation coefficient 
of 0.69 between the proposed influence index (2) and the modified h-index 
(3). Notably, this coefficient was calculated when the h-index did not refer to 
the centrality parameter of each leader account. Including the centrality indica-
tor increased the correlation coefficient to 0.80.
As a ranking algorithm, the h-index provides a useful method for establish-
ing the most influential contributors and can be used for ranking leaders. It 
also confirms the validity of the proposed time-invariant influence rank (2). As 
any other methods, the h-index for Twitter is not without deficiencies and 
potentially may not be used for samples where leaders are highly popular and 
produce a large quantity of tweets. As the Twitter REST API limits access to 
3200 most recent posts, the h-index will not be able to produce an index 
higher than the quantity of posts. Yet in the case of current measurements of 
Russian Twitter, this issue was not a problem, as the most popular user—Alexei 
Navalny—scored only 902 points on the scale. Furthermore, both indices (2 
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and 3) are consistent and consonant with common wisdom that the actual 
disposition of actors and organizations within the political arena should be cor-
related with their political influence.
30.4  Beyond the score: cross ValIdatIon 
of detected Patterns
30.4.1  Further Validating “Echo Chambers”
Focusing on intra- and cross-community conversation, we observed homophi-
lous conversation patterns between the various communities as users tended to 
share content with like-minded individuals inside their own community, most 
especially between the pro-government and Opposition groups. Nominal 
homophily however can be misleading as users in small communities are more 
likely to converse across community lines simply because their community is 
small, and users in large communities are unlikely to converse outside their 
group due to its relative proportion. We adopt a method developed by Currarini 
et al. (2007) to validate the nominal homophily observed. Specifically, nominal 
homophily, or the proportion of conversations a community has within itself 
(Hi) is compared to its relative size within the network (wi).
 
4 5 6        H w H w H wi i i i i i; ;  
Baseline homophily (4) occurs when the proportion of user conversations 
within a community equals the relative size of the community, indicating that 
on aggregate, users in that community show no special preference or bias for 
their own friends. Inbreeding homophily (5) indicates that users are biased and 
converse more often within their own group than is expected on the basis of its 
relative demographic size. Finally, if a community shows heterophilous pat-
terns (6), the number of conversations within the group will be less than the 
relative size of the group.9 To enable comparisons between communities of 
various sizes and different conversation types on Twitter, we standardize 
homophily indicators for (7) baseline homophily, (8) inbreeding homophily, 
and (9) heterophily.
 



















), we find that each 
community demonstrated strong in breeding homophily (Table  30.4). 
Interestingly, the non-systemic opposition is more homophilous than the pro- 
government community. A few communities, such as communities 3 and 4, 
while quite small, demonstrated excessively high standardized homophily 
indicators.
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30.4.2  Makeup of Two Main Political Communities and Their 
Reactions to Political Events
Individually assessing the pro-government community, we observe that it was 
by far the largest political group, always actively participating in all events. The 
community displayed strong pro-Putin, pro-government, anti-western (includ-
ing anti-US [United States], anti-Europe and anti-Ukraine), and, in some 
instances even nationalist sentiment. While sometimes a little critical of the 
regime, the users in this community (community 0 or purple in Fig.  30.1 
above) generally disseminated information in line with a patriotic narrative and 
demonstrated two patterns of Twitter use. If the informational event was not 
negative to Russia or the government, such as the two-year anniversary of the 
accession of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, then reactions were usu-
ally event-specific and generally positive. However, if the informational event 
was inherently negative to the government, reaction was usually split between 
a certain proportion of anti-government content, and neutral or positive pro- 
government reaction. In certain cases, a pattern is evident whereby positive 
content was coordinated around specific keywords that were trending nega-
tively in order to coopt the term and spin it positively, distracting the conversa-
tion to unrelated pro-government content.
Reactions to Prime Minister Medvedev’s comment of “there is no money, but 
you hang in there” to Crimean pensioners, posted to YouTube on May 23, 2016, 
demonstrate these two patterns well (Fig. 30.5). While some users derided the 
Prime Minister’s comments, factual and neutral reactions were quite prevalent. A 
large amount of disseminated content focused on unrelated positive topics to 
distract and mitigate the initial negative reaction inside the community. Two sto-
ries were widely mentioned on May 23 and 24 focusing on specific keywords. The 
first focused on the word “money” by distributing a story on the Prime Minister 
promising to find money for museums in Crimea. The second focused on the 
terms “economy” and “investment,” disseminating content about the release of a 
government plan, approved by the Prime Minister, aiming to increase domestic 
demand for the products of Russian chemical and petrochemical industries. Other 
reactions also included the factual reporting of the Prime Minister’s comments or 
presenting the information in a neutral fashion, with tweets such as “Medvedev 
admitted that there is no money to index pensions.”10 Interestingly, such neutral 
posts usually did not include links and were composed of just text.
The solid line indicates the number of tweets on an hourly basis (right axis) 
in the pro-government community, and the dashed line indicates the 
Table 30.4 Relative community sizes and standardized homophily indicators
Com 0 
[pro-government]
Com 1 Com 2 
[opposition]
Com 3 Com 4










 (mentions) 3.56 8.81 10.74 111.16 0.00
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proportion of conversation (i.e. of the tweets and retweets made during that 
hour) that had to do with Medvedev’s comment (left axis). Tweets containing 
“money,” “hang in there,” “pensioners,” “have a good day” (“deneg,” 
“den’gi,” “deržitesʹ,” “pensii,” “pensij,” “nastroenie”) were used to calculate 
the proportion. Specifically, lemmatized words in each tweet were checked 
against the lemmas of desired keywords. Tweets that contained keywords 
known to be used in the counter strategy were excluded.
The second of the two main political groups, the Opposition community 
(community 2, marked teal in Fig.  30.1 above), was on average 3.5  times 
smaller. Its users displayed negative, ironic, and critical assessments of the 
Russian government and also disseminated Ukrainian-friendly, pro-US, and 
pro-Western content. While users in this community also shared content on 
liberal values, such as opposition to authoritarian government or support for 
democracy, a majority focused on vilifying the government, with users spreading 
negative memes or ridiculing government strategies or statements. Indeed, par-
ticularly virile ridicule and even contempt of the government followed 
Medvedev’s comments in Crimea. The community is also made up of a sizable 
proportion of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, which seemed to influence how the 
group reacts to informational events. Indeed the Savchenko affair and the 
Eurovision contest, both highly interrelated with Ukrainian politics, are the 
largest samples of captured Opposition group users, with the former being the 
largest by number of tweets and the latter, the largest in quantity of engaged users.
Similar to the pro-government community, content shared within the 
Opposition group followed a dual pattern. If the informational event was neu-
tral or negative to the government, and hence in line with community expecta-
tion, users either discussed the topic in a neutral fashion or spread content 
negative to the government. However, when the informational event ran coun-
ter to community expectations, then reaction was split as users reacted in 
Fig. 30.5 Pro-government community reaction to Medvedev’s comment to pension-
ers in Crimea
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different ways. The three-pronged reaction following the arrest of the liberal 
governor of the Kirov Oblast, Nikita Belykh, well demonstrates this trend. 
Factual and neutral tweeting was predominant; however, genuine shock and 
disbelief, often including statements that Belykh was set up, was also prevalent 
(see Fig. 30.6). Finally, a third opinion expressed by the community was that 
of anti-Belykh statements, believing that he betrayed the liberal movement by 
becoming a systemic politician.
Represents data from June 25 to June 28. The solid line indicates the number of 
tweets per hour (right axis) and the dashed line indicates the proportion of con-
versation believing Belykh was set up (left axis). Tweets containing lemmatized 
words including “setup,” “don’t believe” and “provocation” (“podstava,” “pod-
stavili,” “podstavit’,” “podstav,” “ne verû,” “poverit,” “provokaciâ,” “provo-
cirovali”) were used to calculate the proportion.
Comparing the standardized rate of tweets per hour between the two main 
communities, we see that the pro-government group reacted very differently 
than the Opposition group to several events, most notably during the Medvedev 
event (see Medvedev Chart in Annex C).11 The initial spike of tweeting activity 
in mid-day on May 24 lagged by a few hours the initial and larger reaction by 
the Opposition group, indicating that the pro-government group was less 
likely to immediately react to the negative information. The secondary and 
larger spike of activity in the latter half of the day is particularly interesting, 
given its size and the content shared during it was mostly not about Medvedev’s 
comment at all. Comparing the (nominal) number of tweets every two hours 
with the proportion of the tweets that have to do with Medvedev’s comments, 
we see that the conversation shifted to discussing other topics during this sec-
ond spike (see Fig. 30.5). Following this, the proportion of unrelated content 
on Medvedev continued to dominate discussions within the community, with 
the proportion mentioning the pensioner comment mostly remaining in the 
Fig. 30.6 Opposition community reaction of disbelief to Belykh’s guilt
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20–30% range. Moreover, given that the keyword used to collect this sample 
was “Medvedev,” we hypothesize that this pattern of distraction specifically 
had to do with positively portraying the Prime Minister.
30.4.3  Finding Bots Within Russian Twitter
SNA is undeservedly neglected in the context of the mainstream topic of “bot” 
and “troll” impact on Russian “online” political discussions. Recent research 
points that the proportion of content created on Russian Twitter has a 50% prob-
ability of being produced by “bots” (Stukal et al. 2017). As stated elsewhere 
(Murthy et al. 2016), bots can have an impact on simple indicators such as fol-
lower counts or hashtag boosting. This may impact users who follow others 
indiscriminantly and network metrics as a whole, which assess all tweets in the 
network without taking into account the structure of social networks (Ferrara 
2018). As ordinary users tend not to follow “bots” and segregate themselves 
into isolated “echo-chambers,” bots are likely to be segregated to isolated com-
munities that have little influence on real politically engaged users.
To evaluate the potential impact and ensure the validity of our findings, we 
apply a three-method strategy to measure the prevalence of bots within the 
identified network structure. First, we evaluate the proportion of duplicate and 
highly similar content created in each community, as bots are known to repeat 
(not retweet) identical tweets (Lawrence 2015). As tweets can have very minor 
purposeful variation, applied to them by bot designers, such as adding an extra 
hashtag or changing the beginning of the tweet, we compare the similarity of 
tweets by excluding tweet extremities. Secondly, to validate the results of the 
first method, we qualitatively assess a sub-sample of tweets shared in suspect 
communities. Finally, we apply the popular Bot or Not method, also known as 
botometer, to score the likelihood of each user in our samples to be a “bot” 
(Davis et al. 2016), a feature-based method that evaluates a set of behaviors of 
a Twitter account and assigns it a score (probability) of being a “bot” (Ferrara 
2018). A tried and relatively accurate approach (Yang et al. 2019), it is appro-
priate for cross-validating other methods utilized.
We find that in the two main political communities, the proportion of dupli-
cate and similar tweets varied by event; however, the pro-government commu-
nity demonstrated a much larger proportion of both in all events (Table 30.5). 
For instance, in the Medvedev sample, 43% of tweets are very similar in the pro-
government community, many spreading the positive new story of government 
support of Russia’s petrochemical industry on May 24. The low proportion of 
duplicate content in the opposition community is intriguing, as is the relatively 
high proportion of similar content. A possible explanation could be that the 
opposition is a more dynamic group of users who follow more sophisticated bots 
that utilize more complex natural language or image methods to spread content. 
We propose this fascinating puzzle as a question for further research in the area.
Outside the main political communities, qualitative and duplicate/similarity 
analysis revealed that many visually segregated communities were made up to a 
very large degree of “bots,” or at least accounts sharing very similar content 
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(Table 30.6). The more unsophisticated groups posted identical or very similar 
content, including as high as 83% of all tweets for an event (community 7, dark 
orange). Others showed more complex approaches, such as tweeting news 
headlines or factual statements, with or without a corresponding link in the 
tweet. Interestingly, when links were present, they often pointed to Yandex 
News or even more commonly to heterodox news or blogging sites. While the 
information captured in the samples of the six events for these communities 
were often political, the public timelines of the “bot” accounts often included 
completely unrelated content, such as for commercial purposes and advertising. 
We assume that these communities of “bots” are owned by marketing or con-
sulting firms and tweet specific content based on the requirements of their cli-
ents, without any particular impact on actual political discussions.
Evaluating the average automation probability of users in each community, 
as reported by botometer, reinforces our findings (Table 30.7). Communities 
of real users had on average low probability of being automated, with a rela-
tively small proportion of users removed or suspended. By the same token, 
communities, previously identified as highly likely as being “botnets” or having 
a large prevalence of “bots” (Communities 3, 7, 8 and others) had much higher 
average probability of being automated. Moreover, a large proportion of 
accounts in these communities have since been suspended by Twitter. Recently 
the company expanded its activities to diminish the impact of bots and trolls by 
suspending multiple accounts.12 The results of these actions reinforced our 
findings, as the proportion of suspended accounts in the communities we iden-
tified as botnets was much higher than in real user communities. Indeed, entire 
Table 30.5 Duplication and similarity of content in two main communities (% identi-
cal; % similar)
Event Pro-government community Opposition community
Belyh 12.4%; 28.2% 0.1%; 6.6%
Crimea 1.2%; 5.1% NA; 2.2%
Eurovision 10.8%; 27.9% 0.3%; 13.%
Medvedev 11.9%; 43.1% 1.1%; 19.5%
Savčenko 11%; 31.5% 0.2%; 24.5%
Turkey 12.7%; 33% 0.1%; 16.4%
Table 30.6 Sample of “bot” communities detected (% identical; % similar)










Belyh 53%; 54% 24%; 24% NA; NA 60%; 60% NA; 27%
Crimea NA NA NA NA; 96% NA; NA
Eurovision 43%; 46% 83%; 83% 3%; 16% 73%; 74% NA; 11%
Medvedev 31%; 36% 61%; 61% 3%; 19% 44%; 47% NA; 13%
Savc ̌enko 27%; 32% 64%; 64% 3%; 12% 71%; 72% 2%; 12%
Turkey 46%; 49% 24%; 24% NA; NA 57%; 57% 8%; 36%
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“botnets” have all but been suspended by Twitter in the two years since the 
samples were originally collected (see Table 30.7). On the other hand, some 
remain relatively untouched. From all above indicators, we conclude that 
“bots,” while undeniably highly numerous and often verbose on Russian 
Twitter, are often segregated to isolated mini communities that have little 
impact on real politically engaged users. Real political communities do likely 
possess a certain proportion of bots, however, as identified in the literature 
(Kollanyi 2016; Murthy et al. 2016), these bots are likely to be complex and 
highly sophisticated, making their study challenging but their potential impact 
on shifting real conversations greater.
30.5  conclusIon
Data on public and political engagement of Russian citizens, active political 
discussions and debates, and even protest coordination activities, are readily 
available to researchers studying Russian politics. This chapter illustrates how 
SNA can be instrumental and ineluctable in evaluating key research hypotheses 
utilizing such data. Using six resonant political discussions collected from 
Twitter over the summer of 2016, we validate multiple political and sociologi-
cal theories important for Russian studies. Firstly, we find that Russian online 
society is divided among the same ideological lines as the public sphere, repre-
senting two distinct and consistent communities of users, one supporting the 
Kremlin, and a “non-systemic” opposition that opposes it. Secondly, we vali-
date the presence of “echo-chambers” in Russian social networks, identifying 
polarization between the two main political groups. Thirdly, we observe that 
“influencers” on Russian Twitter are not generally traditional political elites, 
but “interesting” and highly informative users such as that of famous pundits, 
parody accounts, or news sources. Furthermore, given regular users’ isolation 
into self-created separate ideological communities as well as further mini- 
communities, we comment that the expected impact of information control 
strategies by the government are likely quite limited.
We obtain our results through the application of a thorough and holistic 
approach in evaluating the network structure, focusing on three levels of analy-
sis. Macroscopic methods, such as community detection and network visualiza-
tion, supports the evaluation of the “overall” picture of online Russian political 
Table 30.7 Botometer (Bot or Not) results (average universal probability of automa-






Community 3 Community 7 Community 8
Belykh 11.2%; 15% 5.8%; 10.1% 49.8%; 37.1% 50.4%; 4.8% NA; 100%
Crimea 7.8%; 12.4% 7.6%, 9.7% 54.7%; 50% NA NA
Medvedev 15.8%; 17% 7.8%; 10.5% 53.6%; 38.1% NA 37.8%; 97%
Savc ̌enko 11.7%; 15.1% 8.8%; 9.8% 57.2%; 32.6% 45.6%; 3.6% 28.6%; 98.2%
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society. Mesoscopic methods validate the detected structures and provide 
insight into the sub-structure of each detected community. Finally, microscopic 
methods identify the “influential” users who are able to widely disseminate 
content and impact political discussions.
We find that SNA is also an economical method to detect “bots” in social net-
works and evaluate their impact on real political users. Currently a hotly debated 
topic both internationally (Murthy et  al. 2016; McKelvey and Dubois 2017; 
Ferrara 2018) and in Russia (Stukal et al. 2017; Lawrence 2015), our findings 
demonstrate that the impact of “bots” on Russian social networks is likely quite 
negligible. We find that while numerous and often verbose, “bots” are mostly 
isolated to mini-communities far removed from real politically engaged users, and 
as such are unlikely to impact real political discussions. We conclude by noting 
that the efficiency of SNA in extracting real and valid structures in Russian social 
networks makes it a prerequisite and fundament for the application of further 
advanced methods, such as topic or sentiment analysis, when studying Russian 
politics (for more on sentiment analysis, see Chap. 28).
annex a: PolarIzatIon of communItIes
Polarization of communities is taken from an aggregate of all six events. Note 
that as over 1000 groups were detected, only the most numerically relevant are 
shown. Percentages represent proportion of the total for each community (the 
“All” category).
Table 30.8 Polarization of communities: retweets
Retweets 0 1 2 3 4 5 8 All
0 89.7% 0.4% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 194,393
1 2.7% 75.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33,392
2 6.8% 0.0% 77.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 54,672
3 15.3% 0.4% 0.5% 75.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 837
4 11.9% 1.4% 0.7% 1.4% 75.9% 0.0% 0.0% 286
5 50.5% 1.0% 7.5% 0.5% 0.0% 13.0% 0.0% 200
8 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 19.5% 87
All 196,233 33,698 53,563 793 232 138 22 350,616
Table 30.9 Polarization of communities: mentions
Mentions 0 1 2 3 5 All
0 80.7% 0.3% 8.8% 0.0% 0.0% 12,114
1 2.9% 82.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1405
2 21.0% 0.3% 66.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3312
3 7.5% 0.0% 1.3% 87.5% 0.0% 80
5 35.0% 0.0% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20
All 11,584 1456 3671 70 1 21,691
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Table 30.10 Polarization of communities: replies
Replies 0 1 2 All
0 85.3% 0.1% 6.5% 5354
1 2.0% 83.7% 0.0% 245
2 24.3% 0.1% 63.7% 1172
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Fig. 30.8 Change in influence of leaders’ accounts when centrality compli-
ments the impact of their distributed content
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Fig. 30.9 Tweet patterns for the two main communities, tweets per hour by event
annex c: tweet Patterns for the two maIn 
communItIes, tweets Per hour By eVent
notes
1. Compared to 46.6M users a month for VK and an internet penetration of 
109.5M. Source: Translate Media (https://www.translatemedia.com/transla-
tion-services/social-media/russian-social-media/).
2. According to the Statista.com. Source: https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-in-selected-countries/.
3. In 2016, amongst the top 100, 17 accounts belonged to politicians, govern-
ment organizations or media personalities who comment mostly on political 
 M. ZHEREBTSOV AND S. GOUSSEV
563
issues, and a further 17 were of news media. In 2017, the pattern was similar 
with 15 and 16 respectively. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has remained the 
most followed politician and always either tops or is at the top of the list. 
Although the trend has shifted towards popularization of non-political accounts, 
as of 2019, the nominal politicization of Twitter still remains quite high with 28 
politically relevant accounts among the top 100. In comparison, German, 
French, UK, and American politicians’ positions are less representative in the 
top 100, as these segments are largely dominated by the non-political (celebri-
ties, media and sport personalities) opinion leaders.
4. Lancichinetti and Fortunato (2009) provides a good overview of available 
methods for various data and network constraints.
5. As a test case, we amalgamated the six samples into one master network, which 
yielded a modularity of 0.551—a relatively strong statistic of network 
stratification.
6. For introduction and application of methods in Network Analysis, see 
Zinoviev (2018).
7. See Twitter’s Developer documentation for available streaming parameters and 
their limitations: https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-real-
time/guides/basic-stream-parameters.html.
8. For instance, the #followback hashtag is commonly used by users to increase 
their number of followers.
9. See Currarini et al. (2007) for in depth explanation.
10. Note that this type of tweet was repeated by many users with slight variation in 
language.
11. Given the difference in the sizes of the pro-government and Opposition com-
munities, a comparison of their participation in events was performed by trans-
forming the nominal tweets per hour scale into a standardized one using 
corresponding t-scores.
12. In July 2018, the Washington Post reported that Twitter suspended 70M 
accounts in May and June. See Timberg and Dwoskin (2018) for more 
information.
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CHAPTER 31




Digital methodologies can be used to complement more traditional approaches 
to art history. Yet, mainly due to the difficulties of analyzing visual material 
with computer-assisted methods, digital art history and visual analysis are areas 
that have arguably developed slower than other branches of digital humanities 
(see Drucker 2013, 5; Klinke 2016, 16; Lozano 2017, 2). With regard to 
training in digital methods, the efforts in the humanities are rather scattered 
and digital training in art history is especially lacking (Zorich 2013, 16). 
However, the field of digital humanities could benefit immensely from the 
traditionally strong expertise of art historians in curating and creating cultural 
data (Schelbert 2017, 5). Indeed, digital art history is not quite as new a field 
as is often thought. Some even argue that art history is not behind other disci-
plines in the development of the digital (Zweig 2015, 40–41). Nonetheless, 
despite the recent advances in image recognition, digital methods have not 
been as widely adopted in the analysis of the visual as in some other fields of 
humanities, making it easy to overlook the efforts that do exist.
Though Soviet and Russian visual materials have been studied quite exten-
sively, they have not been analyzed much within the framework of digital art 
history. This is partly because many of the widely used digital art repositories 
contain only Western European and Renaissance art, leaving other art in a mar-
ginalized role (see, e.g., Münster et al. 2018, 380). However, scholars are now 
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debating the advantages of creating and making accessible digitized Russian 
visual material in collections and archives in- and outside of Russia (see Kizhner 
et al. 2018; Bridgers and Blood 2010; Kain 2018). For example, Biryukova 
et al. (2017) discuss how virtual cultural storages and virtual museums can be 
used to preserve the Russian cultural heritage. Other researchers have analyzed 
the possibilities and problems associated with making 3D models of cultural 
heritage objects and Russian architectural monuments, such as churches and 
monasteries, and presenting them online (see e.g. Borodkin et  al. 2015; 
Zherebyatiev and Ionova 2014). Indeed, as Biryukova et al. (2017, 157) show, 
many of Russia’s most popular virtual museums contain churches and monas-
teries reconstructed in a virtual space. Some researchers, like Anna Sanina 
(2019), Olha Korniienko (2014), and S. Polovinets and E. Baranova (2018), 
have even applied digital methods to the study of Russian and Soviet satirical 
visual material. However, the majority of research using digital methods is 
based on content analyses, which in turn have relied on the coding of the 
images by the researcher or research assistants. To the best of my knowledge, 
no machine learning or computer vision methods have been used in visual 
studies of Russian and Soviet material.
In this chapter, I chalk out some options and possibilities to expand and 
apply new digital research methods and visual analyses, in order to complement 
the more traditional approaches to Russian and Soviet art history. As an exam-
ple of a field of art historical research that may benefit from such digital meth-
ods, I use my own research on Soviet political cartoons published during the 
“Great Patriotic War,” as the years of war between the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany, 1941–1945, of the Second World War are known in Russian. During 
these years, the official party newspaper Pravda published 185 political car-
toons, bearing nine different artists’ signatures. In the course of my research, I 
manually collected these political cartoons and assembled an Excel spreadsheet 
with detailed annotations that essentially functioned as a database and allowed 
me to conduct a qualitative analysis on them.
To interpret a political cartoon, it is necessary to understand the contextual, 
textual, and visual features and information contained in them. This requires 
the researcher to have a certain amount of background knowledge. I employ 
Ernst Gombrich’s (2002, 142–154) ideas, according to which a communicat-
ing image consists of three components—context (the environment within 
which the cartoon exists), caption (the verbal elements of the image), and code 
(the visual language the artist uses). This chapter thus ultimately discusses how 
digital methods could facilitate a Gombrichian analysis of a communicative 
image, such as a Soviet political cartoon.
Before getting into the use of digital methods to enhance the research of 
visual material, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of the situation in 
Russia regarding the digitization of material, copyright laws, and open access. 
Next, I look at recent developments in digital methods for art history and their 
potential application to Russian and Soviet art, especially with regard to 
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visualizing data and the use of machine-learning algorithms to help analyze 
databases of relevant textual and visual material. One of the benefits of using 
such algorithms is that they could facilitate piecing together the cultural con-
text for an art historical research project. However, as I discuss in the following 
section, the vast amount of cultural knowledge that is required for a machine 
to properly understand the representations within an image is where machine-
learning algorithms reach their limits. As is laid out in the final section, these 
limits could be overcome by combining the new digital methods with tradi-
tional art historical research methods. Ideally, larger research projects, featur-
ing both Information Technologies (IT) professionals and trained art historians, 
would enable us to create more useful art historical databases that would allow 
for a more effective use of the new digital methods while also combining the 
strengths of both digital and traditional art historical research.
31.2  dIgItIzatIon, copyrIght Laws, and open access
It is a common trend that archival material and cultural artifacts are being digi-
tized at an increasing rate. However, the level of digitization is not universal, 
and its organizational forms differ. Certain cultures, mainly Western European 
and North American ones, are making bigger investments in their digitization 
projects and are thus overrepresented, while others remain in a marginalized 
position (Rodríguez Ortega 2013, 131). Some countries, like Russia, have 
government involvement driving the digitization, while in others it remains the 
task of individual organizations.
It is often difficult for art historians to find relevant, available, open-access, 
and good quality visual material in digital repositories (Münster et al. 2018, 
369–371; ibid., 380). And with digital archives that are not exclusively devoted 
to Russian data, it is occasionally difficult to search for Russian material, because 
not all archives attach keywords such as “Russia” or “Slavic” to their docu-
ments and objects (cf. Bridgers and Blood 2010, 78; for more, see Chap. 20). 
These problems with accessing digital databases often lead to researchers creat-
ing their own personal collections (Münster et al. 2018, 371). Thus, Russian 
art history remains very much a question of the researcher knowing where to 
look for accessible and relevant material, and in many cases still traveling to the 
destination to retrieve it.
Online resources of Russian digitized art are rather limited. However, some 
resources do exist. For instance, some Russian art museums have now made 
parts of their collections available online, and some have even created virtual 
tours of their museums (see, e.g., Virtual Visit, the State Hermitage Museum). 
A number of museums and galleries, including the State Russian Museum, are 
also collaborating with the Google Arts and Culture project to digitize and put 
parts of their collections online (see Virtual Russian Museum). In addition to 
such classic art resources, there are also newspaper, journal, and photography 
repositories that may be of interest to art historians. For instance, a 
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collaboration of the Russian search engine Yandex with museums and private 
collectors has resulted in a large online photo archive (see  Istoriâ Rossii v 
fotografiâh).
The National Library of Finland has also recently subscribed to East View’s 
digital collections (http://www.eastview.com), sidelining their microfilm col-
lections. However, the East View interface offers only a text-based search 
option, which makes looking for images in the newspaper difficult. Furthermore, 
compared to the library’s microfilms, the digital archive’s image quality is 
worse and some issues of Pravda that were available on microfilm are missing 
from the digital archive. Nonetheless, these digital copies of Pravda provide an 
easier option for studying the textual environment—the Gombrichian cap-
tion—within which the image exists. But while digital repositories like East 
View make accessing digitized material easier for those who have online access, 
they do not provide the services for free (for more, see Chap. 20). They offer 
researchers material that would otherwise require them travelling to archives to 
retrieve, but they do not make the information openly available to everyone. 
Furthermore, the digitization of textual sources is generally much more com-
mon than that of, for example, art objects.
An ongoing Ministry of Culture led program aims to have all the Russian 
Federation Museum Collections cataloged, digitized, and available online at 
https://goskatalog.ru by 2026 (see Gosudarstvennyj katalog Muzejnogo fonda 
Rossijskoj Federacii). That is, it aims to make available metadata and pictures of 
all the items in the public museums. The participation of private museums in 
this project is voluntary (Kizhner et al. 2018, 351–352). In 2018—eight years 
before the project was supposed to be completed—only 14% of the objects 
were digitized and 9%, that is 7,034,904 objects, were included in the database 
(ibid., 352–354). By May 2019, the number of objects in the online catalogue 
was 11,017,513, which means that the digitization and cataloging process 
advanced by about four million objects within the past year or so.
This digitization project by the Russian Ministry of Culture, however, does 
not currently grant complete open online access to the cultural heritage objects. 
For example, in St. Petersburg the number of digitized items is higher than on 
average in Russia, and even higher than digitization on average in European 
museums, but the number of items available online is lower than the average in 
Russia (Kizhner et al. 2018, 356–358). Furthermore, the quality of the photo-
graphs is not necessarily an aspect to which much attention has been paid. This 
becomes evident when scrolling through the various images of the catalog. A 
more thorough “digital museumification,” that is, a proper transformation of 
the object into digital form with full metadata, would be needed to make the 
objects in the catalog more useable to the researcher (cf. Biryukova et al. 2017, 
153). This could be achieved by using crawlers or appropriate scripts. If the 
Russian Ministry of Culture’s project’s aim is achieved by 2026, and if the 
Russian policies allow for open licenses on cultural heritage objects, this would 
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provide substantially easier access to the Russian cultural heritage to a wider 
audience, including international researchers (Kizhner et  al. 2018, 363). It 
remains to be seen where the digitization project will lead and what it will in 
the end provide to the researchers of Russia.
Copyright laws largely limit what digitized material remains closed and what 
becomes public, which influences the research and other projects connected to 
cultural objects (Arditi 2018, 54; Roued-Cunliffe 2018, 288). Internationally, 
copyright laws largely accept the so-called fair use policy of images, which 
means that they can be used without obtaining permission from the copyright 
holder in certain cases, such as in research papers where the image is the direct 
subject of the analysis rather than merely an illustration. However, the Russian 
laws are more restrictive. Here, the state legislation supports the so-called “per-
missions culture,” which works counter to the fair use policy. Accordingly, 
museums can retain the rights to all their material even in a case that would be 
regarded as fair use in a research publication. In practice, this varies from 
museum to museum and the researcher needs to figure out the museum’s prac-
tices. For instance, the State Hermitage allows their material to be used, for 
example, for educational purposes, in conference presentations, and in PhD 
theses. But permission is required to use images for commercial purposes or in 
research publications, or to publish conference slides online (Kizhner et  al. 
2018, 359). The fact that visual material is by nature copyright heavy, when 
compared, for example, to text sources, hinders the work of individual research-
ers as well as the building of digital repositories that would benefit the field 
more broadly.
The complexities of the copyright laws and the “permission culture” that 
prevail in Russia make it unfeasible for an individual researcher to make their 
personal databases of primary material open to other researchers. While noth-
ing prevents me from publishing my metadata, the fear of litigation or of being 
denied further access to the archival material has kept me from making my col-
lection of Pravda political cartoons accessible to the public. Instead, I have the 
database stored on personal devices and the images saved in accessible formats, 
such as PNG and TIFF. Indeed, when thinking about the storage of data, it is 
necessary to consider whether the data can be made open and who could ben-
efit from it. For data to be openly accessible, it is necessary to use file formats 
that are possible to use with a variety of non-commercial programs and are 
likely to stay in use for a long period of time (Roued-Cunliffe 2018, 292). Such 
formats include, but are not limited to, JSON, XML, and IIIF. With regard to 
Russian images, a more widespread use of the annotation ready IIIF format by 
the heritage institutions and in the Russian museum catalogs would provide 
researchers better access and more possibilities to present the images with sta-
ble Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs).
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31.3  new dIgItaL approaches to VIsuaL anaLysIs 
and art hIstory
Digital methods provide new approaches to art history, such as the visualiza-
tion and display of data and research results, the digitization and digital render-
ing of art, and most recently the use of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) 
for simple and even more complex recognition tasks. The increasing computa-
tional power we have at our disposal now enables rather more complex visual-
izations than the traditional bar chart or pie chart. For instance, one can create 
complex visualizations that consist of a large quantity of individual images that, 
when combined, provide an overall picture (Schelbert 2017, 4). New visualiza-
tion techniques also allow for more dynamic “moving” charts in electronic 
form. The use of such visualizations in digital visual research has been criticized 
for its lack of accompanying interpretation (see Bishop 2017, paragraph 9). 
However, when approached with care, new modes of visualization can be very 
powerful at revealing tendencies that might otherwise be missed. Thus, with 
the Pravda political cartoons, one could create visualizations to exemplify their 
structure, their connections to historical events, their intertextuality, and other 
aspects, in the spirit of Gombrich’s notion of contextualizing an image. One 
could, for example, place the cartoons on a map of Europe, showing where 
each one takes place, or do a cross-referencing of countries and animal charac-
ters to see the significance of animal symbolism in the cartoons.
In addition to such visualizations of data, digital methods also offer other 
options for representing research findings. Digitized art and the digital render-
ing of art artifacts enable the researchers to bring the art to a wider audience. 
For example, the University of Nottingham’s project Windows on War: Soviet 
Posters 1943–1945 (see Windows on War), which was conducted by a multidis-
ciplinary team, allows the visitor to look at the images while at the same time 
reading about culturally specific information and the historical contextualiza-
tion of the images. In a sense, this makes the communication of art history 
independent of both location and time, allowing people to immediately access 
art from around the world and even to view a virtual restructuration of an 
already destroyed artwork, such as an old building (Kellaway 2013, 95–96; 
Borodkin et al. 2015, 5–7). Furthermore, contemporary digital online spaces 
offer us the possibility to reconstruct old exhibitions, of which we have photo-
graphic evidence, such as the “godless corners” of the early twentieth-century 
Soviet Union (Kain 2018, 219). Thus, the use of digital methods is not limited 
to the actual process of conducting the research or disseminating the results 
within the academic environment; they can be employed in researchers’ popu-
lar outreach efforts as well.
One of the difficulties of digital humanities is to turn the primary material 
into useful data: to quantify a body of material that is not traditionally handled 
in such a way and to combine this quantification with humanities methods and 
theories of enquiry (Otty and Thomson 2016, 135). Manually annotating 
images is perhaps still the most common way of approaching the problem of 
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turning an image into a format that is possible to analyze with the use of a 
computer. Here, researchers annotate the images with appropriate keywords, 
that is, metadata, which are then used as a basis to build a database and conduct 
a computer-assisted analysis to find underlying tendencies of the material (see, 
e.g., Korniienko 2014; Sanina 2019). I followed this procedure when I made 
my database of the 185 Pravda political cartoons. My metadata included, when 
relevant, information on the cartoon’s date of publication, page, position on 
the page, artist, title, captions, text in image, quote, poet, poem, characters, 
countries represented, symbols, combinations of a symbol and a country/per-
son, combinations of attributes and a person/country, and the roles of the 
characters. This allowed me to analyze the cartoons on the basis of the assigned 
keywords and to make cross-references between them. Such studies rely on the 
human to do the coding, instead of employing machine vision, which to this 
date is not yet at a level where most researchers would completely rely on it or 
know how to use it for the principal annotation of the primary visual material.
The possibility that a machine could take over such basic art historical analy-
ses would help immensely with metadata extraction and other rather mechani-
cal work. The extraction of this metadata, in turn, would directly facilitate the 
analysis of Gombrich’s caption and code—text, quotes, and title being part of 
the caption and characters, symbols, and attributes part of the code. Naturally, 
using machines to do this would enable researchers to process much larger 
datasets. And furthermore, a machine would assign keywords more consis-
tently than a group of coders, who are each assigning keywords based on their 
varying interpretations (cf. Rose 2007, 60–61; Bell 2001, 22). By combining 
this computer analysis of a vast body of imagery with an art historian’s analysis 
of specific images from that same body, one could also create a two-sided data-
base. The first side would comprise simple computer-assigned characteristics of 
large amounts of images, while the second would consist of the art historian’s 
keywords and would address the more semantic notions of the image (Dressen 
2017, 8). This would allow the researcher to conduct a qualitative analysis with 
specific images as examples, while the bulk of the images serve as a contextual-
izing device.
The computer vision technology that would facilitate such analyses is in a 
process of constant development. For some time now, computers have been 
able to reliably detect the colors and textures of an artwork, which does not 
help us to make any semantic interpretations but does facilitate more precise 
quantitative analyses of colors and shadings used by various artists as well as to 
identify artworks and attribute them to artists (Manovich 2015, 22; Schelbert 
2017, 5). According to Emily L.  Spratt, the image analysis capabilities of 
machines is now approaching the second of Erwin Panofsky’s three levels of art 
historical analysis. That is, they can not only identify basic elements within the 
image, such as animals or people, but also detect conventional cultural repre-
sentations, such as religious motifs (Spratt 2017, 12). In the case of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), these could include ideological motifs, 
such as depictions of revolutionary events, or certain types of characters, such 
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as the archetypal worker or peasant. Applying such a tried and true art histori-
cal theory as Panofsky’s to these new developments is, of course, not straight-
forward. But the fact that the capabilities of computer image analysis are now 
being directly compared to the image analysis skills of people is, on its own, 
very telling.
At present, a number of research groups are working to push the limits of 
what computer vision can do with comics (cf. Laubrock and Dubray 2019; 
Laubrock and Dunst 2019; Young-Min 2019). Any such research is, of course, 
heavily dependent on the availability of appropriate training sets. For instance, 
the Digital Comic Museum (DCM) hosts a set of nearly 200,000 pages of 
American comics published before 1959, segmented into panels and text bub-
bles by machine, and transcribed using optical character recognition (OCR), 
which can be downloaded at https://github.com/miyyer/comics (see Digital 
Comic Museum). Due to the imperfections of having the segmentation done 
by a machine, Nguyen et al. (2018) have also produced a subset of 772 pages 
from the DCM that has been fully annotated by humans. With the help of this 
training set, among others, researchers have achieved good results in identify-
ing various elements of a comic, such as speech bubbles, panels, and captions. 
And they are now moving on to more advanced recognition tasks, such as get-
ting machines to recognize recurrent characters, image-text relations, and sim-
ple narrative structures (Laubrock and Dunst 2019, 11–20; ibid. 28). It is 
conceivable, that similar datasets could be created of recent Russian comics. 
But unfortunately, many other areas of art history do not yet benefit from such 
vast and high-quality datasets, and as discussed in the following section, Russian 
art history is no exception to this rule.
31.4  the current LImIts of machIne LearnIng
Perhaps the biggest challenge of using machine learning for analyzing visual 
imagery is that it requires very large datasets to train the algorithms. For large 
corpora of visual material with repetitive elements, such as medieval manu-
scripts, it has already proven to be especially feasible to use computer vision to 
annotate the images, saving the researchers countless working hours (Bell et al. 
2013, 27). As with the medieval manuscripts, if it were possible to construct a 
sufficiently large training set, it now seems entirely possible that a machine 
could be trained to help analyze political cartoons. For instance, a machine 
could learn to identify certain characters by distinguishing the exaggerated 
physical attributes that make a caricature look like its target, such as the mous-
tache and hair of Hitler or the big mouth and short stature of Goebbels. 
However, care would have to be taken to include enough features so that the 
computer would not, for example, mistake Chaplin for Hitler on the basis of 
his moustache. Furthermore, conventional facial recognition currently works 
by identifying the dimensions of the face. So, for this to work, either the facial 
recognition software would have to be expanded or a separate recognition 
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algorithm would have to be developed to identify exaggerated and satirized 
physical features (for more on machine learning, see Chap. 26).
The question in this specific case is whether the Soviet political cartoons, or 
visual propaganda more generally, are repetitive enough that training comput-
ers to do the annotation would be feasible. While features like Hitler’s mous-
tache certainly repeat, each cartoonist has their own style and the themes and 
topics vary. The only way to find out for sure would be to gather a sufficiently 
large dataset and try it out. Saurav Jha et al. (2018) point out that the training 
sets that are currently available are too small to train a neural network to rec-
ognize cartoon characters. Hence, the training sets need to be supplemented 
with the inclusion of photographs of the people who appear in the cartoons. 
However, the inclusion of large amounts of photographic material decreases 
the feature recognition of the cartoons. Additionally, the more exaggerated the 
features of the character, the more the machine has trouble identifying the face. 
Going even further, one wonders whether a machine could learn to detect 
satire and ridicule. Or make the connection and find the similarities and differ-
ences between a caricatured and a photographed Hitler. If a computer could 
effectively learn to examine the Gombrichian code of an image, it would enable 
the faster analysis of large visual corpora of propaganda imagery and, possibly, 
provide us with a more complete picture of the ways in which visual propa-
ganda functions.
In addition to the size of the training set, the quality of its images and their 
similarity to the material that is to be investigated are also crucial, lest the neu-
ral network end up interpreting images in different ways than the trainer’s 
intention. As the training set of convolutional neural networks influences the 
way the network interprets other images shown to it, the training set needs to 
be carefully planned so that it will not cause erratic results (Spratt 2017, 4). 
When an image is different from the images of the training set, the machine 
may end up facing difficulties. For example, in one image-to-image translation 
project, the machine was taught to transform images so that a winter scenery 
became a summer scenery, a photograph into a painting by a famous artist, or 
a horse into a zebra. However, the training set did not contain images of horses, 
which resulted in the machine transforming not only the horse’s coat but also 
the skin of the bare-chested President of Russia riding the horse into a zebra- 
patterned being (Zhu et al. 2017). This exemplifies how the computer inter-
prets visual material only on the basis of the training set that has been used. 
Thus, the machine does not have the contextual information and interpreta-
tion capabilities that a human in a similar situation would have.
Images have a high level of cultural coding. So even if a computer can extract 
large amounts of data from an image, it cannot understand the semantic side of 
an image as well as a human does. Current developments in computer vision 
aim to bridge this “semantic gap,” to allow a machine to detect basic semantic 
meanings based on the information it can obtain from an image (Manovich 
2015, 22). However, in the same way that computer vision needs to be trained 
to recognize images, humans have been trained by culture and society to 
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recognize and interpret them correctly (Spratt 2017, 7). In other words, for a 
machine to be able to correctly analyze the significant elements of an image, it 
essentially needs the same training and cultural knowledge that a human has. 
The almost incomprehensibly vast amount of information that forms this cul-
tural context of an image is where machine learning and computer vision reach 
their limits and where the guidance and supervision by trained art historians 
will for the foreseeable future remain essential for any research project.
Our interpretations are always dependent on our spatial, temporal, and cul-
tural contexts. Any interpretation by an art historian—or anyone else for that 
matter—is dependent on their background (Gaehtgens 2013, 23–24). For 
example, given an image of a miserable tiger, a contemporary of the wartime 
political cartoons in the Soviet Union would have understood its significance 
as a play on the German heavy tank Tiger getting stuck in the muddy spring of 
the Eastern Front, as would someone familiar with the fate of Tiger tanks. 
However, without the contextual knowledge, the symbolism of the animal 
could end up signifying something else, such as the characteristics of the 
Germans as defeated wild animals. That is, the interpretation I make might dif-
fer largely from the interpretation someone else makes—can a computer make 
such semantic interpretations?
In the same way that the interpretation of data is dependent on the back-
ground of the researcher, the way that the data are organized depends on the 
interpretations of the researcher. Thus, the way I organize data might differ 
largely from how someone else does it (see Otty and Thomson 2016, 115). In 
other words, when making interpretations or organizing data, one needs to 
remember one’s own contextual situation and not blindly trust digital methods 
and believe that they will provide completely replicable and authoritative results 
(for more, see Chap. 21). And until machine-learning algorithms can be trained 
to take into account a reasonable proportion of the cultural context of its target 
material, we must bear in mind that any interpretations made by such algo-
rithms will be based on a considerably narrower background than that of any 
human researcher.
31.5  how humans and machInes can work together
The advantages of the new digital methods and of traditional art historical 
research are conveniently complementary. Indeed, by combining the strengths 
of a trained researcher with the capabilities of machine-learning algorithms, it 
should be possible to cancel out any limitations of either. The digitization of 
visual imagery enables researchers to conduct contextual analyses of images 
that would not be feasible without access to digital resources. Thus, it facili-
tates an even wider contextual analysis than Gombrich (2002, 142–154) could 
have had in mind when writing about the context of the image. As has been 
discussed, developments in the digital methods are currently on the cusp of 
making this possible. Well-designed databases with easy accessibility and prop-
erly annotated images would help researchers to examine the intertextuality 
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and connections between different works of art and other cultural, social, and 
historical phenomena (Brandhorst 2013, 72–73). For instance, it would help 
the researchers if computers could do a search and comparison within a data-
base for art works that are similar to the one that they are examining. Of course, 
for this to be practical and feasible, it will first be necessary for the machines to 
be able to reliably identify and catalog certain elements within the visual arti-
facts. In this way, a computer could go through large corpora and their meta-
data considerably faster than a human (Klinke 2016, 16). Furthermore, the 
comparison of many images with each other when it comes to composition and 
aesthetics could provide new insights into how different artists composed their 
images (Pfisterer 2018, 138). After all, it is impossible to compare as many 
images in person as it would be with a computer.
The high level of intertextuality of political cartoons would also become 
more evident with such comparative computational methods. Their connec-
tions to various areas of culture, including the Soviet visual propaganda imag-
ery, which had the tendency to repeat and borrow ideas from previous images, 
illustrate propaganda’s dependency on the cultural context within which it 
operates (see Kangas 2017, 46–47). For a contextual analysis of the political 
cartoons, the pages on which they were published—or even whole issues of 
Pravda—could be processed with OCR for a cross-referencing of the news text 
with cartoon. The comparison of the text surrounding the image with the 
actual image could provide additional contextualization, complementing the 
researcher’s efforts to place the image within the context of the war events. The 
computer could also assign a value to the similarity between specific features of 
the cartoons and other images and cultural artifacts, war events, or their geo-
graphical location. These values could then be mapped onto a graph in which 
all the variables would be presented together in a dynamic visualization. 
However, due to the complexity and the wide variety of cultural representa-
tions, this is currently still beyond the capabilities of machine-learning.
More generally, with the help of computer programs that could search for 
such open access information—this requires open access as well—many proj-
ects could benefit from the information as a part of the contextualization of art 
(Dressen 2017, 4–5). And the emergence of large text databases of art histori-
cal material will enable a more thorough and accessible contextual analysis of 
the visual, which has traditionally been slow and cumbersome due to the large 
amount of background material needed (Drucker 2013, 10). Thus, with digital 
methods, it is possible for human researchers to take into account ever larger 
amounts of background information when conducting their research.
With regard to training a machine-learning algorithm to detect conven-
tional cultural representations and thus establish connections to the broader 
cultural context, here too it is a question of having sufficient information avail-
able. Thus, apart from computers with the necessary processing power to do 
the analysis, the digitization and accessibility of cultural artifacts is essential for 
a full analysis that takes into account both the cultural context and the formal 
properties of the object (Schelbert 2017, 5). But is it possible to train a machine 
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to see what is not presented? Indeed, in images, and texts too, what has been 
left out conveys semantic information. That is, in an image what you cannot 
see is often as important—or even more important—than what you can see 
(Rose 2007, 72). Even if it is possible to train a machine-learning algorithm to 
“see” what is missing in an image, it is difficult for it to do an analysis of the 
meaning of the omissions. For example, in Soviet political cartoons, the Soviet 
Union or its allies are rarely shown. However, their omission does not mean 
that their presence is not implied. Once again, here, the interpretative skills and 
supervision by a trained art historian is necessary to fully understand what is 
going on.
The increasing use of digital methods in the study of the visual does not 
necessarily mean the overthrow of art history’s more traditional methodolo-
gies. In combining digital and traditional quantitative methods, the researcher 
can draw a range of conclusions from their datasets that would be difficult to 
manage without the machine’s computational power. But at the same time, 
through qualitative analyses, the researcher can make interpretations and evalu-
ations that a computer cannot (see Klinke 2016, 28; Lozano 2017, 6; Rose 
2007, 70–71). To employ such a wide methodological oeuvre calls for interdis-
ciplinarity and/or collaboration between specialists from varying backgrounds. 
There have been several calls for such collaborations (e.g., Glinka et al. 2016, 
209; Klinke 2016, 31; Mercuriali 2018, 149). Having teams that employ peo-
ple with expertise from different fields and with different skill sets would fur-
ther the goal of creating large, accessible databases, as well as the planning of 
new complex methods of analysis.
31.6  concLusIon
In this chapter I looked at some of the advantages and challenges that the digi-
tal study of visual material will encounter. My starting point was to consider 
these issues in the light of a previous research project which was conducted 
mainly with more “traditional” methods, such as archival work on microfilms, 
digitization of material, and conducting a “manual” qualitative analysis of the 
primary material. I used my earlier analysis of Soviet visual data as an example 
and discussed the possibilities of digital methods that I could have used in the 
project.
In some ways, researchers of Russian and Soviet visual material face many of 
the same challenges that any other academics face when using machine- learning 
methods to enhance their research. For instance, it is important to train the 
machine to be “intelligent” and to learn to “see” appropriately and ethically—
we would not want the machine to learn to tamper with the data to make the 
researcher happy. Additionally, the training process is still too slow and com-
plex to be used in a small-scale research project, but the development of 
machine and deep learning might change the situation and make these meth-
ods more approachable for a wider base of researchers.
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In other ways, researchers of Russian art history face their own unique set of 
challenges in adopting the new digital methods. For instance, the problem of 
the “semantic gap,” that is, that computers are not able to handle the semantic 
side of the objects they are analyzing, is especially pertinent when analyzing 
visual imagery, which is heavily reliant on a large amount of contextualizing 
information. And the collection of such contextualizing information in digital 
databases, so as to make it useful for machine-learning algorithms, is further 
confounded in Russia by their restrictive copyright laws and permission culture.
These restrictive copyright laws are especially detrimental, as the lack of 
openly accessible, large-scale databases of visual material is the primary bottle-
neck preventing the use of new digital methods for conducting art historical 
research in Russia. As a result, these digital methods have not yet found a 
secure foothold within Russian visual studies. Some research has been con-
ducted, but it has mainly relied on rather traditional computational methods, 
such as content analysis. Considering the breadth of visual material that 
Russia—which is generally considered to be a very visual culture—and the 
Soviet Union have produced, it would be extremely advantageous to employ 
some of the more recent digital methodologies to that material.
Nonetheless, larger projects featuring interdisciplinary teams and collabora-
tions within art history and other fields that employ digital methods for visual 
analysis could yield considerable results. In many cases, a digital project would 
benefit from the participation of people with varying backgrounds and skills, 
such as IT, quantitative, and qualitative methods. Through the co-operation of 
people with all of these different skill sets, it would be possible to employ the 
digital methods more fully and find new creative solutions to, for instance, cre-
ate suitable databases that better serve the researchers or more dynamic visual-
izations of the research results. So, despite the challenges some of them still 
face, the new digital methods provide many new possibilities for the study of 
the visual, facilitating an easier examination of the images’ context, caption, 
and code, in the spirit of Ernst Gombrich.
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CHAPTER 32
Geospatial Data Analysis in Russia’s Geoweb
Mykola Makhortykh
32.1  IntroductIon
The rise of digital technologies has led to the emergence of new ways in which 
physical spaces are perceived, experienced, and mapped. The availability of 
high-quality satellite imaginary amplified by the unprecedented possibilities for 
crowdsourcing geospatial data (Crampton 2009) has enabled the emergence of 
multiple platforms dealing with geographic information. It was followed by the 
integration of geographically aware computing in the architecture of major 
social media platforms (Crampton et al. 2013) and the growing capabilities for 
location tracking embedded into mobile devices (Sansurooah and Keane 
2015). Together, these changes have given rise to a global collection of services 
which use the geographic data for different domains’ applications. These ser-
vices are currently known as “geospatial Web” (Lake and Farley 2009) or sim-
ply “geoweb” (Crampton 2009).
The emergence of geoweb and associated “neographic” (Haklay et al. 2008) 
practices of publishing, sharing, and visualizing information about places and 
people has significant implications for academic research. In the large-scale 
review of studies, which use geospatial data, Stock (2018) demonstrates these 
data’s applicability to a wide range of research fields, including recreation, crisis 
management, and environment studies. The reasons for the growing adoption 
of geospatial data vary from the emergence of geographic datasets of unprec-
edented size and granularity (Elwood 2010) to the transformation of citizens 
into geospatial subjects able to produce and employ geospatial data (Wilson 
2011). Their use is amplified by innovative possibilities for identifying and 
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mapping spatial relationships enabled by artificial intelligence and big data 
(VoPham et al. 2018).
Russia is not an exception from this trend as shown by the increasing num-
ber of studies applying geospatial data to study subjects varying from electoral 
fraud (Kobak et al. 2016) to Silk Road tourism (Tikunov et al. 2018) to Second 
World War remembrance (Bernstein 2016). Yet, the use of geospatial data in 
the context of Digital Russian Studies has its own specifics attributed both to 
the general role of digital media in Russia’s media ecologies and to the particu-
lar importance of geoweb in this geopolitical context. The explosive growth of 
Internet use in Russia in 2000s has led to profound changes in the language 
and communication in multiple domains, including politics (Gorham et  al. 
2014). The importance of the digital sphere increased even further since the 
beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, which marked the unprecedented level 
of state-sponsored cynicism toward the media sphere and its growing instru-
mentalization for propaganda and disinformation (Roudakova 2017). In this 
“post-truth” (Surowiec 2017) environment, geolocation data that allow to 
(dis)prove the existence of specific phenomena emerge as a pivotal factor for 
making and refuting knowledge claims (e.g. about the presence of Russian 
troops in Ukraine (Shim 2018)).
To further contextualize the features of Russian geoweb and examine how 
recent studies address opportunities and challenges provided by it, I will start 
by reviewing different sources of geospatial data available in the Russian con-
text, varying from social media platforms to crowdsourced databases. I will 
then move toward discussing possible ways of extracting location information; 
these ways vary from mapping location names provided through metadata to 
specific geographic coordinates to extracting location from verbal or visual 
texts or inferring it from users’ activity on social media. Then, I will explore 
different ways to use geospatial data, such as mapping spatial distribution of 
socioeconomic phenomena and analyzing mediatization of cultural practices. 
Additionally, I will briefly discuss the ethical aspects of some of these uses, in 
particular privacy-related issues. Finally, I will conclude by recapping the main 
arguments of the chapter and scrutinizing possible directions for future uses of 
geospatial data in Digital Russian Studies.
32.2  data acquIsItIon
The first question to address in research using geoweb analysis is what kind of 
geospatial data is to be used. As I mentioned in the introduction, the distribu-
tion of location tracking devices and geographic crowdsourcing gave rise to 
multiple platforms dealing with geospatial data; however, the format, scope, 
and quality of these data vary significantly depending on the platform. To illus-
trate these differences, I will review below three categories of geospatial data 
sources, which are of particular relevance for Digital Russian Studies: crowd-
sourced databases, open datasets, and social media.
 M. MAKHORTYKH
587
32.2.1  Crowdsourced Databases
The availability of digital technology allowing to collect, visualize, and share 
geospatial data led to the emergence of multiple projects focused on crowd-
sourcing “volunteered geographic information” (Goodchild 2007). Unlike 
established sources of geographic information (e.g., open datasets produced by 
national mapping agencies), crowdsourced databases rely on the assumption 
that geospatial content produced and edited by multiple individuals will even-
tually converge on a consensus (Elwood et al. 2012, 575). While this assump-
tion does not guarantee the same quality of data as in the case of sources 
produced by certified experts, crowdsourced projects are able to account for 
attributes which are usually omitted by traditional mapping agencies and cap-
ture fast-changing phenomena (e.g., natural disasters).
The scope and focus of volunteered geographic projects vary significantly. 
Some of them, such as Open Street Map (OSM) (https://www.openstreet-
map.org), HERE Maps (https://mapcreator.here.com/), or Yandex People’s 
Map (https://n.maps.yandex.ru/), pursue the goal of creating and sustaining 
free digital maps or gazetteers. Other projects have limited temporal and the-
matic focus. Both in Russia and in the West,1 the latter projects often arise as 
part of the volunteered reporting in the context of natural disasters2 or armed 
conflicts.3
Both categories of crowdsourced databases can be of use in the context of 
Digital Russian Studies. Many global initiatives provide relevant geospatial 
information, which can be used for Russia-centered research. For instance, 
Quinn and Tucker (2017) used OSM and Wikimapia (https://wikimapia.
org/) to trace how crowdsourced maps are used to represent disputed areas 
such as Crimea and found substantial differences in the ways geopolitical dis-
agreements were visualized and addressed. These differences were attributed to 
the OSM hosting more contributions from Western editors, whereas Wikimapia 
was more eager to transmit the Russian official discourse. Other examples 
include the study by Kulakov, Petrina, and Pavlova (2016), who used Wikimapia 
for evaluating digital smart services utilized for cultural heritage tourism plan-
ning, and the research by Karbovskii et al. (2014), who employed Wikimapia 
for simulating the process of decision making based on 2012 Krymsk flooding.
Additionally, the Russian digital landscape features a number of crowd-
sourced projects dealing with specific domains or topics. Despite their variety 
and rich data, these projects have so far received limited acknowledgement in 
academic scholarship. A few exceptions include, for instance, Pomnite nas 
(Remember Us) (http://www.pomnite-nas.ru/), a project devoted to collect-
ing geospatial data about Second World War monuments devoted to Soviet 
soldiers (Bernstein 2016). Another example is RosYama (Russian Pit) (https://
rosyama.ru/), a civic project initialized by Alexei Navalny, a Russian anti- 
systemic opposition leader and activist, who created an online crowdsourced 
service for reporting road potholes (Ermoshina 2014). Many of these projects 
are not necessarily designed as sources of geolocation data for academic research 
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and, instead, intended to facilitate social activities (e.g. collective remembrance 
of the Second World War in the case of Pomnite nas). Despite these non- 
academic goals, these projects can still be a valuable asset to the researcher who 
would creatively approach their data. For instance, geolocation data offered by 
RosYama can be used not only for research focused on the quality of Russian 
roads but also for visualizing geographic networks of activists or detecting the 
misappropriation of funds planned by specific regions for repairing the roads 
(for more projects like this, see Chap. 8).
The major challenge of using crowdsourced databases is related to the qual-
ity of data provided through them. Because of the lack of authoritative control 
over their content, the possibility of encountering errors or conscious distor-
tions of geographic facts is higher than in the case of open datasets. In the 
larger crowdsourced databases such as Wikimapia or Yandex’s People Map, 
such probability is lower because of the large number of contributors, which 
leads to faster error correction. The situation with small databases is more chal-
lenging: often, these projects are curated by small groups of users with limited 
time and financial resources. While the data offered by them can still be valu-
able (or even unavailable by other means), it is important to critically assess 
their quality and identify (as much as possible) who contributes to the database 
and for what ends.
32.2.2  Open Datasets
Besides the rise of volunteered geographic initiatives, the unprecedented ease 
of accumulating and sharing geospatial data resulted in the distribution of open 
datasets produced by certified actors such as state institutions and mapping 
agencies. Generated using authoritative geographic sources, these datasets are 
characterized by higher data quality when compared with crowdsourced data-
bases. While the turn toward open data that are made available through official 
portals (for instance, data.gov or europeandataportal.eu) originated in the 
West, where these datasets are often employed in academic research on the 
subjects varying from earthquakes to government institutions’ budgets (Ding 
et  al. 2010; Shadbolt et  al. 2012), Russia increasingly joins the open data 
movement.
A number of Russian official agencies make their data available through 
online portals, such as Russian Open Data Portal (RODP) (data.gov.ru) or 
Open Data Portal of Moscow City Government (data.mos.ru) (Bundin and 
Martynov 2015; Koznov et al. 2016; Repponen 2018). A selection of Russian 
portals, where open datasets are published, is provided in Table 32.1. Despite 
being subjected to a number of drawbacks, including often limited data pre- 
processing, absence of unified data standards for different organizations, and 
the lack of application programming interfaces (APIs) (fiftin 2017), these por-
tals provide access to a variety of unique geospatial datasets from different 
domains, varying from culture (e.g., the dataset on the geospatial distribution 
of places related to Russian poetess Anna Akhmatova in Moscow [Data.gov 
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2016]) to crime (e.g., data about the number of committed, resolved, and 
unresolved crimes by region in Russia [Data.gov 2014]; for more on govern-
ment data, see Chap. 23).
Two platforms which are of particular interest in this context are Russian 
Open Data Portal (RODP) and Open Data Hub (ODH). Both platforms pro-
vide a large number of datasets (22,233 for RODP and 8151 for ODH) from 
multiple Russian organizations (1102 and 42  organizations, respectively). 
These organizations vary from the federal organizations (e.g., the Ministry of 
Justice or the Federal Statistics Service) to the local ones (e.g., Tomsk Oblast 
administration). Not all of these datasets deal with geospatial information, but 
many of them do and can serve as a valuable source of data for geospatial 
research.
32.2.3  Social Media
As noted in other chapters of the handbook (see Chapters 20 and 30 on social 
media use in the context of Digital Russian Studies), social media platforms 
constitute a major source of digital data. Geospatial data are not an exception 
as the majority of social media platforms provide in one form or another infor-
mation about the location of their users and/or content produced. Stock 
(2018) notes that the majority of studies focus on a few Western platforms, 
such as Twitter and Flickr, which have accessible APIs and contain geotagged 
content.4 This combination allows both identifying the location in which some 
content available through the platforms is produced and also searching and 
retrieving data for the specific geographic range (e.g., for collecting messages 
and images produced within  recreational areas to trace visitors’ numbers 
[Tenkanen et al. 2017] and behavior [Sessions et al. 2016]).
In addition to Western social media platforms, Russian geoweb includes 
several major local platforms, such as VK (also known as VKontakte), 
Table 32.1 Open datasets in Russian geoweb
Dataset name Web address Description English 
interface




Collection of datasets related to Russian 
state agencies
Yes





Collection of datasets produced by the 
Moscow City Government
Yes
Open Data Portal of 





Collection of datasets produced by the 
Russian Ministry of Culture
No
Open Data Hub https://
opengovdata.
ru/
Collection of datasets related to Russian 
state agencies, commercial organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)
Yes
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Odnoklassniki, and Moj Mir. Among these platforms, however, only VK pro-
vides easy access to its API, which allows retrieving a wide range of geospatial 
data (Tikunov et al. 2018). Specifically, VK API includes a number of functions 
also known as methods, which can be used for data extraction (for more on 
social networks, see Chaps. 19 and 30).5
The most common type of geospatial data provided by VK is the one on the 
country and the city/town of residence, which constitutes part of user profile 
(Zamyatina and Yashunsky 2018). In the case of publicly available profiles, 
these data can be retrieved using users.get method. The method takes as its 
input user ids which are of interest for the researcher and the list of fields that 
have to be retrieved (“country” and “city” are a common choice). These data 
can be further enriched and/or verified via other profile fields available on VK 
such as the ones on employment and education.
Besides data available as part of user profiles, VK also provides access to 
check-in data, which can be retrieved via places.getCheckins method. The 
method takes as input latitude and longitude coordinates and returns posts 
made within the specified area together with ids of users who published them. 
Similarly, VK allows retrieving images uploaded by users together with these 
images’ geographic coordinates using photos.get method. The method returns 
geographic coordinates of retrieved images if these coordinates are provided by 
the user. Using this method, it is possible to retrieve a sample of images from 
specific geographic regions in order to, for instance, examine the ways in which 
these regions are represented online (Tikunov et al. 2018).
32.3  LocatIon ExtractIon
After choosing the specific data source(s) and acquiring actual data, the next 
step is to process these data. In the case of geospatial data, the major purpose 
of processing involves the extraction of specific location(s) to which the data 
refer to or represent. Depending on the data format and available metadata, 
the process of location extraction can be as simple as retrieving exact geotags 
present in the metadata or mapping the location name to data from a geo-
graphic information system. In other cases, it can be more complex and involve 
the use of machine learning techniques to recognize the names of geographic 
entities in visual or verbal texts or to infer the location based on online user 
activity.
Geographic coordinates extraction from document metadata. The easiest—
and most common (Stock 2018)—way of detecting location is by using geo-
graphic coordinates included in the document (meta)data. Such an approach is 
particularly applicable for data available from open datasets as well as crowd-
sourced databases, which often include specific geographic coordinates. 
Additionally, some platforms such as Twitter and VK provide geographic coor-
dinates for some types of their content.6 The question of validity of these data, 
however, is an open one: especially in the case of geotagged content from social 
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media platforms, there is also a need to differentiate between the place in which 
the content was published and the place to which it actually refers.
Location name extraction from document metadata. In the cases when geo-
graphic coordinates are not provided, one of the alternatives is to extract place 
names from the metadata. This process usually consists of two steps: (1) top-
onym recognition: that is, identification of the toponym in the body of the 
metadata (Sagcan and Karagoz 2015), and (2) toponym resolution: that is, 
assigning of geographic coordinates to the recognized toponyms (Lieberman 
and Samet 2012). An example of the platform for which this approach can be 
highly beneficial is VK, which allows users to report their place of residence in 
their profiles. While the platform itself does not connect these data to a geo-
graphic information system, the location names can be retrieved via VK API 
and then connected to a geocoding service (e.g., Google Maps) to generate 
geographic coordinates (Lee et al. 2013; Baucom et al. 2013).
The most popular approach to location name extraction from the metadata 
is the gazetteer-based one, where the extracted location names are matched 
with the list of geographic named entities such as the ones provided by 
GeoNames (https://www.geonames.org/). Because of the limited number of 
gazetteers for the Russian language, such lists are often taken from Wikipedia 
or from a few training datasets such as FactRuEval (Starostin et al. 2016). At 
the same time, this approach suffers from a number of issues, including, for 
instance, intended or unintended mispronunciation (such as Maskva instead of 
Moskva) or instances of double naming (e.g. Sankt-Peterburg and Piter). To 
address these limitations, more complex approaches were proposed (for 
reviews, see Leidner 2007; Leidner and Lieberman 2011); a recent study com-
paring different approaches to the task indicates that approaches using lexical 
context of toponyms and their importance (e.g., by solving typonym-related 
ambiguity by always preferring options with the largest population) perform 
particularly well (Weissenbacher et al. 2019).
Location name extraction from raw text. This approach is similar to the loca-
tion name extraction from document metadata and involves the same two 
steps: toponym recognition and toponym resolution. However, unlike the for-
mer approach which relies on the document’s metadata, the latter one takes as 
input raw text data. Stock (2018, 219) notes that a major benefit of this 
approach is that it can be used for any text-based message (e.g. photo/video 
descriptions or blog posts). This approach tends to be less accurate than the 
one relying on supplied geotags, especially as geographic names are often 
ambiguous. However, it is often the only way to extract location in the cases 
when geographic coordinates are not provided.
The usual way of extracting location from raw texts employs the named 
entity recognition approach: that is, automatic detection of the words which 
refer to certain geographic locations. The process of detection is based on 
named entity recognition tools, such as Stanford or GATE, which combine 
machine learning techniques with pre-made geographic gazetteers, such as 
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GeoNames or OpenStreetMap (Stock 2018, 220; for practical examples see 
Jaiswal et al. 2013; Inkpen 2016; Bassi et al. 2016).
While most of the research on named entity recognition approach is tailored 
to the English language, in recent years the growing number of works 
employs this technique for the Russian context.7 Because of the limited num-
ber of pre-made Russian gazetteers, a number of studies (see, for instance, 
Sysoev and Andrianov 2016) employ Wikipedia as a source of information. 
Additionally, there are several training datasets which include geographic data. 
An example of such a dataset is FactRuEval, an open annotated corpus of 
Russian texts.8 The paper by Ivanitskiy et al. (2016) discusses in more details 
how  FactRuEval can be used  for geographic named entity retrieval from 
Russian sources.
Location inference from user activity. In some cases, the documents in ques-
tion do not provide explicit references to the geographic entity; however, even 
under these conditions, it is still possible to infer the location based on earlier 
user activity. Jurgens et al. (2015) summarizes several approaches based on user 
networks which can be applied for dealing with this task. The majority of these 
approaches involve identification of users sharing the closest connections with 
the user in question and then using data from them to infer the user’s location.
Another approach is based on content produced by the user online. A num-
ber of studies (Cheng et al. 2010; Chang et al., 2012; Han et al. 2014) discuss 
the possibility of inferring geographic location from local terms also known as 
location indicative words (LIWs) (Han et al. 2014). LIWs are terms which are 
particularly representative for specific places, either because of being indicative 
of certain locations (e.g. “rockets” for Houston) or language practices (e.g. 
“howdy” for Texas). Consequently, LIWs can be used to predict the location 
of a user who uses these terms through machine learning techniques.
Several studies (Han et  al. 2014; Mourad et  al. 2017) apply the latter 
approach to detect location based on Russian LIWs. The main idea behind it is 
to acquire textual data produced by users at certain geographic locations 
(Twitter was used in the above-mentioned studies, but the same principle can 
be employed for Instagram or VK) and then create separate text corpora for 
each location in question. Then, for each location LIWs are extracted and the 
model is trained. Han et  al. (2014) offer a detailed discussion of different 
approaches toward LIWs extraction and show that information gain ratio 
approach provides the best performance.
Location name extraction from image. While location extraction from images 
is more challenging than from textual data, several techniques allow addressing 
this task. The first of them is based on the use of geographic information, in 
particular geotags, embedded in the image metadata. Usually provided in EXIF 
format (Stock 2018, 222), these metadata are created by the camera and 
include data about the image creation date, camera settings, and geolocation. 
Some platforms, such as Flickr, provide API access to these metadata, thus 
allowing to search these platforms’ contents for images from specific areas and 
specific time span (McDougall and Temple-Watts 2012).
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The second technique can be employed in the cases where no metadata is 
provided and involves the comparison of image similarity. Stock (2018, 222) 
identifies a number of approaches used to address this task, varying from the 
use of scale-invariant feature transformation (SIFT) for comparing selected 
image features (Crandall et al. 2009) to color and texton histograms employed 
in the domain of computer vision (Gallagher et  al. 2009). After identifying 
these features for the image in question, they can then be compared with large 
image datasets (e.g., coming from Flickr) to identify similarities.
Location name extraction from video. Similar to location extraction from 
image, several other major approaches for location extraction can be identified. 
The first of them involves the use of video metadata (e.g., geographic coordi-
nates produced by Global Positioning System [GPS] and compass sensors, 
which are embedded into video descriptions). This information can be used to 
identify the region in which the video was produced. Then geoinformation 
services (e.g., OSM) can be used to extract data about visible objects in the 
region (e.g., monuments or office buildings) in 2D or 3D.9 Using OSM data, 
the descriptive tags can be generated for different objects in the area (e.g., their 
addresses and names), and then the object models can be compared with 
objects from the videos. Then, the relevance of each tag for specific video frame 
is calculated (i.e., to detect if a specific tag is present or absent on the frame) 
(Shen et al. 2011). While currently there are no papers applying this approach 
to the Russian context, such an approach is language-agnostic and can be 
implemented for any video independently of the language in which it is pro-
duced, until there is some metadata available.
The second approach can also be employed in the cases where no video 
metadata is present and combines audio and visual features of videos for iden-
tifying the location shown in them. For this purpose, a geotagged collection of 
videos is required; this collection is then used for calculating the audiovisual 
similarity with non-geotagged content. Specifically, visual frames and soundtrack 
are extracted from the videos, and then visual and acoustic features are com-
puted for each one of them. Following the extraction, k-nearest neighbor algo-
rithm (a classification algorithm, which classifies the unknown objects according 
to the classes of k closest neighbors) is employed to identify geotagged videos 
which look and sound more similar to the non-geotagged content (Sevillano 
et al. 2015).
32.4  LocatIon usE
After the location is extracted and identified, it can be used for actual analysis. 
As I noted earlier, the advantage of geospatial data is their versatility and appli-
cability for addressing a wide range of research questions. In this section, I 
scrutinize some of the uses of geoweb in the context of Digital Russian 
Studies,  from mapping the spatial distribution of phenomena and specifying 
actors’ identities and relationships to scrutinizing the role of location in online 
cultural practices.
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Mapping the spatial distribution of phenomena. An important feature of 
using geospatial data is its rich potential for mapping socioeconomic and (geo)
political phenomena. These phenomena vary from tourist mobility (e.g., spatial 
and temporal dimensions of tourist flows [Lu and Stepchenkova 2015; 
Kirilenko and Stepchenkova 2017]) to electoral fraud during Russia’s federal 
elections (Kobak et al. 2016) and migration patterns (Zamyatina and Piliasov 
2013). Geotag data can be also used for mapping contested phenomena, when 
official reports are often subjected to censorship or disinformation, such as the 
involvement of Russian troops in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine based on 
Instagram data (Czuperski et al. 2015). While the use of geospatial data for 
studying such contested cases often raises multiple concerns (e.g., concerning 
the reproducibility and the quality of available data), it can still provide valuable 
insights for researchers.
Specifying actor identities and relationships. Another common use of geospa-
tial data is for identifying specific actors and tracking connections between 
them. Such tasks are particularly common for studies in political communica-
tion and/or disinformation online: for instance, Zelenkauskaite and Balduccini 
(2017) used geospatial data to specify the origins of users commenting on 
Russian language news portals in Lithuania, whereas Helmus et  al. (2018) 
employed geoweb to track the identities of users involved in Russian propa-
ganda and counter-propaganda efforts on Twitter. Disinformation, however, is 
not the only subject which can be investigated in this context as shown by 
Smirnov et al. (2016), who used geospatial data for identifying friendship net-
works between youngsters on VK.
Scrutinizing digitization of cultural practices. The use of geospatial data 
increasingly becomes part of the mediatization of cultural practices, varying 
from war remembrance to tourism. Bernstein (2016) in his research on Second 
World War memory in Russia showed how the formation of a geotagged data-
base of Soviet monuments enriches existing memory practices by producing 
virtual embodiments of existing memorials and re-iterating the mainstream 
Soviet narrative of the war. Another example is the use of geotagged images as 
part of sharing—and shaping—travel experiences as shown by several studies 
focused on the use of geospatial information to examine vacation culture in 
Russia (Kirilenko and Stepchenkova 2017; Tikunov et al. 2018).
Exploring identity narration. Besides extensive possibilities for tracking phe-
nomena, digital platforms also enable new ways of (re)-imagining individual 
and collective identities. A number of studies (Stefanidis et al. 2013; Croitoru 
et al. 2015) suggest that geospatial data can serve as a strong identifier of group 
belonging and individual self-expression. Examples of such identifications are, 
for instance, elements of individual user profiles on Wikipedia, where userboxes 
are employed for declaring individuals’ interests, preferences, and personal 
details (Neff et al. 2013). In the context of Digital Russian Studies, these means 
of self-expression often deal with geospatial data (e.g., place of residence 
[Dounaevsky 2014]) or geopolitical aspects of territoriality (e.g., belonging of 
the Southern Ossetia to Georgia). Another example is the use of geolocation 
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data for producing digital maps of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (e.g., 
MilitaryMaps or Liveuamap), which are used to visualize the borders of imag-
ined communities (e.g., of the self-declared confederation of Novorossiya 
[Makhortykh 2018]).
32.5  GEospatIaL data and rEsEarch EthIcs
The advent of big data research opens unprecedented possibilities for studying 
different phenomena, but it also raises multiple ethical concerns. Some of these 
concerns are related to the general considerations of using big data for research 
purposes (e.g., acquiring proper permissions for data use [Richards and King 
2014]), but some are rather specific for geospatial data, in particular in the 
Russian context. In this pre-final section, I will briefly discuss three of these 
concerns: validity, privacy, and reliability.
Privacy. Security and privacy are two key concerns of using geospatial data 
for research purposes (Li et al. 2016). The use of portable GPS receivers in 
mobile devices together with the enrichment of social media data with geospa-
tial information raise concerns about the use of these data for tracking indi-
viduals’ actions and movements (Loebel 2012). While such data can be 
beneficial for many types of research, their use also requires the researcher to 
recognize the potential consequences for the privacy of users. Such conse-
quences are particularly important in cases dealing with highly sensitive and/or 
polarizing subjects, where the use of geotag data can cause material or immate-
rial harm for research participants.
The privacy risks are even greater when geotag data is used for studying 
phenomena occurring in authoritarian states. An example of a highly privacy- 
sensitive subject is research on anti-government protests, where geospatial data 
can be (ab)used to identify the location of individual protesters and expose 
their involvement in the protests, thus bringing legal repercussions by the state. 
To address this concern, the use of personal data should be minimized and 
(pseudo)anonymization techniques should be used. On the official level, how-
ever, Russian legislation is still catching up with the notion of big data and their 
uses for research purposes (for an overview, see Zharova and Elin 2017). 
Consequently, the protection of the data rights of individuals in Russia is still 
significantly less strict than in the European Union (EU) countries, where it is 
regulated by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Validity. Sheppard (2005, 74) defines validity as the degree to which the use 
of a specific instrument or finding is sound, defensible, and well-grounded for 
the issue at hand. The question of validity is of particular relevance for the use 
of geospatial data, because of their significant potential for being used for 
manipulation: both through the data and their visualization (Sheppard and 
Cizek 2009). In some cases, the use of data can be invalidated by their wrong 
interpretation (i.e., when geospatial information is used to prove a point which 
is incorrect), whereas in other cases obscure visualizations of data can mislead 
the public.
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An example of the invalid use of geographic data is the contrasting reporting 
of the 2018 clashes near Chigari village in Eastern Ukraine. Both the Ukrainian 
authorities and pro-Russian insurgents produced video records showing them 
controlling certain landmarks, which were claimed to be related to the village 
in question. Despite these claims, not all of the shown landmarks were related 
to Chigari and eventually it was proven that the village was controlled by the 
Ukrainian army, but not before causing significant confusion. A possible way of 
increasing validity according to Sheppard and Cizek (2009, 2112) is to use 
more flexible and interactive approaches for geospatial data analysis, thus allow-
ing end users more control over results’ reporting.
Reliability. Sheppard (2005) argues that reliability is another major concern 
of using geospatial data. Unlike validity, which focuses on the possible (ab)uses 
of geospatial data for drawing invalid conclusions, reliability concerns the inter-
nal consistency of analysis and the possibility to produce the same results under 
similar conditions. The issue of reliability is of particular importance for analy-
ses produced via crowdsourced databases and social media as both data sources 
are subjected to frequent changes and often provide limited possibilities for 
consistent data access.
An example of reliability issues which accompany the use of geospatial data 
is MilitaryMaps mentioned earlier. This crowdsourced database aggregates 
updates from conflicts in the post-Soviet space as well as in the Middle East and 
provides geotags indicating the movement of troops and outbursts of violence. 
From September 2018, however, the previously open project switched toward 
paid subscription, which made it harder to recreate analyses based on 
MilitaryMaps data. Another reliability-related limitation of the project is its 
reliance on the GoogleMaps framework, which stores markers that are added 
to the map only for a one-year period. Sheppard and Cizek (2009) suggest that 
the main way to amend these and other reliability issues is the use of more 
prescriptive approaches to data analysis and presentation based on recog-
nized quality standards.
32.6  concLusIons
In this chapter, I discussed the possible uses of data available through geoweb, 
the integrated and discoverable collection of geographically related web ser-
vices and data (Lake and Farley 2009), in the context of the Digital Russian 
Studies. Increasingly employed for academic studies worldwide, geoweb data 
are of particular importance for Russia-centered digital research, serving both 
as a pivotal factor for making and verifying knowledge claims by regional actors 
and an integral means of producing individual and collective narratives on sub-
jects varying from international conflicts (Shim 2018) to presidential elections 
(Kobak et al. 2016).
The use of geoweb for Digital Russian Studies is facilitated by the large vol-
ume of geospatial data available today. As I discussed above, these data can be 
divided into three broad categories according to their source: (a) crowdsourced 
databases, (b) open datasets, and (c) social media. Out of these three, social 
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media data are the hardest to get and often require extensive pre-processing; 
however, they are also applicable to a wide range of research questions, in par-
ticular the ones related to inter-user interactions. Furthermore, the largest 
Russian social media platform, VK, provides public access to multiple forms of 
geospatial data (e.g. users’ self-declared place of residence/work and check-in 
data), thus enabling more possibilities for data collection than many Western 
platforms.
The research possibilities provided by geospatial data are amplified by the 
quickly developing toolkit of analytical techniques used to extract geographic 
location from different data formats. The complexity of techniques varies 
depending on the data format. In the simplest scenarios, geographic coordi-
nates or the location’s administrative address are provided in the metadata and 
only has to be matched with data from existing geographic information sys-
tems. In the more difficult scenarios, the location has to be extracted from the 
content or inferred from the user’s earlier activity using a combination of 
machine learning and geographic gazetteers. Much still can be done to better 
adapt these techniques to the Russophone context, in particular in terms of 
improving named entity recognition techniques and developing better gazet-
teers. Yet, even in the current state of research, there are plenty of possibilities 
for using the mentioned techniques for different types of Russia-centered 
studies.
The importance of location extraction techniques is exemplified by the wide 
range of research questions to which Russian geospatial data are applicable. 
These research questions vary from the spatial distribution of socioeconomic 
and political phenomena, such as migration and electoral fraud, to the verifica-
tion of knowledge claims about the presence of Russian troops in Eastern 
Ukraine to the analysis of mediatization of cultural practices of war remem-
brance and the exploration of narrative uses of geospatial data for communicat-
ing individual and collective identities.
Despite their significant potential for Digital Russian Studies, the future of 
geospatial data is not fully clear. The existing concerns about complex interre-
lations between privacy and geospatial data are amplified by the current calls for 
tightening the government’s control over the Internet in Russia, leading to 
increasing restrictions on data retrieval from Russian platforms’ APIs, includ-
ing VK. These limitations might curb the amount of geospatial data available 
from social media; however, the growing number of open datasets and crowd-
sourced databases suggests that Russia’s geoweb will remain a valuable research 
venue for Digital Russian Studies for years to come.
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1. For Western examples see Goodchild and Glennon (2010) and Cavelty and 
Giroux (2011).
2. See, for instance, Virtual Bell (http://russian-fires.ru/) project, which was used 
from 2010 till 2013 to collect reports of wildfires in Russia.
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3. An example of such a project is MilitaryMaps (https://militarymaps.info/), 
which crowdsources the recent developments in conflict zones where Russian 
geopolitical interests are involved.
4. See, for instance, Cheng, Caverlee, and Lee (2010), Chang et al. (2012), Van 
Canneyt, Schockaert, and Dhoedt (2016), Tenkanen et al. (2017).
5. For more information see the description provided by VK documentation 
(https://vk.com/dev/methods; also available in English).
6. In the case of social media, however, geotagged content is often subjected to 
numerous limitations, which have to be recognized: in the case of Twitter, only a 
small number of users (i.e., less than one percent [Cheng, Caverlee, and Lee 
2010]) enable geolocation in their profiles, whereas in VKontakte the use of the 
check-in option is used by the limited number of users and often confined to 
specific social situations (e.g., tourist visits).
7. See, for instance, Gareev et  al. (2013), Sysoev and Andrianov (2016), Anh, 
Arkhipov, and Burtsev (2017).
8. For the description, see Starostin et al. (2016); the dataset is available in open 
access at https://github.com/dialogue-evaluation/factRuEval-2016.
9. For an overview of tools which can use OSM data to make 3D models see 
https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/3D.
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